Court On Its Own Motion vs State And Ors on 4 April, 2026

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    Delhi High Court

    Court On Its Own Motion vs State And Ors on 4 April, 2026

    Author: Swarana Kanta Sharma

    Bench: Swarana Kanta Sharma

                              $~
                              *       IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                              %                                            Judgment reserved on: 05.01.2026
                                                                        Judgment pronounced on: 04.04.2026
                                                                          Judgment uploaded on: 04.04.2026
    
    
                              +       CRL.REV.P. 691/2024
                                      COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION                                               .....Petitioner
                                                                 Through:         Ms. Aasha Tiwari, Advocate/
                                                                                  Amicus Curiae with Mr.
                                                                                  Puneet Narula, Advocate.
                                                                 Versus
    
                                      STATE AND ORS.                                                   .....Respondents
                                                                 Through:         Mrs. Anubha Bhardwaj, SPP
                                                                                  for CBI along with Ms. Anchal
                                                                                  Kashyap and Mr. Vijay Misra,
                                                                                  Advocates.
                                                                                  Mr. Nitin Chaudhary and Mr.
                                                                                  Abhishek Singh, Advocates for
                                                                                  R-2.
                              CORAM:
                              HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
                                                                 JUDGMENT
    

    Index to the Judgment
    INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………… 2
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND ………………………………………………………… 3
    SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT ……………………………………… 6
    ANALYSIS & FINDINGS …………………………………………………………… 8

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    A. Section 15(2) of POCSO Act …………………………………………………………… 9
    B. Meaning of ‘Child’ under POCSO Act ………………………………………….. 11
    C. Interpretation of ‘Child’ in the Context of Child Pornographic
    Material under the POCSO Act ………………………………………………………….. 13
    D. Application of the Test of Subjective Satisfaction to the Material on
    Record ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18
    E. The Decision ………………………………………………………………………………… 20

    SPONSORED

    DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J

    INTRODUCTION

    1. A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed by one Tulir
    Charitable Trust, assailing the order dated 01.09.2023 [hereafter
    ‗impugned order’] passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
    (Special Court-POCSO), Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts
    [hereafter ‗Sessions Court’] in SC 18/2022, whereby the respondent
    nos. 3 and 4 herein were discharged of offences under Section 15(2)
    of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
    [hereafter ‗POCSO Act‘]. Guidelines were also sought with respect to
    cases involving Child Sexual Abuse Material of unidentified
    child/children online or offline. The PIL came to be listed before the
    Division Bench-I.

    2. By way of judgment dated 09.05.2024, the Division Bench-I
    observed that the prayer seeking formulation of guidelines for the
    benefit of POCSO Special Courts dealing with cases involving Child
    Sexual Abuse Material of unidentified child/children was not
    required to be considered in the present case, as sufficient legal

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    provisions already exist to deal with such situations. It was further
    noted that, vide the impugned order, the learned Sessions Court had
    held that the provisions of Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act could not
    be invoked against the accused persons in the absence of any criteria
    for determining the age of the children appearing in the pornographic
    videos and photographs. On that basis, the learned Sessions Court
    had discharged the said respondents of the offence under Section
    15(2)
    of the POCSO Act. Division Bench-I, after taking note of the
    scheme of the POCSO Act and certain judicial precedents, expressed
    a prima facie view that the findings recorded in the impugned order
    suffered from manifest illegalities and had resulted in miscarriage of
    justice.

    3. Accordingly, the PIL was converted into the present suo motu
    revision petition and was thereafter listed before this Court. During
    the course of proceedings, the Union of India was deleted from the
    array of parties, and an amended memo of parties was placed on
    record. The trial court proceedings were stayed vide order dated
    21.05.2024.

