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HomeLalit Kumar vs State And Ors on 1 April, 2026

Lalit Kumar vs State And Ors on 1 April, 2026

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Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

Lalit Kumar vs State And Ors on 1 April, 2026

Author: Rekha Borana

Bench: Rekha Borana

[2025:RJ-JD:55266]

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                         JODHPUR
                 S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3103/2015

Lalit Kumar S/o Shri Nana Lal, aged about 33 years, R/o Peva,
Tehsil & District Sikar, Rajasthan. Presently residing as Constable
Belt No. 193 at Reserve                 Police Line, Dungarpur, District
Dungarpur, Rajasthan.
                                                                       ----Petitioner
                                     Versus

1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary to the Government,
Department of Home Affairs Secretariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.

2. Director General of Police, Police Department, Udaipur, Range,
Udaipur, Rajasthan.

3. Inspector General of Police, Police Department, Udaipur,
Range, Udaipur, Rajasthan.

4. Superintendent of Police, Dungarpur, Rajasthan.

                                                                   ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)          :     Mr. Nikhil Dungawat
For Respondent(s)          :     Mr. Rituraj Singh Bhati with
                                 Mr. Raj Singh Bhati
                                 Mr. Shailendra Kumar
                                 Mr. Paramvir Singh
                                 Mr. Roop Singh Rathore, Dy.S.P. (OIC)
                                 present in person



              HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA

                                   ORDER

Judgment Reserved on 17/12/2025
Judgment Pronounced on 01/04/2026

1. The present writ petition has been filed aggrieved of order

SPONSORED

dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure-15) passed by the Appellate

Authority vide which order dated 22.12.2013 (Annexure-11)

passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing a punishment of

censure on the petitioner, stood affirmed. The inaction of the

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reviewing authority, in not deciding the review petition as filed by

the petitioner, is also under challenge.

2. The facts are that the petitioner who was appointed as

‘Constable’ with the respondent department in the Year 1995, was

placed under suspension vide order dated 23.11.2011 in

pursuance to a proposed departmental Enquiry in terms of Rule 13

of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,

1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCA Rules’). Memorandum of

charges dated 03.01.2012 (Annexure-2) was served on the

petitioner whereby charges of an alleged demand of illegal

gratification and further for sale of liquor allegedly loaded in a

vehicle, were framed.

3. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Officer, vide

report dated 10.07.2013 (Annexure-4), found all the charges to

be disproved. However, vide communication dated 26.08.2013

(Annexure-5), the Superintendent of Police, Dungarpur concluded

the said enquiry report to be incomplete and remanded the same

back to the Enquiry Officer for a detailed enquiry on the points as

communicated vide the said letter.

4. In compliance thereof, the Enquiry Officer, vide

communication dated 11.09.2013 (Annexure-6), filed a detailed

explanation on all the five points as raised in communication dated

26.08.2013 and again concluded that no charge against the

incumbents was found to be proved. The Enquiry Officer went on

to record that the confidential letter as filed by the then concerned

SHO, on basis of which the complete proceedings were initiated,

itself was doubtful.

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5. However, still being dissatisfied with the report, vide

communication dated 20.09.2013 (Annexure-8), a factual report

was again called for by the Superintendent of Police and in

response thereof, vide communication dated 12.11.2013

(Annexure-9), it was communicated by the Additional

Superintendent of Police that the statements of one Sub-Inspector

Ved Prakash were not recorded during the enquiry proceedings

which ought to have been recorded. Therefore, an explanation

ought to be called for and disciplinary proceedings deserve to be

initiated against the said Sub-Inspector.

6. However, subsequently on the directions been issued, the

statements of said Sub-Inspector Ved Prakash were recorded on

20.11.2013 and a supplementary Enquiry Report was submitted

on 16.12.2013 (Annexure-10). The said Enquiry Report however

concluded the same result i.e., charges against the incumbents

were found to be not proved.

7. After the Enquiry Report been submitted to the Disciplinary

Authority, vide order dated 22.12.2013 (Annexure-11), the

Disciplinary Authority observed that although the charges were

found to be proved in the preliminary enquiry, the same were not

found to be proved in the disciplinary proceedings and it was only

because of the witnesses turning hostile. The complete episode

however, tarnished the image of Police and hence, impose the

punishment of censure on all the incumbents therein, including

the present petitioner. So far as the period of 35 days of absence

from duty qua the petitioner is concerned, the same was

sanctioned to be converted into extra-ordinary leaves.

