Jharkhand High Court
Rajan Sao vs The State Of Jharkhand on 7 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.57 of 2026
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Rajan Sao, aged about 25 years, Son of Kauleshwar Sao, Resident of
Village- Terpa, P.O & P.S-Patratu, District-Ramgarh
.... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand
.... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Tiwary, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, Spl.PP
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C.A.V on 19.03.2026 Pronounced on 07/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated
09.07.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1186 of 2025 by the
learned AJC-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-ATS, Ranchi whereby and
whereunder the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with ATS
Court Case No.02 of 2024 in arising out of ATS P.S Case No.07 of 2023
registered for the offence under Sections 353, 332, 333, 307, 120(B) of
the Indian Penal Code, Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 16, 17,
20 of U.A.P Act has been rejected.
Factual Matrix
2. At the very outset, it needs to mention herein that earlier the prayer
for bail of the appellant was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated
16.04.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 by a co-ordinate
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Division Bench of this Court. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the
appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed
in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed
order.
3. The prosecution case is based upon the self-statement dated
17.07.2023 of one Law Kumar Singh, Inspector alleging therein that for
the last few months accused Aman Sao @ Aman Sahu gang in a planned
manner is operating gang from jail and through his gang members is
indulged in extortion money from different individuals. On 17.07.2023
at about 21:30 hrs. the S.P, ATS received confidential information that
Aman Sao from the Jail conspired with his other associates Akash Rai @
Monu, Hari Tiwari @ Dhirendra Tiwari, Boby Sao @ Sidharth Sao,
Mayank Singh and other active members of the gang are collecting
ransom from contractors, businessman, coal transporters, coal extracting
companies, truck owner association on the threat of life.
4. It has further been alleged that the extortion money received by
them is used for purchasing AK-47 and other sophisticated fire arms,
large number of pistols, Carbine, revolver, cartridges explosives and
those weapons and explosives are used to damage the Central
Government and State Government institution, N.T.P.C, L&T, CCL
which are working for the development of the country. Accused Aman
Sao is associated with TPC and PLFI, banned organization of Jharkhand,
and has nexus of interstate and international contacts, the high profile
criminals of Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, UP, Haryana, Nepal etc. The
extortion/levy recovered is being used in country as well as outside
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country by his associate-Narayan Thapa of Nepal through Hawala and by
using the said extortion money, sophisticated international standard
weapons and explosive substance are purchased. Aman Sao through his
associates is able to stop the development work of the State Government
and Central Government, the railway and road construction work and
coal extraction work. Aman Sao is involved in about 90 cases of serious
nature in Jharkhand and other States who is operating the gang from jail
and due to his fear the businessmen, coal transport officials all under fear
of life and many of them after giving the extortion money does not report
to the police. Many shooters of Aman Sao gang, namely, Chandan Sahu
who is accused of Barkagaon P.S. Case No.156 of 2023 in which the
official of Ritwik Company was murdered. He is also accused of Argora
P.S. Case No.261 of 2023. An information was received that he along
with his associates has stayed in the house of Champa Devi w/o Jodhan
Munda in Vill- Dardag, Ormanjhi P.S. The said information was
registered in station diary and for ascertaining the same and taking the
action one team was constituted by A.T.S. under Sri Niraj Kumar, Dy.
S.P. and several other police personnel which the members of the team
including the informant at about 11.45 left for the abovementioned place
and apprehended Chandan Sao and one Sonu Kumar with firearm and
forged Aadhar card. On interrogation, Chandan Sao accepted that he
made firing upon Ranjeet Gupta in Argora along with his associate
Waris Ansarı @ Musa. He informed that he has kept the used fire arm
with Hidayat Ansari and Bobby Sao @ Sidhrath Sao. He also said that he
can get the said fire arms and motorcycle recovered, which were used in
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the crime. The informant informed the senior officials and under the
leadership of Dy S.P. Niraj Kumar, Chandan Sao and Sonu Kumar was
taken with them towards Ramgarh and near Banjari Devi Temple one
Waris Ansari Musa was apprehended along with fire arms, cartridges
and motorcycle. On interrogation, Chandan Sao informed that under
command of his boss Aman Sao, Mayank Singh, Sunil Kumar Meena,
Hari Tiwari, Yogeshwar Mahto, Waris Ansari he along with his other
associates were to conduct meeting in village Rochap Terpa in which his
other gang members Digambar Prajapati, Akash Sao, Rajan Sao, Bobby
Sao, Raja Ansari, Ravi Munda and other members were to meet and
commit one big incident at Ramgarh. They arrested accused Waris
Ansari, Sonu Kumar along with fire arm (Pistol), (Revolver/Cartridges),
Motorcycle and other articles. The team members took them to Dhurwa
A.T.S. for registration of formal FIR thereafter along with Chandan Sao
the team proceeded for arrest and recovery of fire arms under the
leadership of Dy SP. Niraj Kumar. They reached near village Terpa,
when they came to Daridih Mahuwa More at about 20.10 hrs. and on
being asked from the local person, they informed that persons sitting on
motorcycle are the accused as the person wearing cap was Siddharth Sao
@ Bobby Sao and one another person standing there was Rajan Sao.