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    4. The facts of the case, in brief, are that upon receiving
    information from a reliable source, an FIR bearing No. RC-
    20(S)/2021/CBI/SC-III/New Delhi was registered by the Central
    Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against Raman Gautam (respondent
    no. 2), one Rakesh Kumar, and other unknown persons for

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    commission of offences under Section 67B of the Information
    Technology Act, 2000 [hereafter ‗IT Act‘] read with Section 120B of
    the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter ‗IPC‘]. It was alleged that the
    said accused persons were involved in transmitting, storing, and
    viewing Child Sexual Exploitation Material [hereafter ‗CSEM’] by
    sharing links, videos, pictures, texts, and posts, and by hosting such
    content on social media groups/platforms and third-party storage or
    hosting platforms.

    5. Pursuant to the registration of the FIR, a search under Section
    165
    of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter ‗Cr.P.C.’]
    was conducted on 16.11.2021 at the residence of respondent no. 2
    herein. During the search, a hard disk and a mobile phone ‗Realme 3
    Pro’ were seized. Upon scrutiny of the mobile phone, it was revealed
    that one Sandeep Singh @ Lovely (respondent no. 3 herein) had been
    transmitting CSEM to respondent no. 2. On the same day, i.e.,
    16.11.2021, respondent no. 3 was also traced, and two mobile phones
    recovered from him were searched. The examination of these devices
    revealed that he had stored pornographic material involving children
    and had also shared/transmitted the same with two other WhatsApp
    users. During the course of investigation, upon scrutiny conducted in
    the presence of independent witnesses, it was established that mobile
    number 9540026597 was being used by respondent no. 2, which had
    been issued in his name. It was further revealed that he had become a
    member of various WhatsApp groups wherein CSEM, along with
    other pornographic material, was being shared. The said material was

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    received by him from respondent no. 3, who was using WhatsApp
    with mobile number 7827167203.

    6. As per the charge-sheet, 34 videos from the mobile phone of
    respondent no. 2 and 14 videos from the hard disk seized from him
    were collected, which depicted children in a sexually explicit manner.
    During investigation, it was also established that the user of three
    mobile numbers, i.e. 9540067545, 8882301205, and 7827167203,
    was respondent no. 3. It was further revealed that 23 videos and 2
    videos were recovered from his two mobile phones respectively, and
    these videos also depicted children in a sexually explicit manner.

    7. After collection of the evidence against respondent nos. 2 and
    3, both of them were chargesheeted for offences under Section 15(2)
    of the POCSO Act, Section 67B of the IT Act, and Section 120B of
    the IPC.

    8. The learned Sessions Court, by way of the impugned order,
    discharged both the accused persons of the offence under Section
    15(2)
    of the POCSO Act.

    9. The learned Sessions Court, inter alia, observed that the
    child/children appearing in the alleged pornographic videos were
    unidentified, i.e., their names, parentage, and place of residence were
    not known. It was further observed that no documents were available,
    for obvious reasons, to establish the age of the victims since the
    children were unidentified. The learned Sessions Court also noted
    that no scientific or medical test had been conducted to determine the

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    age of the child/children visible in the photos/videos. The learned
    Sessions Court further observed that had the victims been identifiable
    in the present case, then even in the absence of age-related
    documents, their age could have been determined through methods
    such as bone age test, examination of wisdom teeth, radiographic
    techniques, or any other scientific test. In such a situation, the
    provisions of Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act could have been
    invoked. However, in the absence of any such determination of age,
    the learned Sessions Court held that the mandatory criteria for
    establishing that the persons depicted were children had not been
    satisfied, and therefore the provisions of Section 15(2) of the POCSO
    Act could not be invoked.

    10. These findings of the learned Sessions Court, in the context of
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act, are presently under consideration
    and scrutiny before this Court.

    SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT

    11. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that respondent nos. 2 and
    3 were erroneously discharged of the offence under Section 15(2) of
    the POCSO Act solely on account of absence of documentary proof
    or physical verification of the age of the children depicted in the
    recovered pornographic videos and images. It is submitted that the
    said respondents were actively involved in circulating, storing, and
    viewing CSEM, including by sharing links, videos, pictures, text, and
    posts, and by hosting such content on various social media groups

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    and platforms. It is pointed out that 34 pornographic videos were
    retrieved from the mobile phone of respondent no. 2 and 14 videos
    from the hard disk seized from him, all depicting children engaged in
    sexually explicit acts. Similarly, 23 videos were recovered from one
    mobile phone of respondent no. 3 and 2 videos from another mobile
    phone, which also depicted children in sexually explicit conduct. It is
    further submitted that respondent no. 3 had been transmitting such
    material to other WhatsApp users through his account. It is contended
    that the learned Sessions Court discharged the respondents on the
    premise that the applicability of the POCSO Act depends upon
    establishing whether the persons appearing in the videos qualify as a
    ‗child’, and that in the absence of documentary proof or physical
    presence of the victims for age verification, such determination could
    not be made. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that such reasoning
    defeats the very object of the POCSO Act, since discharging accused
    persons merely because the children depicted in such material are
    unidentified and their age cannot be determined through conventional
    methods would result in grave miscarriage of justice in cases
    involving unidentified child victims exploited in pornographic
    material. It is further submitted that the learned Sessions Court failed
    to duly consider the expert opinions of two doctors who had opined
    that the persons appearing in certain videos appeared to be children
    below the age of 18 years. It is also submitted that conducting
    medical or scientific age determination tests was not feasible in the
    present case since the victims were unidentified and had not appeared

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    before the Court.

    12. The learned SPP appearing for the CBI supports the
    submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the
    order passed by the learned Sessions Court is perverse. It is argued
    that the law does not mandate the identification or physical presence
    of the child for the purpose of invoking Section 15(2) of the POCSO
    Act, and that the definition of ‗child’ under Section 2(d) of the
    POCSO Act cannot be applied in such a rigid manner so as to defeat
    the purpose of the statute.

    13. Conversely, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2
    vehemently opposes the present petition and submits that there is no
    infirmity in the detailed and reasoned order passed by the learned
    Sessions Court. It is argued that there is no material on record to
    establish that the individuals depicted in the alleged CSEM are
    children, i.e., below the age of 18 years. It is contended that in the
    absence of any such proof or material, the offence under Section
    15(2)
    of the POCSO Act cannot be invoked or charges framed
    against the accused persons.

    14. This Court has heard arguments addressed by the learned
    amicus curiae, the learned SPP for the CBI and the learned counsel
    for respondent no. 2, and has perused the material placed on record.

    ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

    15. In the present case, respondent nos. 2 and 3 were
    chargesheeted for commission of offences under Section 15(2) of the

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    POCSO Act, Section 67B of the IT Act, and Section 120B of the
    IPC. However, the learned Sessions Court subsequently discharged
    respondent nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the offence under Section 15(2)
    of the POCSO Act.

    A. Section 15(2) of POCSO Act

    16. At the outset, it would be appropriate to examine the
    circumstances in which Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act is attracted.
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act reads as under:

    ―15. Punishment for storage of pornographic material
    involving child.–

    (1) x x x
    (2) Any person, who stores or possesses pornographic material
    in any form involving a child for transmitting or propagating or
    displaying or distributing in any manner at any time except for
    the purpose of reporting, as may be prescribed, or for use as
    evidence in court, shall be punished with imprisonment of
    either description which may extend to three years, or with
    fine, or with both.‖

    17. A reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the
    following essential ingredients must be satisfied for the purpose of
    attracting Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act:

    (i) First, the person must store or possess pornographic
    material in any form which depicts a child in a sexually
    explicit manner.

    (ii) Second, such storage or possession must be for the
    purpose of transmitting, propagating, displaying, or
    distributing such material in any manner.

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    (iii) Third, the provision carves out an exception where such
    material is stored or possessed solely for the purpose of
    reporting the matter, as may be prescribed, or for use as
    evidence before a court of law.

