Man Singh vs Smt. Bhagwati Kunwar … on 19 March, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    Man Singh vs Smt. Bhagwati Kunwar … on 19 March, 2026

    [2026:RJ-JD:14101]
    
          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                           JODHPUR
                     S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3268/2026
    
    Man Singh S/o Gulab Singh Ji Rao, Aged About 61 Years,
    Resident Of Rao Maadada (Bhat Maadada), Tehsil Gogunda,
    District Udaipur Raj.
                                                                       ----Petitioner
                                        Versus
    Smt. Bhagwati Kunwar W/o Sh. Bhawani Singh Ji Rao, Resident
    Of Rao Maadada (Bhat Maadada), Tehsil Gogunda, District
    Udaipur Raj.
                                                                     ----Respondent
    
    
    For Petitioner(s)         :     Mrs. Akshiti Singhvi
    For Respondent(s)         :     Ms. Apeksha Chhangani assisted by
                                    Ms. Prenal Lodha through VC
    
    
    
              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKESH RAJPUROHIT

    Order

    19/03/2026

    SPONSORED

    1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-

    plaintiff laying a challenge to the order dated 28.01.2026 (Annx.7)

    passed by the Additional District Judge No. 4, Udaipur in Civil

    Regular Suit No. 125/2022 (C.I.S. No. 1320/2024) titled as ‘Gulab

    Singh & Anr. vs. Bhagwati Kunwar’ whereby, applications filed

    under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. on

    27.11.2025 and 14.01.2026 seeking amendment of the plaint,

    have been rejected.

    2. The facts, in short, are that a civil suit originally filed by

    Gulab Singh and Man Singh; now continued solely by Man Singh

    as Gulab Singh has passed away. The plaintiff claims sole

    ownership of property of Devi Singh; asserting Kesar Bai (widow

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    of predeceased son Jorawar Singh) had only maintenance rights

    and was never remain possession of any portion of the suit

    property. It was submitted that Kesar Bai had earlier filed a suit on

    13.01.1975, which was decided on the basis of compromise,

    wherein she presented an application in the suit stating that she

    had no rights in the suit property and had only maintenance rights

    against Gulab Singh. The compromise confirmed that she had no

    claim, but revenue records erroneously showed her name. It was

    further submitted that Kesar Bai allegedly executed gift deed

    dated 19.08.1982 in favour of Shambu Singh and later, sale deed

    dated 01.02.2007 in favor of respondent-defendant. The plaintiff

    has claimed the same as null and void. The respondent-defendant

    contended that Kesar Bai had possession, valid rights in suit

    property and that sale deed was lawful; however, disputes some

    family details and adoption claim. During pendency of the suit, the

    petitioner-plaintiff sought amendment in suit to also challenge gift

    deed dated 19.08.1982 but the trial court rejected amendment

    applications, citing delay and change in suit’s nature vide order

    dated 28.01.2026, which is impugned herein.

    3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

    4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that rejection of

    the amendment applications on the ground of delay is entirely

    unjustified. No prejudice is caused to the respondents, and

    substantial justice requires that the amendment should be

    allowed.

    5. It is further submitted that the proposed amendment does

    not alter the nature of the suit. It merely seeks to declare the gift

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    deed dated 19.08.1982 null and void, similar to the already

    challenged sale deed dated 01.02.2007 executed by the same

    person over the same property.

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that denial

    of the amendment would compel the petitioner to file a separate

    suit, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and potential

    inconsistent findings, which is contrary to the settled principle that

    procedural law should facilitate, and not obstruct, justice.

    7. It is contended that prior litigation and compromise,

    including Kesar Bai’s renunciation of rights and the dismissal of

    Shambu Singh’s suit, underscore the necessity of allowing the

    amendment to conclusively resolve the dispute. The gift deed has

    already been referenced in the plaint and the proposed

    amendment is merely consequential and clarificatory, causing no

    injustice to the respondents.

    8. It is also submitted that the respondent-defendant herself

    has admitted the execution of the gift deed. Therefore, the

    subsequent sale deed by the same person is invalid, further

    reinforcing the necessity of the amendment.

