Telangana High Court
B. Sridhar Reddy vs Union Of India on 7 April, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
1
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 28152 of 2025
07thApril, 2026
Between:
B. Sridhar Reddy, S/o Venkat Reddy
... Petitioner
AND
1. Union of India, and others
... Respondents
ORDER:
The case of the petitioner, precisely, as per the writ affidavit is that
the initial land acquisition notification issued under Section 3A of the
National Highways Act, 1956, published in Gazette No.1102(E) dated
10.03.2021 and subsequently published in newspapers on 25.03.2021. This
notification proposed the acquisition of lands across approximately ten
villages in Parkal, Shayampet, and Damera mandals, including portions of
the petitioner’s land, for construction of a new four-lane green highway.
The petitioner asserts that the notification lacked adequate landowner-wise
details and merely specified survey numbers and extents, making it
difficult for affected persons to clearly identify their holdings. He further
states that the notification claimed maps and plans were available with the
competent authority, but in reality no such documents were accessible.
2
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
Believing the project unnecessary given the existence of nearby National
and State Highways that were allegedly underutilized, the petitioner and
other affected farmers submitted general objections to the authorities.
During the environmental impact assessment stage, a public hearing was
conducted in which several landowners, including affected persons from
the region, raised objections to the project.
1.1. For nearly a year thereafter, the petitioner claims there was no
communication regarding the progress of the acquisition or environmental
clearance. The situation changed when a public notice dated 04.02.2023
was issued under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, and published
in newspapers on 15.02.2023, directing landowners to appear before the
competent authority on various dates between 23.02.2023 and 09.03.2023
to submit their compensation claims. Through this notice, the petitioner
states he first learned that a declaration under Section 3D had already been
issued through Gazette No.1017 dated 08.03.2022, which effectively
finalized the acquisition of the land. He asserts that this declaration was
neither published locally nor circulated in newspapers with local
readership, thereby depriving affected landowners of proper notice. In
response, the petitioner and others submitted representations to the
authorities requesting that the acquisition process be halted.
1.2. Subsequently, the petitioner and several other affected
landowners approached this Court by filing W.P. No.5187 of 2023,
challenging both the Section 3D declaration dated 08.03.2022 and the
Section 3G award enquiry notice dated 04.02.2023. Their principal
contention was that the acquisition process had advanced prior to obtaining
environmental clearance, which they argued was impermissible under law.
This Court initially granted stay of further proceedings for more than six
3
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
months, but during the pendency of the writ petition the environmental
clearance was obtained. As a result, the Court dismissed the petition in
October 2023. The petitioner and others then filed Writ Appeal No.1190 of
2023, which was admitted and remains pending adjudication. The
petitioner asserts that after the dismissal of the earlier writ petition and
during the pendency of the writ appeal, the authorities resumed the
acquisition process and proceeded to issue further notices and awards
under Section 3G.
1.3. It is stated that in April 2024, several other landowners from
Oorugonda village filed W.P. No.9909 of 2024, challenging multiple
acquisition notifications including Section 3A notifications S.O.No.1102
dated 10.03.2021 and S.O.No.1905 dated 21.04.2022, the Section 3D
notifications dated 08.03.2021 and 29.07.2022, the public notice under
Section 3G dated 04.02.2023, and an unnumbered notice dated 13.01.2024.
In that case, this Court granted interim protection from dispossession, by
Order dated 03.05.2024, and the order has continued to be extended. Since
those lands were adjacent to his own and involved identical legal issues
under the same acquisition notifications, the petitioner states that he
believed the authorities would also refrain from interfering with his
possession until the disputes were resolved. Additionally, he asserts that
copies of the award proceedings were not initially provided to him and
were only supplied after repeated representations in February 2025.
