Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Idel Sk @ Gaba Sk And Another vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 6 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 2301 OF 2022
IDEL SK @ GABA SK AND ANOTHER
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Swapan Kumar Mallick,
Mr. M. H. Chowdhury
For the State : Ms. Anasuya Sinha, Ld. APP
Mr. Prakash Mishra
For the de facto Complainant : Mr. Sujan Chatterjee
Mr. Rohan Bavishi
Hearing concluded on : 23.02.2026
Judgment on : 06.04.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
INTRODUCTION
1.
The inherent jurisdiction of this Court, enshrined under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) read with
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is invoked to test the
structural and substantive integrity of a criminal prosecution
initiated under Sections 447, 379, 506, and 34 of the Indian
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Penal Code, 1860, alongside the stringent provisions of Section
3 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989. In this context, the petitioners seek the
quashing of proceedings in Special (A) Case No. 02 of 2021
(arising out of Rampurhat P.S. Case No. 365/2021), currently
pending before the Learned Judge, Special Court under
Atrocities Act, 1st Court, Suri, Birbhum.
2. The fundamental inquiry before this Court is whether the
criminal machinery was set in motion to redress a genuine social
atrocity, or whether it has been strategically deployed as a
“criminal veneer” to settle a commercial score arising from a
fractured family dynamic. The petitioners, describing themselves
as reputable timber merchants, characterize this prosecution as
a “gross abuse of the process of law,” asserting that its
continuation would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
THE FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The genesis of this prosecution lies in a petition moved under
Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. before the Learned ACJM,
Rampurhat, on January 22, 2021. The narrative of the de-facto
complainant, Surjamin Soren (Opposite Party No. 2), reveals a
deep-seated dispute over a plot of land inherited from her late
husband. It is alleged that between October 9 and October 11,
2020, the petitioners, in collusion with the complainant’s
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nephew, co-accused Alphen Murmu (a Civic Volunteer),
forcefully entered the complainant’s garden to fell and remove
approximately 1,000 trees of significant height (ranging from 4
ft. to 30 ft.), valued at nearly ₹6,00,000.
4. To attract the stringent provisions of the Special Act, the
complainant further alleged that during this operation, when the
complainant and her daughters protested, they were subjected
to caste-based vitriol: “Tui Santhal achis, tui choto jaat… toke
amra mere fele debo” (You are a Santhal, a low caste… we will
kill you). This allegation serves as the foundation for invoking
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989. Notably, the FIR also reveals an allegation
of administrative influence, claiming that the co-accused, Alphen
Murmu, utilized his status as a “Civic Volunteer” to facilitate the
illegal felling under the purported orders of the local police.
5. This factual landscape is starkly contested by the petitioners,
whose grievances have compelled them to seek this Court’s
intervention. They maintain that they are bona fide purchasers
for value who dealt with Alphen Murmu under the impression
that he possessed the absolute authority to sell the trees. They
argue that they have been “roped in” solely to provide a criminal
edge to an otherwise civil claim for sale proceeds, caught in the
crossfire of an internecine feud between an aunt and her
nephew. Furthermore, the petitioners highlight a significant
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hiatus, an unexplained delay of nearly seven months from the
court complaint and over a year from the alleged incident,
suggesting that the narrative of “criminality” was a crafted
afterthought manufactured to extract money.
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
6. Having scanned the records with clinical precision and mulled
over the rival contentions, this Court is left to determine the
following pivotal questions:
I. Whether the failure to support the initial Section 156(3)
petition with a mandatory affidavit–as mandated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava And
Another v. State of U.P. And Others –renders the
entire subsequent proceeding, including the registration
of the FIR and the resulting Charge Sheet,
jurisdictionally fatal and liable to be quashed?
II. Whether the alleged act of felling 1,000 trees in an
open garden–an operation of such magnitude–
satisfies the “public view” requirement under Section 3
of the SC/ST Act, or whether the private nature of the
land provides a statutory shield to the accused as
contemplated in the Hitesh Verma ratio?