    9. It is contended that the trial court adopted an unduly hyper-

    technical approach, overlooking the fundamental principle that

    procedural law exists to advance justice, not to frustrate

    substantive rights. Therefore, it is urged that impugned order

    dated 28.01.2026 demonstrates a failure to exercise discretion

    under Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C. and hence, same being

    arbitrary and unlawful, passed without proper consideration, is

    liable to be set aside.

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    10. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the

    petitioner on the following judgments :-

    i. Revajeetu Builders and Developers (M/s)
    vs. M/s Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors.

    reported in 2009 DNJ (SC) 1156;

    ii. Kamal Kishore Prasad vs. Sri Lal Kumar
    Rai
    reported in Civil Misc. Jurisdiction No.
    657 of 2017;

    iii. Pankaja and Another vs. Yellappa (dead)
    by LR’s and Others reported in (2004) 6
    Supreme Court Cases 415;

    iv. Ashok Rathi and Others vs. Kartar Chand
    and Others
    reported in 2025 SCC Online
    MP 217;

    v. Abdul Rehman and Another vs. Mohd.

    Ruldu and Others reported in (2012) 11
    Supreme Court Cases 341; and
    vi. Kamal Kishore Prasad vs. Sri Lal Kumar
    Rai & Ors. (Civil Miscellaneous
    Jurisdiction No. 654/2017) decided on
    12.06.2024 (Patna High Court).

    11. Learned counsel for the respondent-defendant submits that

    the petitioner lacks locus standi, having failed to establish a valid

    adoption under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance

    Act, 1956. The alleged Adoption Deed dated 09.04.1996 is not

    legally enforceable. Therefore, the petitioner possesses no title,

    interest or enforceable rights in the suit property.

    12. It is submitted that the properties of Late Devi Singh and

    Late Gulab Singh devolved upon Smt. Kesar Bai and her daughter,

    Smt. Mohan Kanwar, to the extent of a 1/2 share. The petitioner is

    neither a coparcener nor an adopted son of Late Gulab Singh.

    Further, the petitioner has failed to implead Smt. Mohan Kanwar, a

    necessary party, thereby rendering the suit defective and

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    incapable of adjudication. It is contended that the suit property

    was lawfully sold by Smt. Kesar Bai to the respondent on

    01.02.2007 through a duly registered sale deed for valid

    consideration. All procedural formalities, including verification by

    the Registration Officer, affixation of photograph and thumb

    impression, were properly complied with. The allegations of

    impersonation are therefore wholly baseless. The respondent,

    being a bona fide purchaser, has been in lawful possession since

    2007, while the petitioner has never possessed the property.

    13. Learned counsel further submits that the amendment

    applications filed by the petitioner are belated, having been

    submitted after a lapse of 18 years, at a stage when plaintiff

    evidence is complete and the matter is fixed for defendant

    evidence. The proposed amendments are neither necessary for

    resolving the real controversy nor integral to the suit, as they

    relate to facts known to the petitioner at the time of institution of

    the suit. Permitting such amendments would prejudice the

    respondent, alter the nature of the suit, and contravene the

    purpose and intent of Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C.

    14. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s attempt to

    challenge the gift deed dated 19.08.1982 after 33 years is

    arbitrary, lacking specificity and unsupported by evidence. No

    proof has been presented to establish that the property gifted in

    1982 is the same as that sold in 2007. Therefore, it is urged that

    impugned order does not exhibit any perversity or patent illegality.

    Lastly, it is submitted that allowing the amendments at this stage

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    would result in multiplicity of proceedings and cause undue

    prejudice to the respondent.

    15. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a

    decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basavaraj vs. Indira and

    Others reported in (2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 705.

    16. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties,

    perused the material available on record and gone through the

    judgments cited at Bar.

    17. Upon careful consideration of the rival submissions and the

    material on record, the court observes that the petitioner seeks to

    amend the plaint to include a declaration regarding the gift deed

    dated 19.08.1982 executed by Smt. Kesar Bai in favour of

    Shambhu Singh as null and void. The amendment appears to be

    sought to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to ensure that all

    claims concerning the same property are adjudicated in a single

    proceeding.

