Jharkhand High Court
Naresh Ganjhu vs Union Of India Through National … on 7 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.82 of 2026
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Naresh Ganjhu, aged about 29 years, son of Chandru Ganjhu, resident of
village-Boda Tola, PO + PS-Chandwa, District-Latehar, Jharkhand
.... ... Appellant
Versus
Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi
.... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Birendra Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
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C.A.V on 17.03.2026 Pronounced on 07/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated
08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 by the
learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum-Special Judge,
NIA, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the prayer for bail of the appellant
in connection with Special (N.I.A) Case No.02 of 2020, corresponding
to RC Case No.25/2020/NIA/DLI, arising out of Chandwa P.S. Case
No.158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019 registered for the offence under
Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302, 353, 379 of the Indian Penal Code,
Section 27 of the Arms Act, Sections 10, 13, 17, 18 of Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act and Section 17 (i) (ii) of Criminal Law
Amendment Act has been rejected.
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2. At the very outset, it needs to mention herein that earlier this
Court vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB)
No.256 of 2023 has dismissed the prayer for bail of the present appellant
on merit by passing a detailed order.
3. The prosecution case is that on 22.11.2019 the patrolling party
had found the cadre of the banned terrorist organization i.e. CPI (Maoist)
who were waiting in advance, fired indiscriminately at the police
patrolling party in consequence thereof the four police personnel had
died. Arms and ammunitions were looted from the martyred police
personnel and by raising slogans, the Maoist fled away. One Home
Guard, namely, Dinesh Ram who had escaped unhurt, rushed to the
Chandwa Police Station and lodged a complaint, based upon the same
Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was instituted against eighteen
named and some unknown accused persons. The police had completed
the investigation.
4. Thereafter, on the basis of fardbeyan of one of the members of the
patrolling party, namely, Dinesh Ram, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of
2019 dated 23.11.2019 u/s 147/148/149/442/302/353/379 of the IPC,
section 27 of Arms Act, Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1908 and section 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 was registered against eighteen named accused
persons and some unknown persons. Thereafter, investigation was taken
up by the SDPO, Latehar. During the investigation, the I.O. visited the
place of occurrence and arrested accused persons who disclosed about
concealment of motorcycle which was used in the said crime. Accused in
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custody Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Sunil Ganjhu @ Mangra (A-2), Naresh
Ganjhu (A-5) (the present appellant) and Faguna Ganjhu (A-6) also
disclosed about the concealment of looted ammunitions.
5. Subsequent thereto, the Central Government in exercise of power
conferred under Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 has directed the N.I.A. to take
up the investigation vide Order No. 11011/42/2020/NIA dated
22.06.2020 and accordingly, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was
re-registered as R.C. No.25 of 2020/NIA/DLI under Sections
147,148,149,452,302,353 & 379 of Indian Penal Code, under Section 27
of the Arms Act, under Section 17 (i) & (ii) of Criminal Law
Amendment Act and under Sections 10,13,17 and 18 of Unlawful
Activity (Prevention) Act, 1967. The NIA had submitted the first
supplementary chargesheet against 34 persons for the offences
punishable under Sections 120 (B), 121, 121(A), 122,
147,148,149,302,307,353,395,396 & 427 of Indian Penal Code, under
sections 10,13,16,17,18,20,21,38,39 & 40 of Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Sections 25(1-b) a, 26,27 & 35 of the
Arms Act. The name of the appellant has come in course of investigation
who has been arrayed as accused No.5.
6. Thereafter, on the basis of fardbeyan of one of the member of the
patrolling party, namely, Dinesh Ram, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of
2019 dated 23.11.2019 u/s 147/148/149/442/302/353/379 of the IPC,
section 27 of Arms Act, Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1908 and Sections 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities
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(Prevention) Act, 1967 was registered against eighteen named accused
persons and some unknown persons. Thereafter, investigation was taken
up by the SDPO, Latehar. During the investigation, the I.O. visited the
place of occurrence and arrested accused persons who disclosed about
concealment of motorcycle which was used in the said crime. As referred
above, the accused in custody Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Sunil Ganjhu
@Mangra (A-2), Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) and Faguna Ganjhu (A-6) also
disclosed about the concealment of looted ammunitions.
7. After investigation, the State Police had submitted charge-sheet before
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Latehar vide
Charge Sheet No.58/2020 on 02.07.2020 under sections 147, 148, 149,
427, 307, 353, 302 & 120B of IPC, Sections 25(1-b)a, 26, 27 & 35 of
Arms Act, section 17 (i) & 17(ii) of the Criminal Amendment Act and
sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18 & 20 of the UA (P) Act, 1967 against 06
accused persons namely (1) Baijnath Ganjhu, (2) Sunil Ganjhu, (3)
Rajesh Ganjhu, (4) Sanjay Ganjhu, (5) Naresh Ganjhu i.e. the present
appellant, and (6) Faguna Ganjhu.
8. During investigation, the role of the present appellant is
mentioned in paragraph 17.14 of the supplementary charge-sheet which
is as follows:
“On 19.11.2019, A-2 took him to Beerjangha forest to meet A-14,
along with elder brother of A-14, Kunwar Ganjhu Next day i.e.
20.11.2019, A-1 informed Kunwar Ganjhu over mobile phone, that
A-14 had called him at Beerjangha forest. Thereafter, A-1, A-2 and
Kunwar Ganjhu went together to Beerjangha forest in a Motor
Cycle belonging to Basant Turi. They parked the motorcycle near
the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). They saw 02 cadres of CPI
(Maoist) and one of them took them to meet A-14. He met A-14,4
2026:JHHC:9944-DBwho was present, along with 10-12 armed cadres of CPI (Maoist).
At that time, Ishwar Ganjhu, R/o Lukuiya also came to meet A-14.
A-14 inquired about his wife Lalita Devi from Baijnath Ganjhu
(Al) and Kunwar Ganjhu. Thereafter, on direction of A-14, A-1
and Ishwar Ganjhu brought 10 Kg of fish from one Lodha Ganjhu,
R/o Bearjnagha. On the way, A-1 saw Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and one
Shivnath Yadav returning, after meeting A-14. A-1 delivered the
fish to A-14 and further was asked to come the next day with Sunil
Ganjhu. Thereafter, A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu returned from there.
