Jharkhand High Court
The Steel Authority Of India Limited Its … vs Dhananjay Kumar (Staff No. 773277 on 6 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Deepak Roshan
2026:JHHC:9834-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.5364 of 2025
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The Steel Authority of India Limited its Chairman Corporate
Office, Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110001
through Mr. J.T. Kongari, aged about 53 years, son of Late
P.L. Kongari working as General Manager (Law), Steel
Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Limited, P.O. B.S.
City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro (Jharkhand).
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Dhananjay Kumar (Staff No. 773277, SAIL PERS. No.
C003676), Son of Sri N.N. Singh, The General Manager
(Blast Furnace), Blast Furnace Department, Bokaro
Steel City, Bokaro, Resident of Quarter No 3003, Sector
5A, P.O. Sector 6, P.S. Sector 6, Bokaro Steel City,
District Bokaro 827006 (Jharkhand).-----Respondent
2. The Director (Personnel), Steel Authority of India
Limited, Corporate Office, Ispat Bhawan, P.O. & P.S New
Delhi, New Delhi: 110001.
3. The Director-In-Charge & Appellate Authority, Steel
Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro
Steel City, P.O. B.S. City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro
827001 (Jharkhand).
4. The Executive Director (Project), Steel Authority of India
Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. B.S.
City, P.S. B.S. City,District Bokaro -827001.(Jharkhand)
5. The Executive Director (Works), Steel Authority of India
Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro Steel City, P.O. B.S.
City, P.S. B.S. City, District Bokaro 827001 (Jharkhand).
...Performa Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
: Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate
: Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate
For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. Bhanu Kumar, Advocate
------
C.A.V. on 24.03.2026 Pronounced on 06/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India directed against the order dated
09.05.2025 passed in O.A./051/00141/2024 whereby and
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whereunder while allowing the original application, the
learned Tribunal has quashed and set aside the order dated
14.12.2023 passed by the disciplinary authority by which
punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of
pay for a period of three years and three months without
cumulative effect has been imposed upon the applicant,
and the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated
27/28.02.2024 has also been set aside with a direction
upon the respondents to restore the pay of the applicant
w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and release the arrears with all
consequential benefits within a period of three months from
the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made
in the writ petition having been incorporated from the
original application read hereunder as :-
While the Respondent No.1 was posted as General
Manager, Blast Furnace, Bokaro Steel City with charge of
the function of Respondent No. 5, the applicant was
shocked to receive one charge Memorandum dated
10.01.2023 issued by respondent no. 4 under Rule 25 of
SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 for totally
vague, false and indistinct allegations mentioned under
Article-l to V.
2
2026:JHHC:9834-DBThe applicant after receipt of the same submitted
his self-explanatory statement of defence on 20.01.2023 in
detail denying the allegations.
It is the case of the applicant/Respondent No.1 that
without considering the above statement of defense, the
respondent no. 4 appointed Inquiry Officer and Presenting
Officer vide order dated 06.02.2023.
It has been contended by the applicant that the
entire action from the stage of issuance of charge
memorandum upto the appointment of I.O. and P.O. was at
the instance and dictates of Vigilance officials.
The I.O. proceeded with the enquiry under the
influence of higher officials of Vigilance and conducted
perfunctory enquiry in between 02.03.2023 to 17.04.2023.
The P.O. brief was also submitted on 08.05.2023.
The applicant submitted his reply to P.O. brief on
30.05.2023 supported with documents and evidences
showing/proving himself to be innocent.
Apart from above, the applicant has stated that
during his 25 years of service in SAIL, BSL his devotion to
duty is of highest level and integrity is above board which
has been accepted by CGM (MRD) who is senior most CGM
in Works Division of BSL.
The I.O. has submitted his report on 26.07.2023
holding that the charges under Article No. I to IV are not
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established and charge under Article No. V is partially
established.
In this regard, the applicant has submitted that
since the allegation No. V either can be fully proved or
disproved but as per the I.O’s report it is partially
established, hence it is completely vitiated and fit to be
declared as null and void and ab initio wrong.
It has been alleged by the applicant that the
respondent no. 4 has committed wrong while calling reply
from the applicant within 7 days which is in violation of
Rule 26.0(2) of SAIL Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules,
1977 which mandatorily gives 15 days’ time for giving reply
to I.O’s report.
