Chattisgarh High Court
Xyz vs Prakash Kumar Yadav on 7 April, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
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2026:CGHC:15710-DB
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17.02.2026 07.04.2026 -- 07.04.2026
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 159 of 2023
XYZ
... Appellant
versus
1 - Prakash Kumar Yadav, S/o Krishnachand Yadav, Aged About 30 Years,
R/o Goshala Para, Police Line Raigarh, Thana-City Kotwali, District Raigarh
(C.G.)
2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Chandrapur, District- Janjgir
Champa (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause Title Taken From CIS System)
For Appellant : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1 : Ms. Shristi Singh along with Mr. Arpan Verma,
Advocates.
For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Himanshu Yadu, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, J.
C A V Judgment
Per, Rajani Dubey, J.
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the
judgment dated 21.02.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions
2
Judge (F.T.C.), Sakti, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial
No. 54/2021 whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the
accused/respondent No. 1 of offence under Sections 376 (2) (n) and
417 of IPC.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the prosecutrix aged about 30 years,
met with the accused/respondent No.1 in the year 2013, when she was
studying in Girls College, Raigarh, they got acquainted with each other.
In the year 2014, the marriage of prosecutrix was fixed with resident of
village Jatri. The accused proposed marriage to the prosecutrix over
phone and on 12.03.2014 came to Chandrapur around 4:00 a.m. He
took her to a hut near her residence and under the pretext of marriage,
forced her into physical relationship, despite her refusal. On the same
day, the accused, under the pretext of marriage, took her by bus to
Raigarh, kept her in a hospice (dharmshala) for about seven days and
continued to have sexual relationship with her. On 19.03.2014, the
accused took the prosecutrix to House No. 25, Vasundhara Vihar,
Govardhanpur, Ambikapur and on pretext of marriage kept the
prosecutrix with him for seven years and in this duration he used to
make sexual relationship with the prosecutrix on the pretext of
marriage. Whenever the prosecutrix asked that when will the accused
marry her, he used to sideline the same by giving different excuses.
She also asked the accused to have a child, but he kept delaying the
same by saying that they will have children only after their marriage.
When the prosecutrix asked the accused to marry her, he used to
blackmail her by giving various threats like death and defamation and
also the accused used to harass her. Being frightened from him, she
remained silent, hoping that he would marry her. She was also not
3
allowed to meet or speak with her family by the accused. On
20.08.2021, two days before Rakshabandhan the accused took the
prosecutrix to Chandrapur under the pretext of meeting her parents,
abandoned her on the road and fled. Her family approached the
accused’s parents, who supported him, causing the prosecutrix’s father
to suffer paralysis from the mental stress. Then, the prosecutrix lodged
a report at Police Station Chandrapur on 09.11.2021 registered as
Crime No. 126/2021 under Sections 376 and 417 IPC, and the police
initiated an investigation. During the investigation, the prosecutrix was
medically examined and her statement was recorded. On finding
evidence against the accused, he was arrested. A spot map was
prepared and the following items were seized: vaginal slide, axillary
and pubic hair and a panty of the prosecutrix vide Ex.P/21; a Vivo 15
Pro mobile phone with two SIM cards vide Ex.P/10; the accused’s
underwear vide Ex.P/11; and semen slides of the accused vide Ex.P/14
and after completion of due and necessary investigation, charge-sheet
was led before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate who, in turn,
committed the case for trial. On the basis of the material contained in
the charge-sheet, learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent
No.1 of offence under Sections 376 (2) (n) & 417 of IPC., against which
the present appeal has been filed by the complainant/appellant.
