Delhi High Court
Government Of Nct Of Delhi vs Najma And Ors on 6 April, 2026
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 19 March 2026
Pronounced on: 6 April 2026
+ LPA 349/2021, CM APPL. 33731/2021
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sameer Vashisht, SC
CIVIL, GNCTD, Ms. Harshita Nathrani,
Mr. Aryaman Vachher, Advocates
versus
NAJMA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Gaurav Jain, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
% JUDGMENT
06.04.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
A. The lis
1. This case requires us to revisit, painfully, a dark period in our
history – the COVID-19 pandemic. It throws up, for consideration, the
issue of whether an assurance extended by the Chief Minister of
Delhi, in a press conference, as a step towards enforcement of the
restrictions on public movement of persons put in place in the wake of
COVID, is unenforceable in law, absent a formal written policy
decision to that effect.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 1 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
2. A learned Single Judge of this Court has answered the issue in
the negative, invoking the principles of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation. The Delhi Government1 is in appeal.
B. Facts
3. COVID struck India in March 2020. In the wake of the
calamity, the likes of which had not been seen in foreseeable history
earlier and, hopefully, would never have to be seen in future, the
Government, both at the Centre and State level, put into effect a slew
of measures to ensure minimal exposure of the populace to the
pandemic and to persuade all to remain indoors as far as possible. As
is well known, the Hon’ble Prime Minister himself came on air to
prohibit movement of persons outside their homes for the period 25
March 2020 to 31 May 2020. It merits mention, while the lockdown
was relaxed in phases, the proscription on inter-state travel was lifted
with effect from 1 June 2020.
4. State Governments were not lagging behind. The then Chief
Minister of Delhi, Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, addressed the public through
a press conference held on 29 March 2020, and the dispute, in these
proceedings, relates to a single utterance made by him during the
press conference. We deem it appropriate to reproduce, in vernacular
as well as in English, the statement made by the Chief Minister,
around which the dispute revolves:
In vernacular
1 Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, hereinafter referred to as “the State”
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 2 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 3 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
In English
“A few days ago, I had asked the landlords to postpone the rent of
impoverished tenants unable to pay rent for 2-3 months and not
take immediate payment.
Today, I am appealing to you and the landlords of entire Delhi-if
you consider me your son or brother then all the landlords must
talk to their tenants and ask them to rest assured that you are with
them and won’t force them to pay rent. Today, all of you must go
and give assurance to them.
There has been news from some places that a few landlords are
forcing their tenants due to which they are evacuating and leaving.
Please don’t force them. Kindly postpone their rent.
In a month or two when this Corona and let’s assume after this
entire mess is over, if a tenant has been unable to pay rent due to
poverty, I assure you the Government will pay for it. I am talking
about those tenants who may be unable to pay some of their rent
due to lack of means.
However, no landlord will force them right now and if they do so
then the Government will take strict action against them.”
(Emphasis supplied)
5. Do the italicized words in the above statement of the Chief
Minister constitute a promise, enforceable, proprio vigore, against the
State and in favour of citizens? As we have already noted, a learned
Single Judge of this Court has, vide judgment dated 22 July 2021,
answered the question in the affirmative, relying on the principles of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 4 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
6. Following the conclusion that the words of the Chief Minister,
as italicized above, constituted an enforceable promise in law, the
impugned judgment concludes with the following directions:
“110. In view of the above factual and legal discussion, the
following directions are issued:
i. The GNCTD would, having regard to the statement
made by the CM on 29th March, 2020, extracted in
paragraph no. 3 above, to landlords and tenants, take a
decision as to the implementation of the same within a
period of 6 weeks;
ii. The said decision would be taken, bearing in mind
the larger interest of the persons to whom the benefits were
intended to be extended in the said statement, as also any
overriding public interest concerns.
iii. Upon the said decision being taken, the GNCTD
would frame a clear policy in this regard.
iv. Upon the said decision being taken, if a Scheme or
Policy is announced, the Petitioners’ case be considered
under the said Scheme/Policy as per the procedure
prescribed therein, if any. Remedies against any decision
taken are left open.”
7. Aggrieved thereby, the State is in appeal.
8. We have heard Mr. Sameer Vashisht, Standing Counsel (Civil)
for the State, and Mr. Gaurav Jain, learned Counsel for the
respondents, at length.
C. The Impugned Judgment
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 5 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
9. Six petitioners petitioned this Court, by way of WP (C)
8956/20202. Of these, five were daily wage labourers, who claimed to
be in impecunious circumstances, and unable to pay, to their
landlords, the rents demanded. The sixth petitioner was a landlord.
All petitioners sought issuance of a mandamus, to the State, to
disgorge the rent payable against the tenanted premises, effectively
seeking, therefore, enforcement of the assurance held out by the Chief
Minister to the public in his press conference of 29 March 2020.
10. Though the State also contested, before the learned Single
Judge, the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned Single
Judge negatived the contention and held the writ petition to be
maintainable. Before us, Mr. Vashisht did not reiterate the objection.
In any event, we find no reason to differ with the learned Single
Judge. The writ petition was clearly maintainable.
11. On merits, the learned Single Judge first examines, in the
impugned judgment, the position regarding promissory estoppel as it
obtains in the United Kingdom and in India. We have, in this country,
an enviable body of precedent on the issue, thereby obviating the
necessity of referring to any foreign judgments. Apropos the legal
position as it obtains in India, the learned Single Judge refers to the
decisions in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the
City of Bombay3, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. State of
Uttar Pradesh4, Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies5, State of
2 Najma & ors v. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi
3 AIR 1951 SC 469
4 (1979) 2 SCC 409
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 6 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd6, State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Nezone
Law House7, Manuelsons Hotels Pvt Ltd v. State of Kerala8, State of
Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd9 and proceeds, thereafter, to
cull out the principles emerging therefrom. Thereafter, the learned
Single Judge proceeds to hold that the issue was required to be
examined in the context of the fact that the statement, the
enforceability of which was in question, was an assurance and
promise made by a Constitutional functionary such as the Chief
Minister, made with the purpose of limiting migration of people from
Delhi, and that presumably some tenants and landlords might have
altered their positions based on the assurance. The learned Single
Judge enumerates the following salient features of the present case, in
the impugned judgment:
“(1) Exceptional circumstances of the Covid-19 Pandemic.
(2) Extreme distress being faced by migrant labourers and
blue-collar workers and employees.
(3) A clear promise/assurance made by the CM.
(4) No positive policy to implement the said
promise/assurance given by the GNCTD.
(5) No contrary policy implemented by the Government,
placed before the court.
(6) No decision taken to not implement the said
promise/assurance that was given by the CM.
(7) The exception of public interest having not been invoked
for the non-implementation of the promise/assurance.”
5 AIR 1968 SC 718
6 (2004) 6 SCC 465
7 (2008) 5 SCC 609
8 (2016) 6 SCC 766
9 2020 SCC OnLine SC 968
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 7 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
12. The learned Single Judge goes on to hold that the Government
could not have remained silent on the promise/assurance held out by
the Chief Minister without taking a decision whether to implement it,
or not implement it. In times of distress, observes the impugned
judgment, elected representatives of the people, especially those
holding posts of heads of the government, are expected to make
responsible assurances and promises, which can be believed by the
citizenry. It could not be argued that no one would take the words of
the Chief Minister seriously, or believe what he said. At the very least,
the citizens could entertain a legitimate expectation that the promise
held out by the Chief Minister would be honoured.