On 21.11.2019, A-1 again went to meet A-14 at Bearganjha. A-14
asked him to bring 03 Jackets, 03 Blankets, 03 pair of Jeans and
Shirts and 03 Towels (Gamcha). He also told to bring blankets first
and also gave money Rs.3,000. He also sent one of the naxal cadre
namely Vikash with A-1. Both came to Chandwa market and
brought 02 numbers of blankets for Rs. 1300 each and
sweets/Laddu (about 15-20 pieces) and Samosa (20 pieces).
Thereafter, both of them returned to Bearganjha and parked
motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). From there,
Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) also joined them and went to meet A-14.
Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to A-1 and A5 to bring
remaining items. Thereafter, one Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu
Singh (A-8) r/o Alaudiya, Chandwa, Shivnath Yadav and two other
persons came to meet A-14. A-1 saw Sonu Singh (A-8) giving
money to A-14. Later, A-1 and A-5 returned from there.”
9. The appellant has been apprehended and taken into custody on
06.01.2020, i.e., prior to the taking over the investigation by the NIA,
and, as such, prayer for bail was made by the present appellant before the
learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of 2022 but
the same has been rejected vide order dated 20.01.2023 against which
criminal appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 was filed
before this Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 11.05.2023
by this Court.
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10. Thereafter, the present appellant has preferred Misc. Cr.
Application No.2197 of 2025 before the special Court with prayer for
bail but the said supplication was dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025
against which the instant appeal has been preferred.
Submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant:
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier to
the instant appeal, the present appellant had moved before this Court by
filing Criminal Appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 256 of 2023 which
was dismissed vide order dated 11.05.2023 and thereafter, the present
appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated
08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 by which
the prayer for grant of bail has been rejected by the learned trial Court.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that
the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and is having no
nexus with the member of the terrorist gang and has been made
scapegoat to ease the burden of investigation.
13. The reason for filing this regular bail application for second
time is the changed circumstance as the co-accused-Rajesh Ganjhu @
Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu, whose case was held to be identical to that of the
case of the present appellant, has been granted bail vide order dated
30.10.2025 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal
(DB) No. 812 of 2025 who earlier had rejected the prayer for bail of the
co-accused Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu vide order dated
05.04.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1458 of 2022 and relying
upon which this Hon’ble Court has rejected the earlier prayer of bail of
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the present appellant vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal
(DB) No.256 of 2023.
14. It has further been submitted that another co-accused-Baijnath
Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated 02.12.2025 passed in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.1132 of 2025 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this
Court and, as such, the present appellant may also be enlarged on bail on
the ground of parity.
15. It has been submitted that very few witnesses have been
examined in the trial and they have not supported the prosecution case as
against the present appellant.
16. It has further been contended that the learned trial Court has
failed to appreciate the fact that the Investigating Agency has given a list
of large numbers of witnesses in charge sheet, but statement of most of
the witnesses have not been recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C by the
Investigating Agency.
17. It has been submitted that the appellant is in custody since
06.01.2020 and, as such, taking into consideration the long custody and
probable delay in conclusion of trial and in view of the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.
A. Najeeb; (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is a fit case where the impugned order
may be interfered with.
Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent:
18. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the
NIA, has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take
the ground that there is no allegation against him, rather, ample materials
7
2026:JHHC:9944-DBhave come against the appellant of having in collaboration with the
members of extremist gang, as would appear from the various
paragraphs of the supplementary chargesheet.
19. Further submission has been made that earlier the prayer for
bail of the present appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated
11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023.
20. The submission has also been made that the gravity of
allegation against the appellant is more serious in comparison to that of
the said co-accused-Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and another
co-accused-Baijnath Ganjhu. Since, in course of investigation it revealed
that the present appellant is a resident of village Beerjangha and he used
to work as an overground worker of co-accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14)
and used to provide logistic support to the members of CPI Maoist. The
armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) used to occasionally reside in the said
village and take food from the villagers. The present appellant provided
food and other things to the cadres of CPI (Maoist) and helped them.
21. The present Appellant (A-5) was taken into police remand by
the NIA from 19.12.2020 to 23.12.2020 for a period of five days, during
which he was interrogated. During the said interrogation, the
appellant/accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) disclosed that his village,
Beerjangha, is situated at the base of Beerjangha Mountain and that the
armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) used to occasionally reside in the village
and take food from the residents. It is further raveled that 4-5 days prior
to the incident, while the appellant was working on his farmland with his
family members, two armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) arrived and directed
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2026:JHHC:9944-DBhim to accompany them for some work. It is revealed that he was taken
to Chorha Aamtand near the mountain, where he found co-accused
Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) present along with 7-8 armed cadres. A-14
allegedly instructed the Appellant to convey a message to Sunil Ganjhu
(A-2) that his maternal uncle (A-14) had called him to Beerjangha Pahar
and to also inform Ishwar Ganjhu and Shivnath Ganjhu to meet him.
22. During the investigation, it has further been revealed that on the
same evening, the appellant went to village Lukuiya, conveyed the
message of A-14 to A-2, and requested him to further inform Ishwar and
Shivnath Ganjhu. The appellant allegedly told A-2 that upon reaching
Hendehas Railway Track, they would meet two Maoist cadres who
would escort them to A-14. On the following day, the appellant
purportedly again visited Lukuiya and informed Ishwar Ganjhu. It is
revealed that around noon, A-2 and Ishwar Ganjhu reached the railway
track where two Maoists led them to A-14, and the appellant provided
2 Kgs of tomatoes to the Maoists before accompanying them to meet
A-14. It is further revealed that on 20.11.2019, two Maoist cadres arrived
at the appellant’s residence and demanded 10 Kgs of rice, which he had
provided. Later that evening, he shortly saw A-2, Shivnath Yadav, and
two unknown individuals returning from Beerjangha forest. On
21.11.2019, at around 15.00 hrs, while the appellant was bathing near a
water tank, two Maoists had arrived and informed him that A-14 had
called him. At the same time, A-1 arrived on a Hero Honda motorcycle,
accompanied by a Maoist cadre, and thereafter A-1, the appellant and
three Maoist cadres allegedly proceeded on foot to meet A-14 at Chorha
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2026:JHHC:9944-DBAamtand. On reaching there, the appellant saw A-1 handing blankets to
A-14 and distributing snacks and sweets among the cadres. A-14 and A-
1 purportedly conversed privately for 10-15 minutes.