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8. Appeal against the above order passed by the Disciplinary

Authority stood dismissed vide order dated 09.04.2014

(Annexure-15) passed by the Appellate Authority.

9. Although, a review petition before His Excellency The

Governor was filed by the petitioner against the above order, but

the same remained pending and hence, the present writ petition

was filed in the month of March 2015.

10. It is relevant to note at this stage that during the pendency

of all these proceedings, the petitioner who was suspended on

23.11.2011, remained so till 18.11.2013 i.e., for a period of 727

days. However, he was permitted to join again on 19.11.2013.

11. Aggrieved of the above orders and inaction of the reviewing

authority in not deciding the review petition, the present writ

petition has been filed.

12. Counsel for the petitioner raised the following grounds:

(i) The Disciplinary Authority erred in concluding contrary to

the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer while relying upon the

preliminary enquiry report. Once, a regular enquiry was

undertaken in terms of law, the preliminary enquiry report could

have no relevance whatsoever and any finding recorded in the

said report, would be of no consequence. The Enquiry Officer

specifically concluded the charges to be not proved and despite

the same, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a punishment of

censure on the petitioner, which is erroneous.

(ii) The Disciplinary Authority, if disagreed with the findings

of the Enquiry Officer, was under an obligation to serve a notice of

disagreement on the petitioner before imposing any punishment.

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The same having not been done, the order of punishment is in

total contravention to law.

(iii) The finding as recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is

totally alien to the basic principles of law. Once the Disciplinary

Authority too observed that the charges were not proved, it could

not have proceeded on to impose any punishment only on the

pretext that the image of the Police had been tarnished. There

being nothing on record to prove so, no punishment whatsoever,

may it be a minor penalty, could have been imposed.

(iv) Even if the punishment of censure is termed to be a

minor penalty but then, it does affect the future career of an

incumbent and hence, the same deserves to be quashed.

(v) So far as the review petition filed before The Governor is

concerned, as per Proviso (iii) to Rule 34 of CCA Rules, the same

ought to have been decided within a period of three years. The

said period having elapsed, it cannot even otherwise be decided

now and hence, the pendency of the same would be of no

relevance so far as the present writ petition is concerned.

13. In support of his submissions, Counsel relied upon the

Hon’ble Apex Court judgments in Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of

Gujarat & Ors.; AIR 2013 SC 1513, Yoginath D. Bagde Vs.

State of Maharashtra; AIR 1999 SC 3734, PNB & Ors. Vs.

Kunj Bihari Mishra & Ors.; AIR 1998 SC 2713 and Satyendra

Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors; 2024 INSC 873 and

the Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court at Jaipur in

Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.; S.B. Civil Writ

Petition No.4148/2010 (decided on 09.01.2018).

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14. Per contra Counsel for the respondent department submitted

that in the preliminary enquiry, all the witnesses admitted the

facts qua which the charges were framed. It is only because of the

said witnesses having turned hostile that the charges could not be

proved in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings. Therefore, the

Disciplinary Authority rightly observed so and imposed the

minimum penalty of censure which was required in the matter

keeping into consideration the charges as levelled against the

incumbents.

15. Counsel submitted that the Disciplinary Authority was well

within his jurisdiction to do so and as no major penalty was

imposed by him, he was not under an obligation to serve any

notice of disagreement prior to the same. The punishment of

censure being the minimum penalty, even otherwise, would not

come in the way of the petitioner for any future benefits of service

and hence, does not deserve interference by this Court.

16. Counsel lastly submitted that the review petition as filed by

the petitioner being pending, the present writ petition could not

have been entertained without the decision of the same.

17. Heard the Counsels. Perused the record.

18. In view of the submissions made, the following issues arise

for consideration of this Court:

(i) Whether the Reviewing Authority can exercise power

under Rule 34 of the CCA Rules, beyond the statutory period

of three years?

(ii) Whether Preliminary Enquiry Report would be of any

relevance after Regular Enquiry been undertaken?

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(iii) Whether this Court can interfere in the case of a minor

penalty imposed under the CCA Rules?