13. The learned Single Judge goes on to hold that the lack of any
decision regarding the assurance given by the Chief Minister, rather
than any decision taken in that regard, was arbitrary. In the event that
the State had decided not to act on the basis of the said assurance, it
owed a responsibility to disclose the reasons for the decision. The
learned Single Judge emphasizes, in this context, the fact that the
decision affected the fundamental rights of citizens, as it dealt with
the right to shelter during the pandemic. Applying the equitable
doctrine of promissory estoppel, the learned Single Judge holds the
State responsible for failing to take any decision on the
assurance/promise held out by the Chief Minister. In this regard, the
learned Single Judge has sought to distinguish the judicial authorities
cited by the State before her, as those were cases in which a policy
decision, contrary to the assurance/promise, had been announced.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 8 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
The State had failed to provide any explanation for failing to take any
decision on the promise or assurance held out by the Chief Minister in
a press conference consciously held in the background of the
lockdown announced pursuant to the COVID pandemic.
14. The learned Single Judge has distinguished the promise made
by the Chief Minister, in the press conference, with statements made
in an election rally. The Chief Minister was presumed to know all
implications, including the number of persons who would be affected
and the financial outlay involved, while making the promise. The
citizen was entitled to believe that, while making the promise, the
Chief Minister was speaking on behalf of the Government.
15. The learned Single Judge has also held the reliance, by the
State, on Article 16610 of the Constitution of India, to be misplaced.
The learned Single Judge holds that a common man, or a citizen,
would believe that the statement of the Chief Minister could be relied
upon and trusted. Invoking Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills, the
learned Single Judge holds that a statement or representation, even
made by the Chief Secretary to the Government, while discharging
Governmental functions, would, even by virtue of the position held by
him, be presumed to be within the scope of his authority and
10 166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State. –
(1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the
name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be
authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the
validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the
ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.
(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the
Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it
is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in
his discretion.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 9 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
enforceable in law. The final enforceable decision would have to be in
the name of the Governor. However, the learned Single Judge
observes that, in the present case, it is the indecision of the State,
following the promise held out by the Chief Minister, which is under
challenge and, therefore, Article 166 of the Constitution would not
apply. The learned Single Judge, therefore, holds that, even absent any
formal policy or order by the State, the very assurance given by the
Chief Minister in a press conference, on a public platform, would
create a valuable and legal right, applying the principle of promissory
estoppel. Non-consideration of the promise thus held out was
amenable to being tested on the anvil of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. Quoting, thereafter, from a passage from Principles of
Administrative Law by Prof. M.P. Jain and Prof. S.N. Jain, the learned
Single Judge finally opines “that the promise/assurance/representation
given by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the
implementation of which ought to be considered by the Government”.
16. Thereafter, before issuing the operative directions already
reproduced in para 6 supra, the learned Single Judge observes as
under:
“109. While holding that the assurance/promise given by the CM
is enforceable, both on the basis of the doctrines of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation, the relief would have to be
moulded keeping in mind the various factors as set out below:
• Firstly, the assurance given by the CM has to be
considered by the Government and a decision has to be
taken whether to implement or not implement the same;
• Secondly, the bona fides of the said petitioners need
to be verified. The material particulars in respect of each ofLPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 10 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
the petitioners, the premises which they have either rented
out or have taken on rent, the amounts which they had paid
during the lockdown period, the loans which have been
taken, etc. would need to be verified. Further, owing to the
decision of the learned Division Bench in Gaurav
Jain v. Union of India11, this Court is also concerned about
the bona fides of the petitioners themselves owing to the
lack of material particulars.
• The pleadings in the present case, especially the
rejoinder, also gives an impression to this Court that the
intention is to sensationalise the issue rather than to actually
seek redressal of a grievance.”
17. Thereafter, the directions, reproduced earlier in this judgment,
follow.
D. Rival Contentions
I. Submissions of Mr. Sameer Vashisht
18. Mr. Vashisht commenced his submissions by stating that the
writ petition filed by the respondents was in fact not even
maintainable, as it sought enforcement of a statement made by a
politician, without any supportive law or policy of the Government.
The principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation
would not, he submits, apply in such a situation. The statement of the
Chief Minister was made, as he would submit, “in the air”,
unfortunately. There was no contract between the State and the
respondents, which could be enforced in the manner sought in the writ
petition.
11 2020 SCC OnLine Del 652
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 11 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
19. A further preliminary submission, advanced by Mr. Vashisht, is
that the learned Single Judge has directed the State to frame a policy,
which is impermissible in law. He submits that no writ of mandamus
can issue to the Government to frame a policy, for which purpose he
relies on Asif Hameed v. State of J & K12.
20. Mr. Vashisht further pleads issue estoppel, for which purpose he
relies on a judgment, dated 15 June 2020, by a Division Bench of this
Court in Gaurav Jain v. Union of India.
21. On merits, Mr. Vashisht submits that the learned Single Judge
was in error in holding that the Chief Minister had held out any
promise to the public and, effectively, directing enforcement of the
promise so held out. To substantiate his plea that such directions could
never have been issued, Mr. Vashisht relies on Union of India v.
Ganesh Rice Mills13, para 23 of State of Karnataka v. K.K.
Mohandas14 and paras 3, 25, 28 to 30, 33, 40 to 42 and 45 of Nestle.
He submits that no law or executive instruction had been issued, with
the approval of the Lieutenant Governor15 as required by Article 166
of the Constitution of India, to the effect that the rent of defaulting
tenants, whatever be their financial condition, would be borne by the
State.
22. Mr. Vashisht has also emphasised the circumstances in which
the statement of the Chief Minister, of which the respondents sought
12 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364
13 (1998) 9 SCC 630
14 (2007) 6 SCC 484
15 “LG” hereinafter
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 12 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
enforcement, was made. He points out that, consequent to the
outbreak of COVID, the Hon’ble Prime Minister had directed a
complete lockdown, with the public being prohibited from venturing
outside, and concomitant closure of all private and government
offices, except those which were rendering essential services. A
meeting, chaired by the Hon’ble Prime Minister followed, pursuant to
which the National Disaster Management Authority16 issued an Order
on 24 March 2020, directing complete restriction of movement of
persons for a period of 21 days with effect from 25 March 2020.
Following this, the Delhi Disaster Management Authority17 issued an
order on 25 March 2020 directing implicit compliance with the
directives of the NDMA. The Chief Minister, thereafter, addressed the
people of Delhi in a press conference on 25 March 2020, in which,
among other things, landlords were requested not to harass tenants
who were battling the COVID pandemic. Owing to fear of the
pandemic, several migrant labourers gathered at the State border, to
leave for their respective homes. As this led to great risk of spreading
of the COVID virus, the Chief Minister, on 29 March 2020, made the
statement which forms a subject matter of the present controversy. We
deem it appropriate to reproduce the exact manner in which the
written submissions of the State refer to this statement:
“f. On 29.03.2020, the Hon’ble Chief Minister held a press
conference and requested the people of the NCT to abide by the
Hon’ble Prime Ministers request of staying at home. In this
context, he also appealed/requested the landlords not to compel
tenants to leave their homes on account of non-payment of rent
and said that if the situation continues for 2-3 months and a tenant
16 “NDMA” hereinafter
17 “DDMA” hereinafter
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 13 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
is unable to pay owing to poverty, then the Government would
consider making some payment on their behalf.”
We are afraid the reference, to the statement made by the Chief
Minister, as contained in the afore-extracted paragraph from the
written submissions of the State, is somewhat misleading. The
statement of the Chief Minister was not that the Government “would
consider making some payment” on behalf of the tenants who are in
default of payment of rent, but that, where the default was owing to
poverty and incapacity to pay the rent, the State would pay the rent on
behalf of the tenants. Nothing was left, therefore, for “consideration”.