III. Whether the present dispute is predominantly a civil or
commercial disagreement regarding sale proceeds and
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CRR 2301 OF 2022property title, strategically “dressed up” in the garb of
a criminal prosecution to exert undue leverage on
reputable businessmen?
IV. Whether the unexplained delay of over one year in
setting the criminal law in motion, coupled with the
lack of independent public witnesses at a private place
of occurrence, makes the prosecution story “manifestly
improbable” and “vaguely crafted,” warranting the
exercise of the Court’s extraordinary power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.?
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
(PETITIONERS)
7. Mr. Swapan Kumar Mallick, learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioners, has mounted a multi-pronged challenge against the
continuation of the impugned proceedings. The primary thrust of
his argument is that the prosecution is not only “procedurally
stillborn” but also substantively hollow, designed as a tool of
coercion rather than a search for justice.
8. Mr. Mallick vehemently argued that the very foundation of the
FIR is legally unsustainable. He pointed out that the petition
under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. was filed in blatant
disregard of the mandatory safeguards established by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava And Another v.
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
State of U.P. And Others (2015) 6 SCC 287. The petition was
neither supported by the mandatory affidavit nor preceded by
documented compliance with Section 154(1) and 154(3). He
submitted that this “judicial filter” is a condition precedent; its
omission renders the Learned Magistrate’s direction to register
an FIR an act coram non judice, making the entire subsequent
investigative superstructure void ab initio.
9. Turning to the charges under the Atrocities Act, Mr. Mallick
placed heavy reliance on the ratio in Hitesh Verma v. State of
Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710. He contended that the alleged
abuse, even if taken at face value, purportedly occurred within
the private garden of the complainant, a location shielded from
the visual and auditory access of the general public. Mr. Mallick,
argued that a private orchard or “bagan” is an extension of the
private enclave of a home. In the absence of any independent
public witnesses at the time of the alleged occurrence, the
essential ingredient of the insult being in a “place within public
view” is missing, thus making the invocation of Section 3 of the
SC/ST Act a manifest “over-reach.”
10. Mr. Mallick further underscored that the root of the controversy
is a failed timber transaction. The petitioners are reputable
businessmen who acted as bona fide purchasers for value,
having paid approximately ₹6,00,000 to the co-accused, Alphen
Murmu, under a commercial arrangement. He argued that the
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
complainant is strategically using the criminal court as a
“weapon of coercion” to resolve a family title dispute and extract
money from the petitioners. Relying on the principles laid down
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, he
submitted that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fides for wreaking vengeance, the Court
must exercise its inherent power to stifle such an oppressive
prosecution.
11. Finally, Mr. Mallick highlights the “crafted” nature of the
narrative by pointing to the abnormal delay. The alleged
incident took place in October 2020, yet the judicial machinery
was only approached in 2021, with the FIR eventually being
registered in August 2021. This gap of nearly a year, without
any plausible explanation in the four corners of the complaint,
suggests that the story of caste-based slurs and forceful
dispossession was “crafted and manufactured” as an
afterthought to provide a criminal edge to a civil grievance. It is
submitted that allowing such a “vaguely crafted” prosecution to
continue would be to permit a travesty of justice against law-
abiding citizens.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE (OPPOSITE
PARTY NO. 1)
12. In a firm rebuttal of the petitioners’ contentions, Ms. Anasuya
Sinha, Learned A.P.P. appearing for the State, submitted that
the Case Diary (C.D.) produced before this Court contains
overwhelming prima facie evidence that precludes any summary
quashing of the proceedings.
13. She submitted that the investigation, led by the Sub-Divisional
Police Officer (SDPO), Rampurhat, has moved beyond mere
allegations. Ms. Sinha highlighted the statements of witnesses
recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., which corroborate
the unauthorized entry into the complainant’s land and the
subsequent felling of approximately 1,000 trees. She underlined
that once the Investigating Agency has found sufficient material
to submit a Charge Sheet (No. 553/2021), the Court should not
interfere with the statutory process of trial.