1.4. It is stated that after obtaining the award documents, the
petitioner discovered that the authorities had already issued the impugned
award on 16.01.2024, through proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G,
and had begun issuing possession notices under Section 3E. The petitioner
contends that the award is fundamentally defective because it was made
4
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, whereas, by virtue of the
Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015, the provisions of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013–including Sections 21 to 30 relating to compensation and
Sections 16 to 18, 23, and 31 relating to rehabilitation and resettlement–
should govern the determination of compensation for acquisitions under
the National Highways Act. According to the petitioner, this legal position
has been recognized by government authorities themselves and supported
by opinions of the Attorney General of India. However, the petitioner
alleges that the competent authority failed to revise the market value of the
land as required under Section 26 of the 2013 Act, and no revision of rates
had occurred since 2013, and further the authorities applied two different
compensation rates for awards issued in January 2024 merely because the
corresponding Section 3A notifications were issued a year apart, and this
resulted in discriminatory treatment of landowners in the same village for
the same project.
1.5. The petitioner further asserts that the award proceedings
themselves acknowledge that compensation for trees and structures located
on the land was never determined, and that no proper enumeration or
valuation of such assets was conducted nor were notices issued for that
purpose. Because the compensation determination did not include these
elements or the applicable rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements, he
contends that the award remains incomplete.
1.6. It is further asserted that the petitioner made repeated
representations expressing his unwillingness to part with the land and
pointing out these alleged legal irregularities, the authorities began
physical marking activities in the fields with police presence during June
and July 2025. He states that officials warned farmers not to cultivate their
5
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
lands and imposed deadlines for accepting compensation, indicating that if
the compensation was not received the amount would be deposited in
Court and possession would be forcibly taken. The petitioner claims that
because he had taken the initiative to challenge the acquisition in Court,
the authorities began targeting him specifically with the assistance of local
police.
2. A counter-affidavit is filed by the Project Director of NHAI, on
behalf of Respondent Nos.2 and 7, essentially contending that NHAI is
entrusted with the development and maintenance of national highways
across the country; and in the present case, NHAI undertook the
construction of a four-lane National Highway-163G between Mancherial
and Warangal, covering the stretch from Km. 88.418 to Km. 111.762 at
Parkal in the State of Telangana, which includes lands in Oorugonda
Village of Damera Mandal. According to the respondents, the project is a
greenfield corridor designed to reduce travel distance, lower vehicle
operating costs, shorten travel time, and promote economic development in
the surrounding region. For implementing the acquisition process, the 5th
respondent-Revenue Divisional Officer, Parkal, was appointed as the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) under the National
Highways Act, 1956.NHAI submitted a requisition for acquisition of the
required land under Section 3A(1) of the Act, and the Central Government
accordingly issued the Section 3A notification through Gazette S.O.
No.1102(E) dated 10.03.2021 for acquisition of lands, including the land
belonging to the petitioner.
2.1. It is further stated that the substance of the Section 3A
notification dated 10.03.2021 was published in Mana Telangana (Telugu)
6
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
and The Hindu (English) on 25.03.2021, granting 21 days’ time for
affected landowners to file objections under Section 3C of the National
Highways Act, 1956.It is stated that no objections were received within the
stipulated period, following which the Central Government issued the
declaration under Section 3D through Gazette S.O. No.1017(E) dated
08.03.2022, resulting in the land vesting absolutely with the Central
Government free from encumbrances. It is further stated that
environmental clearance for the project was granted by the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change on 05.07.2023. Prior to the
award determination, a public notice dated 04.02.2023 was issued under
Section 3G(3) of the National Highways Act and published in Mana
Telangana and The Hindu on 15.02.2023, calling upon interested persons
to appear before the Competent Authority on 06.03.2023 during office
hours to submit their claims and documentary proof of title. Following this
enquiry conducted under Section 3G, the Competent Authority passed the
award on 16.01.2024 through Proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G,
determining compensation for the acquired lands.
2.2. According to the respondents, the petitioner was granted a
compensation amount of Rs. 69,51,221/-, calculated strictly in accordance
with the statutory framework. It is contended that compensation for land
acquired under the National Highways Act is determined by applying
Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, including statutory
benefits such as 100% solatium, an additional 12% market value from the
date of Section 3A publication to the date of award, and a 1.5
multiplication factor on the land value. The respondents also state that
although compensation for the land has been determined, possession of the
land has not yet been taken and will only be taken after payment of
7
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
compensation as required under Section 3H of the National Highways Act,
1956. It is further stated that NHAI has already deposited the
compensation amount determined under the award, and that a
supplementary award will subsequently be issued by the Competent
Authority for structures such as trees and borewells after following due
procedure.