    18. It is noted that the trial court, in the impugned order dated

    28.01.2026, has rejected the amendment primarily on the

    grounds of delay and purported change in the nature of the suit.

    However, the petitioner has demonstrated that the facts pertaining

    to the gift deed were already referred in the plaint, and that the

    amendment is purely consequential and clarificatory. No prejudice

    would be caused to the respondent by allowing the amendment,

    whereas, refusal would compel the petitioner to institute a

    separate suit, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and potential

    inconsistent findings.

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    19. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers (M/s) (supra),

    the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

    “Whether Amendment is Necessary to Decide Real Controversy :

    61. The first condition which must be satisfied before the
    amendment can be allowed by the court is whether such
    amendment is necessary for the determination of the real question
    in controversy. If that condition is not satisfied, the amendment
    cannot be allowed. This is the basic test which should govern the
    courts’ discretion in grant or refusal of the amendment.
    No Prejudice or Injustice to other Party :

    62. The other important condition which should govern the
    discretion of the Court is the potentiality of prejudice or injustice
    which is likely to be caused to other side. Ordinarily, if other side is
    compensated by costs, then there is no injustice but in practice
    hardly any court grants actual costs to the opposite side.

    63. The Courts have very wide discretion in the matter of
    amendment of pleadings but court’s powers must be exercised
    judiciously and with great care.

    64. In Ganga Bai’s case (supra), this Court has rightly observed:

    “The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may
    at any stage be appropriately exercised in the interest of justice, the
    law of limitation notwithstanding. But the exercise of such far-
    reaching discretionary powers is governed by judicial
    considerations and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the
    care and circumspection on the part of the court.”

    Costs :

    65. The Courts have consistently laid down that for unnecessary
    delay and inconvenience, the opposite party must be compensated
    with costs. The imposition of costs is an important judicial exercise
    particularly when the courts deal with the cases of amendment. The
    costs cannot and should not be imposed arbitrarily. In our view, the
    following parameters must be taken into consideration while
    imposing the costs. These factors are illustrative in nature and not
    exhaustive.

    (i) At what stage the amendment was sought?

    (ii) While imposing the costs, it should be taken into
    consideration whether the amendment has been sought at a
    pre-trial or post-trial stage;

    (iii)The financial benefit derived by one party at the cost of
    other party should be properly calculated in terms of
    money and the costs be awarded accordingly.

    (iv) The imposition of costs should not be symbolic but
    realistic;

    (v) The delay and inconvenience caused to the opposite
    side must be clearly evaluated in terms of additional and
    extra court hearings compelling the opposite party to bear
    the extra costs.

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    (vi) In case of appeal to higher courts, the victim of
    amendment is compelled to bear considerable additional
    costs.

    All these aspects must be carefully taken into considera- tion
    while awarding the costs.

    66. The purpose of imposing costs is to:

    a) Discourage malafide amendments designed to delay the
    legal proceedings;

    b) Compensate the other party for the delay and the
    inconvenience caused;

    c) Compensate the other party for avoidable expenses on
    the litigation which had to be incurred by opposite party
    for opposing the amendment; and

    d) To send a clear message that the parties have to be
    careful while drafting the original pleadings.

    Factors to be taken into Consideration while Dealing with
    Applications for Amendments :

    67. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some
    basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration
    while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment.
    (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper
    and effective adjudication of the case?

    (2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or
    mala fide?

    (3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the
    other side which cannot be compensated adequately in
    terms of money;

    (4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or
    lead to multiple litigation;

    (5) Whether the proposed amendment con- stitutionally or
    fundamentally changes the nature and character of the
    case? And
    (6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments
    if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by
    limitation on the date of application.

    68. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in
    mind while dealing with application filed under Order VI Rule 17.
    These are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

    69. The decision on an application made under Order VI Rule 17 is
    a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never
    be undertaken in a casual manner.