    18. In the present case, it is noteworthy that during the course of
    investigation, the mobile phones of respondent nos. 2 and 3 were
    examined and data was recovered therefrom. The material collected
    during investigation prima facie indicates the possession and storage
    of pornographic material depicting children engaged in sexually
    explicit acts. Specifically, 34 such videos were retrieved from the
    mobile phone of respondent no. 2 and 14 videos from the hard disk
    seized from him. It was also revealed during investigation that
    respondent no. 2, using mobile number 95******97, was a member
    of multiple WhatsApp groups wherein such CSEM was being
    circulated.

    19. Insofar as respondent no. 3 is concerned, two mobile phones
    were seized from him, from which a total of 25 videos were
    recovered, which also depicted children engaged in sexually explicit
    acts. The investigation further revealed that respondent no. 3 had
    transmitted such CSEM to respondent no. 2 and other WhatsApp
    users through mobile number 78******03.

    20. Thus, the essential ingredients of Section 15(2) of the POCSO
    Act appear to be prima facie satisfied, inasmuch as respondent nos. 2
    and 3 were allegedly found to be in possession of pornographic

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    videos depicting children in sexually explicit acts, and were also
    involved in transmitting the same to other WhatsApp users.

    B. Meaning of ‘Child’ under POCSO Act

    21. At this stage, it would also be appropriate to examine how the
    age of a child is determined for the purposes of the POCSO Act.

    22. The legislature had enacted the POCSO Act with the object of
    safeguarding children from offences of sexual assault, sexual
    harassment, and pornography. A foundational requirement for the
    applicability of the POCSO Act is that the alleged offence must have
    been committed against a child. It is only upon satisfaction of this
    essential condition that the provisions of the Act can be invoked.

    23. The expression ‗child’ has been specifically defined under
    Section 2(1)(d) of the POCSO Act, which reads as follows:

    ―child means any person below the age of eighteen years‖

    24. Thus, the definition of ―child‖ under the POCSO Act makes it
    clear that any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years is to
    be regarded as a child. Consequently, before invoking the provisions
    of the POCSO Act, it becomes necessary to determine whether the
    alleged offence has been committed against a person who was below
    the age of 18 years at the relevant time.

    25. The determination of the age of the victim for the purposes of
    the POCSO Act is governed by Section 34 of the Act. The said
    provision makes it clear that the Special Court is required to satisfy

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    itself regarding the age of the person concerned and record reasons in
    writing for such determination. Section 34 of the POCSO Act reads
    as follows:

    ―34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child
    and determination of age by Special Court.–

    (1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child,
    such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of 1 [the
    Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2
    of 2016)].

    (2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special
    Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be
    determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the
    age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for
    such determination.

    26. The criteria for determining the age of an individual for the
    purpose of ascertaining whether he or she is a child is further
    provided under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
    Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The said provision lays down the
    procedure to be followed for age determination and provides as
    follows:

    ―94. Presumption and determination of age.

    (1) x x x
    (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds
    for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a
    child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be,
    shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking
    evidence by obtaining —

    (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
    matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned
    examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

    (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
    authority or a panchayat;

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    (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall
    be determined by an ossification test or any other latest
    medical age determination test conducted on the orders of
    the Committee or the Board:

    Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of
    the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen
    days from the date of such order.

    (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the
    age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this
    Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.

    27. However, the aforesaid procedure ordinarily applies in
    situations where the victim child is identifiable or traceable before the
    Court. In the impugned order, the learned Sessions Court has placed
    reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
    Yuvaprakash v. State of T.N.: (2024) 17 SCC 684, wherein it was
    observed that the determination of age must be carried out in terms of
    Section 34 of the POCSO Act read with Section 94 of the JJ Act.
    However, what the learned Sessions Court has failed to take into
    consideration is that the said decision pertained to an offence under
    Section 6 of the POCSO Act, which prescribes punishment for
    aggravated penetrative sexual assault. In that case, the victim was
    identified, traceable, and physically available before the Court, and
    therefore the question of determining the age of the victim through
    the procedure prescribed under the statute had directly arisen.