Applicant then submitted his reply on 25.08.2023
to the I.O’s report denying the finding of the I.O. in respect
of allegation No. V as partially established. He has stated
that the I.O. acted under pressure of the vigilance officials.
The applicant also enclosed various Commendations/
Awards/ Appreciation letters related to his performance in
the company which has been highly rated.
In the meantime, the applicant received an order
dated 14.12.2023 issued by respondent no. 4 whereby
punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of
pay for a period of three years and three months without
cumulative effect has been imposed without application of
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quasi-judicious mind, without giving any disagreement
notice and without competence to impose such
punishment. According to the applicant, the punishment
imposed is vague, per-se illegal and contrary to Rule 23.0
(f) of 1977 rules which clearly speaks about the effect of
punishment after its expiry which was not clarified in the
said punishment order.
It has been alleged by the applicant that without
disagreement notice the respondent no. 4 relying on the
allegations under Article No. 1 to IV of the charge memo
imposed the punishment which is not sustainable in the
eyes of law.
Thereafter, applicant filed Appeal before respondent
no.3 on 28.12.2023 which was rejected vide order dated
27/28.02.2024 and aggrieved thereof the original
application being O.A./051/00141/2024 has been
preferred.
Before the Tribunal, the petitioner (herein)/
respondents in their written statement have denied the
contentions of the applicant and submitted that
Respondent No. 3 who is the competent authority has
appointed Respondent No. 4 as the Disciplinary Authority
as per law.
It has been submitted that the applicant simply
denied all of the charges neither specifically denied nor
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admitted any of the charges. The respondents have alleged
that the applicant being the Engineer I/C of the contract
has acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the
company, shown negligence in the performance of his duty
and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to
duty thereby committed misconduct as per clause 5.0(5),
5.0(6) of SAIL CDA Rules, 1977 and thus violated Rule
4.1(1(i) & (ii) of SAIL, CDA Rules, 1977.
The respondents have alleged irregularities
committed by the applicant in violation of the contractual
terms.
It has further been submitted that there is no
violation of any provision on calling reply from the applicant
within 7 days of I.O. report since the enquiry against the
applicant was initiated on the recommendation of Vigilance.
The respondents have denied the issue of
incompetent authority as the respondent no. 4 has been
appointed as DA by respondent no. 3 who is the competent
authority as per schedule appended to SAIL CDA Rules,
1977. Respondent no. 4 being Executive Director is
competent to be appointed as DA. The respondents have
stated that in the instant case there was no disagreement
as the disagreement has to be shown in a very specific
situation when some difference exists between I.O’s
findings and DA’s views. While contending that the
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applicant is making misinterpretation of the said rule the
respondents have prayed for dismissal of the OA.
The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, vide
its judgment dated 09.05.2025, has quashed and set aside
the order dated 14.12.2023 (passed by the Disciplinary
Authority) and order dated 27/28.02.2024 (passed by the
Appellate Authority) and directed the respondents to
restore the pay of the applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay
the arrears with all consequential benefits within a period
of three months from the date of receipt of the order.
Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of the
learned Tribunal, the petitioner – Steel Authority of India
Limited has preferred the instant writ petition.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect that while the
Respondent No.1 was posted as General Manager, Blast
Furnace, Bokaro Steel City, one charge Memorandum
dated 10.01.2023 was issued under Rule 25 of SAIL
Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1977 wherein five
charges were alleged against the respondent No.1.
The applicant submitted his statement of defence
on 20.01.2023 denying the allegations. Thereafter, the
Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer were appointed
vide order dated 06.02.2023.
The enquiry proceeded and the Inquiry Officer has
submitted its report on 26.07.2023 holding that the
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charges under Article No. I to IV are not established and
charge under Article No. V is partially established.
Thereafter, vide order dated 14.12.2023,
punishment of reduction by one stage lower in time scale of
pay for a period of three years and three months without
cumulative effect has been imposed without giving any
disagreement notice.
The Respondent No.1 filed appeal against the order
imposing punishment which was rejected vide order dated
27/28.02.2024 against which the original application being
O.A./051/00141/2024 has been preferred.