2.3. The respondents deny the allegation that the award is invalid
or incomplete. They assert that the acquisition process–from the Section
3A notification on 10.03.2021, the newspaper publication on 25.03.2021,
the Section 3D declaration on 08.03.2022, the Section 3G notice dated
04.02.2023, the enquiry conducted on 06.03.2023, and finally the award
dated 16.01.2024–was conducted strictly in accordance with the National
Highways Act. The respondents also reject the petitioner’s argument that
Section 3G of the National Highways Act is no longer in force, stating that
only the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act relating to determination of
compensation under Sections 26 to 30 are applicable to highway
acquisitions, and not the entire framework of the 2013 Act as alleged by
the petitioner. According to the respondents, the petitioner has
misinterpreted the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015 issued through
Gazette Notification No. S.O.2368(E) dated 28.08.2015, which came into
force on 01.09.2015, and is attempting to mislead the Court by claiming
broader applicability of the RFCTLARR provisions.
2.4. The respondents contend that rehabilitation and resettlement
benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013apply only to “displaced families” as defined under Section 3(k) of
the Act, meaning families must have been relocated and resettled from the
affected area to a resettlement area due to land acquisition. They assert that
8
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
in the present case the petitioner has neither been displaced nor relocated,
as only a small extent of land required for the highway’s Right of Way,
typically ranging between 45 metres and 70 metres for four-lane highways,
has been acquired. Consequently, it is contended that the petitioner does
not qualify for rehabilitation or resettlement benefits and has failed to
provide any documentary evidence demonstrating displacement or loss of
livelihood. It is contended that for considering the rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits, the Competent Authority must certify that the
affected family has been displaced, but in the petitioner’s case, no such
certification exists in favour of the petitioner.
2.5. It is contended that though W.P. No.5187 of 2023 was filed
earlier and that Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023 is pending, there is no stay
order in the writ appeal, and therefore the acquisition proceedings cannot
be halted on the ground of mere pendency of appeal as there is no stay
order. Similarly, it is contended that the interim order granted on
03.05.2024 in W.P. No.9909 of 2024 in favour of other landowners does
not automatically extend to the petitioner, and that such interim relief
applies only to the parties in that particular proceeding.
2.6. It is also contended that even if the petitioner has any
grievance regarding the compensation determined in the award dated
16.01.2024, the appropriate remedy is not a writ petition but the statutory
mechanism under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956,
which allows an aggrieved landowner to seek determination by an
arbitrator, usually the District Collector, followed by further recourse under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the District
Court. It is contended that since the project is undertaken for a public
9
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
purpose and any alleged loss to the petitioner can be compensated
monetarily, the balance of convenience does not lie in favour the petitioner.
3. A counter-affidavit is also filed by the respondent No.5 – Revenue
Divisional Officer/CALA, contending that the award proceedings No.
B/85/2021-10-NH-163G dated 16.01.2024, relating to the petitioner’s land
measuring Ac.0.3506726 guntas in Survey No.123 of Oorugonda Village,
Damera Mandal, Hanumakonda District, were passed strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and
the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
3.1. It is contended that the decision to adopt the greenfield
alignment was taken during a Land Acquisition Committee meeting held
on 03.09.2020 at the headquarters of the concerned authority, and once the
alignment was finalized based on technical parameters and site conditions,
it could not be altered. The respondent states that the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Parkal, was formally designated as the Competent Authority for
Land Acquisition for the project within the Parkal Revenue Division
through Gazette Notification No.3099 dated 27.08.2019. Following a
requisition from the implementing authority, the Central Government
issued the Section 3A notification through Gazette No.1102(E) dated
10.03.2021, proposing acquisition of lands across ten villages, including
the petitioner’s land in Oorugonda Village. The substance of this
notification was published in the newspapers Mana Telangana and The
Hindu on 25.03.2021, inviting objections from interested persons within 21
days as required under Section 3C of the National Highways Act.
3.2. It is contended that several landowners, including the
petitioner, filed their objections within the statutory period. Their
10
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
objections were considered by the Competent Authority, and hearings were
conducted after issuing notices to the objectors. After examining the issues
raised, the objections were rejected through Proceedings No. B/85/2021
dated 20.11.2021, and the acquisition process was allowed to proceed.