    C. Interpretation of ‘Child’ in the Context of Child Pornographic
    Material under the POCSO Act

    28. In contrast, the present case concerns the applicability of
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act, which deals with punishment for

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    storing, collecting, and further transmitting CSEM. In cases of this
    nature, the victims depicted in such material are most often
    unidentified and untraceable; their parentage and addresses remain
    unknown, and they cannot be produced before the Court. In such
    circumstances, the rigid application of the age-determination
    procedure under Section 34 of the POCSO Act read with Section 94
    of the JJ Act would be wholly impractical and unjust. Applying such
    stringent requirements would effectively deny justice to the victims,
    as most would never be traced for obvious reasons, thereby rendering
    the protective framework of the law ineffective.

    29. In the impugned order, the learned Sessions Court discharged
    respondent nos. 2 and 3 of the offence under Section 15(2) of the
    POCSO Act on the ground that no documentary proof regarding the
    age of the persons appearing in the videos was available before the
    Court and that no medical or scientific test had been conducted to
    ascertain their age.

    30. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned
    Sessions Court erred in adopting this approach, as it failed to take
    into consideration the scope and import of Section 2(1)(da) of the
    POCSO Act, which specifically defines what constitutes ‗child
    pornography’. Section 2(1)(da) of the POCSO Act defines ‗child
    pornography’ in the following terms:

    ―child pornography means any visual depiction of sexually
    explicit conduct involving a child which include photograph,
    video, digital or computer generated image indistinguishable

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    from an actual child and image created, adapted, or modified,
    but appear to depict a child‖

    31. The aforesaid provision makes it clear that child pornography
    includes any visual depiction showing a child engaged in sexually
    explicit conduct. Importantly, the definition also covers images which
    are created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict a child.

    32. The expression ―appear to depict a child‖ used in Section
    2(1)(da)
    is of significance. It indicates that, for the purposes of
    determining whether a particular visual depiction falls within the
    ambit of child pornography, the Court may undertake a prima facie
    assessment of the material itself to determine whether the person
    appearing in the depiction appears to be a child.

    33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Just Rights for
    Children Alliance v. S. Harish: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611, has
    categorically held that for determining whether a visual depiction of a
    sexually explicit act involves a child, the Court is required to apply
    the test of subjective satisfaction. The relevant observations of the
    Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced below:

    ―131. Thus, any visual depiction of a sexually explicit act
    which any ordinary person of a prudent mind would reasonably
    believe to prima facie depict a child or appear to involve a
    child, would be deemed as ‗child pornography’ for the
    purposes of the POCSO. Therefore, for any offence under
    the POCSO that relates to child pornographic material,
    such as Section 15, the courts would only be required to
    form a prima facie subjective satisfaction that the material
    appears to depict a child from the perspective of any
    ordinary prudent person. Such satisfaction may be arrived
    at from any authoritative and definitive opinion such as

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    through a forensic science laboratory (FSL) report of such
    material or from any expert opinion on the material in
    question, or by the assessment of such material by the
    courts themselves, depending on the peculiar facts and
    circumstances of each case.‖

    34. Further, it must be borne in mind that Section 15 of the
    POCSO Act cannot be interpreted in isolation and must be read in
    conjunction with Section 2(1)(da) of the Act. The introduction of
    Section 2(1)(da) reflects a clear legislative intent that rigid or strictly
    objective standards for determining the precise age of a person
    visually depicted in a sexually explicit act should not impede the
    operation of Section 15. Any interpretation to the contrary would
    defeat the very purpose for which the provision was enacted. It is
    evident that the legislature was conscious of the practical difficulty
    involved in ascertaining the exact age of individuals appearing in
    such visual depictions. Had strict age-determination criteria been
    insisted upon in every case, the application of Section 15 would have
    been rendered largely ineffective. Section 2(1)(da) was therefore
    incorporated to ensure that offences relating to CSEM are not
    frustrated merely because the age of the person depicted cannot be
    established through conventional or objective means.

