Madhavaneni Venkateshwar Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 26 March, 2026

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    Telangana High Court

    Madhavaneni Venkateshwar Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 26 March, 2026

    Author: Juvvadi Sridevi

    Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi

          IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                          AT HYDERABAD
    
           THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
    
              CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.7809 and 6850 of 2024
    
                              26 MARCH, 2026
    Between:
    
    Yellu Vijay Bhasker Reddy and another             ... Petitioners
    
                                    AND
    The State of Telangana
    Through SHO,
    Siddipet I Town Police Station,
    Siddipet District,
    rep. by Public Prosecutor,
    High Court for the State of Telangana,
    High Court, Hyderabad and another               ...Respondents
    
                              : COMMON ORDER :

    These Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 of

    Cr.P.C. by the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2, seeking to quash the

    SPONSORED

    proceedings against them in C.C.No.868 of 2024 pending on the file of

    the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of

    First Class at Siddipet (for short ‘trial Court’), registered for the

    offences under Sections 417, 420, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal

    Code (for short ‘IPC‘).

    2. Since both the criminal petitions are arising out of

    C.C.No.868 of 2024, they are heard together and disposed of by way

    of this common order.

    2

    3. Heard Mr. P.Raja Sripathi Rao, learned Senior Counsel

    representing Mr. B.Arjun Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner in

    Crl.P.No.7809 of 2024; Mr. K.Rajashekar, learned counsel for the

    petitioner in Crl.P.No.6850 of 2024 and Mr. P.Vamsheedhar Reddy,

    learned counsel for respondent No.2-de facto complainant and

    Mr. M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor

    appearing for respondent No.1-State.

    4. Brief facts of the case:

    4.1. The petitioner-accused No.1 is the husband of the de facto

    complainant. Due to matrimonial disputes, the petitioner-accused No.1

    filed F.C.O.P.No.155 of 2010 before the Family Court at

    Secunderabad, seeking dissolution of marriage. Thereafter, the

    de facto complainant filed Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 through petitioner-

    accused No.2 before this Court seeking transfer of the said F.C.O.P. to

    the Family Court at Siddipet. This Court, by order dated 29.09.2010,

    granted stay of all further proceedings in the said F.C.O.P.

    Subsequently, the petitioner-accused No.1 did not pursue the said

    F.C.O.P., for the reasons best known to him and the same was

    dismissed as not pressed on 21.04.2011. In view thereof, Tr.C.M.P

    No.503 of 2010 was also closed.

    3

    4.2. Thereafter, on 27.06.2022, the de facto complainant

    received summons in O.S.No.299 of 2022 from the Court of the

    Principal Junior Civil Judge at Siddipet, through which she came to

    know about the whereabouts of petitioner-accused No.1 and her

    children. On reading of the plaint averments, the de facto complainant

    was shocked to know that her daughter Yellu Pranavi, at the behest of

    petitioner-accused No.1, had instituted a suit for partition against her

    father, brother, two sisters and herself, claiming 1/15th share in the self

    acquired properties of her father and brother and had also described

    the de facto complainant as a person of unsound mind. Her father and

    brother appeared before the said Court on the first hearing of the civil

    suit and sought time to file vakalat and counter.

    4.3. Upon further enquiry made by her brother namely

    Mr. A. Srinivas Reddy, they came to know on 11.08.2022 that

    petitioner-accused No.1, in criminal conspiracy with petitioner-accused

    No.2, had filed M.C.No.14 of 2011 before the Court of Additional

    Judicial First Class Magistrate at Siddipet, seeking maintenance, by

    forging the signatures of the de facto complainant on the vakalat and

    petitions. It is the case of the de facto complainant that the signature

    therein is not hers and the case was filed without her knowledge.

    Subsequently, petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 allowed the said
    4

    maintenance case to be dismissed for default on 01.10.2012. As the

    de facto complainant was in rehabilitation centre since May, 2022, she

    lodged the present complaint on 15.09.2022.

    4.4. Basing on the said complaint, the Investigation Officer

    registered a case in Crime No.342 of 2022 and took up investigation.