Thereafter, the Central Government issued the final declaration under
Section 3D through Gazette Notification S.O. No.1017(E) dated
08.03.2022, which legally vested the acquired lands in the Central
Government free from encumbrances. It is stated that, during the
preparation of sub-division records, the authorities discovered that certain
extents of land within the alignment had been inadvertently omitted from
the original Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021, and to rectify this
omission, an additional Section 3A notification S.O. No.1905(E) dated
21.04.2022 was issued covering the missing extents without any overlap.
After disposal of objections under Section 3C, a further Section 3D
declaration S.O. No.3526(E) dated 29.07.2022 was issued, and the
consequential Section 3G public notice was published on 13.01.2024 in
Mana Telangana and The Hindu.
3.3. It is contended that the acquisition proceedings were
temporarily affected by litigation initiated by certain landowners. It is
stated that in W.P. No.5187 of 2023, which was filed challenging the
environmental clearance process, this Court granted interim orders on
26.02.2023 in favour of petitioners. However, the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, granted
environmental clearance on 05.07.2023. Following the grant of
environmental clearance, this Court dismissed the writ petition on
26.09.2023, and although Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023 was subsequently
filed,no stay order has been granted in that appeal. Consequently, the
11
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
acquisition proceedings continued in accordance with law. After
conducting the required enquiry under Section 3G, the Competent
Authority passed the award on 16.01.2024, determining compensation by
applying Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, including
statutory benefits such as 100% solatium, an additional 12% market value
calculated from the date of Section 3A publication to the date of the award,
and a 1.5 multiplication factor on the land value.
3.4. It is stated that the market value determined by the Competent
Authority was subsequently reviewed by the Arbitrator-cum-District
Collector, Hanumakonda, who enhanced the market value for lands
acquired under the project in all ten villages including Oorugonda Village
through Appeal No. G/1371/2024-1 dated 17.10.2025, and that the
enhanced compensation has already been disbursed to the concerned
landowners. The respondent further states that compensation for structures
and trees was separately assessed through technical evaluations conducted
by the Executive Engineer, MB Intra Division, Hanumakonda, the District
Horticulture and Sericulture Officer, the District (R&B) Officer,
Hanumakonda, and the District Forest Officer, Hanumakonda. Based on
these evaluations, a Supplementary Award bearing Proceedings No.
B/85/2021-10-NH-163G-Structure dated 28.05.2025 was issued to
compensate for structures and trees on the acquired lands.
3.5. It is argued that Section 3G of the National Highways Act,
1956 is still valid. The Removal of Difficulties Order only makes certain
parts of the 2013 Act (Sections 26 to 30, which deal with compensation)
applicable. The rest of the 2013 Act does not apply to land acquisitions
under the National Highways Act.It is contended that the petitioner has
misconstrued by claiming broader applicability of provisions such as
12
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
Sections 16 to 18, 21, and 23, which relate to preparation of rehabilitation
and resettlement schemes, and that such provisions are not applicable to
highway acquisitions because these projects are linear in nature, involve
limited Right of Way, and rarely cause displacement requiring relocation
and resettlement.
3.6. It is further stated that the determination of market value
under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act requires examination of sale
transactions during the three years preceding the Section 3A notification,
and since the original Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021 and the
additional Section 3A notification dated 21.04.2022 were issued on
different dates, and therefore the reference periods differed, resulting in
variation in land values, and therefore the differential compensation is a
lawful consequence of the statutory method of valuation and does not
constitute discrimination.
3.7. Adverting to the petitioner’s allegation that possession is
being taken without due process, it is contended that notices under Section
3E of the National Highways Act have been issued only after completion
of statutory procedures, and that in cases where this Court has granted
protection–such as W.P. No.9909 of 2024–the authorities have complied
with the Court’s directions and refrained from dispossessing those
petitioners. Further, the petitioner’s allegation that officials or contractors
interfered with cultivation or damaged crops is denied.