    35. In the majority of cases involving CSEM, the children depicted
    remain unidentified and untraceable, and therefore cannot be
    produced before the Court. In such circumstances, it becomes
    practically impossible to obtain documentary proof of age or to
    conduct any medical or scientific test for age determination. If, on

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    this ground alone, accused persons are discharged of offences under
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act, it would have far-reaching
    consequences and would leave countless children unprotected –
    children who may not even be aware that sexually explicit videos
    depicting them are circulating online and being viewed by numerous
    individuals. Such an approach would defeat the very object and
    purpose of Section 15 of the POCSO Act, since the prosecution
    would fail at the very threshold merely due to the inability to
    conclusively determine the age of the child depicted.

    36. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Just Rights for Children
    Alliance v. S. Harish (supra), has made the following observations:

    ―137. The test or criteria of ‗subjective satisfaction’ is in view
    of the practical difficulty that exists in conclusively
    establishing the age of an individual in any pornographic
    material through any objective means or criteria. This is owed
    to the fact that often, it is next to impossible to establish the
    identity of the victim, then to trace the whereabouts of such
    person, and then objectively determine their age. If such a
    criterion is adopted, then most of the cases pertaining to the
    possession of any child pornographic material would fail at the
    threshold, due to want of any means or information for
    conclusively proving the age of the victim.

    138. The aforesaid aspect may be looked at from one another
    angle. Any mandate of an objective determination of the age by
    conclusive means, could possibly result in absurd
    consequences. For instance, say a pornographic material
    involves an under-teen child who by virtue of his built on the
    face of it appears to be a child, yet such material will not be
    considered child pornographic material in the eyes of law,
    unless an objective determination of the exact age of such child
    is carried out in a conclusive manner. In the absence of any
    such determination, the prosecution of possession of such
    material would have to fail, merely due to technicalities and the

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    inflexible character of the criteria or test for determining the
    age.

    139. The aforesaid provision of Section 2(1)(da) of the POCSO
    holds significant importance, as the legislature whilst giving
    teeth to the existing provision of Section 15 of the Act, and
    making three distinct offences punishable under it through the
    2019 Amendment Act, also consciously defined the term ‗child
    pornography’ under the POCSO through the very same
    amendment. It indicates the legislature’s intention of
    construing both these provisions together as a whole; neither
    Section 15 of the POCSO nor Section 2(1)(da) can be
    interpreted or invoked in isolation from the other.

    140. The legislature through Section 2(1)(da) of the POCSO,
    made a conscious departure from the already existing objective
    criterion of determination of age in terms of Section 2(1)(d)
    which is generally applicable to the POCSO, as it was alive to
    aforementioned inherent difficulty that is posed by such
    criteria. The legislature was well aware, that if the proof of age
    in offences pertaining to child pornography such as under

    Section 15 of the POCSO would also have to be assessed by
    the existing objective test, it would lead to a very chilling
    effect, whereby the entire Section 15 of the POCSO could be
    rendered unworkable merely on account of a hyper-technical
    approach as to determination of age, thereby defeating the very
    object of the POCSO.‖

    D. Application of the Test of Subjective Satisfaction to the Material
    on Record

    37. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the opinion of
    two experts, namely Dr. Rachna Sharma (PW-9), Senior Specialist,
    Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Maulana Azad Medical
    College and Lok Nayak Hospital, New Delhi, and Dr. Sreenivas M.
    [PW-9(1)], Director Professor & HOD, Department of Forensic
    Medicine, Maulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi, was obtained
    during the course of investigation. The pornographic videos

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    recovered from the mobile phones of respondent nos. 2 and 3 were
    shown to the said experts. After examining the material, both experts
    opined that, on the basis of developmental characteristics such as
    physical development, genital development, and secondary sexual
    characteristics, some of the persons appearing in the videos and
    photographs were children below the age of 18 years. The relevant
    portion of the expert opinion reads as follows:

