Lalit Kumar vs State And Ors on 1 April, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    Lalit Kumar vs State And Ors on 1 April, 2026

    Author: Rekha Borana

    Bench: Rekha Borana

    [2025:RJ-JD:55266]
    
            HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                             JODHPUR
                     S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3103/2015
    
    Lalit Kumar S/o Shri Nana Lal, aged about 33 years, R/o Peva,
    Tehsil & District Sikar, Rajasthan. Presently residing as Constable
    Belt No. 193 at Reserve                 Police Line, Dungarpur, District
    Dungarpur, Rajasthan.
                                                                           ----Petitioner
                                         Versus
    
    1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary to the Government,
    Department of Home Affairs Secretariat, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
    
    2. Director General of Police, Police Department, Udaipur, Range,
    Udaipur, Rajasthan.
    
    3. Inspector General of Police, Police Department, Udaipur,
    Range, Udaipur, Rajasthan.
    
    4. Superintendent of Police, Dungarpur, Rajasthan.
    
                                                                       ----Respondents
    
    
    For Petitioner(s)          :     Mr. Nikhil Dungawat
    For Respondent(s)          :     Mr. Rituraj Singh Bhati with
                                     Mr. Raj Singh Bhati
                                     Mr. Shailendra Kumar
                                     Mr. Paramvir Singh
                                     Mr. Roop Singh Rathore, Dy.S.P. (OIC)
                                     present in person
    
    
    
                  HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA
    
                                       ORDER
    

    Judgment Reserved on 17/12/2025
    Judgment Pronounced on 01/04/2026

    1. The present writ petition has been filed aggrieved of order

    SPONSORED

    dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure-15) passed by the Appellate

    Authority vide which order dated 22.12.2013 (Annexure-11)

    passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing a punishment of

    censure on the petitioner, stood affirmed. The inaction of the

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    reviewing authority, in not deciding the review petition as filed by

    the petitioner, is also under challenge.

    2. The facts are that the petitioner who was appointed as

    ‘Constable’ with the respondent department in the Year 1995, was

    placed under suspension vide order dated 23.11.2011 in

    pursuance to a proposed departmental Enquiry in terms of Rule 13

    of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,

    1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCA Rules’). Memorandum of

    charges dated 03.01.2012 (Annexure-2) was served on the

    petitioner whereby charges of an alleged demand of illegal

    gratification and further for sale of liquor allegedly loaded in a

    vehicle, were framed.

    3. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Officer, vide

    report dated 10.07.2013 (Annexure-4), found all the charges to

    be disproved. However, vide communication dated 26.08.2013

    (Annexure-5), the Superintendent of Police, Dungarpur concluded

    the said enquiry report to be incomplete and remanded the same

    back to the Enquiry Officer for a detailed enquiry on the points as

    communicated vide the said letter.

    4. In compliance thereof, the Enquiry Officer, vide

    communication dated 11.09.2013 (Annexure-6), filed a detailed

    explanation on all the five points as raised in communication dated

    26.08.2013 and again concluded that no charge against the

    incumbents was found to be proved. The Enquiry Officer went on

    to record that the confidential letter as filed by the then concerned

    SHO, on basis of which the complete proceedings were initiated,

    itself was doubtful.

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    5. However, still being dissatisfied with the report, vide

    communication dated 20.09.2013 (Annexure-8), a factual report

    was again called for by the Superintendent of Police and in

    response thereof, vide communication dated 12.11.2013

    (Annexure-9), it was communicated by the Additional

    Superintendent of Police that the statements of one Sub-Inspector

    Ved Prakash were not recorded during the enquiry proceedings

    which ought to have been recorded. Therefore, an explanation

    ought to be called for and disciplinary proceedings deserve to be

    initiated against the said Sub-Inspector.

    6. However, subsequently on the directions been issued, the

    statements of said Sub-Inspector Ved Prakash were recorded on

    20.11.2013 and a supplementary Enquiry Report was submitted

    on 16.12.2013 (Annexure-10). The said Enquiry Report however

    concluded the same result i.e., charges against the incumbents

    were found to be not proved.

    7. After the Enquiry Report been submitted to the Disciplinary

    Authority, vide order dated 22.12.2013 (Annexure-11), the

    Disciplinary Authority observed that although the charges were

    found to be proved in the preliminary enquiry, the same were not

    found to be proved in the disciplinary proceedings and it was only

    because of the witnesses turning hostile. The complete episode

    however, tarnished the image of Police and hence, impose the

    punishment of censure on all the incumbents therein, including

    the present petitioner. So far as the period of 35 days of absence

    from duty qua the petitioner is concerned, the same was

    sanctioned to be converted into extra-ordinary leaves.

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    8. Appeal against the above order passed by the Disciplinary

    Authority stood dismissed vide order dated 09.04.2014

    (Annexure-15) passed by the Appellate Authority.

