Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Prem Naresh vs State Of U.P on 23 March, 2026
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.7574 of 2025)
PREM NARESH … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. … RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 20.10.2021 at
about 2:30 pm, when the complainant’s granddaughter
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘victim’) was playing near the house,
the appellant herein took the victim to his brother-in-law –
Signature Not Verified
Shivprem’s house, by luring her with biscuits. After some time,
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2026.04.06
17:28:06 IST
Reason:
the complainant, on hearing noises of the victim crying, rushed to
1
the spot and found the victim lying naked inside a fodder room,
bleeding from her private parts. The appellant was also present in
the same room. On seeing the complainant, the appellant fled
from the spot. The complainant alleged that on the pretext of
giving her biscuits, the appellant took the victim to the fodder
room and raped her.
3. Based on the aforesaid allegations, a written complaint was
submitted by the complainant pursuant to which an FIR bearing
No. 516/2021 was registered on 20.10.2021 at P.S. Bidhuna,
District Auraiya, against the appellant herein under Section
376AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and under Section 5
read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’). On completion of the
investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the appellant under
the aforesaid provisions. Thereafter, a criminal case bearing
Special Session Trial No. 1276/2021 was committed to the Court
of Special Judge (POCSO Act), Auraiya (‘trial court’).
4. Upon completion of the trial, the trial court, by its judgment
dated 09.02.2023, held the appellant guilty of offences under
2
Section 376AB of the IPC and under Section 5 read with Section 6
of the POCSO Act. By order of sentence dated 14.02.2023, the
appellant herein was awarded a death sentence along with a fine
of Rs. 5,00,000/-.
5. Being aggrieved, appellant herein preferred a jail appeal
bearing Capital Case No. 7 of 2023 before the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad.
6. By the impugned order dated 23.07.2024, the High Court
dismissed the appeal against conviction. However the High Court
partly allowed the appeal qua the sentence by commuting the
capital punishment imposed on the appellant to life imprisonment
for a fixed term of twenty-five years without any remission.
7. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present
criminal appeal before this Court.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent-State.
9. We note that the High Court, while affirming the conviction
of the appellant, however granted relief by commuting the death
3
penalty to life imprisonment for a fixed term of twenty five years
without any remission.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this would
imply that the appellant would not be entitled to any remission in
terms of the provisions of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and the applicable policy of remission.
That, had the life imprisonment not being for a fixed term of
twenty-five years without any remission, then the appellant would
have had the right to apply for remission on completion of
fourteen years of incarceration in terms of Section 432 CrPC.
However, the impugned sentence bars him from seeking any kind
of remission for a period of twenty-five years. The same is harsh
and would cause great hardship to the appellant herein inasmuch
as there would be an absence of reformative justice in the instant
case; that the appellant was twenty-nine years of age when the
crime was committed and presently he is around thirty-five years
of age and having two young children. In the circumstances, she
submitted that this Court may consider modification of the
sentence of punishment imposed by the High Court.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State with
4
reference to the counter-affidavit contended that the appellant
has already been granted the relief by the High Court by
commuting sentence from death penalty to life imprisonment. The
High Court in its wisdom had imposed life imprisonment for a
fixed term of twenty-five years without any remission having
regard to the gruesome nature of the crime. The appellant was
twenty-nine years at the time of the incident and therefore the
High Court has considered the mitigating circumstances and
imposed the said sentence. Learned counsel for the respondent-
State hence submitted that there is no merit in this appeal and
hence, the same may be dismissed.
12. The mitigating circumstances were considered in paragraph
36(i) to (vi) of the impugned judgment, which read as under:
“(i) The accused who is aged about 29 years at the
time of incident has no criminal history and has his
family to support.
(ii) Both the families of victim and accused were
having visiting terms with each other and, therefore, the
possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the
appellant in the society cannot be ruled out as the Trial
Court has not recorded any finding that awarding
severest, punishment is the only possibility in the present
case.
(iii) The Trial court has also not recorded any finding
5
that accused can be a menace to the society before
awarding capital punishment.
(iv) The Trial court has not recorded any aggravating
circumstances against the appellant which can over
weigh the mitigating circumstances especially, when the
appellant has no criminal history.