14. Relying on the authoritative pronouncements in Dineshbhai
Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2018) 3 SCC 104 and M/s
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
(2021) SCC OnLine SC 315 she argued that the High Court, in
its revisional jurisdiction, is not a forum for a “mini-trial.” It is
submitted that the veracity of the petitioners’ claim–that they
were bona fide purchasers, is a matter of evidence that must be
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
tested during cross-examination. The State emphasized that at
this stage, the Court must only satisfy itself that the ingredients
of the alleged offences (Theft, Trespass, and Atrocity) are
disclosed in the Charge Sheet, which they clearly are.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DE-FACTO
COMPLAINANT (OPPOSITE PARTY NO. 2)
15. Mr. Sujan Chatterjee, Learned Counsel appearing for the de-
facto complainant (Opposite Party No. 2), has vehemently
resisted the prayer for quashing, asserting that the present
revisional application is a strategic attempt to stifle a legitimate
prosecution at the threshold.
16. In addressing the petitioners’ reliance on the Hitesh Verma
ratio, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that a “private garden” cannot
serve as a sanctuary for caste-based abuse when the act is
performed in a manner visible and audible to the public. It is
argued that the felling of approximately 1,000 trees–a massive,
three-day logging operation involving a fleet of laborers and
heavy transport vehicles–is an inherently open-air and visible
activity. Relying on the authoritative pronouncement in Swaran
Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435, he contended that the “public
view” requirement of Section 3 of the SC/ST Act is fully
satisfied, as the operation of such a magnitude invited public
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
attention and the derogatory slurs were audible to independent
witnesses in the vicinity.
17. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that the petitioners, being
influential local businessmen, utilized the co-accused, Alphen
Murmu, who held the status of a “Civic Volunteer,” to facilitate
this illegal dispossession. Counsel for the complainant alleged
that this administrative status was weaponized to intimidate the
complainant and create a false impression of official sanction for
the illegal felling. The complainant asserts that the specific
caste-based vitriol, “Tui Santhal achis, tui choto jaat,” was
intentionally deployed to humiliate her and her daughter in their
own neighborhood and to establish social dominance over their
ancestral property.
18. Addressing the petitioners’ contention regarding the delay in
setting the criminal law in motion, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that
the complainant is a member of a marginalized community
(Santhal) who faced systemic hurdles, fear of reprisal, and initial
police inaction due to the petitioners’ local “heavyweight” status.
It is argued that in cases involving Scheduled Tribes, a delay is
often a direct consequence of the social power imbalance and
should not be used as a ground to doubt a narrative that has
since been substantiated by an independent investigation and
the filing of a Charge Sheet.
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19. Mr. Chatterjee concluded by submitting that the petitioners’
defense of being “bona fide purchasers” is a matter for the Trial
Court. Relying on M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra (supra), he argued that the High Court should
not exercise its extraordinary power to quash when the Charge
Sheet discloses prima facie ingredients of theft, trespass, and
social atrocity. To stifle the trial at this stage would, he
submitted, result in a manifest failure of justice and would
frustrate the benevolent objects of the Special Act, which aims
to protect vulnerable sections of society from such high-handed
dispossession and humiliation.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
20. Having scanned the records with clinical precision and mulled
over the rival contentions, I now proceed to address the
foundational challenge raised by the petitioners. The
adjudication of this revision requires a delicate balancing act: on
one hand, the Court must protect citizens from oppressive and
“crafted” prosecutions; on the other, it must ensure that the
benevolent objects of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are not frustrated by a
hyper-technical approach.
21. The discourse must necessarily begin with the jurisdictional
attack on the very inception of the criminal machinery. It is the
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
specific contention of the petitioners that the petition moved
under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was
“procedurally stillborn,” as it lacked the mandatory “judicial
filter” of a supporting affidavit.