    During the course of investigation, the Investigation Officer recorded

    the statements of the witnesses and collected relevant documents. He

    also obtained expert opinion, wherein it was opined that the red

    enclosed signatures marked as S1 to S32 did not tally with questioned

    signatures i.e., Q1 to Q3.

    4.5. After completion of the investigation, the Investigation Officer

    filed a charge sheet before the trial Court, the same was taken

    cognizance and numbered as C.C.No.868 of 2024 for the aforesaid

    offences.

    5. Following are the submissions of learned Senior

    Counsel for the petitioners:

    5.1. The petitioners are innocent and have been falsely

    implicated in the case. They are in no way concerned with the offences

    alleged. As a counterblast to O.S.No.299 of 2022 filed by the daughter

    of petitioner-accused No.1 against the de facto complainant and her
    5

    family members, the present complaint was lodged by the de facto

    complainant against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2. Similarly, as

    a counterblast to F.C.O.P.No.155 of 2010 filed by petitioner-accused

    No.1, the de facto complainant filed M.C.No.14 of 2011, against him

    claiming maintenance. While filing a maintenance case, the

    appearance of the concerned party is mandatory prior to the

    registration of the case. In the present case, it is highly questionable

    as to how the petitioner-accused No.1 was able to file the case by

    forging the signatures of the de facto complainant without the

    mandatory appearance and verification before the Court.

    5.2. Though the expert opinion states that the red enclosed

    signatures marked as S1 to S32 did not tally with the questioned

    signatures marked as Q1 to Q3, the very basis of such comparison is

    legally untenable.

    5.3. The questioned signatures i.e., the signatures on the vakalat

    and petition in M.C.No.14 of 2011 dated 17.02.2011, were compared

    with the signatures found on the certified copies of sale deeds

    pertaining to the year 2022, an Identity Card of Government College,

    Siddipet, pertaining to the academic years 1991-92 and 1992-93 and a

    PAN card (year not mentioned). Thus, there is a considerable time

    gap between the two sets of signatures. Furthermore, the comparison
    6

    of questioned signatures with those found on certified copies of sale

    deeds is impermissible in law and the same ought to have been

    compared only with contemporary original signatures. The PAN card

    does not contain the original signature.

    5.4. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel relied

    on the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature, Andhra

    Pradesh at Hyderabad in Smt. Renu Devi Kedia v. Smt. Seetha

    Devi 1 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.5, wherein, it

    was held as follows:

    “5. Coming to the facts on hand, the disputed signatures
    are of the year 1995 and whereas the specimen signatures
    are of the year 2004, there is a gap of nearly nine years
    between the two signatures. So far as signatures of the
    petitioners appearing in written statement etc., there is every
    possibility of his disguising his style of signature so as to make
    them dissimilar with the disputed signatures. Since there are
    no contemporaneous signatures for comparison with the
    disputed signatures, there is no useful purpose in sending the
    suit documents to an expert for his opinion. The trial Court
    considered the matter in right perspective and dismissed the
    application. I do not see any valid ground to interfere with the
    impugned order.”

    5.5. Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the judgment of

    this Court in C.Nagarathanamma v. V.Parameswari 2, wherein, at

    paragraph Nos.12 to 14, it was held as follows:

    “12. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the
    respondent/plaintiff argued that the suit is not barred by
    limitation as it was filed within three years from the date of
    1
    2004 (3) A.P.L.J. 203 (HC)
    2
    2016 SCC OnLine Hyderabad 771
    7

    Ex.A2 endorsement and the attester of Ex.A2 i.e., PW2 clearly
    held that the defendant executed Ex.A2 and that after
    considering the evidence on record, the first appellate Court
    rightly allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and relied upon
    the case law reported in Sallepalli Narasimha Reddy v.
    Yerram Pedda Subba Reddy, (2014) 2 ALD 195, wherein it is
    held at Para 19 as follows:

    “The rule of prudence requires the Court to send the
    admitted and contemporary signatures of the person
    to the expert to compare the same with his disputed
    signatures on the document According to
    Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
    “Contemporary” means belonging to the same or a
    stated period in the past. It is needless to say that
    admitted signatures means the signatures on the
    documents maintained by any authority in course of
    its business such as signatures on a passport,
    income tax returns, bank passbook or registered
    sale deed.”