3.8. It is further contended that out of 1035 affected awardees, 859
landowners have already accepted the compensation, which is roughly
83%, whereas only the petitioner and a few others have refused to receive
the payment. In any event, if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the
compensation determined in the award dated 16.01.2024, the proper
13
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
remedy lies under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, which
allows an aggrieved party to approach the statutory arbitrator, namely the
District Collector, and thereafter seek further remedy before the District
Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Since the acquisition process has been conducted strictly in accordance
with law and the petitioner has an adequate statutory remedy, the
respondent submits that the writ petition is not maintainable and prays for
dismissal of the writ petition apart from vacating the interim order.
4. Learned Standing Counsel for NHAI appearing for respondents
No.2 and 7 contends that the entire land acquisition process for the NH-
163G project between Km. 88.418 and Km. 111.762 (Mancherial-
Warangal section) has been conducted strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable
provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is submitted that the
acquisition proceedings commenced with the Section 3A notification dated
10.03.2021, which was published in the newspapers Mana Telangana and
The Hindu on 25.03.2021, followed by the Section 3D declaration dated
08.03.2022, and thereafter the Section 3G notice dated 04.02.2023,
pursuant to which an enquiry was conducted on 06.03.2023. Learned
counsel submits that after conducting due enquiry, the Competent
Authority passed the award on 16.01.2024 in Proceedings No. B/85/2021-
10-NH-163G, granting the petitioner compensation of Rs. 69,51,221/-,
calculated in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, along
with 100% solatium, 12% additional market value, and a 1.5 multiplication
factor. It is argued that the petitioner’s contention that Section 3G of the
National Highways Act has become inoperative is legally untenable and
amounts to a misinterpretation of the Removal of Difficulties Order dated
14
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
28.08.2015. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is not
entitled to rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the Second and
Third Schedules of the 2013 Act, as he has neither been displaced nor
relocated from the affected area and therefore does not fall within the
definition of a “displaced family” under Section 3(k) of the Act. It is also
contended that the petitioner cannot rely upon interim orders granted to
other landowners in W.P. No.9909 of 2024, nor can he claim any benefit
from the pendency of Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023, as no stay order has
been granted for halting the acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel
further submits that possession of the land will be taken only after payment
of compensation in accordance with Section 3H of the National Highways
Act, and therefore the petitioner’s apprehensions are unfounded. It is
argued that if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the compensation
determined in the award dated 16.01.2024, the appropriate remedy lies
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act by approaching the
statutory arbitrator and not by invoking writ jurisdiction, and therefore
contends that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 3 to 6 also
made submissions in similar lines of respondent No.2 and 7. Learned
counsel contends that the petitioner is not entitled to rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits, since the acquisition is for a linear highway project
involving limited Right of Way, and the petitioner has neither been
displaced nor relocated. The learned counsel further points out that the
Arbitrator-cum-District Collector, Hanumakonda, has already enhanced the
market value through Appeal No. G/1371/2024-1 dated 17.10.2025, and a
supplementary award dated 28.05.2025 was issued for structures and trees
after technical evaluation by concerned departments. It is also submitted
15
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
that out of 1035 affected awardees, 859 landowners have already received
compensation, while the petitioner alone has refused to accept the amount
and if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the compensation determined, the
proper remedy lies under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act
before the statutory arbitrator and not through a writ petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the acquisition
proceedings were earlier challenged in WP No.5187 of 2023 on the ground
that environmental clearance was not obtained prior to issuance of the
declaration under Section 3D of the NH Act, 1956, and though interim
orders were initially granted, the writ petition was later dismissed and Writ
Appeal No.1190 of 2023 is pending without interim relief; that some
adjoining landowners have separately challenged the Section 3A and 3D
notifications in WP No.10431 of 2024 and obtained interim protection,
leading the petitioners to reasonably believe that the authorities would not
interfere with their possession until final adjudication; that the petitioners
received copies of the Award proceedings only in February 2025; that
multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D were issued without
specifying survey numbers, landowner-wise extents, plans, or maps, and
the order under Section 3C dated 20.11.2021 was not communicated to the
petitioners; that the petitioners came to know about the multiple
notifications only through the NHAI website and were unaware of the
environmental clearance for nearly a year until public notices appeared in
newspapers; that Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956, relating to determination
of compensation, is no longer operative in view of the RFCTLARR
(Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015 issued under Section 105(3) of the
RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and therefore the provisions of the 2013 Act apply
to acquisitions under the National Highways Act; that consequently,
16
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
compensation and rehabilitation benefits ought to have been determined in
accordance with Sections 16 to 18, 21 to 30, 23 and 31 of the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013 and not under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that the
competent authority failed to revise or update the market value of the
acquired land as required under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act prior to
issuance of the Section 3A notification; that two different rates were
adopted while passing the award in January 2024; that the expressions
“amount” and “compensation” used in Sections 3G and 3H of the National
Highways Act include compensation for land, structures, and rehabilitation
entitlements to affected families; that though the petitioners may not be
displaced, they remain an affected family entitled to rehabilitation benefits;
that possession of the land cannot be taken unless complete compensation
including valuation of trees and structures and determination of
rehabilitation entitlements is finalized; that the award proceedings are
unsustainable as compensation for structures and trees has not been
determined and therefore the notice under Section 3E of the National
Highways Act is also liable to be set aside; that the competent authority
ought to have issued notice under Section 21 of the RFCTLARR Act and
conducted award enquiry under Section 23 after following the procedure