22. In addressing this contention, I have considered the
authoritative and landmark pronouncement of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava And Another v. State of
U.P. And Others (supra). In that decision, the Apex Court
expressed grave concern over the rampant abuse of Section
156(3) as a tool for settling personal scores and exerting undue
pressure on law-abiding citizens. To curb such “manufactured
litigation,” the Court held that –
“There has to be prior applications under Section 154(1)
and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3)…
further, every such application must be supported by an
affidavit so that the person making the application
should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no
false affidavit is made.”
23. It provides that the applications under Section 156(3) must be
supported by an affidavit so that the person making the
application is conscious of the legal consequences of making a
false statement. The objective is to ensure the Magistrate does
not act as a mere “post-office” but applies a “judicial filter” to
prevent harassment.
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
24. Applying this mandate to the present factual matrix, the records
of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampurhat,
indeed indicate that the complainant’s petition was neither
supported by an affidavit nor preceded by documented service
of information to the Superintendent of Police under Section
154(3). The petitioners contend that this omission is not a mere
venial infirmity but a jurisdictional error that vitiates the
subsequent FIR and investigation void ab initio. Ordinarily, such
a lapse might invite the “lethal force” of quashing at the
threshold; however, the facts of the case at hand require this
Court to distinguish the specific stage of the criminal process at
which this challenge is mounted.
25. Crucially, the wheel of justice has turned significantly since the
initial order. Unlike the circumstances in Priyanka Srivastava
(supra), where the challenge often arises at the pre-
investigative stage, we are here dealing with a case where an
investigation led by the SDPO, Rampurhat, has already
culminated in a substantive Charge Sheet (No. 553/2021). The
investigating agency has scanned the allegations and found
prima facie material to support the charges of theft, trespass,
and social atrocity. In the mature view of this Court, once a
specialized agency finds evidence of criminality, the technical
“filter” of the affidavit is superseded by the actual “finding” of
the police.
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26. To further solidify this reasoning, reference must be made to
Section 465 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 511 of the BNSS,
2023), which deals with the curability of irregularities. It
provides that no finding or order shall be reversed on account of
an error in the complaint unless a “failure of justice” has been
occasioned. In the present matrix, the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate how the absence of an affidavit at the complaint
stage has caused a substantive failure of justice. To quash a
proceeding where the police have already found a prima facie
case would be to allow the “handmaid of justice” (procedure) to
strangle the “substance of justice” (the merits of the crime).
27. Consequently, I find that while the Learned Magistrate indeed
failed to exercise the requisite circumspection at the inception,
such deficiency constitutes a curable irregularity and not a
jurisdictional fatality. As held in HDFC Securities Ltd. & Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2017) 1 SCC 640, the inherent
power under Section 482 should not be used to stifle a
legitimate prosecution when the investigation has already
yielded a Charge Sheet.
28. Therefore, the answer to Question No. I is in the negative; while
the initial order was procedurally deficient, the subsequent
findings of the investigating agency possess the legal vitality to
sustain the trial.
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29. Transitioning from the procedural challenge to the substantive
merits of the Special Act, I move to the second limb of the
petitioners’ argument regarding the “Public View” doctrine under
Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act. Mr. Mallick has placed
heavy reliance on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand (supra),
contending that since the alleged incident occurred within a
“private garden,” it fails to meet the essential statutory
ingredient of being committed in a “place within public view.”
30. In addressing this, I have meticulously examined the ratio in
Hitesh Verma (supra) regarding the distinction between a
“public place” and a “place within public view.” The Apex Court
was pleased to clarify that while an offence need not be
committed in a public place (such as a street or a park), it must
be committed in a location where the public, meaning
independent persons, can actually view or hear the act of
humiliation. The Court observed that an upper-caste person
abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste within the “four walls of
a house” would not attract the Act, as no member of the public
was present. The petitioners argue that a private garden is
merely an extension of that private enclave, and in the absence
of independent witnesses mentioned in the initial complaint, the
Special Act cannot be invoked.