23. That the investigation further revealed that A-14 handed over
Rs. 3,000 to the appellant and directed him to purchase two jackets and a
set of shirt-pant (28-inch size), and also asked for his motorcycle for the
following evening, to which the appellant had agreed. Thereafter, A-1
and the appellant/accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) allegedly returned and
exchanged mobile numbers. It is also alleged that on 22.11.2019 at
around 06.30 hrs, two Maoist cadres arrived at the appellant’s residence
and demanded vegetables, which he provided, and that subsequently the
appellant returned the said amount of Rs-3,000 claiming that he needed
to take his nephew for medical treatment. Later that evening, he went to
Budh Bazar, Chandwa to sell vegetables and thereafter visited his in-
laws’ village Talsakhadiya. On the next day, he came to know about the
alleged incident at Lukuiya More.
24. It has been contended that during police custody, a disclosure
memorandum and a pointing-out-memorandum proceeding were
prepared at the instance of the present appellant, wherein he pointed out
the location where he, along with the co-accused, had met A-14.
25. It has been contended that in a Photo Identification
Memorandum prepared by the police, the appellant/accused Naresh
Ganjhu (A-5), the present appellant identified photographs of CPI
(Maoist) cadres and associates, namely A-14, A-20, A-30, A-22, A-18
and A-23.
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26. It has been submitted that during the course of further
investigation by NIA, involvement of the appellant-Naresh Ganjhu (A-5)
emerged in the instant crime and evidence against accused Naresh
Ganjhu (A-5) was collected and he was arrested on 06.01.2020.
Sufficient prosecutable evidences has collected against him and on the
basis of the outcome of the investigation, first supplementary charge-
sheet was filed by NIA vide Chargesheet No. 16/2021 on 30.04.2021,
before the Special NIA Court, Ranchi against the appellant marked as
Accused No. 05 along with 33 other accused persons, as their roles and
offences completed had emerged on the basis of evidence gathered
which is mentioned in internal page 94 of 109 of the 1 st Supplementary
Chargesheet which is quoted herein under for reference:
” Investigation has established that A-5 used to work as an
OGW of A-14 and used to provide logistic support to the members
of CPI Maoist. On 18th & 19th Nov, 2019, he met A-14 at
Beerjangha forest and on direction of A-14, he passed messages
to A-1, A-2, Shivnath Yadav & Ishwar Ganjhu regarding meeting
with A-14 at Beerjangha forest. On 20.11.2019, he provided 10 kg
rice to the cadres of CPI(Maosit). On 21.11.2019, he went to
Beerjangha forest & met A-14 where he received Rs.3000/- for
purchasing 02 Jackets, one pair Pant Shirt.
Therefore, as per averments made in pre-para, it is established
that A-5 was an Over Ground Worker of CPI (Maoist), a
proscribed organization, and was part of the conspiracy to
assemble with deadly weapons to carry out terrorist attack on the
police patrolling party which resulted in the killing of 04 police
personnel and subsequently, snatching/ looting of Government
issued arms and ammunitions. Thereby, A-S committed offences
under sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353,
395, 396, 427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, as amended 2019
sections 25(1-B) a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.
27. It has further been contended that the statements of Protected
Witnesses were recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C and Protected
Witness ‘B’ has supported the case of the prosecution.
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28. It has been contended that the charges against the present
appellant have already been framed and the trial is progressing and as
many 16 witnesses have already been examined in this instant case.
Therefore, if the present appellant is released on bail, there are all
probabilities that he may influence the witnesses and tamper with the
evidences, which may cause serious prejudice to the prosecution of
instant of crime.
29. Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA, has
submitted that there are so many materials basis upon which it can be
said that the allegation against the appellant is prima facie true and,
hence, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1, the appellant does not deserve to be released
on bail.
30. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that no
fresh ground, on facts as well as on law, has been agitated herein by
renewing the prayer for grant of bail, hence, the instant appeal is also fit
to be dismissed.
Analysis:
31. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
documents available on record and the finding recorded by the learned
trial Court as recorded in the impugned order dated 08.12.2025.
32. Before entering into the merit of the case, it would be apt to
refer herein that the prayer for bail of the present appellant was made
before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of
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2022 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order
dated 20.01.2023 against which appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal
(DB) No. 256 of 2023 which has also been dismissed by this Court vide
order dated 11.05.2023. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of
the order dated 11.05.2023 are being quoted as under:
8. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and has
considered the finding recorded by the learned court rejecting the bail
application as also the averment made in the counter affidavit and the
material gathered by the Investigating Agency in the case diary, since,
the supplementary charge-sheet has been appended with the counter-
affidavit. This Court in order to examine the difference in between the
material which has been gathered in the case of Rajesh Ganjhu @
Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and the appellant, since, the argument which
has been emphasized by learned Counsel for the appellant that the
case of the appellant is different to that of the case of Rajesh Ganjhu
@ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu. It appears from the order rejecting the bail
application of Rajesh Ganjhu, wherein, the following paragraphs have
been taken into consideration as would appear from paragraph 8
thereof, for ready reference is being referred herein:
“A perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that the appellant was an
over-ground worker and is a sympathizer as well as a cousin of
Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). The role played by the appellant has been
defined in the charge sheet which reads as follows: “Investigation has
established that A-3 was an over ground worker (OGW) of CPI
(Maoist) and is relative of A-14. He used to provide logistic support to
the Dasta of A-14. On 22.11.2019, A-14 went to Beerjangha forest
and met A-14 who told that he will take revenge with Police for
arresting his wife Lalita Devi and directed him to live with them. On
22.11.2019, he accompanied the Support Team headed by A-14 at
Boda pond. After the incident, all members of CPI (Maoist) assembled
there and congratulated each other for killing police personnel &
looting their arms and ammunitions. Thereafter, he stayed over night
with Dasta of A-14 at Beerjangha forest and 23.11.2019, he returned
to his village Banjhi Tola. Therefore, as per averments made in pre-
para, it is established that A-3, was an Over Ground Worker/member13
2026:JHHC:9944-DBof CPI (Maoist), a proscribed organization, and participated in the
meeting in which conspiracy was hatched among co accused, with
common intention, to assemble with deadly 6 weapons and to carry
out terrorist attack on the police patrolling party which resulted in the
killing of 04 police personnel and subsequently, snatching/looting of
Government issued arms and ammunition at Lukuiya More. Thereby,
A-3 committed offences under sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148,
149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396, 427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18,
20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as
amended 2019, sections 25(1-B)a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.”