The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties, vide
order dated 09.05.2025, has quashed and set aside the
order dated 14.12.2023 (passed by the Disciplinary
Authority) and order dated 27/28.02.2024 (passed by the
Appellate Authority) and directed the respondents to
restore the pay of the applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay
the arrears with all consequential benefits within a period
of three months from the date of receipt of the order.
The petitioner – Steel Authority of India Limited has
challenged the aforesaid order of the learned Tribunal
which is the subject matter of the instant appeal.
Submission on behalf of the Petitioner
4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner, has submitted at Bar that although the
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prayer has been made for quashing of the order passed by
the learned Tribunal dated 09.05.2025, but he is restricting
his prayer only for issuance of direction to remit the matter
before the disciplinary authority from the stage of showing
the difference of opinion so as to pass a fresh order after
following the due procedure of law.
5. It has been submitted by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner that even accepting the fact
that out of 05 charges, 04 charges have not been proved
and 01 charge has partially been proved, the requirement
of law was that the disciplinary authority i.e. respondent
no.4 was to differ with the finding recorded by the Inquiry
Officer so far as the charge which has not been found to be
proved by assigning the reason therein showing the
difference of opinion and by serving the aforesaid difference
of opinion to the delinquent employee, the Respondent No.1
herein, for the purpose of providing an opportunity of
hearing. But that cannot be a ground to quash the order of
punishment by not remitting the matter for passing the
fresh order by the authority after following the due
procedure of law.
6. The argument has been made that if any error has
been committed by the disciplinary authority, the
delinquent employee may not be allowed to take advantage
of technicalities, rather, the charge is to be considered by
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the disciplinary authority based upon the procedure of law
so that the injustice may not be there and delinquent
employee may not be allowed to go escort free. The learned
Tribunal has not considered the aforesaid aspect of the
matter and merely on technicality, the order impugned has
been quashed and set aside without remitting the matter
before the disciplinary authority for passing a fresh order.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent
7. Mr. Bhanu Kumar, learned counsel appearing for
the Respondent No.1-applicant, has submitted that the writ
petitioner was well conscious with the procedure as has
been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab
National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra,
reported in 1998(7) SCC 84 and even then the said
procedure has not been followed and, as such, being a
wrong doer, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to take
advantage of its own wrong.
8. It has been submitted that the memo of charge is of
the year 2023 being issued on 10.01.2023 and since then
two years has already lapsed and, as such, if the matter will
be remitted before the disciplinary authority, it will be
prejudicial to the interest of the applicant and after taking
into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the
Tribunal has not remitted the matter before the disciplinary
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authority, hence, the order passed by the learned Tribunal
may not be interfered with.
Analysis
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal
as available in the impugned order as also the pleading
made on behalf of the parties before the learned Tribunal.
10. The admitted fact herein is that based upon the
memorandum of charge wherein altogether five charges
have been levelled which, for ready reference, are being
referred herein :-
“Article-I Failed to control over-reporting of Work Through Slag
(WTS) by the contractor providing undue benefit to the
contractor as same has been over-reported by under-
loading the tippers thereby inflating the number of
trips of such tippers. This has led to steep increase in
WTS generation, as per the records, during his tenure
as Engineer I/c.
Article-II He did not ensure dumping of WTS as per BSL
requirement in violation to the provisions of the
contract.
Article-III He failed to prevent pilferage by mix-up of low value
and high value scraps for sale to the contractor.
Article-IV As per SOP of the contract, dumping of fresh slag
within the working area of the contractor was not
permitted; however, he did not take adequate steps to
prevent dumping of fresh slag arising at contractor site
from SMS.
Article-V Irregularities in execution of the contract by the
contractor were brought to executing department’s
notice by Vigilance; however, he as Engineer I/c has
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evaded taking or initiating action against the
contractor as per contractual terms.”
11. The Inquiry Officer has found 04 charges not proved
while 5th charge has partially been found to be proved. The
disciplinary authority although was to differ with the
finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer so far as the charges
not found to be proved (04 in number) but instead of
differing with the finding so recorded by the Inquiry Officer,
he straightway has imposed the punishment of reduction
by one stage lower in time scale of pay for a period of three
years and three months without cumulative effect.
