Allahabad High Court
Lko. Development Authority Thru. Secy. vs Shakuntala Devi (Dead) Thru. Sudhir … on 7 January, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:986
[AFR]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
FIRST APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 129 of 2025
Lko. Development Authority Thru. Secy.
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Shakuntala Devi (Dead) Thru. Sudhir Kumar Rastogi And Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Mukund Tewari, Dhawal Bir Prasad
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Along with :
1.
First Appeal Defective No. 130 of 2025:
Lko. Development Authority Vipin Khand Gomti Nagar Lko. Thru. Secy.
Versus
Chandra Kishore Rastogi (Dead) and 3 others
Court No. - 20
HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.
Order on Applications for Condonation of Delay
1. Vakalatnama filed by Shri Paavan Awasthi on behalf of respondent No.1/2/1 in First Appeal Defective No.129/2025 is taken on record.
2. Heard Shri Mukund Tewari, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Bhanu Bajpai, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Paaavan Awasthi, learned counsel for respondents and perused the record.
3. As per office report, First Appeal Defective No.129 of 2025 has been filed with delay of 173 days and First Appeal Defective No.130 of 2025 has been filed with delay of 182 days.
4. These first appeals have been filed by the appellant-Lko. Development Authority against the judgment and order dated 09.08.2024 passed by Presiding Officer, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Tribunal, Kapoorthala, Lucknow Division, Lucknow in Misc. Case No.16/1990 (Smt. Shakuntala Devi (dead) and others vs. U.P. State through Collector, Lucknow and others) and Misc. Case No.14/1990, Chandra Kishore Rastogi (dead) and another vs. U.P. State through Collector, Lucknow and others under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 respectively.
5. The reasons stated in the delay condonation applications are that the impugned orders were passed on 09.08.2024 and the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant before the Tribunal only came to know about the judgment on 08.09.2024 however, no reasons had been given as to who informed him and what was the reason for not knowing. Even after knowing about the judgment on 08.09.2024, the certified copies were applied on 25.09.2024 which were made available on 03.10.2024. The reasons stated in the application filed along with delay condonation applications are nothing but an excuse and an effort has been made to explain the delay.
6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of appellant submits that in these cases the delay is not an inordinate delay as the delay is only 173 & 182 days respectively.
7. It is further submitted that the certified copies were misplaced and later on recovered and it is only after getting certified copies, an opinion was given by him to contest the matter on 21.12.2024. Thereafter, the matter was put up before the Department who examined the matter on 08.01.2025 and 21.01.2025 and thereafter, the matter was referred to the lawyer and the appeal was filed on 08.05.2025.
8. To buttress his argument he has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Inder Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in [2025 SCC OnLine SC 600]. He submits that this judgment considers the previous judgments and held as under:- “13. In the present case, the contentions of the appellant, on first blush appears to be attractive, inasmuch as the State cannot be given any undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant, especially in matters of limitation. There is no doubt that all parties, whether or not State under Article 123 of the Constitution, are required to act with due diligence and promptitude. 14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation. 15. In the present case, the filing of the Review Petition before the First Appellate Court was with a delay of two years and four months and the Second Appeal before the High Court was delayed by about a year from the date of the dismissal of the Review Petition i.e., 30.09.2019. Pausing for a moment, it is necessary to indicate that in the present case, the dispute over title of a land is not between private parties, but rather between the private party and the State. Moreover, when the land in question was taken possession of by the State and allotted for public purpose to the Youth Welfare Department and the Collectorate and has continued in the possession of the State, the claim of the State that it is government land cannot be summarily discarded. We find, upon a perusal of the record, that the appellant had, in fact, filed an execution case for taking over possession of the land, which would demonstrate clearly the admitted position that he was not in possession thereof. Thus, the matter would, in our considered view, require adjudication on its own merits due to various reasons.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court Court in the matter of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 has held as under:-
“10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110, 116 :(1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit …. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.
10. He also placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board and others reported in [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969] which reads as under:- “119. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice ? that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in such matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the message had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and, accordingly, emphasis was laid on the courts adopting a liberal and justice oriented approach. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531]. 120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531].”