31. However, the facts of the present case require this Court to
distinguish the “magnitude” of the occurrence from a localized,
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CRR 2301 OF 2022
private confrontation. In Hitesh Verma, the dispute was a
limited altercation over a boundary wall. In the case at hand,
the complainant alleges the forceful felling and removal of
approximately 1,000 trees of significant height (4 ft. to 30 ft.)
over a span of three days. Perusing the Case Diary and the
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., I find that an operation
involving a fleet of laborers, heavy logging equipment, and the
transportation of massive timber loads is, by its very nature, an
open-air and visible activity.
32. An operation involving a fleet of laborers, heavy logging
equipment, and the transportation of massive timber loads is,
by its very nature, an open-air and visible activity. Reference
must be made to Swaran Singh and Others v. State (supra),
which notes that if an incident is visible or audible to the public
(such as neighbors or passers-by), it satisfies the statutory
intent of “public view.” One cannot fell a forest of a thousand
trees in secrecy; the sheer scale of the operation invites public
attention and renders the site a “place within public view” for
the duration of the act.
33. Consequently, the answer to Question No. II is that the private
nature of the land title does not provide an automatic statutory
shield to the accused. If caste-based slurs were hurled during a
massive and visible operation of tree felling, the requirement of
“public view” is prima facie satisfied. Whether the slurs were
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actually uttered or whether independent neighbours witnessed
the incident is a matter of evidence that must be tested in the
crucible of a full-dress trial. Following Dineshbhai Chandubhai
Patel (supra), this Court cannot act as an investigating agency
to scan the topography or weigh the “publicness” of the view at
this stage. Therefore, the invocation of Section 3 of the Special
Act in the Charge Sheet is legally sustainable for the purpose of
proceeding to trial.
34. Advancing to the third limb of the challenge, I address the
contention that this is a “civil dispute dressed up in the garb of a
criminal case.” The petitioners argue they are bona fide
purchasers for value, caught in an internecine feud between the
complainant and her nephew, Alphen Murmu. In evaluating this,
one must apply the “Criminal Veneer” test established in State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra). While the Court may quash
proceedings attended with mala fides, the mere existence of a
“civil profile” does not grant immunity if the essential
ingredients of a cognizable crime are present.
35. As held in Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi (2021) SCC OnLine
SC 206, a single set of facts can concurrently give rise to both
civil and criminal liability. The unauthorized entry onto land
(Section 447 IPC), the dishonest removal of property (Section
379 IPC), and criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC) are
distinct criminal acts. The fact that the petitioners “paid” a third
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party does not automatically absolve them of mens rea. These
are disputed questions of fact that require a “full-dress trial”
where the transaction can be scrutinized to see if it was a
genuine purchase or a coordinated effort to dispossess a
member of a Scheduled Tribe.
36. Furthermore, in a trial for theft, the primary question is whether
the accused intended to dishonestly take moveable property out
of the possession of another without their consent. If the
petitioners entered the land belonging to the complainant
without her consent and removed 1,000 trees, the fact that they
“paid” a third party, even a relative of the owner, does not
automatically absolve them of criminal intent (mens rea). The
“internecine family feud” between the aunt and the nephew may
provide the contextual background, but it does not act as a
statutory bar to prosecution at this prima facie stage.
37. Crucially, as held in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of
Gujarat (supra), this Court cannot act as an investigating
agency or a trial court, while exercising its inherent powers
under Section 482. We cannot weigh the “truth” of the
petitioners’ defence of being bona fide purchasers against the
complainant’s allegations of forceful dispossession. Such a
determination requires a “full-dress trial” where the “civil
transaction” can be scrutinized to see if it was a genuine
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CRR 2301 OF 2022purchase or a coordinated effort to dispossess a member of a
Scheduled Tribe of her property.
38. Consequently, the answer to Question No. III is that the
presence of a commercial or civil element does not warrant the
quashing. Following M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra (supra), the power to quash must be
exercised with “extreme care and caution.” Where the
allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences, the
“truth” of the transaction must be tested in the crucible of trial.
The petitioners’ defense is a shield to be used before the Trial
Court, not a sword to terminate the proceedings at this
threshold. Therefore, the dispute cannot be characterized as
“purely civil” so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court.