    70. We can conclude our discussion by observing that while
    deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse
    bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and
    should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest
    amendments.”

    The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pankaja and another

    (supra) has held as under :-

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    “12. So far as the Court’s jurisdiction to allow an amendment of
    pleadings is concerned there can be no two opinion that the same
    is wide enough to permit amendments even in cases where there
    has been substantial delay in filing such amendment applications.

    This Court in numerous cases has held the dominant purpose of
    allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation, therefore, if
    the facts of the case so permits, it is always open to the court to
    allow applications in spite of the delay and latches in moving such
    amendment application.

    13. But the question for our consideration is whether in cases
    where the delay has extinguished the right of the party by virtue of
    expiry of the period of the period of limitation prescribed in law,
    can the court in the exercise of its discretion take away the right
    accrued to another party by allowing such belated amendments?

    14. The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that
    there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred
    because of limitation an amendment should not be allowed.
    Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circumstances of
    the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment
    being discretionary the same will have to be exercised in a
    judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the
    amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really
    subserves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation
    the same should be allowed. There can be no straight jacket
    formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings.
    Each case depends on the factual background of that case.

    15. This Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs.
    Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co. – A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 357 has held :-

    “16. It is no doubt true that Courts would, as a rule,
    decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the
    amended claim would be barred by limitation on the
    date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken
    into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether
    amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the
    power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the
    interests of justice.”

    16. This view of this Court has, since, been followed by a 3
    Judge Bench of this Court in the case of T.N. Alloy Foundry Co.
    Ltd. Vs. T.N. Electricity Board & Ors.
    2004 (3) SCC 392.
    Therefore, an application for amendment of the pleading should
    not be disallowed merely because it is opposed on the ground that
    the same is barred by limitation, on the contrary, application will
    have to be considered bearing in mind the discretion that is vested
    with the Court in allowing or disallowing such amendment in the
    interest of justice.”

    The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Kishore Prasad

    (supra) has summarized the legal principles as regards

    amendment in the pleadings and has held as under :-

    “13. In sum and substance, if the amendment is necessary for
    deciding the real controversy between the parties and for arriving at

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    a just conclusion, such amendment could be allowed even at a late
    stage. The law on this point has been settled by various decisions of
    the Hon’ble Supreme Court and recently in the case of Life
    Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders (P) Ltd.
    ,
    reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1128, the Hon’ble Supreme
    Court summarized the law on the point of amendment in paragraph
    70 in the following manner :

    “70. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus:

    (i) Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against
    a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for
    application thereof are satisfied and the field of
    amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The
    plea of amendment being barred under Order II Rule 2
    CPC
    is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived.

    (ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are
    necessary for determining the real question in
    controversy provided it does not cause injustice or
    prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is
    apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter
    part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC.

    (iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed

    (i) if the amendment is required for effective and
    proper adjudication of the controversy between the
    parties, and

    (ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided

    (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to
    the other side,

    (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking
    amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear
    admission made by the party which confers a right on the
    other side and

    (c) the amendment does not raise a time barred
    claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a
    valuable accrued right (in certain situations).

    (iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required
    to be allowed unless

    (i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is
    sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the
    claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for
    consideration,

    (ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit,

    (iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or

    (iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid
    defence.

    (v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of
    pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical
    approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal
    especially where the opposite party can be compensated
    by costs.

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    (vi) Where the amendment would enable the court
    to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in
    rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for
    amendment should be allowed.

    (vii) Where the amendment merely sought to
    introduce an additional or a new approach without
    introducing a time barred cause of action, the amendment
    is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation.

    (viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed
    where it is intended to rectify the absence of material
    particulars in the plaint.

    (ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not
    a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of
    delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be
    allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for
    decision.

    (x) Where the amendment changes the nature of
    the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely
    new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the
    amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the
    amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the
    plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already
    pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is
    required to be allowed.