    9. Although, a review petition before His Excellency The

    Governor was filed by the petitioner against the above order, but

    the same remained pending and hence, the present writ petition

    was filed in the month of March 2015.

    10. It is relevant to note at this stage that during the pendency

    of all these proceedings, the petitioner who was suspended on

    23.11.2011, remained so till 18.11.2013 i.e., for a period of 727

    days. However, he was permitted to join again on 19.11.2013.

    11. Aggrieved of the above orders and inaction of the reviewing

    authority in not deciding the review petition, the present writ

    petition has been filed.

    12. Counsel for the petitioner raised the following grounds:

    (i) The Disciplinary Authority erred in concluding contrary to

    the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer while relying upon the

    preliminary enquiry report. Once, a regular enquiry was

    undertaken in terms of law, the preliminary enquiry report could

    have no relevance whatsoever and any finding recorded in the

    said report, would be of no consequence. The Enquiry Officer

    specifically concluded the charges to be not proved and despite

    the same, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a punishment of

    censure on the petitioner, which is erroneous.

    (ii) The Disciplinary Authority, if disagreed with the findings

    of the Enquiry Officer, was under an obligation to serve a notice of

    disagreement on the petitioner before imposing any punishment.

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    The same having not been done, the order of punishment is in

    total contravention to law.

    (iii) The finding as recorded by the Disciplinary Authority is

    totally alien to the basic principles of law. Once the Disciplinary

    Authority too observed that the charges were not proved, it could

    not have proceeded on to impose any punishment only on the

    pretext that the image of the Police had been tarnished. There

    being nothing on record to prove so, no punishment whatsoever,

    may it be a minor penalty, could have been imposed.

    (iv) Even if the punishment of censure is termed to be a

    minor penalty but then, it does affect the future career of an

    incumbent and hence, the same deserves to be quashed.

    (v) So far as the review petition filed before The Governor is

    concerned, as per Proviso (iii) to Rule 34 of CCA Rules, the same

    ought to have been decided within a period of three years. The

    said period having elapsed, it cannot even otherwise be decided

    now and hence, the pendency of the same would be of no

    relevance so far as the present writ petition is concerned.

    13. In support of his submissions, Counsel relied upon the

    Hon’ble Apex Court judgments in Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of

    Gujarat & Ors.; AIR 2013 SC 1513, Yoginath D. Bagde Vs.

    State of Maharashtra; AIR 1999 SC 3734, PNB & Ors. Vs.

    Kunj Bihari Mishra & Ors.; AIR 1998 SC 2713 and Satyendra

    Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors; 2024 INSC 873 and

    the Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court at Jaipur in

    Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.; S.B. Civil Writ

    Petition No.4148/2010 (decided on 09.01.2018).

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    14. Per contra Counsel for the respondent department submitted

    that in the preliminary enquiry, all the witnesses admitted the

    facts qua which the charges were framed. It is only because of the

    said witnesses having turned hostile that the charges could not be

    proved in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings. Therefore, the

    Disciplinary Authority rightly observed so and imposed the

    minimum penalty of censure which was required in the matter

    keeping into consideration the charges as levelled against the

    incumbents.

    15. Counsel submitted that the Disciplinary Authority was well

    within his jurisdiction to do so and as no major penalty was

    imposed by him, he was not under an obligation to serve any

    notice of disagreement prior to the same. The punishment of

    censure being the minimum penalty, even otherwise, would not

    come in the way of the petitioner for any future benefits of service

    and hence, does not deserve interference by this Court.

    16. Counsel lastly submitted that the review petition as filed by

    the petitioner being pending, the present writ petition could not

    have been entertained without the decision of the same.

    17. Heard the Counsels. Perused the record.

    18. In view of the submissions made, the following issues arise

    for consideration of this Court:

    (i) Whether the Reviewing Authority can exercise power

    under Rule 34 of the CCA Rules, beyond the statutory period

    of three years?

    (ii) Whether Preliminary Enquiry Report would be of any

    relevance after Regular Enquiry been undertaken?

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    (iii) Whether this Court can interfere in the case of a minor

    penalty imposed under the CCA Rules?

    19. Coming on to the first issue, Rule 34 of the CCA Rules reads

    as under:-

    “34. Governor’s power to review.-Notwithstanding
    anything contained in these rules, the Governor may, on
    his own motion or otherwise, after calling for the records
    of these case, review any order which is made or
    appealable under these rules or the rules repealed by
    rule 35 and, after consultation with the Commission
    where such consultation is necessary:

    (a) Confirm, modify or set aside the orders;

    (b) Impose any penalties or set aside, reduce, confirm or
    enhance the penalty imposed by the order;

    (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order
    or to any other authority directing such further action or
    enquiry as he considers proper in the circumstances of
    the case; or

    (d) Pass such other orders as he deems fit:
    Provided that:-

    (i) An order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be
    passed unless the person concerned has been given an
    opportunity of making any representation which he may
    wish to make against such enhanced penalty:

    (ii) if the Governor proposes to impose any of the
    penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 in a
    case where an enquiry under rule 16 has not been held,
    he shall subject to the provisions of rule 19, direct that
    such enquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of
    the proceedings of such enquiry, pass such orders as he
    may deem fit.