    13. The learned Counsel also relied upon the case law
    reported in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
    (1996) 4 SCC 596 : (1996) 2 ALD (Cri) 926 (S.C.) : AIR 1996
    SC 2184, wherein it is held at Para 27 as follows:

    “27. Thus, the evidence of PW3, is not definite and
    cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect
    the appellant with the disputed letters. The evidence
    of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence and
    the Courts do not generally consider it as offering
    ‘conclusive’ proof and, therefore safe to rely upon
    the same without seeking independent and reliable
    corroboration.”

    14. Further, he also relied upon a case law reported in
    Vandavasi Karthikeya alias Krishna Murthy v. S. Kamalamma,
    AIR 1994 AP 102, wherein it is held as follows:

    “The science of handwriting is not an exact science
    unlike the science of fingerprints. Even experts tend
    to commit errors in giving their opinions on the
    genuineness of the signatures and handwriting.
    Even in genuine writing, at times, the pen hesitates
    or even stops especially when the author is under
    great physical or mental strain. Sometimes, it would
    be difficult for an expert to examine even the
    genuineness of different writings, each having its
    own individuality, but all by the same author. It
    requires intelligent comparison to differentiate the
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    genuine signature from the forged one. Great care
    and caution should be exercised especially when
    the Court is not assisted by the evidence of an
    expert in determining the genuineness of a
    signature of handwriting. Even while calling experts,
    it is now admitted by all authorities that if one cannot
    get a competent man, it is better not to adduce any
    expert evidence at all. (Para 29)”

    5.6. Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the judgment of the

    erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.Lakshmi v. State of

    Andhra Pradesh 3 and drawn attention of this Court to paragraph

    Nos.19 and 20, wherein, it was held as follows:

    “19. A similar question came up before this Court in
    P. Kusuma Kumari v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2015) 1 ALD
    (Cri.) 995] wherein this Court held that disputed signature is
    required to be referred to the expert along with admitted
    signatures of the party, the Court is bound to refer the
    document by exercising power under Section 73.

    20. Section 45 of the Act enables the Court to obtain the
    opinion of an expert on various aspects, including the one
    relating to the comparison of disputed signatures. An expert
    would be in a position to render his opinion, only when the
    original of the document containing the disputed signature is
    forwarded to him. Further, there can be effective comparison
    and verification of the signatures, if only another document
    containing the undisputed signatures of the contemporary
    period are made available to the expert. The opinion of a hand
    writing expert involves the analysis of the slant, which a
    person uses in the matter of putting his signature, and in some
    cases, the point of time, at which it may have been
    subscribed. These analyses would become possible only
    vis-a-vis an original signature; and the signature mark : on a
    Xerox copy of a document can never constitute the basis.
    (vide Bheri Nageswara Rao v. Mavuri Veerabhadra Rao
    [(2006) 4 ALD 295]).”

    5.7. The de facto complainant is suffering from Schizophrenia, a

    severe mental disorder and has been undergoing continuous medical

    3
    2021 SCC OnLine AP 3670
    9

    treatment since 2009. She could not respond properly due to her

    deteriorated health condition and was speaking irrelevantly. All the

    witnesses, including the de facto complainant and her family members,

    in their statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., have

    admitted that she has been mentally disturbed for a considerable

    period of time.

    5.8. Further, the brother of the de facto complainant, along with

    another person, has filed W.P.No.29298 of 2023 before this Court

    questioning the action of the respondents-Police therein in not

    recording their statements under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and seeking a

    direction to consider the medical certificates, dated 19.09.2023,

    22.09.2023 and 30.09.2023 as well as the expert opinion report, dated

    03.08.2023 issued by the Telangana State Forensic Science

    Laboratory, while disposing of their representation dated 04.10.2023.

    5.9. In the said writ petition, the petitioners therein themselves

    have clearly admitted that the mental condition of the de facto

    complainant is not proper and she is not in a position to visit the Police

    Station for the purpose of giving her further statement.