3. Learned counsel for the complainant/appellant submits that the learned
trial Court passed the impugned judgment without appreciating the
material available on record. Learned trial Court has given grandness
to minor contradictions and omissions and passed the impugned
judgment which is bad in law and liable to be dismissed. Learned
counsel further submits that the facts and circumstances available on
4
record indicate that right from day one, the intention of the accused
was not to marry with the prosecutrix and was just to satiate his lust
upon her and he gave wrong commitments of marriage to the
prosecutrix, gained her trust and took an undue advantage of the same
for his personal agenda. The trial Court has failed to appreciate that if
the accused has not projected the pretext of marriage to physically
abused the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix would not have allowed the
accused to make sexual relationship with him. In her entire evidence
the prosecutrix has clearly impressed upon the fact that it was the
promise of marriage given by the accused due to which, without
protesting, she allowed the accused to make sexual relationship with
her. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that in absence of
such believable promise the prosecutrix would not have allowed the
accused to have sexual relationship with her not only at the first
occasion, but subsequently also. Such conduct falls squarely within the
ambit of Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes
sexual intercourse by a man with a woman under a false promise of
marriage. Each occasion of physical intimacy, entered into under this
deceit, constitutes a separate act of sexual assault and the accused is
liable for each such act. It is further submitted that the accused’s
conduct also satisfies the elements of cheating under Section 417 IPC.
The essence of cheating is the deliberate inducement of a person to
act to their prejudice by false representations. Here, the accused by
falsely representing his intention to marry the prosecutrix, dishonestly
induced her to consent to physical intimacy, thereby causing her grave
emotional and psychological prejudice. This conduct is deliberate,
calculated, and clearly dishonest, and the accused cannot claim
5
ignorance or lack of intention. The learned trial Court has erred in
failing to appreciate that such deceit, resulting in serious harm to the
prosecutrix, fulfills all the necessary ingredients for a conviction under
Section 417 IPC. He next submits that the prosecutrix’s testimony is
coherent, consistent, and believable. The evidence demonstrates a
clear causal connection between the accused’s false promise of
marriage and the prosecutrix’s consent to the relationship. The
accused exploited this trust to satisfy his personal desires, without any
intention of honoring his promise. The trial Court’s failure to recognize
this deliberate deception amounts to a grave oversight and does not
reflect a correct application of law or appreciation of facts.
Furthermore, it is submitted that in a society where the dignity, safety,
and bodily autonomy of women are of paramount concern, the courts
must adopt a protective and sensitive approach towards the
prosecutrix. Allowing the accused to escape liability on the ground that
the prosecutrix voluntarily entered into a relationship, when such
voluntariness was obtained through deliberate fraud, would set a
dangerous precedent and undermine the legal protections intended to
safeguard women against sexual exploitation.
Hence, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the
judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is perverse and is liable
to be set aside. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Deepak Gulati
vs. State of Haryana.1, Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of
Bihar2 & Phool Singh vs. State of M.P3.
1 (2013) 7 SCC 675
2 (2005) 1 SCC 88
3 (2022) 2 SCC 74
6
4. Learned counsel for the State supporting the argument of counsel for
the appellant/complainant submits that the learned trial Court has
passed the impugned order in a cryptic and laconic manner without
appreciating the material available on record and the accused/
respondent No. 1 is liable to be convicted for the said offences. The
impugned judgment, finding and order of acquittal passed by the
learned trial Court is illegal, improper,incorrect and is liable to be set
aside.
5. Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1/accused
supporting the impugned judgment submit that the learned trial Court
minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly
acquitted the respondent No. 1/accused of the aforesaid charges.
Therefore, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any irregularity
or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
In support of their contention, they relied upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Uday vs. State of Karnataka4,
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra5, Sonu @
Subhash Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Anr. 6 and Naim Ahamed vs.
State (NCT of Delhi)7
6. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the
material available on record.
7. It is evident from the record of the learned trial Court that it framed
charges against the accused/respondent No.1 for offence under
4 (2003) 4 SCC 46
5 (2019) 9 SCC 608
6 (2021) 18 SCC 517
7 (2023) 15 SCC 385
7
Sections 376 (2) (n) and 417 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court
acquitted the accused/respondent No.1 of the aforesaid charges on
this ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt.