    (iii) No action under this rule shall be initiated
    more than three years after the date of order to be
    reviewed.

    20. Evidently, the order was passed by the Appellate Authority

    on 09.04.2014 and the review petition was preferred on

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    26.05.2014. It is an admitted fact that the review petition was not

    decided till the filing of the present writ petition and further, even

    till date. As per the submission made by Counsel for the

    respondent on 02.12.2025 before this Court, the same has not

    been decided because of the pendency of the present writ petition.

    Meaning thereby, the statutory period as provided under Rule 34

    of the CCA Rules, has already elapsed.

    21. Admittedly, there was no interim order operating in the

    present writ petition. Mere pendency of a writ petition cannot

    extend, suspend or revive the statutory limitation period as

    provided under law.

    22. In Bahadur Singh (supra) while dealing with an identical

    issue, the Court held as under:-

    “The Court finds that the penalty order in the
    instant case was passed by the Disciplinary Authority
    on 23.09.2005 and the Appellate Authority passed the
    order on 18.01.2006. The order which has been
    passed by the Governor under Rule 34 is dt.
    20.07.2009. The two impugned orders challenged by
    the petitioner before the Reviewing Authority, were
    required to be considered by the Governor as per
    powers conferred on him by virtue of Rule 34 of CCA
    Rules, 1958.

    The Rule making authority in its wisdom has
    provided outer limit of limitation of three years for
    reviewing the order passed by the authorities. In
    the opinion of the Court, the limitation
    cannot be stretched or extended for invoking
    the power conferred under Rule 34. The
    purpose of providing limitation of three years is
    required to be followed and if any delinquent files
    review petition, the Reviewing Authority can

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    exercise any of the powers which are conferred
    like modifying, setting aside or confirming orders
    or it can impose any penalties or it can set aside,
    reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty. A perusal
    of Rule further shows that the Reviewing Authority
    is also having full competence to remit the case to
    the Authority which made the order or any other
    Authority directing further action or enquiry as it
    deems just and proper in the circumstances of the
    case. However, proviso (iii) puts a restriction
    that any action which is to be taken under
    Rule 34, has to be initiated within three
    years from the date of order which is sought
    to be reviewed.”

    23. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, the statutory

    limitation to decide the review petition having expired long back,

    the reviewing authority stands denuded of jurisdiction to decide

    the same. Hence, the pendency of the review petition would be of

    no consequence so far as the present writ petition is concerned.

    24. Coming on to the second issue, it is the settled position of

    law that evidence recorded in a preliminary enquiry cannot be

    used in a regular enquiry. It is also the settled position of law that

    after issuance of a charge-sheet and initiation of a regular enquiry,

    the preliminary enquiry as a whole, looses its importance and

    remains of no consequence.

    25. In Satyendra Singh (supra), the Apex Court while dealing

    with the issue and while relying upon its earlier judgment in

    Nirmala J. Jhala (supra) observed and held as under:-

    “16. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala, this Court held
    that evidence recorded in a preliminary enquiry

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    cannot be used for a regular enquiry as the
    delinquent is not associated with it and the
    opportunity to cross-examine persons examined in
    preliminary enquiry is not given. Relevant extract
    thereof reads as under:-

    “42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
    Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway [AIR
    1960 SC 992], held that the purpose of holding
    a preliminary enquiry in respect of a particular
    alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of
    finding a particular fact and prima facie, to
    know as to whether the alleged misconduct has
    been committed and on the basis of the
    findings recorded in preliminary enquiry,
    no order of punishment can be passed. It
    may be used only to take a view as to whether
    a regular disciplinary proceeding against the
    delinquent is required to be held.

    43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v.

    Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854] a
    Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a
    similar view held that preliminary enquiry
    should not be confused with regular enquiry.
    The preliminary enquiry is not governed by the
    provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution
    of India. Preliminary enquiry may be held ex
    parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the
    Government though usually for the sake of
    fairness, an explanation may be sought from
    the government servant even at such an
    enquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be
    heard as the enquiry is merely for the
    satisfaction of the Government as to whether a
    regular enquiry must be held. The Court further
    held
    as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)
    “12. … There must therefore be no confusion
    between the two enquiries and it is only
    when the government proceeds to hold a
    departmental enquiry for the purpose of

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    inflicting on the government servant one of
    the three major punishments indicated in
    Article 311 that the government servant is
    entitled to the protection of that article [,
    nor prior to that].”

