Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 27.02.2026 vs Of on 13 March, 2026
2026:HHC:9424
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 6 of 2026
.
Reserved on: 27.02.2026
Date of Decision: 13.3.2026.
Ravi Dutta ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of HP and another ...Respondents
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Kulbhushan Khajuria,
Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Vishwinder, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 73 of 2023, dated 11.05.2023, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323,
504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Rohru,
District Shimla, H.P. based on the compromise effected between
the parties.
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Heard.
3. Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. provides for compounding
.
of the offences. Section 320(1) mentions that the offences
punishable under Sections 323, 504 and 506 can be compounded
without permission of the Court. The offence punishable under
Section 451 of IPC can be compounded before the learned
of
Magistrate with permission from the Court.
4. Therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner has an
rt
alternate remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate and
seeking the composition of the offences.
5. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra,
(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent jurisdiction
should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was
observed:
At the outset the following principles may be noticed in
relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally,
almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there
is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice;
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2026:HHC:9424
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.”
.
6. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High
Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the power
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (Corresponding to Section 528 of
BNSS) is vested in the Court to make such order as may be
of
necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
rt
of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific
remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It
was observed:-
“8. In order to determine the question under
consideration as to what is the scope of the inherentpowers of the High Court becomes relevant. The
inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because ofits being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The
inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section
482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders asmay be necessary to give effect to any order under the
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482
envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
exercised by it with the object of achieving the above
said three results. It is for this reason that section 482
does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers
of the High Court which are wide enough to be exercised
in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party.
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While exercising inherent powers it has to be borne in
mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to
matters specifically covered by the other provisions of.
the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C.
866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated
succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa
Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section
482 it was observed that a provision which saves the
inherent powers of a Court cannot override any expressof
provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting
it in another form the Court observed that if there is an
express provision in a statute governing a particular subject
rt
there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent
powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply theprovisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern
the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied)
7. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.,
(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that
jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and
should not be exercised when specific remedy has been provided
under the Code. It was observed:
“2. It appears that unfortunately the High Court by
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) has
prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of
the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-
called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent
the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:31:49 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:9424of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged
abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be.
secured in accordance with law including procedural law and
not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of
extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the
object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases wherethere is no express provision empowering the High Court to
achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent
power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered byof
specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe
any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the
High Court overlooked the procedural law which
empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory
rt
appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court
has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalledthe course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
xxxxx
9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court
entertaining the petition of the convicted accused underSection 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal,
erroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known
to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedingsto the effect that final judgment and order convicting the
accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was alsorecorded by the trial court that as the accused were
absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. Insuch a situation, instead of directing the accused to
remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps
contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the
High Court has stayed further proceedings including the
operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial
court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the
important legal aspect that the accused have a right of appeal
against the order of conviction purported to have been passed
by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought
not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the
Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy
of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:31:49 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:9424accused made certain allegations against the trial Judge
the substantive law cannot be bypassed.
8. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida
.
v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not
be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was
of
observed:
“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power
conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has
rt
to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare
cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or whensome miscarriage of justice is done. The content and
scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in
considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978SC 47] and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8)
The following principles may be stated in relation to
the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is
a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1545] after a review of a large number of earlier
decisions, it was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29)
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:31:49 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:9424where interference is absolutely necessary for securing
the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly as cases which require.
interference would be few and far between. The most
common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally
exercised is where criminal proceedings are required
to be quashed because they are initiated illegally,
vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases
set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be
remembered that the inherent power is not to be
of
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code
or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of
the aggrieved party. This power should not be
exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in
rt
any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code.
This power cannot be exercised as against an express
bar in some other enactment.”
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC
146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a
petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of
conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and
before the sentence had been awarded and further
proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this
Court set aside the order of the High Court after
reiterating the principle that it is well settled that
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any
matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its
exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code.
It was further observed that the High Court overlooked
the procedural law which empowered the convicted
accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of
the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and
soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage
of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly
set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482
CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had
an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the
Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other
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decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has
been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be
entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code
.
of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could
apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted
into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not
do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order
to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have
of
been required to surrender as the bail application could be
entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody.
It is important to note that no order adverse to the
respondents-accused had been passed by any court nor
rt
was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In
such circumstances, the High Court committed a
manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under
Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the
subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for
the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order
passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting
bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on
the very day on which they were taken into custody, got
an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had
succumbed to his injuries and the case had been
converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any
court examining the case on merits, as it stood after
conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for
the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available
to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of,
the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it
has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)
9. In the present case, the petitioner mention in para 11
of the petition that the petitioner has no other remedy available
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to him except to approach this Court by filing the present
petition.
.
10. Hence, this is the incorrect statement because the
remedy of approaching the learned Magistrate is available to the
petitioner under Section 320(1) of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, there is
no reason to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
of
11. In view of the above, the present petition fails and
the same is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the
rt
petitioner from approaching the learned Trial Court seeking the
composition of the offences.
12. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending
miscellaneous applications, if any.
13. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
13th March, 2026
(Nikita)
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