39. Finally, regarding Question No. IV, Mr. Mallick argued that the
“unexplained delay” of over one year and the absence of
independent witnesses render the story “manifestly improbable
and “vaguely crafted,” and that these factors, taken together,
bring the case within the seventh category of the Bhajan Lal
guidelines, where the proceeding is “manifestly attended with
mala fides.”
40. However, in evaluating the impact of delay, one must navigate
the balance between a “stale claim” and a “suppressed
grievance.” While an inordinate and unexplained delay in
lodging an FIR can often be a ground for suspicion, the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court has repeatedly held, as in State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71, that delay by itself is
not a ground for quashing a prosecution if the complainant
provides a plausible reason or if the circumstances of the case
explain the hiatus. In the present factual matrix, the
complainant is a member of a marginalized Santhal community,
alleging high-handedness by local businessmen and a “Civic
Volunteer.”Connectivity must be established between the social
status of the victim and the temporal gap in the litigation.
41. In this matrix, the complainant is a member of a marginalized
Santhal community (a Scheduled Tribe) facing local
“heavyweights,” the loss of 1,000 trees and enduring caste-
based slurs, often grapples with systemic hurdles, fear of
reprisal, and a lack of immediate legal resources. As noted in
Swaran Singh v. State (supra), the court must take a
“pragmatic view” of such delays in the context of social power
imbalances. Whether the delay was used to “manufacture” a
story or was a product of genuine distress is a “triable issue” of
fact. It would be a travesty of justice to stifle a trial at the
threshold solely on the ground of delay without allowing the
complainant to explain the same in the witness box.
42. Similarly, the absence of independent public witnesses at this
stage is not a “lethal blow,” to the Charge Sheet/ proceedings,
as the Case Diary contains corroborating statements under
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Section 161 Cr.P.C. In a revisional jurisdiction, this Court cannot
presume that the prosecution’s case is “vague” merely because
the list of witnesses primarily includes the complainant’s family.
Following the ratio in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158, the Court’s duty is to ensure that the
“truth” is not the casualty of technicalities. The presence of
Section 161 statements in the Case Diary corroborating the
felling of trees and the use of slurs provides sufficient prima
facie ground to proceed.
43. The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528
BNSS) is an extraordinary power to be exercised “ex debito
justitiae”, to do real and substantial justice. As reiterated in M/s
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the High Court
cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations when the Charge Sheet discloses
cognizable offences. If there is a prima facie case of theft,
trespass, and social atrocity, the High Court must stay its hand
and allow the Trial Court to function as the “master of facts.”
44. Consequently, the answer to Question No. IV is also in the
negative. The delay and the nature of the witnesses are matters
of “appreciation of evidence,” which fall strictly within the
province of the Trial Court. The prosecution story cannot be
termed “manifestly improbable” at this stage so as to warrant a
summary termination of the proceedings.
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45. Therefore, having answered all four questions against the
petitioners, I find no compelling reason to interfere with the
ongoing proceedings. The “truth” of the defence and the
“veracity” of the grievances must be tested at trial.
CONCLUSION AND LEGAL RATIO
46. The adjudication of this revision has necessitated a delicate
balancing of procedural mandates against the substantive
requirements of social justice. In light of the exhaustive
discussions recorded above, this Court determines that:
(i) Investigative findings in a Charge Sheet supersede
pre-cognizance procedural lapses, making them
curable under Section 465 Cr.P.C.
(ii) “Public View” is a functional concept determined by
the visibility of the offence, not the proprietary title
of the land. An operation of significant magnitude
like the felling of 1,000 trees, is inherently an open-
air activity that invites public attention, thereby
satisfying the statutory intent of “public view”
regardless of the private nature of the orchard or
garden.
(iii) The existence of a “civil profile” does not grant
immunity from criminal prosecution, where the
ingredients of Theft (Section 379 IPC) and Trespass
(Section 447 IPC) are disclosed.