19. Coming on to the first issue, Rule 34 of the CCA Rules reads

as under:-

“34. Governor’s power to review.-Notwithstanding
anything contained in these rules, the Governor may, on
his own motion or otherwise, after calling for the records
of these case, review any order which is made or
appealable under these rules or the rules repealed by
rule 35 and, after consultation with the Commission
where such consultation is necessary:

(a) Confirm, modify or set aside the orders;

(b) Impose any penalties or set aside, reduce, confirm or
enhance the penalty imposed by the order;

(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order
or to any other authority directing such further action or
enquiry as he considers proper in the circumstances of
the case; or

(d) Pass such other orders as he deems fit:
Provided that:-

(i) An order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be
passed unless the person concerned has been given an
opportunity of making any representation which he may
wish to make against such enhanced penalty:

(ii) if the Governor proposes to impose any of the
penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 in a
case where an enquiry under rule 16 has not been held,
he shall subject to the provisions of rule 19, direct that
such enquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of
the proceedings of such enquiry, pass such orders as he
may deem fit.

(iii) No action under this rule shall be initiated
more than three years after the date of order to be
reviewed.

20. Evidently, the order was passed by the Appellate Authority

on 09.04.2014 and the review petition was preferred on

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26.05.2014. It is an admitted fact that the review petition was not

decided till the filing of the present writ petition and further, even

till date. As per the submission made by Counsel for the

respondent on 02.12.2025 before this Court, the same has not

been decided because of the pendency of the present writ petition.

Meaning thereby, the statutory period as provided under Rule 34

of the CCA Rules, has already elapsed.

21. Admittedly, there was no interim order operating in the

present writ petition. Mere pendency of a writ petition cannot

extend, suspend or revive the statutory limitation period as

provided under law.

22. In Bahadur Singh (supra) while dealing with an identical

issue, the Court held as under:-

“The Court finds that the penalty order in the
instant case was passed by the Disciplinary Authority
on 23.09.2005 and the Appellate Authority passed the
order on 18.01.2006. The order which has been
passed by the Governor under Rule 34 is dt.
20.07.2009. The two impugned orders challenged by
the petitioner before the Reviewing Authority, were
required to be considered by the Governor as per
powers conferred on him by virtue of Rule 34 of CCA
Rules, 1958.

The Rule making authority in its wisdom has
provided outer limit of limitation of three years for
reviewing the order passed by the authorities. In
the opinion of the Court, the limitation
cannot be stretched or extended for invoking
the power conferred under Rule 34. The
purpose of providing limitation of three years is
required to be followed and if any delinquent files
review petition, the Reviewing Authority can

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exercise any of the powers which are conferred
like modifying, setting aside or confirming orders
or it can impose any penalties or it can set aside,
reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty. A perusal
of Rule further shows that the Reviewing Authority
is also having full competence to remit the case to
the Authority which made the order or any other
Authority directing further action or enquiry as it
deems just and proper in the circumstances of the
case. However, proviso (iii) puts a restriction
that any action which is to be taken under
Rule 34, has to be initiated within three
years from the date of order which is sought
to be reviewed.”

23. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, the statutory

limitation to decide the review petition having expired long back,

the reviewing authority stands denuded of jurisdiction to decide

the same. Hence, the pendency of the review petition would be of

no consequence so far as the present writ petition is concerned.

24. Coming on to the second issue, it is the settled position of

law that evidence recorded in a preliminary enquiry cannot be

used in a regular enquiry. It is also the settled position of law that

after issuance of a charge-sheet and initiation of a regular enquiry,

the preliminary enquiry as a whole, looses its importance and

remains of no consequence.

25. In Satyendra Singh (supra), the Apex Court while dealing

with the issue and while relying upon its earlier judgment in

Nirmala J. Jhala (supra) observed and held as under:-

“16. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala, this Court held
that evidence recorded in a preliminary enquiry

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cannot be used for a regular enquiry as the
delinquent is not associated with it and the
opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in
preliminary enquiry is not given. Relevant extract
thereof reads as under:-

“42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [AIR
1960 SC 992], held that the purpose of holding
a preliminary enquiry in respect of a particular
alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of
finding a particular fact and prima facie, to
know as to whether the alleged misconduct has
been committed and on the basis of the
findings recorded in preliminary enquiry,
no order of punishment can be passed. It
may be used only to take a view as to whether
a regular disciplinary proceeding against the
delinquent is required to be held.

43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v.

Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854] a
Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a
similar view held that preliminary enquiry
should not be confused with regular enquiry.
The preliminary enquiry is not governed by the
provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution
of India. Preliminary enquiry may be held ex
parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the
Government though usually for the sake of
fairness, an explanation may be sought from
the government servant even at such an
enquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be
heard as the enquiry is merely for the
satisfaction of the Government as to whether a
regular enquiry must be held. The Court further
held
as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)
“12. … There must therefore be no confusion
between the two enquiries and it is only
when the government proceeds to hold a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of

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inflicting on the government servant one of
the three major punishments indicated in
Article 311 that the government servant is
entitled to the protection of that article [,
nor prior to that].”