under Sections 16 to 18 for identification of eligible persons and
preparation of a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme instead of
proceeding under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that despite
representations expressing unwillingness to part with the land and pointing
out the illegality in the acquisition and compensation determination, the
authorities in June-July 2025 attempted to mark the petitioner’s land with
police assistance and threatened the petitioner not to cultivate the land
despite the existence of standing crops, thereby compelling the petitioner
to approach this Court.
17
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
7. Learned counsel for the petitionersrelies on:
4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 4;
9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias
Cheluvaiah 9;
10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;
12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12
7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a
dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway
765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and1
W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court)
2
(2024) 10 SCC 533
3
(2021) 14 SCC 703
4
(2005) 7 SCC 627
5
W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court)
6
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
7
Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 – DB (Allahabad High Court)
8
(1973) 1 SCC 500
9
(2022) 15 SCC 1
10
2023 SCC OnLine All 5276
11
(2014) 6 SCC 564
12
1963 SCC OnLine SC 23
18
wp_28152_2025
NBK, JResettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such
benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the
National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated
12.11.2024, rejected the authorities’ prayer to vacate an earlier stay order
and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R
protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing
authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R
compensation.
7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land
acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights–
including the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a
reasoned decision–along with requirements for an efficient process and
fair rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the
Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is
invalid.
7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The
Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300-
A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible
assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without
proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful
deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected
any notion that the State can act with “royal prerogative” and insisted that
19
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result,
the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government
for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the
rightful owners.
7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The
Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the
landowner’s objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under
Section 5-A is a significant safeguard–comparable in importance to a
fundamental right–and must involve a real and careful consideration by
the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that
when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its
records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed.
Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter-
affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that
laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to
prevent arbitrary state action.
7.5. In K. Ramachandram(supra), this Courtexamined whether
the government had followed the required statutory procedures while
attempting to acquire the petitioner’s land; and held that although the
preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly
extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities’ failure
to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes
under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these
20
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner’s rights, the
declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly
comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also
encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land
exchange or fair monetary compensation.
7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division
Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a
railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three
daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits
are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother’s solatium and
allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied
with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all
affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.
7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court
adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National
Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her
claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not
received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that
her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to
additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal
within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing,
13
W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)
21
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act,
and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.
7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act
violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to
acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws.
The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying
different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority
conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the
principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are
entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the
acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory
treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.
7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and
clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that
an arbitrator’s failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for
compensation constitutes a ground of “patent illegality,” justifying judicial
intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including
solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with
constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the
property’s market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.
7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court
addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National
Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation
and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and
22
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly
assessed, rejecting the authorities’ contention that linear road projects
cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a
thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District
Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as
housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part
of their compensation.
7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Courtconsidered
the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including
violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official
but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also
examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older
cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide
compensation for over five years.