When the Dy. S.P. along with S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu proceeded towards
them all of a sudden they started firing upon the police party with
intention to kill them in which Dy. S.P Niraj Kumar and S.I. Sonu
Kumar Sahu sustained fire arms injury, the Dy. S.P. shouted that they are
the police personnel and they were having direction to arrest. They
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ordered to arrest the accused persons but taking the advantage of forest
and darkness the accused persons they managed to flee away. The
injured police personnel were taken to hospital and from the place of
occurrence automatic 9 MM pistol, cartridges were recovered and the
damaged mobile phone of Realme Company of S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu
was also recovered. One pair of sleepers of the accused and key of the
motorcycle were recovered and seizure list was prepared and the FIR
was lodged in the matter.
5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report A.T.S. P.S Case
No.07 of 2023 dated 18.07.2023 was registered for the offence under
section 353, 332, 333, 307, 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of Arms
Act and under Section 16, 17, 20 of U.A.P Act against the present
appellant and other co-accused persons.
6. After investigation, the police had submitted charge-sheet
against the present appellant and other co-accused persons on 20.01.2024
under section 353, 332, 307, 120(B) of Indian Penal Code, under section
27 of Arms Act and under sections 16, 17, 20 of U.A.P Act.
7. The prayer for bail of the present appellant was made before the
learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.3731 of 2023 but
the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated
25.01.2024 against which an appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal
(DB) No.244 of 2024 but Vide order dated 16.04.2024 the aforesaid
appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.
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8. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the appellant was
rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Criminal
Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed order.
9. The appellant has again preferred an application for regular bail
before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No. 1186 of
2025 which was dismissed vide order dated 09.07.2025.
10. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred by the
appellant against the order dated 09.07.2025 which is impugned herein.
Submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant:
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier to
the present appeal, the present appellant had moved before this Court
twice by filing criminal appeals. First attempt was made by filing Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 which was dismissed as withdrawn vide
order dated 16.04.2024 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court.
12. The appellant again approached this Court by filing another
criminal appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 823 of 2024 which was
dismissed vide order dated 12.12.2024 and thereafter, the present appeal
has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 09.07.2025
passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1186 of 2025 by which the prayer for
grant of bail has been rejected by the learned trial Court.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that
the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and is having no
nexus with the member of the terrorist gang and has been made
scapegoat to ease the burden of investigation.
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14. It has been contended that the reason for filing the instant
appeal with prayer for bail for third time is the changed circumstance as
the co-accused persons, namely, Ravi Munda, Hari Tiwari, Warish
Ansari, Chandan Saw and Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth Kumar
have been granted bail by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. The co-
accused-Ravi Munda has been granted bail vide order dated 27.06.2024
passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.404 of 2024; co-accused-Hari Tiwari @
Dhirendra Tiwari has been granted bail vide order dated 06.09.2024
passed in B.A No.4395 of 2024, co-accused-Warish Ansari @ Mussa has
been granted bail vide order dated 08.05.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.745 of 2024, co-accused-Chandan Kumar Saw @ Chandan Saw has
been granted bail vide order dated 13.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.871 of 2025 and co-accused-Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth
Kumar has been granted bail vide order dated 04.08.2025 passed in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.676 of 2025 and, as such, the present appellant may be
granted bail on the ground of parity.
15. It has been contended that no incriminating article has been
recovered from the possession of the appellant relating to the present
case.
16. It has further been contended that except confessional
statement, no any strong material has been found during the course of
investigation.
17. It has been contended that the investigation agency failed to
proof criminal conspiracy and all the sections levelled against the present
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appellant are on the basis of investigation which is not sustainable in the
eyes of law.