    (xi) Where the amendment is sought before
    commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal
    in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the
    fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet
    the case set up in amendment. As such, where the
    amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the
    opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an
    advantage which it had secured as a result of an
    admission by the party seeking amendment, the
    amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the
    amendment is necessary for the court to effectively
    adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the
    parties, the amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay
    Gupta v. Gagninder Kr. Gandhi
    , 2022 SCC OnLine Del
    1897)”

    14. From the facts of the case before me, it is much apparent that
    the amendment has been sought after the evidence of plaintiffs
    started, but it is the suit of plaintiffs and if any delay is caused,
    ultimately the plaintiffs would be sufferer. It could not be said that
    allowing the amendment at this stage would not cause prejudice to
    the other side. However, if the other side could be compensated in
    terms of cost, the amendment could be allowed. Moreover, it is for
    the Court to decide that such amendment would enable the court to
    consider the dispute between the parties in true perspective and
    would help it in arriving at a right decision and allow it to
    determine the real question in controversy. Further, if such
    amendment avoids multiplicity of litigation, then these amendments
    need to be allowed.

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    15. So far as the finding of the learned trial court regarding change
    in the nature of the suit is concerned, I think the same is
    misconceived. If the amendment is not allowed, it will lead to
    unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. The amendments also appear
    to be necessary for the purpose of determination of real controversy
    between the parties. However, for putting the defendants to undue
    harassment, I think the defendants should be amply compensated.

    16. In the light of aforesaid discussion, I think the learned trial
    court committed an error of jurisdiction when it refused to allow
    the amendment petition and rejected the same. Hence, I do not find
    the impugned order dated 27.01.2017 to be sustainable in the eyes
    of law and, accordingly, the same is set aside. Consequently, the
    application dated 14.09.2016 filed before the learned trial court is
    allowed subject to payment of cost of Rs. 50,000/-(fifty thousand
    only) to be paid by the plaintiff/petitioner to the contesting
    defendant/respondent on the first date before the learned trial court
    after passing of this judgment.

    In Ashok Rathi and others (supra), the Madhya Pradesh

    High Court has held as under :-

    “9. In the aforesaid judgment, it has been categorically held by the
    Apex Court that when the amendment sought is only in respect to
    the relief in the plaint and is predicated on facts which are already
    pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily, the amendment is required to be
    allowed. In the present case also, the amendment sought for by
    plaintiffs is for claiming an additional relief on the basis of already
    existing averments and no new facts are sought to be introduced.
    The same in view of the aforesaid decision deserved to be and has
    rightly been allowed.

    10. In Basavaraj (supra), which is a decision of a two Judge Bench,
    relied upon by the learned counsel for defendants No.4 to 7,
    amendment was primarily disallowed on the ground that the same
    was proposed at the stage of final hearing of the suit and permitting
    the same would have caused prejudice to the defendants. It was on
    the assumption that the relief claimed for would be barred by time
    since with passage of time, right had accrued in favour of the
    defendants and permitting amendment would cause prejudice to
    them. However, there was no discussion as regards whether the
    amendment, if permitted, would relate back to the date of filing of
    the suit or would be relatable to the date on which the application
    was filed.

    11. In L.J. Leach and Company Limited and Another Vs. Jardine
    Skinner and Company
    , AIR 1957 SC 357, which is a decision of a
    four Judge Bench, it was held by the Apex Court that no doubt
    Courts would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments if a fresh suit
    on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of
    the application, but that is a factor to be taken into account in
    exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be
    ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that
    is required in the interest of justice. In the present case, the fact
    scenario which has emerged requires in the interest of justice that
    the amendment prayed for by the plaintiffs should be allowed.

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    12. The suit which has been filed by the plaintiffs is within time. On
    the basis of the averments as made in the plaint, an additional relief
    is sought for by the plaintiffs. For the present, only amendment has
    been permitted and defendants would very well have the right to
    make consequential amendment and raise objection that the relief
    sought for by way of amendment has become barred by time. An
    issue can very well be framed by the trial Court in that regard to be
    decided at the appropriate stage.