To be fair to him, Mr. Vashisht, on our expressing our unhappiness at
this statement of fact, as contained in the written submissions of the
State, requested us to ignore it and stated that he would argue on the
statement of the Chief Minister as actually made.
23. The written submissions of the State thereafter proceed to detail
developments which took place after 29 April 2020. They are not of
particular relevance to the controversy at hand, except for the
assertion that, on 29 April 2020, the Central Government relaxed the
restriction on inter-State level of stranded persons and directed State
Governments to develop protocols to send and receive such persons.
Even while the lockdown was, thereafter, extended by order dated 1
May 2020, till 17 May 2020, the relaxation for movement of stranded
migrant workers, pilgrims, tourists and other persons, was maintained.
The Ministry of Home Affairs18 also issued orders permitting travel
through special trains operated by the Railways. The lockdown was
18 “MHA” hereinafter
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 14 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
further extended by order dated 3 May 2020 for two weeks with effect
from 4 May 2020, but, simultaneously, a detailed Standard Operating
Procedure19 was notified, for movement of stranded persons from and
to Delhi. This was followed by a formal notification dated 11 May
2020 issued by the MHA. By these measures, as also a further order
dated 14 May 2020 issued by the Central Government, movement of
stranded migrant workers and labourers by train and bus was
facilitated. On 17 May 2020, the first notification was issued by the
Central Government relaxing the lockdown restrictions. Following
this, on 18 May 2020, the DDMA issued a notification, relaxing the
direction to landlords not to collect rent from their tenants, in view of
the reduction of intensity of the COVID pandemic.
24. Mr. Vashisht submits that, therefore, the circumstance which
prompted the Chief Minister to make the statement, of which the
respondents seek enforcement, on 29 March 2020, i.e. restriction on
movement of stranded migrant labourers and workers, was no longer
in existence after 29 April 2020 and, therefore, no further statement,
continuing the assurance contained in the statement dated 29 March
2020, was made by the Chief Minister.
25. Mr. Vashisht submits that, in law, a mere statement, sans
anything more, cannot form the basis of an enforceable right against
the Government. Inasmuch as the statement made on 29 March 2020
was never converted into a formal decision in the shape of a policy
19 “SOP” hereinafter
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 15 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
document of the Government, he submits that no writ of mandamus
could issue to enforce the statement.
26. Similarly, he submits that the doctrine of legitimate expectation
has been erroneously invoked by the learned Single Judge. According
to Mr. Vashisht, the foundational basis for invoking the doctrine is the
conversion of a representation/statement/assurance into a definite
policy. Equally, for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
he submits that an assurance/representation, in the form of a policy
document of the Government, coupled with the intention to bring into
existence a legal relationship, must exist. The pleadings in the writ
petition, he submits, do not even make out a prima facie case of
existence of these factors. There is no material on the basis of which it
could be found that the petitioners were in fact migrant labours who
had come to Delhi from other states or that, relying on the statement
of the Chief Minister, they decided to stay back in Delhi and, thereby,
altered their position to their prejudice. The impugned judgment,
which proceeds without considering these facts is, therefore, he
submits, unsustainable.
27. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, submits Mr. Vashisht,
can be invoked only where there exists a legal obligation, and not
merely a wish, a desire, a pious hope, or even a moral obligation. The
obligation, of which enforcement is sought, he submits, must be
founded on the sanction of law or custom or established procedure
followed in the regular and natural sequence. He relies, for this
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 16 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
purpose, on paras 21 to 23 of State of Bihar v. Sachindra Narayan20
and paras 8 to 15 of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd v. CTO21.
II. Submissions of Mr. Gaurav Jain
28. Mr. Gaurav Jain, in reply, draws our attention to para 17 of the
impugned judgment, in which the learned Single Judge has noted the
contention of the State that the statement of the Chief Minister, dated
29 March 2020, “could at best be construed as an assurance by a
CM”. He submits that, therefore, the State acknowledges and admits
that the statement was, at the very least, an assurance.
29. Mr. Jain submits that the circumstances in which the statement
was rendered are of extreme significance, as the statement was
intended at providing succour to persons who were desperate to save
their life. This position, he submits, continued till October-November
2020. Mr. Jain submits that the learned Single Judge has held,
unexceptionably, that the statement was in the nature of a promise
affecting the right of the respondents to life, livelihood and residence
and had, therefore, to be adhered to.
30. Mr. Jain contests Mr. Vashisht’s contention that the promise
extended by the Chief Minister was not supported by any policy or
other statutory instrument. He submits that the provisions of the
Disaster Management Act, 2005 and Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897,
imminently empowered the State to make such a promise. Mr. Jain
20 (2019) 3 SCC 803
21 (2005) 1 SCC 625
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 17 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
also relies on Order No. 122-A, dated 29 March 2020, issued by the
DDMA, and specifically emphasises the following paras from the said
Order:
“10. Wherever the workers, including the migrants, of living in
rented accommodation, the landlords of those properties shall not
demand payment of rent for a period of one month.
11. If any landlord is forcing labourers and students to vacate
their premises, they shall be liable for action under the Act.
The District Magistrates & District Deputy Commissioners of
Police, Incident Commanders & counterpart Assistant
Commissioners of Police and SHOs of respective jurisdiction will
be personally liable for implementation of the above directions and
lockdown measures issued under the aforesaid Orders as
enclosed.”
Mr. Jain submits that the statement of the Chief Minister was only
towards implementation of this Order of the DDMA, as landlords
could not be compelled to allow tenants to stay in rented premises
without paying any rent. It was for this reason, he submits, that the
State undertook to bear the burden of the rent payable to the
landlords. It was not, therefore, as though the Chief Minister had
made his statement “in the air”, or unsupported by any policy or
statute, as Mr. Vashisht would seek to contend. Mr. Jain submits that
the State cannot seek to enforce Order No 122-A issued by the
DDMA and avoid the statement made by the Chief Minister.
31. Mr. Jain also relies on Article 300-A22 of the Constitution of
India.
22 300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. – No person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 18 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
III. Submissions of Mr. Vashisht in rejoinder
32. In rejoinder, Mr. Vashisht nearly submits that the DDMA
Order No 122-A was extended only till 17 May 2020 as, after the
said date, movement of the migrants was permitted.
E. Analysis
I. What does the impugned judgment direct?
33. Facially, the directions in the impugned judgment only require
the State to take a decision as to implementation of the statement
made by the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020. Also, the impugned
judgment, at more points than one, observes that the Court was
concerned with the indecision, on the part of the State, regarding
whether to implement, or not to implement, the assurance held out by
the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020 that the State would bear the
rent of migrants who were unable to pay rent owing to poverty.
However, the impugned judgment, in para 108, also holds, with some
degree of finality, that “the promise/assurance/representation given
by the CM clearly amounts to an enforceable promise, the
implementation of which ought to be considered by the
Government.” The tenor of the impugned judgment is, therefore,
unmistakably that the State was bound to bear the rent of the
poverty-stricken migrants, and were only required to take a decision
on the modality of implementation.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 19 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
34. The issue of whether, therefore, the statement of the Chief
Minister, dated 29 March 2020, gave rise to an enforceable promise
that the State would bear the rent of the migrants, therefore, squarely
arises for consideration.
II. Was the statement of the Chief Minister, forming subject matter
of dispute, merely “a statement made by a politician”?