    44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v.
    State of Maharashtra
    [(1997) 1 SCC 299 : 1997
    SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148] this Court
    dealt with the issue and held as under:

    “… a preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with
    the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-
    sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out
    whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated
    against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is
    held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry
    loses its importance and, whether preliminary
    enquiry was held strictly in accordance with law
    or by observing principles of natural justice of
    (sic) nor, remains of no consequence.”

    45. In view of the above, it is evident that
    the evidence recorded in preliminary
    enquiry cannot be used in regular enquiry
    as the delinquent is not associated with it,
    and opportunity to cross-examine the
    persons examined in such enquiry is not
    given. Using such evidence would be
    violative of the principles of natural
    justice.”

    26. In the present matter, findings as recorded by the

    Disciplinary Authority read as under:-

    “विभागीय जाँच अधिकारी पुलिस उप अधीक्षक वत
    ृ डूग
    ं रपुर की

    जाँच रिपोर्ट एवं पत्रावली पर उपलब्ध समस्त दस्तावेजों का

    अवलोकन एवं मनन किया गया। प्राथमिक जाँच में आरोपो की

    पष्टि
    ु हुई है । विभागीय जाँच में गवाहों के पलटने के आधार पर

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    आरोपों की पष्टि
    ु नहीं हो पाई है । पूरे घटनाक्रम में मामला

    निश्चित तौर पर संदेहास्प्रद रहा है तथा पुलिस कर्मियों की

    कार्य प्रणाली संदेह से परे रही हैं तथा पलि
    ु स कर्मियों के अलावा

    अन्य व्यक्तियों का इस घटनाक्रम में बतौर गवाह या किसी

    अन्य Capacity में Involved रहा है , पैसा लेने-दे ने में सबत

    चाहे विभागीय जाँच में साक्ष्य के Hostile होने के कारण नहीं

    मिले हैं। परन्तु पुरा घटनाक्रम पलि
    ु स की छवि एवं कार्य प्रणाली

    को गलत तरह से दर्शाता हैं।

    अतः श्री प्रवीण सिंह है ड कानि० 536, श्री मदनलाल

    कानिं० 184, श्री ललित कुमार कानि० 193, श्री मक
    ु े श कुमार

    कानि० 374, श्री रामचन्द्र कानि० 177 एवं श्री सीताराम

    ड्राईवर कानि० नं० 586 को परिनिन्दा के दण्ड से दण्डित किया

    जाता है ।”

    27. Applying the ratio as laid down by the Apex Court to the

    present matter, it is evident from the above decision of the

    Disciplinary Authority that he imposed the punishment solely on

    basis of the fact that the charges were proved in the preliminary

    enquiry. The same being in contravention to the settled position of

    law, cannot be sustained and hence, the punishment as imposed

    by the Disciplinary Authority and as affirmed by the Appellate

    Authority, does deserve interference by this Court and the same is

    hence, quashed.

    28. Coming on third issue, it is the settled position of law that

    the Courts should not interfere with the disciplinary proceedings

    unless the findings of the enquiry are based on no evidence; or

    there is violation of statutory provisions; or the findings are so

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    perverse that no reasonable person could have reached to such

    conclusion; or the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the

    proven misconduct. Here is a case where all the findings in the

    enquiry proceedings had been recorded in favour of the

    incumbents and it was not once, but thrice, concluded by the

    Enquiry Officer that no charge was found to be proved. Despite

    the same and despite the Disciplinary Authority himself observing

    that no charge was found to be proved, proceeded on to impose

    the punishment on the sole pretext that the whole episode was

    doubtful and the action of the incumbents tarnished the image of

    the Police. Meaning thereby, the conclusion drawn by the

    Disciplinary Authority is on mere surmises and without any

    evidence.

    29. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SBI Vs. Ajai

    Kumar Srivastava; (2021) 2 SCC 612, the Constitutional

    Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review, would

    although not interfere in findings of fact arrived at in the

    departmental enquiry proceedings generally, but would do so

    where there is no evidence to support a finding.

    30. Herein is the specific case where all the findings recorded by

    the Enquiry Officer were in favour of the incumbent but the

    Disciplinary Authority while ignoring the same, imposed a

    punishment without any evidence. The same therefore, falls within

    the scope of judicial review.

    31. In view of the above overall analysis, the present writ

    petition stands allowed. Order dated 22.12.2013 passed by the

    Disciplinary Authority to the extent of imposition of punishment of

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    Censure is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, order

    dated 09.04.2014 passed by the Appellate Authority too is hereby

    quashed and set aside. It is further held that the Reviewing

    Authority shall now not be entitled to pass any order on the

    pending review petition of the petitioner.

    32. Stay petition and pending applications, if any, stands

    disposed of.

    (REKHA BORANA),J
    Mak/-

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