18. It has been contended that nothing specific came against the
present appellant during the course of investigation and the investigating
agency failed to find cogent material regarding connectivity of the
present appellant with alleged allegation as per FIR.
19. It has been submitted that the appellant is in custody since
03.08.2023 and, as such, taking into consideration the long custody,
delay in trial and on the ground of parity, it is a fit case where the
impugned order may be interfered with.
Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent:
20. Per contra, Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, learned Spl.PP
appearing for the respondent-ATS, has submitted that it is incorrect on
the part of the appellant to take the ground that there is no allegation
against him, rather, ample materials have come against the appellant of
having in collaboration with the members of gang, as would appear from
the various paragraphs of the case diary as also from the FIR itself.
21. Further submission has been made that earlier the prayer for
bail of the present appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated
12.12.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2023 by a detailed
order on merit.
22. The submission has also been made that the gravity of
allegation against the appellant is more serious in comparison to that of
the aforesaid co-accused persons who have been granted bail, since, in
course of investigation it revealed that the present appellant had started
8
2026:JHHC:9942-DBfiring upon the police party with intention to kill them in which police
personnel were sustained injuries.
23. It has further been contended that the place from where the
appellant was arrested one cartridge and large number of incriminating
articles, i.e., sophisticated weapons, large number of pistols, carbine
revolver, cartridges, explosives etc. were seized
24. It has been contended that it has come on record that the
appellant is having three criminal antecedents including the present one
of like nature and, as such, it is not a fit case to interfere with the
impugned order.
25. So far delay in trial is concerned, it has been contended that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Gurwinder Singh Versus
State of Punjab and Another (2024 SCC OnLine SC 109) has held that
for the offences under UAPA “Bail will be an exception and Jail will be
the rule” and merely period of custody and delay in trial will not be a
ground for grant for bail.
26. So far as likelihood of delay in the trial is concerned, the
submission has been made on behalf of respondent that out of 21 charge-
sheeted witness 7 witnesses have already been examined. As such, the
plea of the petitioner about the probable delay in the trial is not fit to be
accepted.
27. Learned counsel for the respondent has emphatically submitted
that the case is at advanced stage, as substantial number of prosecution
witnesses have already been examined and the appellant having criminal
antecedents and if at this stage the appellant would be enlarged on bail,
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there is every likelihood of influencing the witnesses and tampering with
the evidence or may abscond, which would seriously prejudice the fair
conduct of the trial.
28. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that no
fresh ground, on facts as well as on law, has been agitated herein by
renewing the prayer for grant of bail, hence, the instant appeal is also fit
to be dismissed.
Analysis:
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
documents available on record and the finding recorded by the learned
trial Court as recorded in the impugned order dated 09.07.2025.
30. Admittedly, the prayer for bail of the present appellant was
made before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application
No.3731 of 2023 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial
Court vide order dated 25.01.2024 against which an appeal being Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 was preferred before this Court, but vide
order dated 16.04.2024 the aforesaid appeal was dismissed as
withdrawn.
31. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the appellant was
rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Criminal
Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed order. For
ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid order i.e. order
dated 12.12.2024 are being referred as under:
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“9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
across the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned
order as also the FIR and the material which has been surfaced
on the basis of statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C, as
referred in the case diary.
10. It is evident from the case diary particularly from paragraphs
4,5,6, 11, 14 and 16 that the name of the appellant has been
disclosed by the person concerned in the statement recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It has further come that due to assault
on one Dy.S.P namely, Niraj Kumar and one SI, namely, Sonu
Kumar Sahu sustained injury due to firing done by the accused
persons.
11. The appellant is having three criminal antecedents including
the present one of like nature.
12. Considering the nature of crime, in which, the appellant is
alleged to be involved, and he is the member of the gang which is
being operated by Aman Sao and further two police personnel
have sustained injury due to sudden firing on the part of terrorist
gang, this Court is of the view that the impugned order requires
no interference by this Court.”
32. From perusal of the aforementioned paragraphs of the order
dated 12.12.2024 it is evident that this Court has already considered all
the pleas of the present appellant/accused while rejecting his earlier
prayer for bail and has taken into consideration the culpability of the
present appellant in the alleged commission of crime. It has further been
observed that the appellant is the member of the gang which is being
operated by Aman Sao and further two police personnel have sustained
injury due to sudden firing on the part of the gang.