35. We reject, outright, the opening submission of Mr. Vashisht that
the assurance to bear the rent of the migrants, as contained in the
statement made by the Chief Minister on 29 March 2020 in the press
conference, was merely a “statement made by a politician”. Facially,
Mr. Vashisht is correct, inasmuch as the Chief Minister was
unquestionably a politician. What we understood from Mr. Vashisht’s
submission is, however, that politicians often make statements, not all
of which are to be taken seriously and, at the very least, not all of
which are enforceable in a court of law. If that is what Mr. Vashisht
meant, we are clear in our mind that the assurance made by the Chief
Minister in his press conference dated 29 March 2020, that the State
would bear the rent of poverty-stricken migrants who were unable to
pay rent, is not one such.
36. Politicians make statements, and statements. Indeed, the very
raison d’ etre of a politician is to speak, ideally for and in the welfare
of the public. There is, however, a distinction between a statement
made by politician before he is elected to public office, and the
statement made by the politician thereafter. During election
propaganda, statements made by candidates aspiring to success in the
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 20 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
election are made without even knowing whether they would succeed
in the election, or being conscious of the circumstances which would
face them in the event of their success and election to public office.
Such statements are made without even being aware of the ground
realities which would face the candidates in the event of their election
and as to whether they would be in a position to fulfil the promise that
they make. At the highest, therefore, failure to abide by the promises
made by a politician prior to his election to public office may only
affect, adversely, his public image, and, perhaps, future success in
elections.
37. A statement made by an elected representative of the people,
such as the Chief Minister, on a public podium is qualitatively
different. Such a statement, therefore, wears an entirely different
complexion, as compared to a statement made by the same politician
before his election to public office. The statement, in the present case,
is not, therefore, merely a statement by a politician, but a statement by
the Chief Minister of the State, and cannot, therefore, be lightly
dismissed.
38. We cannot, therefore, decide the present lis on the premise that
the assurance held out by the Chief Minister in his press conference
dated 29 March 2020 was merely a “statement made by a politician”,
of which no serious note was required to be taken.
39. Whether, however, the assurance contained in the statement
could translate into a mandamus in a court of law is, however, a
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 21 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
somewhat more nuanced issue, with which we are essentially
concerned.
III. A preliminary point
40. The prayer clause, in the writ petition, read thus:
“In view of the above facts and circumstances, it is most
respectfully prayed that this Court may be pleased to:
a. Pass an appropriate writ of mandamus or order
directing the Government of NCT of Delhi (R1) to honour
the promise made by its Chief Minister (R2) on 29.03.2020.
b. Make the above writ or order, if in favour of the
Petitioners, applicable to the people who have already
written to R2, and other tenants and landlords placed in a
situation similar to that of Petitioners.
c. Pass any other direction, order or writ is this Court
may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the instant
case.”
41. The impugned judgment directs the State to take a decision as
to implementation of the statement made by the Chief Minister on 29
March 2020, without restricting the direction to any particular part or
facet of the statement.
42. The statement of the Chief Minister, dated 29 March 2020,
however, held out two promises, not one. The first was that landlords
could not compel migrant tenants, occupying rented premises, to pay
the rent, during the period the lockdown remained in force. The
second was that the State would pay the said rent.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 22 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
43. There is a qualitative difference between these assurances,
apropos their enforceability. This is because, while the first
assurance was preceded by the DDMA Order No. 122-A of the same
day, the second was not. The DDMA Order No. 122-A proscribed
collection of rent by landlords from impecunious migrant tenants
during the period the lockdown remained in force, but did not contain
any assurance that the rent would be paid by the State.
44. The prayer clause in the writ petition, and the relief ultimately
granted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment,
covers both these assurances. They are not limited to the assurance,
by the State, to disgorge the rent payable by the migrant tenants to
their landlords.
IV. The position in law
45. Before addressing these issues in greater detail, we may, even
at this juncture, set out what we find the legal position to be.
46. The law, as per discussion hereinafter would reveal, would
permit enforcement of the first assurance, proscribing collection of
rent by landlords from migrant tenants during the period of the
lockdown, as it was not merely an assurance contained in a statement
of the Chief Minister, but was also contained in the DDMA Order No.
122-A of the same date, which was never challenged.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 23 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
47. However, the second assurance, i.e., that the rent would be paid
by the State, is not a legally enforceable assurance, even applying the
principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. This is
because the assurance was restricted merely to a statement made
during the press conference held by the Chief Minister on 29 March
2020, and was never reduced to writing in the form of any official
document or communication made known to the public.
48. A mere statement made by the Chief Minister would not be
enforceable in law, even if the citizens to whom it was made believed
it to be so. Inasmuch as the assurance to pay the rent, out of State
funds, was not translated to any written document, Office
Memorandum, Notification, Circular, or any other instrument having
the force of law, it cannot be enforced merely because it was made in
a statement during the press conference. That, as we see it, is the law
which emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point.
49. In fact, the Supreme Court goes to the extent of holding that
such a statement does not even constitute a “promise”, apart from
independently ruling that it is not enforceable on the principle of
promissory estoppel.
V. Examining the legal position
50. Let us review the circumstances which preceded, and
succeeded, the assurance extended by the Chief Minister in his
statement dated 29 March 2020. COVID struck in mid March 2020.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 24 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
The Prime Minister announced a nationwide lockdown on movement
of the public, save in certain exceptional circumstances, for the period
25 May 2020 to 31 May 2020. During this period, the DDMA, in its
Order dated 29 May 2020, directed landlords not to insist on payment
of rent by migrants for a period of one month or evict them from the
tenanted premises in their occupation, so as to ensure that the migrant
tenants were not on the streets. The Order did not, however, contain
any assurance that the rent payable by the migrants to the landlords
would be paid by the State. The Chief Minister, however, in his press
conference held on the same day, i.e. 29 May 2020, did extend such
an assurance, and it is that assurance which forms the nub of
controversy.
51. The press conference was not followed, however, by the
issuance of any official document, such as an Office Memorandum,
Notification, Public Notice or Circular, reducing the assurance held
out by the Chief Minister to writing. Why, is not for us to hazard any
view, but the circumstance was, at the least, extremely unfortunate.
We are clear in our mind that the State Government of the day ought
to have translated the assurance given by the Chief Minister into a
written document, so that it would acquire legal form and sanctity.
52. That, however, never happened. Resulting in our requiring to
decide whether the learned Single Judge was correct in holding that
the assurance, only contained as it was in the statement of the Chief
Minister during the press conference, is enforceable as such.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 25 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
53. While we have no doubt that the migrants, and their landlords,
who may have heard the statement, legitimately believed in its
enforceability, the belief of the migrants and the landlords cannot
translate into authority, on the part of the Court, to issue a writ of
mandamus, commanding its compliance. A mandamus can issue only
to compel performance of a duty which the State, or public authority,
is required, in law, to perform. If no such legal liability exists, no writ
of mandamus can issue.
54. We are clear, in our mind, that the fact that the statement was
made consequent on the onset of COVID, and the circumstances in
which it was made, cannot influence us in compelling its
performance. Else, the law would become totally subjective, and
statements could be made enforceable, or not enforceable, merely on
the basis of the circumstances in which they were made. That, in our
view, cannot be the law. Expressed otherwise, we cannot bind the
State to the assurance contained in the statement of the Chief Minister
merely because of the circumstances in which it was made, if said
assurance is not, otherwise, enforceable in law.
55. A “promise”, in law, has its own connotations, as it becomes
enforceable against the promisor. While there may not be any
substantial difference, in this context, between an “assurance” and a
“promise”, a “promise”, when made by the Government to the
citizens, has its own indicia.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 26 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
56. We proceed, now, to examine what the Supreme Court holds,
on the issue.
57. Ganesh Rice Mills
57.1 This distinction is starkly reflected in the decision in Ganesh
Rice Mills which, though a short, order, is clear and unequivocal:
“1. Leave granted.