(v) In view of Navas alias Mulanvas Case (Supra),
there should be exceptional circumstances warranting
imposition of excess death penalty which cannot be
reversed.
(vi) Lastly, the trial court has also not recorded any
finding as to how the present case is rarest of the rare
case even though he accused has committed the gravest
offence.”
13. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in
light of the material on record and reasoning of the High Court in
the impugned judgment, which has also recorded the aforesaid
mitigating circumstances. Section 376AB of the IPC for which the
appellant was convicted reads as under:
“376AB. Punishment for rape on woman under twelve
years of age.—
Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years
of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for
a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but
which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s
natural life, and with fine or with death:
6
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to
meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the
victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this section
shall be paid to the victim.”
14. The minimum punishment stipulated under the said Section
is twenty years and the maximum sentence is death penalty. The
provision also incorporates another variety of sentence namely
imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life.
15. The High court while commuting the death penalty has also
not chosen to impose punishment for the remainder of the
appellant’s natural life and instead has awarded imprisonment for
life for a fixed term of twenty-five years without any remission.
The term of minimum imprisonment is twenty years.
16. We find that the Constitutional Courts while commuting a
death penalty into one of life imprisonment have also the power to
impose a fixed term of punishment. In the instant case, a period
of twenty-five years without remission is the fixed term of
punishment. We however, find that having regard to the
mitigating circumstances, we can reduce the life imprisonment for
a fixed term of twenty years without any remission.
7
17. In this regard, we rely upon the judgment of this Court in
Sukhdev Yadav alias Pehalwan vs. State of (NCT of Delhi),
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1671, the relevant portions of which are
extracted as under:
“10.8. Therefore, the law-makers have thought it fit to
prescribe the minimum and maximum sentence to be
imposed having regard to the nature of crime and have
left it to the Courts to determine the kind of punishments
that have to be imposed within the prescribed limit under
the relevant provision. In other words, while the
maximum extent of punishment of either death or life
imprisonment is provided for under the relevant
provisions, it will be for the Courts to decide if, in its
opinion, the imposition of death may not be warranted,
what should be the number of years of imprisonment
that would be judiciously and judicially more
appropriate. This is by taking into account, apart from
the crime itself, the interest of the society at large and
other relevant factors which cannot be put in any straight
jacket formula. The said process of determination must
be held to be available with the courts by virtue of extent
of the punishments provided for such specified nature of
crimes and such power is also to be derived from those
penal provisions themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Recently, this Court in Shiva Kumar v. State of
Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817 (“Shiva Kumar”) reiterating
the aforesaid observations made in Sriharan, observed
that there is a power which can be derived from
the IPC to impose a fixed term sentence or modified
punishment which can only be exercised by the High
Court or in the event of any further appeal, by the
8
Supreme Court and not by any other Court. It was
further observed that the Constitution Bench
in Sriharan held that power to impose a modified
punishment of providing any specific term of
incarceration or till the end of convict’s life as an
alternative to death penalty, can be exercised only by the
High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other
inferior Court. More pertinently, it was observed that the
observations of the Constitution Bench
in Sriharan cannot be construed in a narrow perspective.
Oka, J. speaking for the Bench observed that “the
majority view in Sriharan cannot be construed to mean
that such a power cannot be exercised by the
Constitutional Courts unless the question is of
commuting the death sentence”. For this, paragraph 104
of the judgment of the Constitution Bench
in Sriharan was relied upon. Clarifying the position at
paragraph 14 of the judgment in Shiva Kumar, Oka, J.
held as under:
“14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt
that even in a case where capital punishment is
not imposed or is not proposed, the
constitutional courts can always exercise the
power of imposing a modified or fixed-term
sentence by directing that a life sentence, as
contemplated by “secondly” in Section
53IPC, shall be of a fixed period of more than
fourteen years, for example, of twenty years,
thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment
cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view
of the mandate of Section 433-A CrPC.”11.1. In the said case, the sentence imposed by the Fast
Track Court (Sessions Court) on the appellant therein to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for rest of his life for an
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was modified
to the extent that the appellant was directed to undergo
thirty years of actual sentence and to be released9
thereafter. The appeal was partly allowed to the above
extent.