33. It is evident that after rejection of prayer for bail again Misc.
Cr. Application No. 1186 of 2025 has been filed by the appellant before
the learned trial Court which has been dismissed vide order dated
09.07.2025, against which the present appeal has been preferred.
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34. This Court, before proceeding to consider the legality and
propriety of the impugned order, and rival submission of learned counsel
for the parties, deems it fit and proper to first refer the some settled
proposition of law and the relevant provisions of Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (herein referred as Act 1967) which is required to
be considered herein.
35. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available
for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty
of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been enacted to provide for the
more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals
and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters
connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of
UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain
unlawful activities.
36. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention
of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided
that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued
under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such
association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
37. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines “terrorist
organization”. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various
offences. Chapter IV has the title “punishment for terrorist act”. Clause
(k) of Section 2 provides that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to
it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes
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an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties
specified in the Second Schedule.
38. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of
Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall
not be released on bail if the Court is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima
facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of
committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act,
1967.
39. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the
UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for
consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “National
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali” [(2019) 5 SCC 1]
wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression
“prima facie true” as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967
which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the
investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused
concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the
face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the
stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and
sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts
constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The
degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the
accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the
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accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special
enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment
is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the
Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or
otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court,
which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in
TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may
have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation
to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the
special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is
required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence.
There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be
recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the
satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that
there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference
to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first
information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or
disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the
complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence.
It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or
the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when
the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as
compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence
as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the
degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of
satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application14
2026:JHHC:9942-DBor framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967
Act….”
40. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v.
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the
Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the
purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out
against the accused or not.
41. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of
granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to
record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the
involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or
otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is
not required to be done at this stage.
42. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the
law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), has observed that the elaborate
examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at
this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the
basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in
the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference,
paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein
under:-
“24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this
stage–of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail–is markedly
different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The
elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to15
2026:JHHC:9942-DBbe done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding
on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the
accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that
the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and
demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of
statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further,
the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were
not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the
document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam
Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment).
Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding
the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164
CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed
cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also
because reference to such statements having been recorded was not
found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in
our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record
its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned
is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the
Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in
reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-
sheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered
by the investigating agency during investigation.
26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967
Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences
under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the
trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis
of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet
by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and
before the filing of the supplementary or final chargesheet consequent
to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of
the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and
recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges
are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion
was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the
Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to16
2026:JHHC:9942-DBjustify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have
to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the
framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-
sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie
true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst
considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report
made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.”
43. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the
Court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or non-
grant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or
demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the
evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is
merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities
regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated
offence or otherwise.
44. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024
SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking into consideration of the judgment as
rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali (Supra) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of
Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special
Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, ‘on
perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such
person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV
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and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused
person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
45. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional
idea in bail jurisprudence vis-Ã -vis ordinary penal offences that the
discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is
the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances justify otherwise –
does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act and the ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP
Act is severely restrictive in scope.
46. In the aforesaid context, it has further been observed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Courts are, therefore, burdened with a
sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail
and the ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final
report submitted before the Special Court.
47. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held
that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected
as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the
final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie
true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of
bail is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence).
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48. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the aforesaid
Judgment are being quoted herein under:
“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows
that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from
releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor
an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an
accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a
complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an
accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case
diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards
commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter
VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that
there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the
one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the
language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP
Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-Ã -vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour
of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ –
unless circumstances justify otherwise – does not find any place while
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the
general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive
in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)–
‘shall not be released’ in contrast with the form of the words as found
in Section 437(1) CrPC – ‘may be released’ – suggests the intention of
the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task
on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts
are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The
‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final
report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has
prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of
satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the
justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted19
2026:JHHC:9942-DBwith the standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while
hearing applications for ‘discharge–”
49. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain.
Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor
and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a
conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail
is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by
Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
50. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual
reading of Section 43 D (5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline
which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong test. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:
“31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry
that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under
the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an
offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report
submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
20
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2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the
general principles relating to grant of bail under
Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?”
51. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law
is now proceeding to examine that whether impugned order by which
bail has been rejected requires interference by this Court.
52. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is available
herein, therefore, the learned counsel for appellant has taken the ground
of long custody i.e. about 2 years and 7 months approximately and
probable delay in conclusion of trial has also been taken as one of the
grounds. The learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue
of parity and submitted that since other co-accused persons have been
granted bail therefore the appellant herein also deserves to be released on
bail by interfering with the order impugned.
53. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent has argued that ample evidence has been collected in course
of investigation wherefrom it is evident that there is specific
attributability regarding the appellant being member and co-aid of gang
being operated by one Aman Sao, who indulge in extortion from
businessmen with the aid of his gang members including the appellant. It
has further been submitted by referring to paragraphs 4,5,6, 11, 14 and
16 of the case diary that specific attributability of the appellant has
surfaced in course of investigation.
54. The ground, therefore, has been agitated that the case of the
appellant is not identical to the said co-accused against whom parity has
21
2026:JHHC:9942-DBbeen claimed rather herein the accused/appellant is active member of
gang of Aman Saw and had played the vital role as would be evident
from different paragraph of the case dairy. Further, the appellant is
having three criminal antecedents of like nature and as such it is not a fit
case to interfere with the impugned order.
55. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the
parties, admittedly herein, earlier the prayer of the appellant for bail has
already been rejected on merit vide order dated 12.12.2024 by this Court
passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 823 of 2024 and the relevant paragraph
of the aforesaid order has already been quoted hereinabove in preceding
paragraphs. The present appeal has been filed on the ground of period of
custody and probable delay in trial and in addition thereto ground of
parity has also been raised.
56. In the aforesaid backdrop, it requires to refer herein that the
statutory mandate contained under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act
1967 imposes a stringent embargo upon the release of an accused
charged with such grave offences on bail, unless the twin conditions
stipulated therein are satisfied. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gurwinder Singh (supra), wherein after considering the judgment in
Union of India v. Κ.Α. Najeeb (supra), it was reiterated that the
statutory parameters contained in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967
must be applied while considering bail in cases involving serious
offences under the Act. It has been held that only where the allegations
are found to be prima facie untrue, on the basis of the material collected
during investigation, can the prayer for bail be considered, and
22
2026:JHHC:9942-DBconversely, where the allegations appear prima facie true, the privilege
of bail cannot be extended.
57. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that
only the long incarceration herein 2 years and 7 month is not the ground
to be looked into for enlarging the accused on bail rather the accusation
so made against the accused persons as also societal impact is also to be
taken care of.
58. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed referred
hereinabove in the preceding paragraph, the test for rejection of bail is
quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public
prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court
arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations are prima facie true. This position is made clear by
Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
59. In the present case, it is apparent from the appellant/accused has
been charged for offences punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act
1967, having maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.
60. Although, the culpability of the present accused/appellant has
already been dealt with by this Court in its order dated 12.12.2024 but at
the cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein in precise form.
61. It is evident from the case diary that the appellant has played
major role in the alleged offence. The appellant and his associates have
23
2026:JHHC:9942-DBhatched a conspiracy to commit a grave offence and one of the co-
accused had shot fire on the police party, in which the two police
personnel got serious bullet injuries.
62. It has come in the case diary that when police reached near
village Terpa, and when they came to Daridih Mahuwa More at about
20.10 hrs. and on being asked, the local persons have informed that
persons sitting on motorcycle are the accused as the person wearing cap
was Siddharth Sao @ Bobby Sao and one another person standing there
was Rajan Sao(appellant). When the Dy.S.P. along with S.I.-Sonu
Kumar Sahu proceeded towards them all of a sudden they started firing
upon the police party with intention to kill in which Dy. S.P. Niraj
Kumar and S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu sustained fire arms injury, the Dy S.P.
shouted that they are the police personnel and they were having direction
to arrest. They ordered to arrest the accused person but taking the
advantage of forest and darkness the accused persons managed to flee
away and from the place of occurrence automatic 9 MM pistol,
cartridges were recovered and the damaged mobile phone of Realme
Company of S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu was also recovered. One pair of
sleepers of the accused and key of the motorcycle were recovered and
seizure list was prepared and the FIR was lodged in the matter.
63. Thus, the materials as well as facts available on the record
suggest the involvement of the appellant in the instant case which is
related to an organized crime of the serious nature and he is identified as
a member of the notorious gang operating in the state as well as other
parts of the country.