2. The only point decided by the High Court is that the
Finance Minister’s statement on the floor of the House must be
held to be binding and the Union was stopped23 from realising the
disputed cess from the appellants. It has been stated that the writ
petitioner had acted to his prejudice on the basis of the promise
made by the Finance Minister. We are of the view that speech
made in Parliament by the Finance Minister cannot be treated as
a promise or representation made to the writ petitioner and the
principle of promissory estoppel was wrongly applied by the High
Court. No case of promissory estoppel has been made out on the
facts of this case.
3. In that view of the matter, the judgment under appeal is set
aside. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.”
57.2 Ganesh Rice Mills holds, clearly and unequivocally, that a
speech made in Parliament by the Finance Minister is not a promise
or representation to the petitioner before the Supreme Court, as would
justify applying the principle of promissory estoppel. While the nature
of the statement made by the Finance Minister on the floor of the
House, the circumstances in which it was made, whether it was
directed towards the appellants before the Supreme Court, are
unknown, it appears clear, from the pronouncement, that such a
23 sic estopped?
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 27 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
statement cannot, by itself, is neither a promise, nor enforceable by
applying the principle of promissory estoppel.
58. K.K. Mohandas
58.1 The exact circumstances in which the issue of promissory
estoppel arose for consideration in K.K. Mohandas are explicit from
the opening sentence in para 18 of the report in that case, which reads:
“18. What is pleaded in this case at best is that in his Budget
speech the Minister concerned had held out to the public at large
that he was proposing to ban sale of toddy in the whole of the State
and this had induced the plaintiffs to believe that the sales in arrack
would go up resulting in their offering higher bid amounts for the
right to sell arrack for Excise Year 1990-1991.”
58.2 Mr. Vashisht relies on the following paragraph from the report,
to contend that the reliance, by the learned Single Judge, on the
principle of promissory estoppel, was misconceived:
“23. That apart, this Court in Express Newspapers (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India24 has held that the principle of estoppel
does not operate at the level of government policy. In Union of
India v. Ganesh Rice Mills this Court had categorically held that
a speech made in Parliament by a Minister cannot be treated as a
promise or representation made to a person attracting the
principle of promissory estoppel. In Pine Chemicals
Ltd. v. Assessing Authority25 this Court held that a Finance
Minister’s statement referring to a proposal to continue the grant of
exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of ten years is
merely a budget proposal which could not give rise to any right to
the parties and it did not amount to a decision, order or notification
extending the period of exemption which was required to found a
plea based on promissory estoppel. The manner in which the courts24 (1986) 1 SCC 133
25 (1992) 2 SCC 683LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 28 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
below including the High Court got over the principle enunciated
by these decisions leaves much to be desired.
24. Thus, it would be seen that the plaintiffs are not entitled to
found any case of promissory estoppel merely on the basis of the
speech made by the Minister in the Assembly of a proposal to ban
sale of toddy in the State.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58.3 Mr. Vashisht is, therefore, correct in his submission that
promissory estoppel does not operate at the level of Government
policy. There can be no gainsaying the position, in fact or in law, that
the decision to bear the rent for all migrant labourers and workers,
irrespective of the circumstances in which it was taken, pertains to the
realm of Government policy. At least ordinarily, therefore, the
principle of promissory estoppel would not apply in such a case.
58.4 Significantly, K.K. Mohandas relies upon, and reiterates,
Ganesh Rice Mills.
59. Nestle
59.1 Nestle, as we have noted, has been cited, and relied upon, in the
impugned judgment. Mr. Vashisht, however, invites reference to the
following paragraphs from the report:
“3. The circumstances under which the respondents had
approached the Court chronologically commenced with an
announcement made by the then Chief Minister of Punjab on 26-2-
1996 while addressing dairy farmers at a State-level function, that
the State Government had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk
products in the State. This announcement was given wide publicity
in several newspapers in the State.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 29 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
*****
25. In other words, promissory estoppel long recognised as a
legitimate defence in equity was held to found a cause of action
against the Government, even when, and this needs to be
emphasised, the representation sought to be enforced was legally
invalid in the sense that it was made in a manner which was not in
conformity with the procedure prescribed by statute.
*****
28. This Court rejected all the three pleas of the Government. It
reiterated the well-known preconditions for the operation of the
doctrine:
(1) a clear and unequivocal promise knowing and
intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee;
(2) such acting upon the promise by the promisee so
that it would be inequitable to allow the promisor to go
back on the promise.
29. As for its strengths it was said: that the doctrine was not
limited only to cases where there was some contractual
relationship or other pre-existing legal relationship between the
parties. The principle would be applied even when the promise is
intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship
which would arise in future. The Government was held to be
equally susceptible to the operation of the doctrine in whatever
area or field the promise is made — contractual, administrative or
statutory. To put it in the words of the Court:
“The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a
result of this decision, that where the Government makes a
promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by
the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance
on it, alters his position, the Government would be held
bound by the promise and the promise would be
enforceable against the Government at the instance of the
promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for
the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of
a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the
Constitution.
*****
[E]quity will, in a given case where justice and fairness
demand, prevent a person from insisting on strict legal
rights, even where they arise, not under any contract, but on
his own title deeds or under statute.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 30 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
*****
Whatever be the nature of the function which the
Government is discharging, the Government is subject to
the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential
ingredients of this rule are satisfied, the Government can be
compelled to carry out the promise made by it.”
(emphasis added)
30. So much for the strengths. Then come the limitations.
These are:
(1) Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an
equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so
requires. But it is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper
and adequate material placed by the Government, that
overriding public interest requires that the Government
should not be held bound by the promise but should be free
to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to
enforce the promise against the Government.
(2) No representation can be enforced which is
prohibited by law in the sense that the person or authority
making the representation or promise must have the power
to carry out the promise. If the power is there, then subject
to the preconditions and limitations noted earlier, it must be
exercised. Thus, if the statute does not contain a provision
enabling the Government to grant exemption, it would not
be possible to enforce the representation against the
Government, because the Government cannot be compelled
to act contrary to the statute. But if the statute confers
power on the Government to grant the exemption, the
Government can legitimately be held bound by its promise
to exempt the promisee from payment of sales tax.
*****
33. Of course, it was also found that the representator had no
authority to make the representation it had. To that extent the
decision could not be said to have deviated from the earlier
pronouncements of the law.
*****
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 31 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
40. The case of Kasinka Trading v. Union of India26 cited by
the appellant is an authority for the proposition that the mere
issuance of an exemption notification under a provision in a fiscal
statute such as Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, could not
create any promissory estoppel because such an exemption by its
very nature is susceptible to being revoked or modified or
subjected to other conditions. In other words, there is no
unequivocal representation. The seeds of equivocation are inherent
in the power to grant exemption. Therefore, an exemption
notification can be revoked without falling foul of the principle of
promissory estoppel. It would not, in the circumstances, be
necessary for the Government to establish an overriding equity in
its favour to defeat the petitioner’s plea of promissory estoppel.
The Court also held that the Government of India had justified the
withdrawal of exemption notification on relevant reasons in the
public interest. Incidentally, the Court also noticed the lack of
established prejudice to the promises when it said:
“The burden of customs duty etc. is passed on to the
consumer and therefore the question of the appellants being
put to a huge loss is not understandable.”
(See also Shrijee Sales Corpn. v. Union of
India27 and STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills28 .) We do not see the
relevance of this decision to the facts of this case. Here the
representations are clear and unequivocal.
41. Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab29 is an
example of where despite the petitioner having established the
ingredients of promissory estoppel, the representation could not be
enforced against the Government because the Court found that the
Government’s assurance was incompetent and illegal and “a fraud
on the Constitution and a breach of faith of the people”. This
principle would also not be applicable in these appeals. No one is
being asked to act contrary to the statute. What is being sought is a
direction on the Government to grant the necessary exemption.
The grant of exemption cannot be said to be contrary to the statute.
The statute does not debar the grant. It envisages it.
42. Although the view expressed by two Judges in Jit Ram30
has been disapproved in Godfrey Philips31 it was ostensibly
resuscitated in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal
26 (1995) 1 SCC 274
27 (1997) 3 SCC 398
28 (1998) 1 SCC 572
29 (1992) 2 SCC 411
30 Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11
31 Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd, (1985) 4 SCC 369
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 32 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
Revenue Officer, A.P.32 In that case the State Government had the
power to remit assessment under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh
Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963. Section 11 of that
Act provided for exemption to be made by an order of the State
Government which was required to be published in the Andhra
Pradesh Gazette prior to which the order had to be laid on the table
of the Legislative Assembly. The Court construed the provisions of
the State Act and came to the conclusion that the nature of the
power under Section 11 did not amount to delegated legislation but
conditional legislation. It was held that:
“If the statute requires that a particular act should be done
in a particular manner and if it is found, as we have found
hereinbefore, that the act done by the Government is
invalid and ineffective for non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of law, it would be rather curious
if it is held that notwithstanding such non-compliance, it
yet constitutes a ‘promise’ or a ‘representation’ for the
purpose of invoking the rule of promissory/equitable
estoppel. Accepting such a plea would amount to nullifying
the mandatory requirements of law besides providing a
licence to the Government or other body to act ignoring the
binding provisions of law. Such a course would render the
mandatory provisions of the enactment meaningless and
superfluous. Where the field is occupied by an enactment,
the executive has to act in accordance therewith,
particularly where the provisions are mandatory in nature.
There is no room for any administrative action or for doing
the thing ordained by the statute otherwise than in
accordance therewith. Where, of course, the matter is not
governed by a law made by a competent legislature, the
executive can act in its executive capacity since the
executive power of the State extends to matters with
respect to which the legislature of a State has the power to
make laws (Article 162 of the Constitution). The
proposition urged by the learned counsel for the appellant
falls foul of our constitutional scheme and public interest. It
would virtually mean that the rule of promissory estoppel
can be pleaded to defeat the provisions of law whereas the
said rule, it is well settled, is not available against a
statutory provision. The sanctity of law and the sanctity of
the mandatory requirement of the law cannot be allowed to
be defeated by resort to rules of estoppel. None of the
decisions cited by the learned counsel say that where an act
is done in violation of a mandatory provision of a statute,
32 (1996) 6 SCC 634
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 33 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
such act can still be made a foundation for invoking the
rule of promissory/equitable estoppel. Moreover, when the
Government acts outside its authority, as in this case, it is
difficult to say that it is acting within its ostensible
authority.”
*****
45. None of these decisions has been considered in I.T.C.
Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P.
except for a brief reference to Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.’s judgment
which was explained away as not being an authority for the
proposition that even where the Government has to and can act
only under and in accordance with a statute — an act done by the
Government in violation thereof can be treated as a presentation to
found a plea of promissory estoppel. But that is exactly what the
learned Judge had said.”
(Italics in original; underscoring supplied)
59.2 It is necessary to note the nature of the dispute which was
before the Supreme Court in Nestle. The principle of promissory
estoppel, in that case, was sought to be invoked on the basis of an
announcement made by the Chief Minister that the State Government
had abolished purchase tax on milk and milk products in the State.
Subsequently, a policy decision was taken not to abolish purchase tax,
despite the statement made by the Chief Minister. It was specifically
pleaded, before the Supreme Court, that abolition of tax had to be by
way of an executive or legislative instrument, and not by a mere
statement made by the Chief Minister.
59.3 The passages on which Mr. Vashisht relies, and which we have
reproduced supra, themselves enunciate the following propositions:
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 34 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
(i) The principle of promissory estoppel would apply even if
the representation, of which enforcement is sought on the said
principle, is made in a manner which is not in conformity with
the statute.
(ii) The principle of promissory estoppel also applies where
the promise intends to create a relationship in the future.
(iii) The promise would bind, whether it is made in a field
which is contractual, administrative or statutory.
(iv) If the ingredients of promissory estoppel are satisfied, the
Government can be bound to the promise.
(v) Promissory estoppel, however, has to yield to equity.
This would, however, apply only where the Court is satisfied,
on the basis of empirical and adequate material, that overriding
public interest requires that the Government be not bound by
the promise.
(vi) Promissory estoppel would not apply if the promise is to
perform an act prohibited by law. Any action taken in a field
covered by an enactment has to be taken in accordance with the
enactment itself, and a promise, envisaging performance of an
act otherwise than as provided in the enactment, would be
unenforceable in law.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 35 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
(vii) Promissory estoppel would also not apply where the
authority making the promise did not have the authority to do
so.
(viii) No promissory estoppel would apply in a case such as
grant of exemption, as an exemption by its very nature is
capable of being revoked, modified, or subjected to conditions
at a later point of time.
59.4 The learned Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, relied
on Nestle to hold that the State was bound by the assurance given by
the Chief Minister, that the rent of the migrants, to their landlords,
would be paid by the State.
60. Arvind Industries v. State of Gujarat33
60.1 Before examining the correctness of this finding, we may also
advert to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind Industries.
The appellants before the Supreme Court, in that case, were
manufacturers of edible oil. On 9 September 1969, the State
Government issued a press note that new industries would be granted
exemption from sales tax for five years from commencement of
production. On 3 March 1970, statements were made by the Chief
Minister and the Finance Minister of the State, on the floor of the
Legislative Assembly, to the same effect. Following this, on 29 April
1970, the State Government issued a notification under Section 49(2)
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 36 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, expressing satisfaction of the State
Government that circumstances existed, which made it necessary to
amend the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970. Following this, Rule 42-A
was introduced in the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, granting drawback, set
off or refund of the tax paid on purchase of raw materials by any new
industry, which were used in the manufacture of goods for sale. This
facility was, however, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions,
which included obtaining of a certificate from the Commissioner of
Industries, Gujarat, to the effect that the new industry had been
commissioned in an area beyond 24 km from the municipal limits of
Ahmedabad and Baroda and 16 km from the municipal limits of
Surat, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and Jamnagar. This notification was
available for a period of five years from the date of commissioning of
the industry. However, by a subsequent notification dated 17 July
1971, solvent extraction of oil, as an industry, was removed from the
scope of the earlier notifications.
60.2 The appellants before the Supreme Court challenged the
notification dated 17 July 1971, contending that, on the basis of the
promise held out by the Finance Minister and the Chief Minister of
the State, and the notifications issued thereafter, the appellants had set
up their solvent extraction industry and that, by the subsequent
notification dated 17 July 1971, the benefit held out by the Chief
Minister and the Finance Minister could not therefore be withdrawn.
The principle of promissory estoppel was sought to be pressed into
service.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 37 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
60.3 The Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument, thus:
“9. The appellant has been entirely unable to make out any
factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel. The appellant
cannot claim that merely because it had set up its industrial unit at
Junagadh at a certain point of time, the fiscal laws of the State
must remain unaltered from that date. The appellant has not been
able to show that some definite promise was made by or on behalf
of the Government and the appellant had acted upon that promise
to its detriment and thereafter the changes effected by the
notification dated 17-7-1971 have caused great prejudice to the
appellant.