    5.10. The de facto complainant addressed a letter, dated

    06.01.2026 to the Commissioner of Police, Siddipet Commissionerate,
    10

    Siddipet District, alleging that an incomplete charge sheet was filed in

    C.C.No.868 of 2024 without proper application of mind by the

    Investigation Officer and requested that further inquiry and further

    investigation be conducted and that an additional charge sheet be

    filed. In the said letter, under major defects, it is specifically mentioned

    that the impersonator was not identified and was not arrayed as an

    accused in the charge sheet, which itself establishes that the

    petitioners herein are not responsible for the alleged offences.

    Furthermore, the de facto complainant has affixed her thumb

    impression instead of her signature on the said letter, which shows that

    she is mentally unstable.

    5.11. The learned Magistrate has taken cognizance against the

    petitioners, without application of mind into the material on record and

    assigning any valid reasons.

    5.12. The petitioner-accused No.1 has been implicated in the

    present case by the de facto complainant because of the pending

    disputes between the parties. The de facto complainant had herself

    filed Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 before this Court and M.C.No.14 of

    2011 before the trial Court through the petitioner-accused No.2. The

    petitioner-accused No.2 acted on the instructions of the de facto

    complainant in his professional capacity as an Advocate and has no
    11

    involvement whatsoever in the personal or family affairs of petitioner-

    accused No.1 and the de facto complainant.

    5.13. Neither the complaint nor the charge sheet discloses any

    specific allegations against the petitioners, even if the allegations are

    taken on their face value and the ingredients of the offences under

    Sections 417, 420, 468 and 120-B of IPC are not made out. Hence,

    learned Senior Counsel prayed to quash the proceedings against the

    petitioners.

    6. Following are the submissions of learned counsel

    appearing for respondent No.2-de facto complainant:

    6.1. The petitioner-accused No.1, in criminal conspiracy with

    petitioner-accused No.2, forged the signatures of the de facto

    complainant and fraudulently filed M.C.No.14 of 2011, which was

    ultimately dismissed for default. The signatures on the vakalat and the

    petition filed in the said M.C. were not those of the de facto

    complainant, rather, they were forged by petitioner-accused No.1 and

    filed through petitioner-accused No.2. Even according to the FSL

    report, the signatures were not tallied, which clearly establishes the

    allegation of forgery. Even on a bare perusal, the signatures of the
    12

    de facto complainant were not tallying and the discrepancy is apparent

    even to the naked eye.

    6.2. When this Court had granted stay of all further proceedings

    in F.C.O.P.No.155 of 2010 in Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 filed before this

    Court, it is not known as to how the said F.C.O.P. was closed by the

    trial Court. Such closure of the proceedings during the subsistence of

    the stay order raises serious questions about the legality of the action

    taken.

    6.3. The signatures were sent for expert opinion based on a

    letter, dated 15.07.2023 addressed by LW-8/Sub-Inspector of Police,

    to the trial Court, which is impermissible in law.

    6.4. With regard to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel

    appearing for the petitioners that cognizance was taken by the learned

    Magistrate in a mechanical manner without non-application of mind, it

    was submitted by the learned counsel for respondent No.2-de facto

    complainant that cognizance is to be taken against the offence, but not

    against the offenders.

    6.5. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the

    judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Enforcement
    13

    Officer v. Videocon International Limited 4 and Prasad Shrikant

    Purohit v. State of Maharashtra and another 5, wherein, it was held

    that, in criminal law, the expression ‘cognizance’ refers to an offence

    and not to the offender, it does not require any formal action and as

    soon as the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the suspected

    commission of the offence, cognizance takes place.

    6.6. He also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar 6, wherein, it was held

    that when a Magistrate takes cognizance on a police report, he takes

    cognizance of the offence and not merely of the particular persons

    named in the charge sheet. Therefore, the Magistrate is entitled to

    summon additional accused against whom he considers that there is

    sufficient evidence, after perusal of the statements recorded by the

    Police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and the other documents referred

    to in Section 173 of Cr.P.C., even without examination of witnesses in

    the Court.

    6.7. Specific allegations are levelled against the petitioners and

    the ingredients of the offences alleged against them are made out.