11. Learned counsel for the appellant further placed reliance on a judgment passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bandi Lakshmana Reddy vs. D. Renuka and ors. ; I.A. No.1 of 2025 in Appeal Suit No.3 of 2013 decided on 14.10.2025 wherein the Court has held as under:- “14. It is a settled principle that “sufficient cause” must be given a liberal construction to advance substantial justice remains a guiding factor. Furthermore, the duration of the delay is less important than the genuineness and acceptability of the explanation provided. A short delay with an unacceptable reason may be rejected, while a long delay with a satisfactory explanation may be condoned. The said proposition is fortified by a recent pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs.v. Karnataka Housing Board MANU/SC/1262/2025: 2025 INSC 1104.”
12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has a very good case on merits and his right would be prejudicially affected if the appeal is dismissed on delay. He further requested that this Court to look into the merit of the matter before deciding the delay condonation application.
13. Per contra, Shri Paavan Awasthi who appears on behalf of the respondents submits that mere explanation for delay cannot be said to be procedural laches. To buttress his argument he has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another reported in [(2012) 3 SCC 563].
14. He further placed reliance on the judgment of State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Bherulal reported in [(2020) 10 SCC 654] wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:- “6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.”
15. I have considered the submissions advanced by parties.
16. Before delving into the merits of the matter, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being reproduced hereinunder:-
“Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, allows courts to condone delay in filing appeals or applications (except for those under Order XXI CPC) if the applicant proves they had a “sufficient cause” for not filing within the prescribed time, enabling extension of the limitation period to meet justice, with “sufficient cause” interpreted liberally by courts based on specific case facts.”
17. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28. Para 605 ?. 266:-
‘605 Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.’
18. An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches.
19. The reason given in the delay condonaton applications were as follows:- “3. That the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal could not know about the passing of the judgment and order dated 09/08/2024 passed in the above case, therefore, he could not apply for a certified copy of the aforesaid judgment. 4. That as soon as the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal became aware of the above judgment and order dated 08/09/2004, he applied for a certified copy on 25/9/2024 which was prepared and issued on 03/10/2024. 5. That the certified copy of the judgment and order dated 09/08/2024 was misplaced in the office of the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal as it was inadvertently placed in record of some other case. 6. That the certified copy of the judgment and order dated 09/08/2024 was finally traced in the second week of December 2024 in the office of the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal. 7. That vide letter dated 21/12/2024, the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal gave an opinion to challenge the judgement and order dated 09/08/2024 as it was legally erroneous and unsustainable. 8. That since two references were decided by a common judgement, the counsel for the Appellant who conducted the case before the Tribunal to certified copy applied for one more of order dated 09/08/2024 on 1/1/2025 which was prepared and issued on 9.1.2025. The certified copy of the formal order dated 18/9/2024 was applied on 1/1/25 which was prepared and delivered on 9/1/2025. 9. That the matter was examined by the Department of Arjan, LDA and on 8.1.2025, the Joint Secretary, Arjan, LDA proposed for filing an appeal against the judgement and order dated 9/8/2024 and the file was forwarded through Secretary, LDA to the Chief Legal Adviser. 10. That the Chief Legal Adviser, LDA examined the matter and on 24/1/2025, gave an opinion to challenge the judgment and order dated 9/8/2024 by filing an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court. 11. That thereafter the matter was again processed at the level of Department of Arjan, LDA and vide notesheet prepared on 10/2/2025, the file was moved for appointment of an Advocate for filing an appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order dated 9/8/2024. 12. That the matter was examined on 13/2/2025 by the AparSachiv, LDA and forwarded to the Law Department for nominating an Advocate. 13. That on 21/2/2025, the Addl. Secretary (Law), LDA the present advocate which was approved by the Secretary, LDA. 14. That the pairokar of LDA contacted the present counsel in the first week of March 2025 and by means of letter dated 2/3/2025 he requested for parawise narrative explaining the delay in filing the appeal alongwith relevant records the case. 15. That the pairokar of LDA again contacted the present counsel in the 3rd week of March 2025 but the record was incomplete, accordingly, vide letter dated 23/3/2025 again a request was made for providing entire record alongwith the parawise narrative explaining the delay in filing the appeal. 16. That in the first week of April 2025, the pairokar of the LDA provided the record alongwith the reasons for delay in filing the present appeal. After examining the matter the present appeal was dictated and typed in the second week of April 2025 and was sent to the Legal Department, LDA for vetting. 17. That the draft of the appeal was received in the last week of April 2025. The final appeal was typed including the annexures and is being filed without any further delay. 18. That the delay in filing the instant appeal is unintentional, genuine, bonafide and beyond the control of the Appellant, therefore, deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lanka Venkateswariu v State of A.P. reported in MANU/SC/0153/2011 deprecated the High Court in condoning the delay in filing of the appeal therein, that was occasioned not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer Inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders concerned, merely because the party seeking condonation happened to be the State. In doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation, particularly in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay.
21. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General (supra) has held as follows:- “26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
22. In the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed its deep anguish over the routine manner in which the State and its instrumentalities continue to seek condonation of delay on the pretext of bureaucratic inefficiencies. It held that the earlier decisions that had afforded a degree of leeway for such Inefficiencies no longer reflects the correct position of law insofar as condonation of delay is concerned. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in view of the decision of Postmaster General (supra), any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or the process of arranging for them through bureaucratic process works is no longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay.
23. A similar view was iterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court placing reliance on Postmaster General (supra) held that a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down merely because the Government is involved. The relevant observations read as under:-
“59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.”
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Odisha and ors. vs. Sunanda Mahakuda reported in (2021) 11 SCC 560 has held that the leeway which was earlier enjoyed by the State and its instrumentalities on account of bureaucratic inefficiencies in matters of condonation of delay is no longer available in view of the technological advancement and the shift in jurisprudence as elucidated in Postmaster General (supra). It observed that no case Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be said to be made out where there is no reason or excuse given in respect of the period for which condonation is sought.
25. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again deprecated the tendency of State and its Instrumentalities to proceed on the assumption that they may approach the courts at their own convenience and sweet will, disregarding the period of limitation prescribed by statute, as though the Limitation statute does not apply to them. It held that the leeway which was at one point extended to the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision of Postmaster General (supra).
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy reported in 2024 : INSC: 262 held that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning a gross delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be. It held that unless the Department has reasonable acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
27. In view of ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (supra), the lapses or delay by the Government or its agencies should not be condoned as a matter of right. It is further held in Shivamma (supra) that the delay should not be condoned merely on the presumption that if the delay is not condoned the government and the public interest run a risk of a meritorious matter being thrown out. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that the State is under a higher duty to act in time in every matter which it litigates hence, the repeated indulgence in condoning the delay on the ground of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of the Limitation Act. It would amount to giving immunity or cart blanche power to the State to act as it pleases. The public interest lies not in condoning the delay inefficiency and delay but in compelling the state and its instrumentalities for being efficient responsible and to take a time bound action. The Court further held that when it comes to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not a free-pass to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The vital test for condoning the delay is for the party that is praying for such condonation to prove that it was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter.
28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the above instant judgment and also the judgment passed in the matter of Inder Singh (supra), Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India reported in [(2023) 10 SCC 531] and State of Manipur vs. Koting Lamkang reported in [(2019) 10 SCC 408] wherein the decision of Postmaster General (supra) was either distinguished or not followed. The delay on account of Government entity therein were condoned.
29. All the above judgments were duly considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (supra) and thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
“210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.
214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay.
228. Limitation laws are themselves grounded in public policy, as already discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, it is based on the maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation”. Therefore, public interest is better served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses. State cannot simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public and yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by allowing limitation periods to lapse.
229. Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted, merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely action.
230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter of course for the Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of “public interest,” there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but rather its betrayal.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely decision-making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal condonation of delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition. Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that functions with diligence and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy embodied in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in administration, and bring a balance between accountability and autonomy of action, It would result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as it pleases with the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell doom all over the collective responsibility that the State and its instrumentalities are entrusted with. Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act.
249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.
259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.”
30. The reasons stated in the delay condonation applications filed along with instant appeals do not show sufficient reasons to condone the delay. No effort has been made to explain the day to day delay which has so occasioned in filing the appeals. The reasons in the delay condonation applications are not ‘sufficient’ which could cause for condonation of delay, therefore, the delay condonation applications are rejected.
31. In view of aforesaid, the instant appeals suffer from delay and laches and are consequently dismissed.
(Prashant Kumar,J.)
January 7, 2026
Saurabh Yadav/-