10. In the premises, it is not necessary to go into the question
of applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the field
of fiscal legislation.
11. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to
costs.”
(Emphasis supplied)
60.4 Clearly, therefore, Arvind Industries reiterates the principle
that statements made by the Chief Minister and the Finance Minister
on the floor of the house, even if they hold out some benefit as being
made available to the citizens, do not constitute an enforceable
promise in law.
61. While Nestlé tilts more towards the assessee and the industry
than Arvind Industries, a careful reading of the principles enunciated
in Nestlé would reveal that, even on their basis, it cannot be said that
the assurance contained in the press conference held by the Chief
Minister on 29 March 2020, that the State would bear the rent to be
paid by the migrants to their landlords, was enforceable by
mandamus.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 38 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
62. Unlike the assurance that landlords would not recover rent from
migrant tenants during the period of lockdown, the DDMA Order No.
122-A did not envisage payment of said rent by the State. As such,
the said assurance, as extended by the Chief Minister in his press
conference on 29 March 2020, was not supported by any provision,
statutory or executive, having the force of law. To that extent, the
Chief Minister had undertaken to do something for which the law did
not provide.
63. Mr Jain also sought to place reliance on the Disaster
Management Act and the Epidemic Diseases Act, to contend that the
assurance fell within the scope of authority of the State as envisaged
in the said statutes.
64. Section 2(1)34 of the Epidemic Diseases Act empowers the
State, whenever it is visited by, or threatened with, any outbreak of
any dangerous epidemic, to take such measures as the State deems
necessary to prevent such outbreak or the spread of the disease. By
directing landlords not to evict migrant tenants, who were not in a
position to pay rent, from their premises, the requisite measures, in
terms of Section 2(1) of the Epidemic Diseases Act, to prevent the
spread of COVID, already stood taken by the State. The further
assurance, in the press conference of the Chief Minister, that the State
34 2. Power to take special measures and prescribe regulations as to dangerous epidemic disease. –
(1) When at any time the State Government is satisfied that the State or any part thereof is
visited by, or threatened with, an out-break of any dangerous epidemic disease, the State
Government, if it thinks that the ordinary provisions of the law for the time being in force are
insufficient for the purpose, may take, or require or empower any person to take, such measures
and, by public notice, prescribe such temporary regulations to be observed by the public or by any
person or class of persons as it shall deem necessary to prevent the outbreak of such disease or the
spread thereof, and may determine in what manner and by whom any expenses incurred (including
compensation if any) shall be defrayed.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 39 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
would pay the said rent to the landlords cannot, to our mind, be
treated as necessary to prevent the spread of COVID or, therefore, be
legitimized under Section 2(1) of the EDA.
65. In a similar vein, Section 38(1)35 of the Disaster Management
Act obligates the State Government to take all measures, as it deems
necessary or expedient, for the purpose of disaster management.
“Disaster” is defined, in Section 2(d) as meaning “a catastrophe,
mishap, calamity or grave currency in any area, arising from natural
or man-made causes, or by accident or negligence which results in
substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and
destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment,
and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping
capacity of the community of the affected area”. It goes without
saying that the COVID pandemic eminently qualifies as a “disaster”,
within the meaning of this definition.
66. Section 38(2) of the Disaster Management Act enumerates
measures which the State Government may take under Section 38(1),
and is worded inclusively, meaning that the enumeration is not
exhaustive. Section 38(2)(l)36 envisages “such other matters as it
deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing effective
implementation of provisions of” the Disaster Management Act.
35 38. State Government to take measures.–
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, each State Government shall take all measures
specified in the guidelines laid down by the National Authority and such further measures as it
deems necessary or expedient, for the purpose of disaster management.
36 (2) The measures which the State Government may take under sub-section (1) include measures with
respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:–
*****
(l) such other matters as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing
effective implementation of provisions of this Act.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 40 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
Section 39(a)37, titled “Responsibilities of departments of the State
Government” obligates every department of the State Government to,
inter alia, “take measures necessary for prevention of disasters,
mitigation, preparedness and capacity-building in accordance with the
guidelines laid down by the National Authority and the State
Authority”. No guidelines, laid down by the NDMA or DDMA,
authorizing rent payable by the migrants to their landlords to be
defrayed from the State exchequer, has been cited by Mr. Jain and,
indeed, we are sanguine that there are none.
67. The assurance, by the Chief Minister, in his press conference,
that the rent payable by the migrant tenants to their landlords would
be paid by the State does not find support, therefore, from statute,
executive instruction, or any other instrument having the force of law.
The assurance was apparently made in the heat of the situation, which
was unquestionably unprecedented, so as to further incentivize the
migrant tenants to remain indoors, but it was without any legal
authority whatsoever.
68. Order No. 122-A had been issued by the DDMA on the very
day when the Chief Minister, in his press conference, assured that the
State would pay the rent of the migrant workers/labourers. However,
the said Order did not envisage payment of rent by the State. There is
nothing, before us, to indicate that, before he extended the said
assurance, the Chief Minister, or the executive authorities below him,
37 39. Responsibilities of departments of the State Government. – It shall be the responsibility of
every department of the Government of a State to–
(a) take measures necessary for prevention of disasters, mitigation, preparedness and
capacity-building in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Authority and the
State Authority;
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 41 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
had assessed the financial and other implications of the assurance, or
the impact that it would have on the State exchequer. Given the
position that the country found itself at that point of time, we indeed
doubt whether any such exercise was even possible, let alone within
the span of a single day.
69. We are, therefore, prima facie of the opinion that the assurance,
by the Chief Minister, that the State would bear the rent of all
migrants, was not made after the requisite degree of study and
application of mind to all relevant aspects. The impugned judgment,
too, does not say so.
70. Insofar as the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge
are concerned, suffice it to state, without burdening this judgment by a
ruling-by-ruling analysis, that none of the decisions holds that a mere
statement, even if made by the elected representative in the
Government, which is not preceded or followed by any executive
instruction, Rule, Regulation or other instrument having the force of
law, can be enforced through a mandamus.
71. We are, therefore, of the clear view that the assurance that the
State would pay the rent of the migrants, for the period during which
the lockdown remained in force, having not been followed up with
any official documentation to that effect, cannot be enforced by a writ
of mandamus.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 42 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
72. Before closing the discussion on this issue, we deem it
appropriate to reproduce, here, para 6 of the counter-affidavit filed by
the State before the learned Single Judge, by way of response to the
Writ Petition:
“6. It is reiterated that the present Petition seeks enforcement of
a statement and the same is not maintainable. It is submitted that
statements made by political personalities cannot be enforced
through the judicial process if not backed by any policy decision.
The relief sought in the present Petition is contrary to the settled
position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a
catena of judgements. It is a matter of public knowledge that even
in recent memory, several political leaders across parties have
made several statements. If every such statement becomes the
subject matter of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India then floodgates will open and pave way for all sorts of
misplaced writ petitions, such as the present one. It is therefore
submitted that the present Petition is liable to dismissed at the
threshold itself.”
We find such a stand truly surprising, coming from the executive
which was, at the time of the filing of the counter-affidavit, still
functioning under the Chief Minister whose statement was in issue.
For reasons unknown, the executive of the day was itself unwilling to
manifest the assurance, given by the Chief Minister, in an enforceable
policy decision. Absent any manifestation in the form of a formal
policy decision of the Government, the statement of the Chief
Minister, by itself, would be unenforceable in law.