7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant’s
confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate’s failure to follow
procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Learned Standing Counsel for NHAI contends that the competent
authority awarded adequate and lawful compensation to the petitioners in
accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956 and the RFCTLARR
Act, 2013; that the Respondent No.4-CALA passed awards dated
05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 in Proceedings No. B/85/2021-08-NH-163G
23
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
after considering objections and providing opportunity of hearing to all
concerned, and the compensation amounts were received by the petitioners
except petitioner Nos. 4 and 6; that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the
determination of compensation, they have an efficacious alternative
remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act by approaching the Arbitration-
cum-District Collector and any challenge to the arbitral award lies before
the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; that the petitioners do not fall within the definition of a displaced
family under Section 3(k) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 as they have
neither been relocated nor resettled from the affected area; that the
petitioners have failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing
displacement or loss of livelihood so as to qualify as an “affected family”
under Section 3(c) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 or to claim benefits under
the Second and Third Schedules of the said Act; that only a portion of the
petitioners’ land has been acquired and the remaining land continues to be
available for their livelihood, thereby negating any claim of deprivation of
livelihood; that where substantial monetary compensation has been
awarded, the landowners can utilize such compensation for acquiring
alternative land or assets and therefore cannot insist on rehabilitation or
resettlement benefits; that even otherwise, the petitioners failed to raise
specific objections before the competent authority demonstrating that the
compensation awarded was insufficient to enable rehabilitation or
resettlement; that any claim for rehabilitation or resettlement requires
cogent evidence demonstrating that the compensation determined is
grossly inadequate to secure such rehabilitation; that entitlement to benefits
under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act arises only when the
competent authority certifies that the family has been displaced or
dislocated, which is not the case here; that preparation of a Social Impact
24
wp_28152_2025
NBK, JAssessment (SIA) report is not mandatory for acquisitions under the
National Highways Act, 1956; that the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013, particularly those relating to Social Impact Assessment and
rehabilitation and resettlement under Chapter II, do not automatically
apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act unless specifically
extended by notification under Section 105 of the Act of 2013, and no such
notification applies in the present case; that since only part of the
petitioners’ land has been acquired and they have not been dislocated, there
is no requirement to frame a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme; that
injunction against an infrastructure project is barred under Section 20-A of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963; that the present project is a public
infrastructure project of national importance and cannot be stalled, and
therefore the acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged merely on the
ground of dissatisfaction with the compensation, particularly when an
effective statutory remedy for enhancement of compensation is available
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act.
9. Learned Standing Counsel for the Competent Authority for Land
Acquisition (CALA) contends that environmental clearance for the project
was obtained on 05.07.2023 vide File No.10/29/2021-IA-III and the
additional notification under Section 3A of the NH Act, 1956 was issued
only for the purpose of covering certain missing structures; that the
competent authority passed awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024
determining compensation for the acquired lands and subsequently passed
a supplementary award dated 11.11.2025 determining compensation for
structures; that several landowners who were aggrieved by the
compensation approached the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector under
Section 3G(5) of the NHActand the arbitrator revised the market value and
25
wp_28152_2025
NBK, Jenhanced compensation through awards dated 09.05.2025, 23.07.2025,
04.08.2025 and 23.10.2025; that the provisions of Sections 16 to 18, 21
and 23 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are not applicable to acquisitions
under the National Highways Act as the project is a linear infrastructure
project where the affected area is confined to the right of way and therefore
identification of eligibility for rehabilitation benefits and preparation of a
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is not mandatory; that benefits
under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act can be claimed only
when the competent authority certifies that the petitioner’s family has been
displaced or dislocated from the area; that objections filed under Section
3C of the National Highways Act were duly received and disposed of and
additional notifications were issued only to acquire certain missing extents
of land, following which notification under Section 3D was issued and the
land vested with the Central Government free from all encumbrances; that
out of 1035 landowners whose lands were acquired or are in the process of
acquisition, 859 landowners have already received compensation and only
the petitioner and a few others have not accepted the amount; that the
petitioner has raised untenable objections and approached this Court with
the intention of stalling the land acquisition process; that Section 3G of the
NHAct continues to govern determination of compensation for lands
acquired under the Act, while only the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act,
2013 relating to determination of compensation under the First Schedule
and Rehabilitation and Resettlement benefits under the Second Schedule
are applicable to such acquisitions, and therefore the writ petition is liable
to be dismissed.
10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in
support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the
26
wp_28152_2025
NBK, Jinstant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of
Maharashtra14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public
interest vis-Ã -vis the private interest while exercising the power and there
are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and
that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.