    The truth or otherwise of the allegations levelled against the petitioners

    4
    (2008) 2 SCC 492
    5
    2015 (7) SCC 440
    6
    1967 AIR Supreme Court 1167
    14

    can only be known after conducting full-fledged trial before the trial

    Court. Hence, he prayed to dismiss the petitions.

    7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the

    State, contended that specific allegations are levelled against the

    petitioners, which is a subject matter of trial. Hence, he prayed to

    dismiss the petitions.

    8. Analysis, Conclusion and Findings:

    8.1. It is not in dispute that the petitioner-accused No.1 is the

    husband of the de facto complainant and matrimonial disputes arose

    between them. In that background, the petitioner-accused No.1 filed

    F.C.O.P.No.155 of 2010 before the Family Court at Secunderabad

    seeking dissolution of marriage. The de facto complainant thereafter

    filed Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 before this Court seeking transfer of the

    said proceedings to the Family Court at Siddipet. This Court, by order,

    dated 29.09.2010, granted stay of all further proceedings in the said

    F.C.O.P. Subsequently, the petitioner-accused No.1 did not pursue

    the said proceedings and the same was dismissed as not pressed on

    21.04.2011, as a result of which Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 was also

    closed.

    15

    8.2. The allegations in the present complaint, dated 15.09.2022

    relates to the filing of M.C.No.14 of 2011 before the Court of the

    Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate at Siddipet, by petitioner-

    accused No.1, in criminal conspiracy with petitioner-accused No.2, by

    forging the signatures of the de facto complainant on the vakalat and

    the petitions and intentionally allowing the said case to be dismissed

    for default on 01.10.2012. It is the case of the de facto complainant

    that she became aware of these facts only on 11.08.2022, upon

    making enquiries, after receiving the summons in O.S.No.299 of 2022.

    8.3. The present complaint was lodged on 15.09.2022 i.e., nearly

    a decade after the proceedings in M.C. had concluded. The delay in

    lodging the complaint was explained on the ground that the de facto

    complainant became aware of the same for the first time on

    11.08.2022 and as she is in a rehabilitation centre since May, 2022,

    she was unable to act earlier.

    8.4. During the course of investigation, the red enclosed

    signatures marked as S1 to S32 were sent for comparison with the

    questioned signatures marked as Q1 to Q3, but they were not tallied.

    The questioned signatures pertaining to the year 2011 were compared

    with the standard signatures of the years 1991-92, 1992-93, 2022 and

    2023 i.e., there is a considerable gap between the two sets of
    16

    signatures. Furthermore, the signatures on the certified copies of the

    sale deeds were compared with the questioned signatures. It is well

    settled law that the signatures on certified copies of the documents

    cannot be compared with questioned signatures, as the process

    requires examination of the originals to observe the natural strokes,

    pressure and other distinctive features that may not be faithfully

    reproduced in certified copies. In the absence of comparison with

    contemporaneous signatures, the expert opinion loses its evidentiary

    value and cannot be relied up. Consequently, the expert opinion is

    liable to be discarded. The judgments relied upon by the learned

    counsel for the petitioner are squarely applicable to the facts of the

    present case.

    8.5. Even the questioned signatures, dated 17.02.2011 i.e., Q1 to

    Q3 were not compared with the signatures, dated 23.09.2010 affixed

    by the de facto complainant on the affidavit of Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of

    2010.

    8.6. The de facto complainant addressed a letter, dated

    06.01.2026 to the Commissioner of Police, Siddipet Commissionerate,

    Siddipet, alleging certain defects in the charge sheet of C.C.No.868 of

    2024. Specifically, it is contended that the impersonator has not been

    identified and that such person has not been included as an accused.
    17

    Such omissions, as pointed out by the de facto complainant herself,

    cast a serious doubt on the involvement of the petitioners in the

    alleged offences. In the said letter, the de facto complainant affixed her

    thumb impression instead of a signature. Even in the vakalats, dated

    02.01.2025 and 27.12.2025 filed by the learned counsel for respondent

    No.2-de facto complainant in the present Criminal Petitions, the

    de facto complainant has affixed her thumb impressions instead of

    signatures.