44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v.
State of Maharashtra
[(1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148] this Court
dealt with the issue and held as under:

“… a preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with
the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-
sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out
whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated
against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is
held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry
loses its importance and, whether preliminary
enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law
or by observing principles of natural justice of
(sic) nor, remains of no consequence.”

45. In view of the above, it is evident that
the evidence recorded in preliminary
enquiry cannot be used in regular enquiry
as the delinquent is not associated with it,
and opportunity to cross-examine the
persons examined in such enquiry is not
given. Using such evidence would be
violative of the principles of natural
justice.”

26. In the present matter, findings as recorded by the

Disciplinary Authority read as under:-

“विभागीय जाँच अधिकारी पुलिस उप अधीक्षक वत
ृ डूग
ं रपुर की

जाँच रिपोर्ट एवं पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध समस्त दस्तावेजों का

अवलोकन एवं मनन किया गया। प्राथमिक जाँच में आरोपो की

पष्टि
ु हुई है । विभागीय जाँच में गवाहों के पलटने के आधार पर

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आरोपों की पष्टि
ु नहीं हो पाई है । पूरे घटनाक्रम में मामला

निश्चित तौर पर संदेहास्प्रद रहा है तथा पुलिस कर्मियों की

कार्य प्रणाली संदेह से परे रही हैं तथा पलि
ु स कर्मियों के अलावा

अन्य व्यक्तियों का इस घटनाक्रम में बतौर गवाह या किसी

अन्य Capacity में Involved रहा है , पैसा लेने-दे ने में सबत

चाहे विभागीय जाँच में साक्ष्य के Hostile होने के कारण नहीं

मिले हैं। परन्तु पुरा घटनाक्रम पलि
ु स की छवि एवं कार्य प्रणाली

को गलत तरह से दर्शाता हैं।

अतः श्री प्रवीण सिंह है ड कानि० 536, श्री मदनलाल

कानिं० 184, श्री ललित कुमार कानि० 193, श्री मक
ु े श कुमार

कानि० 374, श्री रामचन्द्र कानि० 177 एवं श्री सीताराम

ड्राईवर कानि० नं० 586 को परिनिन्दा के दण्ड से दण्डित किया

जाता है ।”

27. Applying the ratio as laid down by the Apex Court to the

present matter, it is evident from the above decision of the

Disciplinary Authority that he imposed the punishment solely on

basis of the fact that the charges were proved in the preliminary

enquiry. The same being in contravention to the settled position of

law, cannot be sustained and hence, the punishment as imposed

by the Disciplinary Authority and as affirmed by the Appellate

Authority, does deserve interference by this Court and the same is

hence, quashed.

28. Coming on third issue, it is the settled position of law that

the Courts should not interfere with the disciplinary proceedings

unless the findings of the enquiry are based on no evidence; or

there is violation of statutory provisions; or the findings are so

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perverse that no reasonable person could have reached to such

conclusion; or the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the

proven misconduct. Here is a case where all the findings in the

enquiry proceedings had been recorded in favour of the

incumbents and it was not once, but thrice, concluded by the

Enquiry Officer that no charge was found to be proved. Despite

the same and despite the Disciplinary Authority himself observing

that no charge was found to be proved, proceeded on to impose

the punishment on the sole pretext that the whole episode was

doubtful and the action of the incumbents tarnished the image of

the Police. Meaning thereby, the conclusion drawn by the

Disciplinary Authority is on mere surmises and without any

evidence.

29. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SBI Vs. Ajai

Kumar Srivastava; (2021) 2 SCC 612, the Constitutional

Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review, would

although not interfere in findings of fact arrived at in the

departmental enquiry proceedings generally, but would do so

where there is no evidence to support a finding.

30. Herein is the specific case where all the findings recorded by

the Enquiry Officer were in favour of the incumbent but the

Disciplinary Authority while ignoring the same, imposed a

punishment without any evidence. The same therefore, falls within

the scope of judicial review.

31. In view of the above overall analysis, the present writ

petition stands allowed. Order dated 22.12.2013 passed by the

Disciplinary Authority to the extent of imposition of punishment of

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Censure is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, order

dated 09.04.2014 passed by the Appellate Authority too is hereby

quashed and set aside. It is further held that the Reviewing

Authority shall now not be entitled to pass any order on the

pending review petition of the petitioner.

32. Stay petition and pending applications, if any, stands

disposed of.

(REKHA BORANA),J
Mak/-

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