VI. Legitimate expectation
73. Inasmuch as the question of applying the principle of legitimate
expectation would arise only if there existed, in the first instance, a
promise by the State to the migrants, and we have already held that no
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 43 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
such promise can, in law, be said to have been made, we do not deem
it necessary to dwell at length on the doctrine. Further, legitimate
expectation, even if found to exist, essentially ensures, before the
authority resiles from the promise, compliance with the principles of
natural justice. A detailed analysis of the doctrine is contained in
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation38, which
holds:
“35. Legitimate expectations may come in various forms and
owe their existence to different kind of circumstances and it is not
possible to give an exhaustive list in the context of vast and fast
expansion of the governmental activities. They shift and change so
fast that the start of our list would be obsolete before we reached
the middle. By and large they arise in cases of promotions which
are in normal course expected, though not guaranteed by way of a
statutory right, in cases of contracts, distribution of largess by the
Government and in somewhat similar situations. For instance
discretionary grant of licences, permits or the like, carry with it a
reasonable expectation, though not a legal right to renewal or non-
revocation, but to summarily disappoint that expectation may be
seen as unfair without the expectant person being heard. But there
again the court has to see whether it was done as a policy or in the
public interest either by way of G.O., rule or by way of a
legislation. If that be so, a decision denying a legitimate
expectation based on such grounds does not qualify for
interference unless in a given case, the decision or action taken
amounts to an abuse of power. Therefore the limitation is
extremely confined and if the according of natural justice does not
condition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate
expectation can have no role to play and the court must not usurp
the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take
the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an
objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full
range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended.
Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion
of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the
decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere
on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest
based on legitimate expectation might be affected. For instance if
an authority who has full discretion to grant a licence prefers an
existing licence holder to a new applicant, the decision cannot be38 (1993) 3 SCC 499
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 44 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
interfered with on the ground of legitimate expectation entertained
by the new applicant applying the principles of natural justice. It
can therefore be seen that legitimate expectation can at the most be
one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the
granting of relief is very much limited. It would thus appear that
there are stronger reasons as to why the legitimate expectation
should not be substantively protected than the reasons as to why it
should be protected. In other words such a legal obligation exists
whenever the case supporting the same in terms of legal principles
of different sorts, is stronger than the case against it. As observed
in Attorney General for New South Wales39: “To strike down the
exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding
the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual
would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism.
Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation (falling short of a
legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the
exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.”
If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to
denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or
biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural
justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds
attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate
expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to
invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider
but the court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is
violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends
very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of
administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of
legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of
concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative
action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable
and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative
power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate
expectation is “not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural
justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court
out of review on the merits”, particularly when the element of
speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As
cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales the courts
should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal
limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful
litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc. can
successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by
directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The
caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the
more important.”
39 Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 45 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
74. The most authoritative pronouncement on legitimate
expectation is to be found in the decision of the Constitution Bench in
Sivananda C.T. v. High Court of Kerala40, which emphatically
underscores the position that legitimate expectation creates, at best, an
expectation, and not a legal right, even when a promise was made and
has been withdrawn:
“43. The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine of
legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to include the
principles of good administration. Since citizens repose their trust
in the state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to
legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its assurance or
past practice by acting in a consistent, transparent, and predictable
manner. The principles of good administration require that the
decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of
consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being
regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14.
44. From the above discussion, it is evident that the doctrine of
substantive legitimate expectation is entrenched in Indian
administrative law subject to the limitations on its applicability in
given factual situations. The development of Indian jurisprudence
is keeping in line with the developments in the common law. The
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation can be successfully
invoked by individuals to claim substantive benefits or
entitlements based on an existing promise or practice of a public
authority. However, it is important to clarify that the doctrine of
legitimate expectation cannot serve as an independent basis for
judicial review of decisions taken by public authorities. Such a
limitation is now well recognized in Indian jurisprudence
considering the fact that a legitimate expectation is not a legal
right. It is merely an expectation to avail a benefit or relief based
on an existing promise or practice. Although the decision by a
public authority to deny legitimate expectation may be termed as
arbitrary, unfair, or abuse of power, the validity of the decision
itself can only be questioned on established principles of equality
and non-arbitrariness under Article 14. In a nutshell, an individual
who claims a benefit or entitlement based on the doctrine of
legitimate expectation has to establish: (i) the legitimacy of the40 (2024) 3 SCC 799
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 46 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
expectation; and (ii) that the denial of the legitimate expectation
led to the violation of Article 14.”
(Emphasis supplied)
75. The above passage from Sivanandan C.T. was cited and
followed, very recently, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana
Mishra41.
76. Besides the fact that, as no legally enforceable promise can be
said to be contained in the press conference held by the Chief Minister
on 29 March 2020, that the State would pay the rent of the migrants,
the principle of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to bind the
State to the statement.
VII. The effect of the statement
77. At the same time, the assurance was only for a period of two to
three months. During the said period, the migrant workers and
labourers, who cannot be expected to be schooled in the niceties of
law, must have proceeded on the belief that the assurance was legally
binding and enforceable. Landlords, too, may have believed that the
rent would ultimately be paid by the State.
78. We have already held that the proscription against evicting of
migrants from tenanted premises, contained as it was in the DDMA
Order No. 122-A, was binding on the landlords. No challenge has ever
been laid to the said dispensation.
41 2026 SCC OnLine SC 37
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 47 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
79. The question then arises as to whether the landlords are to be
deprived the rent, for the premises let out to the migrants, during the
period for which the lockdown remained in effect.
80. Had the NDMA or DDMA held this to be a further step which
was necessary to curtail the spread of the pandemic, or had any
Executive Instruction, Circular, Memorandum, Rule or Regulation to
that effect been issued alongside the statement of the Chief Minister,
the assurance that the rent of the migrants would have been borne by
the State would have become enforceable in law as, then, the
assurance would have metamorphosed from a mere statement in a
press conference to a documented indicator of State intent. That,
however, never took place, and, we reiterate, most unfortunately.
81. The question of issuing a writ of mandamus, in the terms
sought by the petitioners does not, therefore, arise. If the Government
decides to act in accordance with the assurance, it would certainly be
at liberty to do so, but we cannot compel performance by mandamus.
F. Conclusion
82. We, therefore, dispose of this appeal by modifying the
directions contained in the impugned judgment in the following terms:
(i) The prayer, in the writ petition, for a direction to the
State to implement the assurance, contained in the pressLPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 48 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
conference dated 29 March 2020 of the Chief Minister, is
misconceived and is accordingly rejected.
(ii) In view of DDMA Order No. 122-A dated 29 March
2020, which has never been challenged, the landlords cannot be
allowed to recover, from their migrant tenants, the rent for the
period during which they continued to occupy the tenanted
premises, but were unable to move out owing to the COVID
imposed lockdown. This amnesty would, however, apply only
for the period the lockdown remained in force.
(iii) This would not, however, inhibit the State Government
from taking a policy decision regarding the assurance given by
the former Chief Minister in his press conference on 29 March
2020, regarding the State paying the rent of the migrants,
should it so deem appropriate. We reiterate our clear opinion,
however, that no mandamus could be issued to enforce the
statement made by the then Chief Minister in the press
conference on 29 March 2020.
(iv) We are unaware of the financial, logistical and other
implications of enforcement of the decision that the State would
bear the rent of the migrants, which, prima facie, appears to
have been taken on the spur of the moment, as it does not even
find reflection in the DDMA Order No. 122-A. We, therefore,
are not expressing any view, one way or the other, thereon.
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 49 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
83. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
84. There shall be no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
APRIL 06, 2026
LPA 349/2021
Signature Not Verified Page 50 of 50
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:06.04.2026
12:01:41