10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of
India 15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be
resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over
individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar
Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and
keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects
should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold
its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.
10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District
Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general
public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and
nothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company
Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment
and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for
initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining
the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of
the NH Act.
14
1997 (1) SCC 134
15
2017 SCC Online Hyd 250
16
2022 (6) SCC 127
17
2011 SCC OnLine AP 267
18
(2020) 15 SCC 161
27
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of
Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and
batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High
Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and
directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the
parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties
can approach the arbitrator.
10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli19, and contends that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the
Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its
objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate
award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and
therefore similar dispensation may be shown in the present writ petition as
well in view of similarity of facts.
11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the
record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is
that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National
Highways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate
publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or
an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of
their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G,
and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended
that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even
before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications
19
Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023
28
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete
compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and
trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as
required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties
Order, 2015. They also allege discriminatory and outdated valuation of
land, denial of statutory entitlements, and attempts by the authorities to
forcibly take possession of their lands without paying lawful
compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and marginal
farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be confined
only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an agricultural extent,
and that compensation should also be granted for the structures existing on
the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits should be extended to
the petitioners.
11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents
(NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners’
land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G
(Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways
Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and
that all statutory steps–issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and
3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and
passing of compensation awards under Section 3G–were duly followed.
According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and
compensation has been determined and deposited as per law. It is also their
contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired,
requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be
shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at
29
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under
alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited
extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any
contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and
resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not “displaced
families”. It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must
be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5)
of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the
petitioners’ allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the
interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a
project of national importance and public interest.
12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying
of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield
Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said
highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature,
connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of
the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that
can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory
benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.
12.1 Further, the petitioners’ grievance with regard to entitlement
to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative
rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such
structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the
structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in
a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.
30
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose,
unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set
aside, nor can the opinion of experts–either with regard to the alignment
of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such
as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable–be
substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty 20, wherein it
was held as follows:
“24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a
professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the
field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of the existing highways, which are vital for
development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to
experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having
vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development
and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating
to development and maintenance of National Highways after
thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project
reports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including
intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The
Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and
feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular
alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such
matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can
nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the
particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the
mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides.”
20
(2011) 12 SCC 69
31
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a
national highway. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by referring to various
precedent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more particularly
Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:
“12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the
projects involving construction of new highways and widening
and development of existing highways are vital for development of
infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to
the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons
having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway
development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the
project relating to development and maintenance after thorough
study by experts.
13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification
issued under the Act, award has already been passed on
10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021
have even received the compensation. The project is virtually
complete except for a small stretch.”
15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the
National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the
Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section
3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the
Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter
shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central
Government–ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself
32
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes
relating to compensation.
16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of
the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons
aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent
Civil Court.
17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation
comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances,
warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In
this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein
the Supreme Court held as follows:
“15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not
to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon
itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally
exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least
three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed
for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or21
1998 (8) SCC 1
33
wp_28152_2025
NBK, Jwhere the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged.”
18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of
fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural
justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities;
nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the
competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the
respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 1035 landowners whose
lands were acquired or in process of acquisition, 859 landowners have
already received compensation; thereby roughly 83% of persons have
received the compensation.
19. The grievance of the petitioners is about (i) determination of
compensation under the awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024, (ii)
alleged improper calculation of market value, multiplication factor,
solatium, and other statutory components, and (iii) alleged inadequate
grant of certain benefits under the RFCTLARR framework as applied to
acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956.
20. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain
rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the
competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has
been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory
remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved,
the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and therefore
the petitioners are not remediless.
34
wp_28152_2025
NBK, J
21. In the light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kushala
Shetty (supra), and Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and also the
judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench in W.A. No.774 of 2024, dated
07.08.2024, this Court does not find any exceptional circumstances to
entertain the writ petition bypassing the statutory arbitration mechanism
provided under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the
petitioners to avail the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the
National Highways Act, 1956 and thereafter, if necessary, under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. No costs. Interim order
dated 10.10.2025 stands vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any,
shall stand closed.
________________________________
JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
07thApril, 2026
ksm