    13. However, the contention of the defendants that the relief which is
    being sought for by plaintiffs by way of amendment has become
    barred by time and permitting the amendment to relate back to the
    date of suit would have the effect of bringing the same within time
    which would deprive them of the advantage accrued to them by
    lapse of time cannot be lost sight of. In similar circumstances, the
    Apex Court in the case of Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and
    Another
    , 2002 (7) SCC 559 had held that interests of defendants can
    be protected by directing that so far as the relief sought for by way
    of amendment is concerned, prayer in that regard shall be deemed
    to have been made on the date on which the application for
    amendment was filed. The defendants have raised a contention that
    the relief sought for by plaintiffs by way of amendment has become
    barred by time. Their right to contend so cannot be taken away by
    way of the amendment.

    14. Consequently, it is held that the trial Court has not committed
    any error in passing the impugned order allowing the application
    for amendment filed by the plaintiffs. The said order is accordingly
    affirmed. However, it is directed that so far as the relief which has
    been sought for by plaintiffs by way of their amendment application
    shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which the
    application for amendment was filed before the trial Court.”

    20. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this

    Court finds that the proposed amendment is necessary for

    effective adjudication of the real controversy and is based on facts

    already pleaded. It does not introduce a new cause of action but is

    connected with the existing challenge to the sale deed, both

    arising from the same transaction. Mere delay, in absence of

    prejudice, is not a valid ground for rejection, particularly when

    refusal would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Any prejudice to

    the respondent can be addressed by permitting consequential

    pleadings and framing appropriate issues. Hence, the trial court’s

    rejection of the amendment on technical grounds is unsustainable

    in law.

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    [2026:RJ-JD:14101] (14 of 15) [CW-3268/2026]

    21. Regarding the reliance placed by the respondent on

    Basavaraj‘s case (supra), it is observed that said judgment dealt

    with amendments that sought to introduce entirely new causes of

    action which were unrelated to the prayer made in the original

    suit. In contrast, the present amendment pertains to the same

    property and arises from the same set of facts as already pleaded,

    namely, the alleged invalidity of alienation by Smt. Kesar Bai. The

    amendment does not introduce a new cause of action but seeks to

    further clarify and complete the relief already claimed. Therefore,

    the cited decision is distinguishable on facts and is not applicable

    to the present case.

    22. In light of the above, impugned order dated 28.01.2026,

    which rejected the petitioner’s applications for amendment, is held

    to be not in accordance with the settled principles of law regarding

    amendments. However, considering the delay in seeking the

    amendment and the stage at which such applications have been

    filed, this Court deems it appropriate to compensate the

    respondent for the inconvenience caused. Accordingly, the

    petitioner is burdened with costs quantified at Rs. 15,000/-,

    payable to the respondent. At the present, this Court has only

    permitted the amendment. It shall, however, be open to the

    defendants to carry out consequential amendments only to the

    extent of amendment permitted in the plaint and to raise all

    permissible objections, including the objection that the relief

    sought to be introduced by way of amendment is barred by

    limitation. In such an event, the learned Trial Court shall be at

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    [2026:RJ-JD:14101] (15 of 15) [CW-3268/2026]

    liberty to frame an appropriate issue in this regard and decide the

    same at the appropriate stage in accordance with law.

    23. At the same time, the learned trial court is directed to

    dispose of the suit on its own merit without being influenced by

    any of the observations made above and expeditiously without

    granting any unnecessary adjournment to the parties since it is a

    matter of 2008.

    24. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed.

    The impugned order dated 28.01.2026 is hereby set aside and the

    trial court is directed to permit the petitioner to carry out

    amendment in the plaint in accordance with Order VI Rule 17 of

    C.P.C., subject to payment of the aforesaid costs of Rs. 15,000/-.

    The said costs shall be paid within a period of two weeks from

    today, failing which the benefit of this order shall not enure to the

    petitioner. The trial court shall thereafter proceed with the matter

    in accordance with law.

    25. Stay application as well as all pending application(s), if any,

    shall also stand disposed of.

    (MUKESH RAJPUROHIT),J
    25-/Inder//-

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