9. It is evident from the aforesaid material as quoted and referred
hereinabove that in course of investigation it has been established that
A-3, the appellant of Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 1458 of 2022 i.e. Rajesh
Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu was an over ground worker (OGW)
of CPI (Maoist) and is relative of A-14, the main person who was
handling the said proscribed organization and used to provide logistic
support to the Dasta of A-14. The contention has been raised that
there is no such allegation against the appellant or providing logistic
support to the Dasta of A-14. In order to examine the aforesaid fact,
this Court requires to refer herein the material which has been
gathered by the Investigating Agency as has been incorporated in the
supplementary charge sheet. The relevant would be the paragraph
17.14 of the supplementary charge-sheet wherein it has come in the
aforesaid paragraph that A-1, A-2 and Kunwar Ganjhu had gone
together to Beerjangha forest, the place where the indiscriminate
firing was given its conclusion and in course of going that place they
parked the motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu, A-5 (the
appellant). They saw 02 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and one of them took
them to meet A-14. It further appears from the aforesaid paragraph
that A-1 again went to meet A-14 at Bearganjha and 7 while returning
to Bearganjha the motorcycle was again parked near the house of
Naresh Ganjhu A-5 and from there, Naresh Ganjhu also joined them
and went to meet A-14. Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to
A-1 and A-5 to bring remaining items, for ready reference the relevant
part of the paragraph 17.14 is being referred herein:
“On 19.11.2019, A-2 took him to Beerjangha forest to meet A-14,
along with elder brother of A-14, Kunwar Ganjhu. Next day i.e.
20.11.2019, A-1 informed Kunwar Ganjhu, over mobile phone, that A-
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14 had called him at Beerjangha forest. Thereafter, A-1, A-2 and
Kunwar Ganjhu went together to Beerjangha forest in a Motor Cycle
belonging to Basant Turi. They parked the motorcycle near the house
of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). They saw 02 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and one
of them took them to meet A-14. He met A-14, who was present, along
with 10-12 armed cadres of CPI (Maoist). At that time, Ishwar
Ganjhu, R/o Lukuiya also came to meet A-14. A-14 inquired about his
wife Lalita Devi from Baijnath Ganjhu (A 1) and Kunwar Ganjhu.
Thereafter, on direction of A-14, A-1 and Ishwar Ganjhu brought 10
Kg of fish from one Lodha Ganjhu, R/o Bearjnagha. On the way, A-1
saw Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and one Shivnath Yadav returning, after
meeting A-14. A-1 delivered the fish to A-14 and further was asked to
come the next day with Sunil Ganjhu. Thereafter, A-1 and Kunwar
Ganjhu returned from there. On 21.11.2019, A-1 again went to meet
A-14 at Bearganjha. A-14 asked him to bring 03 Jackets, 03 Blankets,
03 pair of Jeans and Shirts and 03 Towels (Gamcha). He also told to
bring blankets first and also gave money Rs.3,000. He also sent one of
the naxal cadre namely Vikash with A-1. Both came to Chandwa
market and brought 02 nos of blankets for Rs. 1300 each and
sweets/Laddu (about 15-20 pieces) and Samosa (20 pieces).
Thereafter, both of them returned to Bearganjha and parked
motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). From there,
Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) also joined them and went to meet A-14.
Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to A-1 and A 5 to bring
remaining items. Thereafter, one Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu
Singh (A-8) r/o Alaudiya, Chandwa, Shivnath Yadav and two other
persons came to meet A-14. A-1 saw Sonu Singh (A-8) giving money
to A-14. Later, A-1 and A-5 returned from there.”
10. It further transpires from the aforesaid paragraphs that the
reference of the mobile phone which was being used by A-5 i.e. 8
6203949830 had been disclosed by the A-1. It has further been
disclosed that on 30.12.2019, A-1 was called by Ravindra Ganjhu. It
further appears from the paragraph 2 of paragraph 17.14 that while
giving disclosure in the police custody it has been disclosed by A-2
that he along with Ishwar Ganjhu and Naresh Ganjhu, appellant
herein (A-5) met Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the leader of the aforesaid
Maoist group. A-14 asked A-2 to come next day and also bring
Kunwar Ganjhu. A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu came to the house of Sunil
Ganjhu (A-2) and from there all three went to Bearganjha forest to
15
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
meet A-14 and on the way he kept his motorcycle in the house of
Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) at Bearjangha Tola and enquired about Naresh
Ganjhu (A-5) but he was not present there. It has further come at
paragraph 5 of paragraph 17.14 that the appellant has confessed that
A-14 gave Rs. 3,000/- and told to bring 02 Jackets, one pair of Pant
Shirt. The reference of paragraph 15.3 also required to be made
herein wherein the looted fire arms after the killing of the police
personnel had been seized from the house of Accused No.1 and sent to
Sergeant Major, Police Centre, Latehar for analysis and expert
opinion. The opinion was given to the effect that all the bullets are live
one and has given a finding to the effect that the said ammunitions are
the same ammunitions issued to the Home Guards who were detailed
with patrolling PCR vehicle of Chandwa Police Station on 22.11.2019
from the Armoury of Police Line, Latehar.
11. This Court on the basis of the aforesaid material gathered against
the appellant is not hesitant in coming to the conclusion that the case
of the appellant is identical to that of the case of Rajesh Ganjhu
rather, prima facie, it appears that the appellant was directly in touch
of the members of proscribed group, MCC, since, it has come that he
has accepted the money from the accused No. 14 for the purpose of
purchasing Jacket etc. that show that he was actively involved to
support the members of the proscribed group. In this reference the
Hon’ble Apex Court held in Sudesh Kedia vrs. Union of India (2021)
4 SCC 704:
11. Section 43-D(5) mandates that a person shall not be released on
bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation made are prima facie true. Apart from
the other offences, the appellant is accused of committing offences
under Section 17, 18 and 21 of the UA (P) Act. The appellant is
accused of providing funds to a terrorist organization. According to
the prosecution, he has entered into a conspiracy with the other
members of the organisation to strengthen and promote the activities
of the organization. Further, an amount of Rs.9,95,000 (Rupees nine
lakh and ninety-five thousand only) was seized from the appellant’s
house, making him liable for punishment under Section 21 of the Act.
12. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali2, this Court considered the
parameters for exercise of the power under Section 43-D (5), held as
follows: (SCC p. 24, para 23)16
2026:JHHC:9944-DB“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the
Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or
otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court,
which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in
TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may
have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to
the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special
enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its
opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree of
difference between the satisfaction to be 10 recorded by the Court that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not
guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the
purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie”
true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would
mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency
in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the
first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome
or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the
complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It
must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the
chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when
the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as
compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as
required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree
of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the
accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to
be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of
charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act….”
12. This Court, therefore, is of the view that there is no reason to take
different view as has been taken by learned Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court while rejecting the bail of co-accused Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh
Kumar Ganjhu vide order dated 05.04.2023 in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No.
1458 of 2022.
17
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
13. Accordingly, this Cr. Appeal is dismissed.
33. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the prayer for bail of
the appellant was rejected by this Court on merit by due appreciation of
evidence available on record. This Court has also taken into
consideration the culpability of the present appellant who used to work
as an overground worker of co-accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) and
used to provide logistic support to the members of CPI Maoist.
34. Thereafter the present appellant has again preferred an
application being M.C.A. No. 2197 of 2025 before the special Judge but
the same has been dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025 against which
the instant appeal has been preferred.
35. This Court, before proceeding to consider the legality and
propriety of the impugned order and rival submission of learned counsel
for the parties, deems it fit and proper to first refer the some settled
proposition of law and the relevant provisions of Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (herein referred as Act 1967) which is required to
be considered herein.
36. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available
for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty
of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been enacted to provide for the
more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals
and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters
connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of
UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain
unlawful activities.
18
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37. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention
of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided
that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued
under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such
association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
38. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines “terrorist
organization”. It is defined as an organization listed in the First
Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the First
Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various
offences. Chapter IV has the title “punishment for terrorist act”. Clause
(k) of Section 2 provides that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to
it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes
an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties
specified in the Second Schedule.
39. Further, section 10(a)(i) of Act 1967 provides that where an
association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3
which has become effective under sub-section (3) of that Section, a
person, who is continues to be a member of such association shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years,
and shall also be liable to fine therefore, so long as Section 10(a)(i)
stands a person who is or continues to be a member of such association
shall be liable to be punished.
40. Further, it would be relevant to mention the offences punishable
under Sections 13 of the 1967 Act, which read thus:
19
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
13. Punishment for unlawful activities.–(1) Whoever– (a) takes
part in or commits, or (b) advocates, abets, advises or incites the
commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall
also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful
activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after
the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective
under subsection (3) of that section, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine,
or with both. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any treaty,
agreement or convention entered into between the Government of
India and the Government of any other country or to any negotiations
therefor carried on by any person authorised in this behalf by the
Government of India.
41. Thus, it is evident that Section 13 prescribes Punishment for
unlawful activities. It is further evident that as per section 13 (1)
Whoever takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites
the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also
be liable to fine.
42. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of
Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall
not be released on bail if the Court is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima
facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of
committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act,
1967.
43. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the
UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for
consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “National
20
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali” [(2019) 5 SCC 1]
wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression
“prima facie true” as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967
which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the
investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused
concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the
face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the
stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and
sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts
constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The
degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the
accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the
accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special
enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment
is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the
Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or
otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court,
which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in
TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may
have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation
to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the
special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is
required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence.
There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be
recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for21
2026:JHHC:9944-DBbelieving that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the
satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that
there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation
against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference
to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first
information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or
disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the
complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence.
It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or
the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when
the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as
compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence
as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the
degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of
satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application
or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967
Act….”
44. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v.
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the
Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the
purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out
against the accused or not.
45. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of
granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to
record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the
involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or
22
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is
not required to be done at this stage.
46. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the
law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), has observed that the elaborate
examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at
this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the
basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in
the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference
paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein
under:-
“24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this
stage–of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail–is markedly
different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The
elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to
be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding
on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the
accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that
the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and
demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of
statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further,
the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were
not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the
document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam
Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment).
Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding
the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164
CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed
cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also
because reference to such statements having been recorded was not
found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in
our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record23
2026:JHHC:9944-DBits opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned
is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the
Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in
reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-
sheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered
by the investigating agency during investigation.
26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967
Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences
under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the
trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis
of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet
by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and
before the filing of the supplementary or final chargesheet consequent
to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of
the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and
recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges
are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion
was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the
Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to
justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have
to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the
framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-
sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie
true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst
considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report
made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.”
47. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the
Court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or non-
grant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or
demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the
evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is
merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities
24
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated
offence or otherwise.
48. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in a very
recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and
Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking into
consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation
Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) has observed that, the
proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on
the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays
down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or the report made
under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure’, is of the opinion
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation,
against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under
Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such
accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
49. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional
idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the
discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is
the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances justify otherwise –
does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act and the ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP
Act is severely restrictive in scope.
50. In the aforesaid context, it has further been observed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Courts are, therefore, burdened with a
sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP
25
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
Act, the Courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail
and the ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final
report submitted before the Special Court.
51. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held
that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected
as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the
final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie
true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of
bail is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence).
52. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the aforesaid
Judgment are being quoted herein under:
“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows
that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from
releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor
an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an
accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a
complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an
accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case
diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards
commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter
VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that
there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the
one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the
language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP
Act.
26
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour
of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ –
unless circumstances justify otherwise – does not find any place while
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the
general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive
in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)–
‘shall not be released’ in contrast with the form of the words as found
in Section 437(1) CrPC – ‘may be released’ – suggests the intention of
the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task
on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts
are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The
‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final
report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has
prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of
satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the
justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted
with the standard of ‘strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while
hearing applications for ‘discharge–”
53. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain.
Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor
and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a
conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail
is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail
application in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by
Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
27
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual
reading of Section 43 D (5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline
which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong test. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:
“31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry
that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under
the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an
offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report
submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the
general principles relating to grant of bail under
Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?”
55. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law and the
factual aspect as has been gathered against the appellant is now
proceeding to examine as to whether the prayer of the instant appeal is fit
to be allowed or not.
56. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is available
herein, therefore, the learned counsel for appellant has taken the ground
of long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial as one of the
grounds. The learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue
of parity and submitted that since other co-accused have been granted
bail, therefore, the appellant herein also deserves to be released on bail
by interfering with the order impugned.