24
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
64. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that matter relates to
organized crime related to collection of levies from coal traders, business
man and other persons of the locality by means of organized crime, in
the name of gangster Aman Sao and attempt to murder to police persons
while they were performing their duties.
65. Thus, there is no material change in the fact or situation so far
the culpability of the present appellant is concerned but ground of
custody and delay in trial as also issue of parity has been raised herein.
66. It requires to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) taking into
consideration the ratio of judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb,
(supra) has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences
as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant
bail, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates
the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities
backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving
exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which
needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the
appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will
influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the
process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a
ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the
appellant cannot be accepted.”
67. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of
Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw
(SC) 1 while appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section
43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration the ratio laid
25
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) has
categorically observed that if prosecutions alleging offences which
implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does
not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory
restraint, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are being quoted as under:
“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a
constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions
cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty
illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the
jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes
determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The
jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to
address offences of a special category.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether
Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how
Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly
conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to
implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an either-or
approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory and constitutional considerations. What is required is
disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused.
Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of
participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic,
organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional
significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly
for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a
central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for
circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory26
2026:JHHC:9942-DBembargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is
peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily
assume a punitive character.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing
approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the
sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate
as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint.
Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The
outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and
contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i)
the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role
attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii)
the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited
threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to
which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the
case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the
guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court expressly
cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged
incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences
under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of
the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on
record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while
Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum
divorced from competing constitutional interests. The Court
emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of
circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate organised
criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly
significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or
solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured
judicial reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes.”
68. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is
evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences, as one
involved in the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.
69. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that the
jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops, recognised various facets
27
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
to be intrinsic to the right to life and liberty such as speedy trial, timely
completion of investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time
circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that harmful to
society such as in this case, stems from a place of concern,
understandably legitimate at that, about public order, societal security,
overall peace and the general deterrent force in criminal law.
70. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand-the
constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21
and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute
and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of
national interest and societal interest.
71. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition that Article
21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly so, at the same time,
though, the individual cannot always be the center of attention. We
observe, therefore, that while Article 21 rights must always be protected,
but however, in cases where the security of the society and nation is
called into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole ground of
consideration.
72. The act of the accused persons must be looked at, on the whole,
and all relevant factors must be given due consideration while granting
or denying bail. Needless to add, any Court seized of bail application(s)
arising out of such offences must record, in their order the reasons and
factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.
28
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
73. In view of the discussion made above, it is the settled fact that
the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation/societal
interest.
74. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern to the
threat raised by terrorist organizations and held that where the
accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate
contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act would
become applicable and the accused would not be released on bail.
75. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted at
Bar that out of 21 charge-sheeted witness 7 witnesses have already been
examined, therefore taking into consideration the aforesaid submission,
the apprehension of appellant in probable delay in trial is not fit to be
accepted.
76. Further, it has been submitted by the respondent that if the
present appellant is allowed to be released on bail, then, he will get all
opportunities to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the
witnesses or he may abscond.
77. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that there are
serious allegations against the appellant/accused that he being the active
member of Aman Sao Gang has participated in the serous crime
therefore, it is considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of the
appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not fit to be
accepted.
29
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
78. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the
issue of parity and has submitted that the other co-accused persons who
are similarly placed have already been directed to be released on bail,
therefore the prayer of the petitioner is fit to be accepted.
79. The learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the
issue of parity by stating that the co-accused-Ravi Munda has been
granted bail vide order dated 27.06.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.404 of 2024; co-accused-Hari Tiwari @ Dhirendra Tiwari has been
granted bail vide order dated 06.09.2024 passed in B.A No.4395 of
2024, co-accused-Warish Ansari @ Mussa has been granted bail vide
order dated 08.05.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.745 of 2024, co-
accused-Chandan Kumar Saw @ Chandan Saw has been granted bail
vide order dated 13.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.871 of 2025
and co-accused-Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth Kumar has been
granted bail vide order dated 04.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.676 of 2025, therefore, the prayer of the present appellant for bail is
fit to be allowed.
80. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent
that the allegation as surfaced against said co-accused cannot be said to
be identical with the case of the appellant,
81. It needs to refer herein that the law is well settled that the
principle of parity is to be applied if the case of the fact is exactly
similar, then, only the principle of parity will be applied in the matter of
passing order but if there is difference in between the facts, then, the
principle of parity, is not to be applied.