8. PW-1, the prosecutrix, stated that while she was studying at Women’s
College, Raigarh, she met the accused and exchanged contact
numbers and they used to talk regularly. Later, when the accused came
to know that her marriage was fixed in Village Jatri, he said that he
would marry her and refused to let her marry there. On 12.03.2014,
around 4:00 PM, the accused called the prosecutrix from her home and
took her to a hut near her residence and committed forcible sexual
intercourse with her. He then took her by bus from Chandrapur to
Raigarh and kept her in a hospice (dharmsala) for about seven days
and made continuous sexual relations with her on the pretext of
marriage. On 20.03.2014, the accused took her by bus from Raigarh to
Ambikapur and kept her there as his wife at House No. 25, Vasundhara
Vihar and he used to say that she is his wife when people asked.
Further stated that the accused threatened to kill her and harassed her
by threatening to defame her when she asked him about marriage. On
20.08.2021, on the occasion of Rakshabandhan, the accused took her
by car to Chandrapur on the pretext of meeting her parents, but
abandoned her on the road and returned. She then informed her
parents and brothers and lodged a written report against the accused
at Police Station- Chandrapur, vide Ex. P/1 and on the basis of said
report an F.I.R. was lodged by the Police vide Ex.P/2 and she gave her
consent for medical examination vide Ex. P/3.
8
In her cross-examination, she admitted that on 12.03.2014, the
accused arrived at Chandrapur around 4:00 am and called her over the
phone to meet him, but she did not inform her parents and brother
about this incident and that her report (Ex. P/1) and FIR (Ex. P/2)
omitted her refusal to let him enter the hut.
In para 11 of his cross-examination, she admitted as under:-
“11.यह कहना सही है कि अभियुक्त जब मुझे खींच कर झोपड़ी अंदर ले जाने लगा तो मैं
चिल्ला कर शोर नहीं की थी। यह कहना सही है कि जब अभियुक्त मुझे झोपड़ी के अंदर मेरे
साथ शारीरिक संबंध बनाने लगा तो में चिल्ला कर शोर शराबा नहीं की। यह कहना सही है कि
अभियुक्त उस समय मेरे हाथ पैर को नहीं बांधा था। यह कहना सही है कि अभियुक्त अपना
कपड़ा वगैरह खोला तो में उसे मना नहीं की। स्वतः कहती है कि अभियुक्त उससे शादी
करूंगा बोला था इसलिए मना नहीं की। यह कहना गलत है कि मैं अपने कपड़े को स्वतः
निकाली थी। स्वतः कहती है कि अभियुक्त निकाला था। यह कहना सही है कि अभियुक्त मेरे
कपड़े को उतार रहा था तो मैं शोर शराबा नहीं की। स्वतः कहती है कि मैं मना कर रही थी
कि शादी के बाद ये सब करना तो आरोपी नहीं माना। यह कहना सही है कि मैं वहां से भागने
का प्रयास नहीं की। स्वतः कहती है कि हम दोनो एक दस
ू रे को पसंद करते थे और अभियुक्तमुझे शादी करूंगा बोला था इसलिए मैं भागने का प्रयास नहीं की। ”
In para 12 of his cross-examination, she herself stated that she
and the accused love each other and he said that he would marry her,
hence, she did not refuse him from having physical relationship.
In para 13 of his cross-examination, she stated as under:-
” 13.जब से अभियुक्त मेरे साथ शारीरिक संबंध बनाना प्रारंभ किया तब से ले
कर रिपोर्ट करने तक 7 साल की अवधि में इस बात को बीच बीच में अपने माँ बाप
को केवल बतायी थी. लेकिन समाज में या अन्य किसी व्यक्ति को मैं नहीं बतायी
थी। यह कहना सही है कि अभियुक्त के साथ मैं 7 वर्षों तक रहने के दौरान
अभियुक्त द्वारा मेरे साथ शादी न करने से मैंने आज दिनांक तक अभियुक्त के
9विरूद्ध मेरे साथ विवाह करने संबंधी कोई दावा मुकदमा किसी न्यायालय में पेश
नहीं की हू।ं ”
In para 14 of her cross-examination, she admitted that there
were other passengers on the bus and that she did not inform
anyone that the accused was taking her to Raigarh and that
she willingly had sexual relationship with him at the
Dharmshala.
