Orissa High Court
Sambit Rath vs State Of Odisha & Anr. …. Opposite … on 6 April, 2026
Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.987 of 2026
Sambit Rath .... Petitioner(s)
Mr. Prasanta Kumar Nanda, Adv.
-versus-
State of Odisha & Anr. .... Opposite Party(s)
Mr. Tej Kumar, ASC
Mr. Jagabandhu Sahu, Adv. (for O.P. No.2)
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
ORDER
Order No.
06.04.2026
01.
1. This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement.
2. Mr. Jagabandhu Sahu, learned Advocate enters appearance on
behalf of Opposite Party No.2 and files Vakalatnama in Court today.
The same be kept on record.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. By filing the present CRLMC, the Petitioner has prayed for
quashing the entire criminal proceedings initiated against him in
connection with Berhampur Mahila P.S. Case No.144 of 2024
corresponding to G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024, pending before the
learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur.
Apart from the above, the Petitioner has also prayed for quashing
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SIPUN BEHERA
Designation: Senior
Stenographer
the order dated 17.12.2024 passed by the learned S.D.J.M.,
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF
ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 08-Apr-2026 18:59:33
Berhampur in G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024.
Page 1 of 12
5. Learned counsel for the respective parties submit that, in the
interregnum, the dispute between the parties has been amicably
settled. In support thereof, a joint affidavit dated 29.03.2026 has been
filed, which is taken on record.
6. The relevant portion of the joint affidavit filed by both the parties
is extracted hereunder:
“xxx xxx xxx
2. That the opp. party no.2 being the informant in Berhampur
Mahila P.S. Case No.144 of 2024, does not want to proceed with
the case as the matter has been settled in between the parties.
Parties to the lis have agreed to live separate for all time to come
and to that effect mutual divorce has been filed before the
learned Judge, Family Court, Berhampur in C.P. Case No.248
of 2025. The opp. party no.2 and the petitioner filed the divorce
on mutual consent without coercion.
3. That it is humbly submitted here that the opp. party no.2 and
the petitioner have mutually agreed to the conditions as has
been mentioned in Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act
petition. The opp. party no.2 has already taken the articles from
her matrimonial house and the petitioner would pay the agreed
amount as per the condition in the mutual divorce proceeding.
At this juncture the opp. party no.2 does not want to proceed
with the case for all time to come and she intends to drop the
proceeding.”
7. This Court has considered the joint affidavit filed by both parties
and is conscious of the settled legal position that the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is distinct
from the power of compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and may
be invoked to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of Court. At the same time, such power is not to be exercised
mechanically merely because the parties have arrived at a settlement;
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the Court is required to examine the nature and gravity of the
allegations, the real genesis of the dispute, the stage of the
proceeding and whether, in view of the stand now taken by the
victim, the possibility of conviction has become remote and
continuation of the prosecution would amount to futility or
oppression.
8. In the present case, Opposite Party No.2 has joined the Petitioner
in filing a sworn affidavit and has categorically stated that Opposite
Party No.2 and the Petitioner have mutually agreed to the conditions
as has been mentioned in Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act. The
Opposite Party No.2 has already taken the articles from her
matrimonial house and the Petitioner would pay the agreed amount
as per the condition in the mutual divorce proceeding. The Opposite
Party No.2 does not want to proceed with the case for all time to
come and she intends to drop the proceeding. Thus, the Court is not
proceeding on the basis of a bare compromise alone, but on the
subsequent stand of the complainant herself, which substantially
erodes the factual substratum of the prosecution. Having regard to
the materials on record, the stage of the case, and the unequivocal
position taken by the complainant, this Court is satisfied that the
possibility of a successful conviction is remote and bleak and that
continuation of the impugned proceeding would serve no useful
purpose but would instead amount to abuse of the process of law.
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9. The Supreme Court in the case of Navneesh Aggarwal & Ors. v.
State of Haryana & Anr1. has held as follows:
“14. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view
that where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by
way of divorce, and the parties have since settled into their
respective lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past
relationship ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of
harassment. In the cases of Mala Kar vs. State Of
Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated
19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of
Delhi, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9178 of 2018
dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”), this Court, while exercising
its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
quashed the criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial
discord against the husband. The Court took note of the fact
that the couple therein had divorced and held that in such a
situation, to continue with criminal prosecution wouldamount
to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted therein
applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in Arun
Jain are extracted respectively as under:
“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant
case, we have already noted that there has been a
decree of divorce passed between the parties dated
18.10.2014. It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the
FIR was registered in respect of the criminal
complaint filed on 09.08.2014. More significantly,
both the appellant No.2 and respondent No.2 have
since remarried and are leading their independent
lives. Therefore, both parties have accepted the decree1
2025 INSC 963
Page 4 of 12
of divorce passed by the Family Court on 18.10.2014.