57. Before entering into the merit of the case, it would be apt to
28
2026:JHHC:9944-DBrefer herein that the prayer for bail was made before the learned trial
Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of 2022 but the same had
been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 20.01.2023
against which appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 256 of
2023 which has also been dismissed by this Court vide order dated
11.05.2023.
58. Thereafter, the appellant has again preferred an application for
regular bail before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application
No.2197 of 2025 which was dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025.
59. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred by the
appellant for grant of regular bail.
60. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that this Court while
rejecting the prayer for bail of the present appellant vide order dated
11.05.2023 has already expressed its view by taking into consideration
the settled proposition of law.
61. Now coming to the contention made by the learned counsel for
the appellant, wherefrom it appears that no fresh ground has been raised
except the ground of parity, custody and personal liberty since the
appellant is languishing in judicial custody since 06.01.2020.
62. In the aforesaid backdrop, it requires to refer herein that the
statutory mandate contained under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act
1967 imposes a stringent embargo upon the release of an accused
charged with such grave offences on bail, unless the twin conditions
stipulated therein are satisfied. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gurwinder Singh (supra), wherein after considering the judgment in
29
2026:JHHC:9944-DBUnion of India v. Κ.Α. Najeeb (supra), it was reiterated that the
statutory parameters contained in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967
must be applied while considering bail in cases involving serious
offences under the Act. It has been held that only where the allegations
are found to be prima facie untrue, on the basis of the material collected
during investigation, can the prayer for bail be considered, and
conversely, where the allegations appear prima facie true, the privilege
of bail cannot be extended.
63. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that
only the long incarceration is not the ground to be looked into for
enlarging the accused on bail rather the accusation so made against the
accused persons as also societal impact is also to be taken care of.
64. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed referred
hereinabove in the preceding paragraph the test for rejection of bail is
quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public
prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court
arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations are prima facie true. This position is made clear by
Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on
granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for
the time being in force on grant of bail.
65. In the present case, it is apparent from the appellant/accused has
been charged for offences punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act
1967, having maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.
30
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
66. Although, the culpability of the present accused/appellant has
already been dealt with by this Court in order dated 11.05.2023 but at the
cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein in precise form.
67. As per the prosecution version that on 22.11.2019 the patrolling
party had found the cadre of the banned terrorist organization i.e. CPI
(Maoist) who were waiting in advance, fired indiscriminately at the
police patrolling party in consequence thereof four police personnel had
died. Arms and ammunitions were looted from the martyred police
personnel and by raising slogans, the Maoist fled away. The Chandwa
P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was instituted against eighteen named and
some unknown accused persons. The police have completed the
investigation.
68. Subsequent thereto, the Central Government in exercise of
power conferred under Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8
of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 has directed the N.I.A. to
take up the investigation vide Order No. 11011/42/2020/NIA dated
22.06.2020 and accordingly the Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was
re-registered as R.C. No.25 of 2020/NIA/DLI under Section
147,148,149,452,302,353 & 379 of Indian Penal Code, under Section 27
of the Arms Act, under Section 17 (i) & (ii) of Criminal Law
Amendment Act and under Sections 10,13,17 and 18 of Unlawful
Activity (Prevention) Act, 1967.
69. The NIA had submitted the first supplementary charge sheet
against 34 persons for the offences punishable under Sections 120 (B),
121, 121(A), 122, 147,148,149,302,307,353,395,396 & 427 of Indian
31
2026:JHHC:9944-DBPenal Code, under sections 10,13,16,17,18,20,21,38,39 & 40 of
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Sections 25(1-b)
a, 26,27 & 35 of the Arms Act. The name of the appellant has come in
course of investigation who has been arrayed as accused No.5.
70. It has come during investigation that the appellant was having
direct contact with the leader of the aforesaid banned Maoist
organization who happens to be accused No.14 and it has come in
several paragraphs that he was actively associated with the accused
No.14 as also the accused No.1.
71. It has come on record that A-14 gave Rs. 10,000/- each to A-1
and A-5 (appellant herein) to bring certain items. It further appears from
the paragraph 2 of paragraph 17.14 of the charge-sheet that while giving
disclosure in the police custody it has been disclosed by A-2 that he
along with Ishwar Ganjhu and Naresh Ganjhu, appellant herein (A-5)
met Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the leader of the aforesaid Maoist group.
A-14 asked A-2 to come next day and also bring Kunwar Ganjhu. A-1
and Kunwar Ganjhu came to the house of Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and from
there all three went to Bearganjha forest to meet A-14 and on the way he
kept his motorcycle in the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) at Bearjangha
Tola and enquired about Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) but he was not present
there. It has further come at paragraph 5 of paragraph 17.14 that the
appellant has confessed that A-14 gave Rs. 3,000/- and told to bring 02
Jackets, one pair of Pant Shirt. The reference of paragraph 15.3 also
required to be made herein wherein the looted fire arms after the killing
of the police personnel had been seized from the house of Accused No.1
32
2026:JHHC:9944-DBand sent to Sergeant Major, Police Centre, Latehar for analysis and
expert opinion. The opinion was given to the effect that all the bullets are
live one and has given a finding to the effect that the said ammunitions
are the same ammunitions issued to the Home Guards who were detailed
with patrolling PCR vehicle of Chandwa Police Station on 22.11.2019
from the Armoury of Police Line, Latehar.
72. It has further come in investigation that during police custody
and disclosure memorandum and pointing out memorandum proceeding
at the instance of A-5 was carried out in which the accused pointed out
the exact location where he alongwith co-accused met with A-14. In
photo identification memorandum A-5 identified photographs of CPI
Maoist and its associates namely A-14, A-20, A-30, A-22 A-18 and A-
23. Further during TIP by eye witness protected B identified Naresh
Ganjhu (present appellant) on 23/1/2021 who stated that “Naresh Ganjhu
Mere Gaon Men Aaana Jana Karta Tha Isiliye Pahchanta Hun.”
73. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that A-5 present appellant
worked as overground worker of A-14 and used to provide logistic
support to CPI Maoist. On 18/19.11.2019 he met A-14 at Beerjangha
forest and on direction of A-14 he passed message to A-1, A2 Shivnath
Ganjhu and Ishwar Ganjhu regarding meeting with A-14 at Beerjangha
forest. On 20.11.2019 he went to Beerjangha forest and met A-14 where
he received Rs.3000/- for purchase of 02 jackets one pair pant shirt.