    8.7. The medical records, along with the statements of the

    witnesses recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., including the

    statement of the de facto complainant and her family members and the

    affidavit filed in W.P.No.29298 of 2023, confirm that she has been

    suffering from Schizophrenia and has been mentally unstable since

    2009. Due to the chronic nature of her mental illness, there has been

    deterioration in her personality, including self-smiling and self-talking,

    along with difficulties in communication and occasional irrelevant

    speech. Furthermore, the affixing of thumb impressions by the

    de facto complainant indicates her mental incapacity and deterioration

    in her health condition. In such circumstances, it is highly improbable

    to believe that the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 could have forged

    the signatures of the de facto complainant, particularly in the light of
    18

    her longstanding mental condition and the inordinate delay in lodging

    the complaint.

    8.8. It is to be noted that the de facto complainant had filed

    Tr.C.M.P.No.503 of 2010 through the petitioner-accused No.2, but

    denied filing of M.C.No.14 of 2011 through him, which itself creates a

    serious suspicion regarding the manner in which the said M.C. was

    filed.

    8.9. Except the statements of witnesses, who are the family

    members and family friends of the de facto complainant, no

    independent witness was examined to support the case of the

    prosecution.

    8.10. Furthermore, the dispute between the parties appears to

    have its genesis in long-standing matrimonial and family discord and

    the allegations raised in the present complaint are closely intertwined

    with civil and family disputes pending among the parties.

    8.11. Additionally, the petitioner-accused No.2 is an Advocate,

    who had acted upon the instructions of the de facto complainant. His

    involvement was limited to the exercise of his professional functions

    and there is no evidence to suggest that he acted independently or
    19

    outside the scope of the instructions given to him by the de facto

    complainant.

    8.12. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion

    that there are no specific allegations against the petitioners with regard

    to the offences of criminal conspiracy, forgery or cheating by

    impersonation. The essential ingredients of the said offences are not

    made out and the present complaint appears to have been maliciously

    instituted by the de facto complainant with an ulterior motive, aimed at

    wreaking vengeance on petitioner-accused No.1 and to spite him, due

    to private and personal grudge, in view of disputes pending between

    the parties. In such circumstances, the present case squarely falls

    within parameter No.7 of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

    Court in the judgment of the State of Haryana and others v.

    CH.Bhajan Lal and others 7, which is as follows:

    “The following categories of cases can be stated by way of
    illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or
    the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be
    exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the
    process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
    though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
    defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
    rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
    cases wherein such power should be exercised:

    (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report
    or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
    accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
    offence or make out a case against the accused;

    7

    1992 SCC (Cri) 426
    20

    (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and
    other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose
    a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
    officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
    order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
    Code;

    (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
    complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
    not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
    case against the accused;

    (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
    cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
    offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without
    an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
    of the Code;

    (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
    absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
    prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
    sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

    (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
    provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
    criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
    continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
    provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
    efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

    (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
    mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
    instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
    on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
    and personal grudge.”

    8.13. Apart from that, it is another contention of the learned

    counsel for the petitioners that cognizance was taken against the

    petitioners without application of mind by the learned Magistrate and

    without assigning any valid or cogent reasons for taking such

    cognizance. On the other hand, it is the contention of the learned

    counsel appearing for respondent No.2-de facto complainant that
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    cognizance is to be taken against an offence, not specifically against

    the offender. Even so, the law requires that valid and cogent reasons

    have to be assigned by the learned Magistrate, while taking

    cognizance of an offence. In the present case, while taking

    cognizance, no such reasons have been assigned by the learned

    Magistrate, contrary to the settled principle of law.

    8.14. The mental condition of the de facto complainant, coupled

    with the delayed lodging of the complaint and the absence of

    contemporaneous evidence, severely undermines the credibility and

    voluntariness of the complaint. Permitting the criminal proceedings to

    continue in such circumstances, would not serve the ends of justice

    and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

    9. Accordingly, both the Criminal Petitions are allowed,

    quashing the proceedings against the petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2

    in C.C.No.868 of 2024 pending on the file of the learned Principal

    Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Siddipet.

    Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand

    closed.

    ____________________
    JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
    Date: 26.03.2026
    rev

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