Moreover, the appellant No.2- former husband of the
respondent No.2 has agreed to pay a sum of
Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex- gratia
to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final
settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this
Court to do complete justice in this matter and for
invoking its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India.
Xxx xxx xxx
Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant
case, it is noted that the appellants and respondent
No.2 were married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter
was born to them on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by
learned counsel for the appellants that appellant No.1
left the matrimonial home on 23.04.2007 and
thereafter respondent No.2 sought divorce which was
granted by the Competent Court on 04.04.2013. It
was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that respondent
No.2 filed the complaint against the appellants herein
and the FIR was registered on 13.02.2014 and the
chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.
15. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 (“Ramawatar”), while
considering quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of
CrPC, in the context of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
took into consideration the fact that there had been a settlement
arrived at between the parties in the said case and therefore,
exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India, the Court quashed the complaint, the FIR, andPage 5 of 12
subsequent criminal proceedings against the accused therein.
The relevant portion of the said judgment is at paragraph 15
which is extracted as under:
“15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India &
Another. has eloquently clarified this point as
follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any
cause or matter pending before it”. The very
nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except
perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by
“ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter
before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It
is well recognised and established that this
Court has always been a law-maker and its role
travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a
“problem solver in the nebulous areas” (see K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India) but the
substantive statutory provisions dealing with
the subject matter of a given case cannot be
altogether ignored by this Court, while making
an order under Article 142. Indeed, these
constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be
controlled by any statutory provisions but at the
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same time these powers are not meant to be
exercised when their exercise may come directly
in conflict with what has been expressly
provided for in a statute dealing expressly with
the subject.”
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun
Sreenivasan2 has held as follows:
“36. The reason is that the courts must not encourage
matrimonial litigation, and prolongation of such litigation
is detrimental to both the parties who lose their young age
in chasing multiple litigations. Thus, adopting a
hypertechnical view can be counterproductive as pendency
itself causes pain, suffering and harassment and,
consequently, it is the duty of the court to ensure that
matrimonial matters are amicably resolved, thereby
bringing the agony, affliction, and torment to an end. In
this regard, the courts only have to enquire and ensure that
the settlement between the parties is achieved without
pressure, force, coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or
undue influence, and that the consent is indeed sought by
free will and choice, and the autonomy of the parties is not
compromised. The latter two decisions in Gian Singh [Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC
(L&S) 988] and Jitendra Raghuvanshi [Jitendra
Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] observe that the inherent power on
the High Court under Section 482CrPC is wide and can be
used/wielded to quash criminal proceedings to secure the
ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court,2
(2023) 14 SCC 231
Page 7 of 12
albeit it has to be exercised sparingly, carefully, and with
caution.”
11. In the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.3, the
Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decisions has laid down
the principles governing quashing of matrimonial disputes where
there has been an amicable settlement, by holding as follows:
“12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are
evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage
genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.
13. The observations made by this Court, though in a
slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad
[(2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for
determining the approach required to be kept in view in a
matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there
has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent
times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of
which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life
and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes
suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions
resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders
of the family are also involved with the result that those
who could have counselled and brought about
rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed
as accused in the criminal case. There are many other
reasons which need not be mentioned here for not
encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may
ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes
amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in
a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude
3
(2003) 4 SCC 675
Page 8 of 12
and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in
chasing their “cases” in different courts.”
12. In the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.4, where a
larger Bench of the Supreme Court had been constituted to decide the
correctness of the decisions in the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of
Haryana & Anr., Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation
& Anr. and Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors. and held as follows:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has
to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim have
settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact
on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim
4
(2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303
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and the offender in relation to the offences under special
statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in
that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing
for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this category of cases, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would
be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount
to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and
whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.
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62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S.
Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil
Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858]
and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)
145] were not correctly decided. We answer the reference
accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the
Bench(es) concerned.”
13. In light of the aforesaid and applying the same to the facts of the
present case, this Court is of the considered view that the
continuance of the impugned criminal proceeding would amount to
an abuse of the process of Court and would not subserve the ends of
justice.
14. Tested against the aforesaid principles and the facts of the present
case, this Court finds that allowing the prosecution to continue
would be futile and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
15. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above,
the background facts, particularly the fact that the marriage between
the Petitioner and Opposite Party No.2 has ended in a divorce and
the Opposite Party No.2 is not interested to proceed with the case,
this Court is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose would
be served by keeping the case pending. Hence, this Court consider
this to be a fit case for exercising of power under Section 528 of BNSS
to quash the impugned order dated 17.12.2024 as well as the entire
criminal proceedings in G.R. Case No.1707 of 2024, pending before
the learned S.D.J.M., Berhampur, arises out of Berhampur Mahila P.S.
Case No.144 of 2024 in the interest of justice.
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16. Accordingly, the CRLMC is allowed.
17. Issue urgent certified copy of this order as per Rules.
( Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Sipun
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