74. Thus, from the aforesaid it may be inferred that this petitioner
was part of Criminal conspiracy hatched by proscribed terrorist
organisation to assemble with deadly weapon to carry out terrorist attack
33
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
on the police personnel in which four police personnel killed and
government issued arms and ammunitions were looted.
75. It requires to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) taking into
consideration the ratio of judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb,
(supra) has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences
as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant
bail, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates
the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities
backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving
exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which
needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the
appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will
influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the
process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a
ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the
appellant cannot be accepted.”
76. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of
Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw
(SC) 1 while appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section
43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration the ratio laid
down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) has
categorically observed that if prosecutions alleging offences which
implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does
not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory
restraint, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are being quoted as under:
34
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a
constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions
cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty
illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the
jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes
determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The
jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to
address offences of a special category.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether
Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how
Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly
conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to
implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an either-or
approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory and constitutional considerations. What is required is
disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused.
Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of
participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic,
organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional
significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly
for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a
central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for
circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory
embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is
peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily
assume a punitive character.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing
approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the
sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate
as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint.
Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The
outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and
35
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i)
the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role
attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii)
the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited
threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to
which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the
case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the
guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court expressly
cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged
incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences
under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of
the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on
record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while
Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum
divorced from competing constitutional interests. The Court
emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of
circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate organised
criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly
significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or
solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured
judicial reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes.”
77. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is
evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences, as one
involved in the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.
78. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that the
jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops, recognised various facets
to be intrinsic to the right to life and liberty such as speedy trial, timely
completion of investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time
circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that harmful to
society such as in this case, stems from a place of concern,
understandably legitimate at that, about public order, societal security,
overall peace and the general deterrent force in criminal law.
36
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
79. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand-the
constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21
and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute
and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of
national interest and societal interest.
80. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition that Article
21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly so, at the same time,
though, the individual cannot always be the center of attention. We
observe, therefore, that while Article 21 rights must always be protected,
but however, in cases where the security of the society and nation is
called into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole ground of
consideration.
81. The act of the accused persons must be looked at, on the whole,
and all relevant factors must be given due consideration while granting
or denying bail. Needless to add, any Court seized of bail application(s)
arising out of such offences must record, in their order the reasons and
factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.
82. In view of the discussion made above, it is the settled fact that
the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation/societal
interest.
83. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab
(supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern to the
threat raised by terrorist organizations and held that where the
accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate
37
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act would
become applicable and the accused would not be released on bail.
84. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted at
Bar that 16 witnesses have already been examined and all endeavor has
been taken for expeditious conclusion of the trial and further the list of
witnesses has already been pruned substantially, therefore taking into
consideration the aforesaid submission, the apprehension of appellant in
probable delay in trial is not fit to be accepted.
85. Further, it has been submitted by the respondent that if the
present appellant is allowed to be released on bail, then, he will get all
opportunities to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the
witnesses or he may abscond.
86. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that there is
serious allegations against the appellant/accused that he being the active
member of proscribed organization had conspired with other member of
the said organization in the serious crime in which 4 police personnel
died therefore, it is considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of
the appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not fit to be
accepted.
87. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the
issue of parity and has submitted that the other co-accused persons who
are similarly placed have already been directed to be released on bail,
therefore the prayer of the appellant is fit to be accepted.
88. The learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the
issue of parity by stating that another co-accused person, namely, Rajesh
38
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated
30.10.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 812 of 2025 and another co-
accused, namely, Baijnath Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated
02.12.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1132 of 2025, therefore, the
prayer of the present appellant for bail is fit to be allowed.
89. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the NIA has contended that
although the prayer for bail of the co- accused, namely, Rajesh Ganjhu
@ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and Baijnath Ganjhu, has been allowed by a
co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court but earlier the prayer for bail of
the present appellant has been rejected by this Court and prima facie the
nexus of the present appellant with the co-accused person, i.e., Ravindra
Ganjhu (A-14) and other CPI (Maoist) cadres and he helped them by
providing food and vegetables, conveying their messages to other co-
villagers and providing his motorcycle to them has been established by
the investigating agency, therefore, prima facie a case of criminal
conspiracy against the present appellant is made out and, as such, the
issue of parity is not available to the present appellant.
90. In the aforesaid context, it requires to refer herein that this
Court is conscious with the settled position of law that the issue of
parity, is to be taken into consideration but the same is to be taken into
consideration by applying the factual aspect along with the surrounding
facts, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun
Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1486 wherein it has held as under:
“18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail
to the appellant on the ground that the other co accused who were
39
2026:JHHC:9944-DBsimilarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also
cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While
applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon
the role attached to the accused whose application is under
consideration.”
91. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail and by simply saying that
another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs.
Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana“, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has
been held as under:
“25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by
the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They
are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged
offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has
held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the
totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed:
(SCC p. 515, para 17):
“17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand
was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was
imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect
and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled
to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with
absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore,
the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the nonapplication of mind.
That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that
40
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of
number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to
take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of
extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to
travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside.”
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in
which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two
orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of
Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai
Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High
Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-
15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13)
to whom bail was granted on 22- 10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha
Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the
ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was “assigned similar
role of armed with stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli
(A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on
the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13)
who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court
has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by
parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the
accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail
was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the
accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is
of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of
parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot
pass muster under the law.”
92. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position this Court
has gone through material available on record.
93. The learned counsel for appellant has contended that another
co-accused person, namely, Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu has
been granted bail vide order dated 30.10.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No. 812 of 2025 and another co-accused, namely, Baijnath Ganjhu has
41
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
been granted bail vide order dated 02.12.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.1132 of 2025.
94. It needs to refer herein that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court
vide order dated 5.04.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1458
of 2022 had earlier rejected the prayer for bail of the said co-accused i.e
Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu against whom parity has been
claimed. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the order dated
05.04.2023 are being referred herein which reads as under:
7. We have considered the rival submissions and have also perused
the various affidavits filed by the respective parties including the
supplementary charge-sheet.