12. The Respondent No.1/applicant has raised the
issue that what is the basis of inflicting the punishment in
a situation of charge having not been found to be proved.
The matter has been carried to the appellate authority by
raising the aforesaid point but even the appellate authority
has not found fit to interfere with the decision taken by the
disciplinary authority.
13. The order of punishment was challenged before the
learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal, after taking note of
the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari
Mishra (Supra), has quashed and set aside the order dated
14.12.2023 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and order
dated 27/28.02.2024 passed by the Appellate Authority
and directed the respondents to restore the pay of the
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applicant w.e.f. 14.12.2023 and pay the arrears with all
consequential benefits within a period of three months from
the date of receipt of the order.
14. The issue which has been raised on behalf of the
writ petitioner that the learned Tribunal ought to have
taken into consideration that while quashing the order of
punishment, it should have been remitted before the
authority for passing the order afresh after following the
due procedure of law.
15. Since the order of punishment dated 14.12.2023
and appellate order dated 27/28.02.2024 are not being
questioned, as per the submission made by Mr. Indrajit
Sinha, as recorded above, rather, only the order passed by
the learned Tribunal has been questioned that it should
have been remitted before the authority from the stage
showing difference of opinion from the finding recorded by
the Inquiry Officer.
16. The law is well settled that no one can be allowed to
take advantage of its own wrong as also the proposition of
law that on technicality no one can be allowed to take
advantage.
17. If the disciplinary proceeding is being started then
it is to be given its conclusive end. It is equally settled that
disciplinary authority is proceeding to initiate departmental
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proceeding, then the same must be concluded in
accordance with law.
18. Law with respect to a situation where the Inquiry
Officer has not found the charge proved has already been
propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari
Mishra (Supra) wherein the disciplinary authority has
remedy. The disciplinary authority, in such situation,
should differ with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer by
assigning the reason which shall be communicated to the
delinquent employee for the purpose of defending himself
based upon the difference of opinion shown by the
disciplinary authority upon the finding recorded by the
Inquiry Officer. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
judgment is being referred hereunder :-
“19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the
principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation
7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority
disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge,
then before it records its own findings on such charge, it
must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and
give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent
before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer
containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the
delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the
disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of
the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we
have already observed, require the authority which has to
take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an
opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a
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representation before the disciplinary authority records its
findings on the charges framed against the officer.”
19. The issue of remand was also a subject matter in
the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj
Behari Mishra (Supra) as per the reference made to that
effect at para 21 and the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the facts of
the aforesaid case, has been pleased not to remit the matter
since the case was of retired employee and more than 14
years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had
superannuated, and hence the Hon’ble Apex Court has
thought it proper not to remit the matter after such long
delay.
“21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12-1983.
During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-
1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record.
More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent
officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the
interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be
remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of
another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such
directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the
decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders
imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release
the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will,
however, be no order as to costs.”
20. This Court, therefore, is now proceeding to examine
that as to whether the principle of not allowing to take
advantage of technicality is to be relaxed in view of the
factual consideration made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
paragraph 21 of the judgment rendered in the case of
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Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari
Mishra (Supra).
21. Herein, the admitted fact is that the memorandum
of charge was issued on 10.01.2023. Thereafter, the appeal
was preferred and it is now about three years from the date
of issuance of memorandum of charge.
22. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the fact of
the present case is not of such nature where the benefit of
technicality is to be allowed to be taken by the delinquent
employee taking into consideration the fact that the
Respondent No.1 is in service and the memo of charge has
only been issued on 10.01.2023.
23. This Court, in view of the aforesaid, is of the
considered view that the learned Tribunal ought to have
taken into consideration the fact about the benefit being
allowed to be taken by the delinquent employee, the
applicant herein, and ought to have remitted the matter
before the disciplinary authority to pass order afresh as per
the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.
Masilamani v. LIC (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein it has been
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if Court thinks that
enquiry was not properly conducted then It must remit the
case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to
conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated,
and conclude the same, for ready reference the relevant
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paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as
under :
“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets
aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry
was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the
employee. It must remit the case concerned to the
disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from
the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same.”
24. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Allahabad
Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tiwari (2017) 2 SCC 308 also
throws light on the approach to be adopted but in a more
nuanced manner than what was held in A. Masilamani
(supra). Paragraph 8 of the decision reads as follows:
“8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases
where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient, either
procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to
remand the matter back to the authority concerned to redo
the same afresh. That course could have been followed even
in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to
the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer for a
proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course
may not have been the only course open in a given situation.
There may be situations where because of a long time-lag or
such other supervening circumstances the writ court
considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct
a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority.
That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case
at hand.”
25. It also needs to be referred herein that the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab
National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra
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(Supra) has been placed before the learned Tribunal and
based upon that the order impugned has been passed.
26. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when the
ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab
National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra
(Supra) has been applied in the facts of the present case
then it should have been in entirety i.e., the issue of remand
of the matter ought to have been considered by the learned
Tribunal but having not been considered, the impugned
order, according to our considered view, suffers from an
error.
27. This Court is conscious that while exercising the
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against
the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the power of
judicial review is to be exercised as per the ratio laid down
in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India &
Ors. reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 at paragraph 99
wherein it has been held that the High Court is having
power of judicial review to look into the legality and
propriety of the order of the tribunal to the extent that if the
order passed by the tribunal suffers from any perversity or
the order is passed without following the principles of
natural justice or there is error apparent on the face of
order. For ready reference, paragraph 99 of the judgment is
quoted as under:-
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“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that
clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B,
to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts
and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of
the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act
and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other
legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and
323- B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The
jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles
226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of
our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted
other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role
in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and
32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article
323-A and Article 323- B of the Constitution are possessed
of the competence to test the constitutional validity of
statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these
Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a
Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will,
nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in
respect of the areas of law for which they have been
constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to
directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they
question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the
legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional
and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”
28. The power of judicial review has also been
deliberated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is to be
considered while exercising the said power only to the
extent that if any order is being passed found to be having
error on the face of the order or without jurisdiction or
suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of
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the order means that if the order appears on its face having
with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be
exercised.
29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal
Central School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim,
(2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at paragraph-30 that the
power of judicial review must be exercised by the Court
after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error
apparent on the face of the record and not the same has
been established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30
of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under:-
“30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to
see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an
apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a
decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record
is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record
or whether the error requires examination or argument to
establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of
reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two
opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the
record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale,
AIR 1960 SC 137] . —.”
30. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and
Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordship have held that the
patent error in a decision can be corrected by writ of
certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on
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the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:-
“11. … An error in the decision or determination itself may
also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a
manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g.
when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which
can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.
….”
31. The power of judicial review can be exercised if the
order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from an error
and if there is any perversity.
32. The element of perversity has been raised. The
Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State
[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009)
10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse
has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,
the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as
under:-
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001)
1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression
“perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate
authority are not supported by the evidence brought on21
2026:JHHC:9834-DBrecord or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of
procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse
finding” means a finding which is not only against the
weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence
itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3)
SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this
is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at
those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant
58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106
NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong
way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current
English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in
a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
22
2026:JHHC:9834-DB
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence
or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th
Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence
but is altogether against the evidence.”
33. This Court, is of the view that when the learned
Tribunal has considered the judgment rendered in the case
of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari
Mishra (Supra), then it should have been considered in its
entirety, i.e., including the issue of remand but having not
done so, the same, according to our considered view, suffers
from perversity.
34. This Court, in view of the legal issues as discussed
hereinabove and the factual aspect of the present case, is
of the view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal
requires modification to the effect that the matter is being
remanded before the disciplinary authority to take decision
afresh after showing the difference of opinion with the
finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, i.e., by following the
law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab
National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra
23
2026:JHHC:9834-DB
(Supra) and communicate it to the delinquent employee
within three weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the
order.
35. The disciplinary authority is further directed to pass
order afresh within a further period of six weeks from the
date of receipt of the explanation which is to be presented
by the Respondent No.1 within two weeks from the date of
receipt of the reason, as directed above.
36. The consequential benefits will depend upon the
final outcome of the said decision.
37. The instant writ petition stands disposed of
accordingly.
38. Pending interlocutory applications, if any,
accordingly disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Deepak Roshan, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.)
Dated 06/04/2026
A.F.R.
Birendra/
Uploaded on 07/04/2026
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