30
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
82. It is further settled connotation of law that the Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying
that another accused has been granted bail, is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established.
83. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarun Kumar Versus
Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2023) SCC
OnLine SC 1486 has observed that parity is not the law and while
applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the
role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.
84. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail and by simply saying that
another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs.
Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has been
held as under:
“25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High
Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are
oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged
offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has
31
2026:JHHC:9942-DBheld that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed
:(SCC p. 515, para 17)
17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was
taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was
imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect
and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to
be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with
absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the
impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine
All 16031] clearly exposes the non application of mind. That apart, as
a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second
respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other
heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the
same.Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its
approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and
accordingly we set it aside.” 26. Another aspect of the case which
needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the
principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020
[Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj
2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020
SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli
(A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on
22- 10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat,
2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court
recorded) that he was “assigned similar role of armed with stick
(sic)”. Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground
that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin
32
2026:JHHC:9942-DB(A-10), Kheta (A15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with
sticks had 42 been granted bail. The High Court has evidently
misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity
while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely
observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with
a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the
grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding
the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The
High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic
assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the
law.”
85. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, this
Court has gone through material available on record.
86. It has come on record that there is direct allegation against the
present appellant that he started firing on seeing the police party in
which two police officers/personnel had got injuries and, as such, it is
not a fit case to interfered with the impugned order.
87. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed
hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against
the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in
alleged commission of crime, is of the view that the principle of parity
cannot be extended to the present appellant.
88. Further, although the prayer for bail of aforesaid co-accused
persons have been allowed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court but
earlier the prayer for bail of the present appellant has been rejected by
this Court by a detailed order and prima facie the nexus of the present
33
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
appellant with the Aman Sao gang has been established by the
investigating agency, therefore, prima facie a case of criminal conspiracy
against the present appellant is made out and, as such, the issue of parity
is not available to the present appellant.
89. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed
hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against
the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in
alleged commission of crime, is of the view that the principle of parity is
not fit to be applied herein.
90. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled
position proposition of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
(supra) and Gurwinder Singh (supra), this Court is now adverting to
the order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court in Misc.
Criminal Application No. 1186 of 2025 which is under challenge herein.
91. The learned trial Court in the said order dated 09.07.2025 has
taken into consideration that the present appellant had earlier filed Misc.
Criminal Application No.3731 of 2023 which had been rejected vide
order dated 25.01.2024.
92. It reveals that against the said order, the appellant preferred an
appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 before the High
Court which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.04.2024
and thereafter again filed another criminal appeal being Criminal Appeal
(DB) No.823 of 2024 which had also got rejected vide order dated
12.12.2024.
34
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
93. The learned trial Court has observed in the order impugned
herein that a prima facie case is being made out against the appellant on
the basis of evidence collected by the ATS team during investigation. It
has revealed during investigation that the appellant has taken active part
in the criminal conspiracy. The learned trial Court has found from the
materials available on record that the appellant is a member of Aman Sao
gang which has linked with anti-national elements and also international
gangs. Hence, the learned trial Court taking into consideration the
seriousness of the crime and role played by the appellant by firing at
police party, has rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant by
holding that successive bail is not maintainable as also there is no fresh
ground for bail except the period of custody of the appellant.
94. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reason, is of the view that
the impugned order rejecting the prayer for bail, suffers from no
infirmity.
95. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal
(DB) No.823 of 2024 had rejected the prayer for bail of the present
appellant which was not challenged before any higher Forum/authority
by the appellant and, as such, the said order attains its finality.
96. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has
submitted at Bar that the trial in the instant case is in progress and
charges have already been framed against the present appellant and out
of 21 witnesses, seven witnesses have already been examined.
97. Thus, taking into consideration that this Court has earlier
expressed its view while rejecting the prayer for grant of bail of the
35
2026:JHHC:9942-DB
present appellant referred hereinabove, as also there is no vital change in
circumstances as also taking into consideration the submission advanced
on behalf of the respondent-ATS that the trial is going on expeditiously,
this Court is of the view that the order impugned dated 09.07.2025
passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1186 of 2025 requires no
interference.
98. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
99. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
100. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not
prejudice the case of the appellant in course of trial and the view as
expressed by this Court is only limited to the instant appeal.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Sudhir
Dated: 07/04/2026.
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
Uploaded on 08/04/2026.
36