8. A perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that the appellant was
an over-ground worker and is a sympathizer as well as a cousin of
Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). The role played by the appellant has been
defined in the charge-sheet which reads as follows:
“Investigation has established that A-3 was an over ground worker
(OGW) of CPI (Maoist) and is relative of A-14. He used to provide
logistic support to the Dasta of A-14. On 22.11.2019, A-14 went to
Beerjangha forest and met A-14 who told that he will take revenge
with Police for arresting his wife Lalita Devi and directed him to live
with them. On 22.11.2019, he accompanied the Support Team headed
by A-14 at Boda pond. After the incident, all members of CPI (Maoist)
assembled there and congratulated each other for killing police
personnel & looting their arms and ammunitions. Thereafter, he
stayed over night with Dasta of A-14 at Beerjangha forest and
23.11.2019, he returned to his village Banjhi Tola. Therefore, as per
averments made in pre-para, it is established that A-3, was an Over
Ground Worker/member of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed organization,
and participated in the meeting in which conspiracy was hatched
among co-accused, with common intention, to assemble with deadly
weapons and to carry out terrorist attack on the police patrolling
party which resulted in the killing of 04 police personnel and
subsequently, snatching/looting of Government issued arms and
ammunition at Lukuiya More. Thereby, A-3 committed offences under
sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396,42
2026:JHHC:9944-DB427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as amended 2019, sections 25(1-
B)a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.”
9. It therefore, appears that the petitioner had given logistic support
to the terrorist organization and was involved in the meeting which
was hatched and which culminated in the incident leading to
institution of Chandwa P. S. Case No. 158 of 2019 and in view of a
prima facie case having been made out against the appellant, we are
not inclined to interfere in the impugned order and consequently this
appeal is dismissed.
95. Thus, from the aforementioned paragraph it is evident that the
co-ordinate Bench of this Court while rejecting the prayer for bail had
taken into consideration the culpability of the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh
Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu that the said co-accused had given
logistic support to the terrorist organization and was involved in the
meeting which was hatched and which culminated in the incident leading
to institution of Chandwa P. S. Case No. 158 of 2019.
96. Thereafter, the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh
Kumar Ganjhu has again preferred the Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 812
of 2025 for bail and this time vide order dated 30.10.2025 the co-
ordinate Bench after taking into consideration the long custody and
probable delay in conclusion of trial has allowed the prayer for bail of
the said co-accused, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid order is being quoted as under:
9. Pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2025 a report has -4- been
submitted by the learned trial court which reveals that out of 133
witnesses 13 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. A
supplementary counter affidavit has been filed by the NIA from which
it appears that the prosecuting agency intends to examine 89
witnesses. Even though the number of witnesses to be examined have43
2026:JHHC:9944-DBbeen toned down but considering the fact that only 13 witnesses have
been examined so far it does appear bleak that the trial would be
concluded in the near future. The probability of delayed trial
juxtaposed with the period of incarceration of the appellant enhances
his claim for grant of bail and, we accordingly in view of the same set
aside the order dated 21.04.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal
Application No. 504 of 2025, in connection with Special (NIA) Case
No. 02/2020 arising out of RC Case No. 25/2020, (Chandwa P.S. Case
No. 158/2019) by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-
cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi and direct that the appellant be
released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten
Thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each, to the
satisfaction of learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum-
Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in connection with Special (NIA) Case No.
02/2020 arising out of RC Case No. 25/2020, (Chandwa P.S. Case No.
158/2019).
97. It needs to refer herein that earlier this Court vide order dated
11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 256 of 2023 while
dismissing the appeal by rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on
merit has observed that the case of present appellant is on similar footing
to the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu.
98. Although the culpability of the present appellant is almost
similar to the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar
Ganjhu and the co-ordinate Bench while allowing the appeal of the said
co-accused has only taken into consideration the probable delay in
conclusion of trial as well as long custody .
99. This Court in the preceding paragraphs by taking reference
from the settled position of law as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Gurwinder Singh (supra) and Gulfisha Fatima versus State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (supra) has already held that delay in trial or
long custody alone cannot be ground for bail. Therefore, on the basis of
44
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
discussion made hereinabove it is considered view of this Court the
benefit of parity cannot be extended to the present appellant.
100. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed
hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against
the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in
alleged commission of crime is of the view that the principle of parity is
not fit to be applied herein.
101. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled
position proposition of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
(supra) and Gurwinder Singh (supra), this Court is now adverting to
the order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the learned trial Court which is
under challenge herein.
102. The learned trial Court in the said order dated 08.12.2025 has
taken into consideration that the present appellant had earlier filed Misc.
Criminal Application No.2580 of 2022 which had been rejected vide
order dated 20.01.2023 against which the appellant preferred appeal
being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 before the High Court
which had also got rejected vide order dated 11.05.2023.
103. The learned trial Court has observed in the order impugned
herein that a prima facie case is being made out against the appellant on
the basis of evidence collected by the NIA during investigation. It has
revealed during investigation that the appellant has taken active part in
the criminal conspiracy. Prior to the alleged occurrence, the appellant
herein has helped the extremists by providing them food, conveying their
45
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
messages to other co-villagers, purchasing the articles for them and
providing them his motorcycle. Hence, the learned trial Court taking into
consideration the seriousness of the crime and role played by the
appellant in preparation of extremist attack at Patrolling Party of police,
has rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant by holding that
there is no fresh ground for bail except the period of custody of the
appellant.
104. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent-NIA has
submitted at Bar that the trial in the instant case is in progress and
charges have already been framed against the present appellant and
further substantial number of witnesses have already been examined.
105. In the light of the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel
for the NIA, this Court is of the view that since in the instant case trial is
in progress, and this Court has already expressed its view on merit in
earlier appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 which has been
filed by the appellant with prayer for bail and since no fresh ground is
available for the appellant except the ground of parity which has already
been answered in the preceding paragraphs, therefore, the present appeal
is not fit to be allowed.
106. Thus, taking into consideration that this Court has earlier
expressed its view with regard to the prayer for grant of bail of the
present appellant as also there is no change in circumstances as no fresh
ground has been agitated herein as also taking into consideration the
submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-NIA that the trial is
going on expeditiously, this Court is of the view that the order impugned
46
2026:JHHC:9944-DB
dated 08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 2197 of
2024 requires no interference.
107. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
108. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Sudhir
Dated:07/04/2026.
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
Uploaded on 08/04/2026.
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