In para 15, she admitted that when the accused took her to
Vasundhara Vihar, Ambikapur, she raised no objection and that
the colony is inhabited by other residents.
In para 16, she admitted that on 20.08.2021, she did not file
any complaint at the police station regarding the accused
taking her to Chandrapur and abandoning her on the road, nor
did she or her parents convened any social meeting with family
or community members. She further admitted that she lodged
the report (Ex. P/1) after passage of 2 months and 18 days.
She further stated that since the year 2013, the accused was
giving her false commitments regarding marrying her, at that
time, she did not tell to her parents about the said fact, she told
this fact after 3-4 years. She also admitted this suggestion that
she is an educated lady, she has knowledge about physical
relationship and also admitted that a boy and girl have physical
relationship after the marriage.
9. PW-2- mother and PW-3- brother of the prosecutrix have supported the
statement of the prosecutrix (PW-1). Both the witnesses have admitted
this suggestion that they did not lodge any report to the Police
10
regarding the prosecutrix who left home and did not return for years.
They also admitted that no social meeting was convened for the same.
10. PW-9- Dr. Madhuri Chandra, examined the prosecutrix, but she did not
find any external or internal injuries on her body and she gave her
report vide Ex. P/4 and vaginal slide sent for chemical examination.
During cross-examination, the witness stated that a thorough
medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted, which included
both external and internal examinations. The results of these
examinations showed no signs or evidence of recent sexual
intercourse and there were no injuries, marks or other indications to
suggest that any force or physical coercion had been used against her
in any manner
11. From the F.S.L. report (Ex. C/1), it is clear that no semen was found in
the seized articles i.e, vaginal slide, pubic hair, axillary hair and cloth
of the prosecutrix (A,B,C,D)
12. Close scrutiny of statements of all the witnesses clearly shows that
prosecutrix is a consenting party to the act of the appellant and she is
an educated major lady.
13. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Pramod
Suryabhan Pawar (supra) in para 18 as under:-
“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges
from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with
respect to Section 375 must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To
establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a
“misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to
11marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise,
given in bad faith and with no intention of being
adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise
itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the
sexual act. ”
14. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Naim Ahamed
(supra) in paras 17 and 18 as under:-
“17.In Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana 5, this Court gave one
more dimension of the word ‘consent’ by distinguishing ‘Rape’
and ‘consensual sex’ and observed as under:
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the
good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction
between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had
mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this
effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within
the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a
distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and
not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a
false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether
12the consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix
agrees to have sexual intercourse on 5 (2013) 7 SCC
675 account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to
her by the accused, or where an accused on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the
initial stage itself, the accused had no intention
whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim.
There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person
having the best of intentions is unable to marry the
victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
“failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear
from the evidence available, does not always amount to
misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact
13must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC
cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon
the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on
the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that
from the very beginning, the accused had never really
intended to marry her”.
18. Again in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others (supra), this Court interpreting the
Section 90 and the Clause – Secondly in Section 375 of IPC,
observed as under: –
“23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must
very carefully examine whether the complainant had
actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide
motives and had made a false promise to this effect
only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a
distinction between mere breach of a promise and not
fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made
the promise with the sole intention to seduce the
prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act
would not amount to rape. There may be a case where
the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused and
not solely on account of the misconception created by
accused, or where an accused, on account of
14circumstances which he could not have foreseen or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her despite having every intention to do. Such cases
must be treated differently. If the complainant had any
mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives,
it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged
consensual physical relationship between the parties
would not constitute an offence under Section 376
IPC.”
15. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Deepak Gulati
(supra) in paras 18, 19, 20, 21 and 24 as under:-
“18. Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
referred to as “the 1872 Act”) provides, that if the
prosecutrix deposes that she did not give her consent, then
the court shall presume that she did not in fact, give such
consent. The facts of the instant case do not warrant that
the provisions of Section 114-A of the 1872 Act be pressed
into service. Hence, the sole question involved herein is
whether her consent had been obtained on the false
promise of marriage. Thus, the provisions of Sections 417,
375 and 376 IPC have to be taken into consideration, along
with the provisions of Section 90 IPC Section 90 IPC
provides that any consent given under a misconception of
fact, would not be considered as valid consent, so far as
the provisions of Section 375 IPC are concerned, and thus,
such a physical relationship would tantamount to
15committing rape.
19.This Court considered the issue involved herein at
length in Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deelip Singh v. State
of Bihar. Yedla Srinivasa Rao v State of A.P.4 and Pradeep
Kumar v. State of Bihars and came to the a conclusion that
in the event that the accused’s promise is not false and
has not been made with the sole intention to seduce the
prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would
not amount to rape. Thus, the same would only hold that
where the prosecutrix, under a misconception of fact to the
extent that the accused is likely to marry her, submits to
the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act cannot be
said to be consensual, so far as the b offence of the
accused is concerned.
20. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible
crime in a society, as it is an assault on the body, mind and
privacy of the victim. While a murderer destroys the
physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles
the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an
animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means
can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a
permanent scar on the life of the victim, and therefore a
rape victim is placed on a higher pedestal than an injured
witness. Rape is a crime against the entire society and
violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most
hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the
supreme honour of a woman, and offends both, her esteem
16and dignity. It causes psychological and physical harm to
the victim, leaving upon her d indelible marks.
21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is
an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind
weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side.
There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual
sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had e actually wanted to
marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a
false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the
latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There
is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and
not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine
whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise
of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after f wholly understanding the nature
and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a
case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused on
account of circumstances which he could not have
foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to
marry her, despite having every intention g to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can be
convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion
17that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he
had clandestine motives.
24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate
evidence to show that at the relevant time Le. at the initial
stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of
keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of
course, be circumstances, when a person having the best
of intentions is 9 unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a
promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due
to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence
available, does not always amount to misconception of
fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term
“misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate
relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in
such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the
accused had never really intended to marry her.”
16. In the light of the aforementioned judgments, it becomes apparent that
in the present case as well, the prosecutrix (PW-1) has herself
admitted that she voluntarily chose to accompany the accused and
cohabit with him over an extended period of approximately seven
years. This admission clearly indicates that the relationship between
the prosecutrix and the accused was consensual in nature, and it
underscores the fact that she willingly participated in the cohabitation,
thereby demonstrating her autonomy and capacity to make personal
18
decisions during the entire period in question. It is further noted that the
prosecutrix is aged about 30 years, which means that seven years ago
she was around 23 years old, indicating that she was a mature adult
capable of making her own decisions during the period in question. As
per the prosecutrix, despite alleging that the accused abandoned her
on 20.08.2021 at Chandrapur, she did not lodge any FIR at the
relevant time and remained silent for about 02 months and 18 days
before filing the complaint/FIR, for which no satisfactory explanation is
forthcoming on record. Thus, the learned trial Court after minutely
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence and observed
guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court rightly finds that offence under
Sections 376 (2) (n) and 417 of IPC are not proved against the
appellant.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 in the case
of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka8, has held in para
36 as under:-
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values
of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:-
“(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core
element of a criminal trial and such
appreciation must be comprehensive
8 (2024) 3 SCC 544
19inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii Partial or selective appreciation of
evidence may result in a miscarriage of
justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii If the Court, after appreciation of
evidence, finds that two views are possible,
the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally
plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary
view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to
reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-
appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the Trial
Court for acquittal and must cover all the
facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to
conviction, the appellate Court must
demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error
of law or fact in the decision of the Trial
Court.”
18. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and the view
20
which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible
and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or
perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned
judgment.
19. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is
liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal)
JUDGE JUDGE
AMIT PATEL