12. Navas alias Mulanavas was a criminal appeal which
arose out of a death reference from the judgment of the
Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Thrissur
in Sessions Case No. 491 of 2006. The High Court had
modified the death penalty to imprisonment for life with
the further direction that the accused shall not be
released from prison for a period of thirty years
including the period already undergone with set off
under Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 (for short, “CrPC”) alone. The accused approached
this Court assailing the aforesaid judgments both on
conviction as well as on sentence. While considering the
alternative submission regarding the sentence of
imprisonment for thirty years without remission being
excessive and disproportionate, this Court speaking
through one of us (Viswanathan, J.) considered the
judgments discussed above and after a chronological
survey of a large number of cases, observed in
paragraph 59 as under:
“59. A journey through the cases set out
hereinabove shows that the fundamental
underpinning is the principle of proportionality.
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances
which the Court considers while deciding
commutation of penalty from death to life
imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding
the number of years of compulsory imprisonment
without remission, too. As a judicially trained
mind pores and ponders over the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and in cases where
they decide to commute the death penalty they
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what
would be the appropriate period of sentence to be
imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda
(supra) principle too. Matters are not cut and10
dried and nicely weighed here to formulate a
uniform principle. That is where the experience
of the judicially trained mind comes in as pointed
out in V. Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the
process of arriving at the number of years as the
most appropriate for the case at hand, which the
convict will have to undergo before which the
remission powers could be invoked, some of the
relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are :
– (a) the number of deceased who are victims of
that crime and their age and gender; (b) the
nature of injuries including sexual assault if any;
(c) the motive for which the offence was
committed; (d) whether the offence was
committed when the convict was on bail in
another case; (e) the premeditated nature of the
offence; (f) the relationship between the offender
and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h)
the criminal antecedents; and whether the
convict, if released, would be a menace to the
society. Some of the positive factors have been,
(1) age of the convict; (2) the probability of
reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a
professional killer; (4) the socioeconomic
condition of the accused; (5) the composition of
the family of the accused and (6) conduct
expressing remorse. These were some of the
relevant factors that were kept in mind in the
cases noticed above while weighing the pros and
cons of the matter. The Court would be
additionally justified in considering the conduct
of the convict in jail; and the period already
undergone to arrive at the number of years which
the Court feels the convict should, serve as part
of the sentence of life imprisonment and before
which he cannot apply for remission. These are
not meant to be exhaustive but illustrative and
each case would depend on the facts and
circumstances therein.”11
12.1. Applying the aforesaid factors to the case, this
Court allowed the appeal in part by modifying the
sentence imposed under Section 302 IPC by the High
Court for a period of thirty years’ of life imprisonment
without remission to a period of twenty-five years without
remission, including the period already undergone.”
18. In view of the foregoing, we uphold the conviction of the
appellant. However, we modify the sentence of “life imprisonment
for a fixed term of twenty-five years without any remission” to the
“life imprisonment for a fixed term of twenty years without any
remission”.
19. The appeal is allowed in part in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………….……J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
………………………………….J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 23, 2026
12
ITEM NO.34 COURT NO.4 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
PETITION(S) FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRL.) NO(S).7574/2025
[ARISING OUT OF IMPUGNED FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED
23.07.2024 IN RC NO. 6/2023 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT OF
JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD]
PREM NARESH PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. RESPONDENT(S)
IA NO. 119686/2025 – CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING
IA NO. 119687/2025 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 23-03-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
For Petitioner(s) : Mrs. Prabha Swami, AOR
Mr. Saimon Farooqui, Adv.
Ms. Divya Swami, Adv.
Mr. Keshav Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Udhay Krishan Ganesan, Adv.
Mr. Mohd Azam Khan, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Yasharth Kant, AOR
Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Adv.
Ms. Sanjana Singh, Adv.
Mr. Ghanshyam Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
Appeal is allowed in part in terms of the non-
reportable judgment, which is placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(B. LAKSHMI MANIKYA VALLI) (DIVYA BABBAR)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER(NSH)
13