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(iv) Criminal and civil liabilities can coexist, and the
“truth” of a bona fide purchase defense is a matter
of evidence to be tested at trial, not a ground for
quashing under Section 482.
(v) In exercising inherent powers, the High Court must
refrain from conducting a “mini-trial” regarding the
reliability of witnesses or the impact of delay, when
the Case Diary discloses a prima facie caseof
cognizable offences and social atrocity, the Court
must stay its hand and allow the Trial Court to
serve as the ultimate master of facts.
47. Consequently, this Court finds that the petitioners have failed
to demonstrate that the proceedings in Special (A) Case No. 02
of 2021 are “manifestly attended with mala fides” or constitute
an “abuse of the process of law.” On the contrary, the
allegations of forceful dispossession and caste-based
humiliation disclose grave issues that warrant a full-dress trial.
The “truth” of the family feud and the “intent” of the timber
merchants are disputed questions of fact that must be resolved
through the crucible of cross-examination.
48. Therefore, the Revisional Application challenging the Charge-
Sheet fails. The pursuit of substantive justice for a member of a
Scheduled Tribe cannot be derailed by hyper-technicality when
24
CRR 2301 OF 2022
the investigating agency has found sufficient grounds for
prosecution.
CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS AND DIRECTIONS
49. In view of the decisive conclusions established above, this
Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, hereby issues
the following formal orders:
I. The Criminal Revisional Application, being C.R.R. No.
2301 of 2022, is hereby dismissed.
II. The prayer for quashing the proceedings in connection
with Rampurhat P.S. Case No. 365 of 2021 (dated
13.08.2021) and the resultant Special (A) Case No. 02
of 2021 is strictly rejected.
III. The Charge Sheet No. 553/2021, dated 30.12.2021,
submitted by the investigating agency, is found to be
legally sustainable for the purpose of framing charges.
IV. To maintain the sanctity of the “judicial filter”
mandated in Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State
of U.P. and Others (supra), while simultaneously
upholding the investigative findings, the de-facto
complainant (Opposite Party No. 2) is directed to file a
Confirmatory/Supplementary Affidavit before the
Learned Trial Court. This affidavit shall validate the
contents of the original Section 156(3) petition and
25
CRR 2301 OF 2022shall be filed within a period of three (3) weeks from
the date of communication of this order.
V. The Learned Judge, Special Court under the Atrocities
Act, 1st Court, Suri, Birbhum, is hereby directed to
proceed with the trial with utmost expedition.
VI. Considering that the alleged incident dates back to
2020, the Learned Trial Court shall endeavour to
conclude the recording of evidence and the final
disposal of the case, preferably within a period of one
(1) year from the date of receipt of this order.
VII. It is made clear that the petitioners are at liberty to
raise all their defences, including the plea of being
bona fide purchasers, the topography of the “public
view,” and the commercial nature of the transaction,
at the stage of framing of charges and subsequently
during the trial. The Learned Trial Court shall decide
such issues strictly on the basis of the evidence led
before it.
VIII. The observations made by this Court in the course of
this judgment are confined solely to the determination
of the revisional application and shall not be construed
as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
26
CRR 2301 OF 2022
IX. The Learned Trial Court shall remain uninfluenced by
these observations and shall conduct the trial
independently, in accordance with the law.
X. The Learned Trial Court is at liberty to take all
necessary steps to secure the presence of the accused
and the witnesses to ensure the continuity of the trial.
XI. All interim orders or stays operating in this matter
stand vacated with immediate effect.
50. The Department is directed to transmit a copy of this Judgment
and Order to the Learned Judge, Special Court under the
Atrocities Act, 1st Court, Suri, Birbhum, and to the Officer-in-
Charge, Rampurhat Police Station, for their information and
immediate compliance.
51. There shall be no order as to the cost.
52. Interim order/orders, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
53. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the
Trial Court, at once.
54. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
55. All parties shall act on a server copy of this order downloaded
from the official website of this Court.
56. Ordered Accordingly.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