    ―After perusal of the said files (videos/photos), and noting
    the developmental characteristics of the persons involved
    including physical development, genital developriènt and
    secondary sexual characteristics, it is opined by me that
    some of the persons are children i.e. below the age of 18
    years.‖
    (emphasis added)

    38. Further, a team consisting of Saurabh Singh (PW-6), Senior
    Program Coordinator, Manish Kumar, Senior Program Coordinator,
    and Ms. Princy Goel (PW-7), Senior Program Coordinator, from the
    Delhi Commission for Women, was constituted to assist the CBI
    during the course of investigation. The statements of PW-6 and PW-7
    were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. after they were
    shown the videos and photographs recovered from the mobile phones
    and hard disk of respondent nos. 2 and 3. Upon viewing the material,
    they opined that the videos involved children depicted in an obscene,
    indecent, and sexually explicit manner.

    39. Furthermore, the statement of Rakesh Kumar (PW-3), who was
    acquainted with respondent no. 3, reveals that respondent no. 3 used
    to routinely transmit adult sexually explicit videos to him, which PW-

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    3 would watch and subsequently delete. He also stated that in
    September 2021, respondent no. 3 had sent a sexually explicit video
    from mobile number 78******03 depicting children engaged in
    sexual activities, after which PW-3 had asked him not to send such
    videos.

    40. Therefore, the statements recorded during the course of
    investigation, the expert opinions, and the other material placed on
    record prima facie indicate that the videos recovered from the mobile
    phones and hard disk of respondent nos. 2 and 3 depict children
    engaged in sexually explicit acts. Consequently, the test of subjective
    satisfaction stands duly met, insofar as the material in question
    appears to depict children in sexually explicit acts.

    41. Further, the electronic devices belonging to respondent nos. 2
    and 3 were duly seized and sent for forensic examination to the
    Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL). A forensic report dated
    28.03.2024 was thereafter received, which records that respondent
    no. 2 had received CSEM from respondent no. 3. The report further
    confirms that respondent no. 2 had stored and collected CSEM, in the
    form of images and videos, on his mobile phone as well as on a hard
    disk. The CFSL report also establishes that respondent no. 3 had
    likewise stored and collected CSEM, in the form of images and
    videos, on both mobile phones seized from his possession.

    E. The Decision

    42. To conclude, this Court finds that the learned Sessions Court

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    erred in discharging respondent nos. 2 and 3 of the offence under
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act solely on the ground that the age of
    the children depicted in the CSEM had not been conclusively
    determined. The learned Sessions Court failed to give due
    consideration to the opinions of two experts, who had categorically
    opined that the pornographic videos depicted children engaged in
    sexually explicit acts. The said expert opinions clearly satisfy the test
    of subjective satisfaction, which was not properly appreciated by the
    learned Sessions Court. Further, this Court is of the considered view
    that upon a perusal of the material placed on record along with the
    chargesheet, it prima facie emerges that respondent nos. 2 and 3 had
    stored and possessed CSEM and had also transmitted the same
    through various WhatsApp groups. The material collected during
    investigation thus sufficiently satisfies the essential ingredients of
    Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act, at the stage of charge.

    43. Accordingly, respondent nos. 2 and 3 are liable to be charged
    for the offence under Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act, in addition to
    the offences under Section 67B of the IT Act and Section 120B of the
    IPC.

    44. The impugned order dated 01.09.2023 is therefore set aside to
    the extent that it discharges respondent nos. 2 and 3 of the offence
    under Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act. The learned Sessions Court
    is directed to frame charges against respondent nos. 2 and 3 for the
    offence under Section 15(2) of the POCSO Act and to proceed with

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    the trial in accordance with law.

    45. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.

    DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
    APRIL 04, 2026/
    TD/TS/RB

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