Chattisgarh High Court
Sanjay Shrivastava vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:13999-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2782 of 2025
Sanjay Shrivastava S/o Ramesh Kumar Shrivastava Aged About 48 Years R/o
27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Police Station Civil Lines Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, C.G.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur,
C.G.
2 - Rekha Shrivastava W/o Sanjay Shrivastav Aged About 48 Years R/o Pallaw
Bhavan Ayodhya Nagar, Present R/o Hemu Nagar, Near Murra Bhatta, P.S.
Torva, District Bilaspur, C.G.
---- Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Virendra Verma, Advocate
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Govt.
Advocate
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh, Advocate along
with Ms. Tejaswi Mandavi, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
24/03/2026
VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
1. Heard Mr. Virendra Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
Digitally signed by
VED PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date: 2026.04.01
as well as Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate
10:53:30 +0530
2
appearing for the respondent No.1/State, and Mr. Vijay K. Deshmukh
along with Ms. Tejaswi Mandavi, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.2.
2. This petition has been preferred under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, wherein the petitioner seeks
quashment of the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bilaspur (C.G.) in
Sessions Trial No. 159/2021, arising out of Crime No. 138/2021
registered at Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.),
whereby charges have been framed against the petitioner under
Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the Indian Penal
Code. The petitioner has also prayed for quashment of the First
Information Report as well as the entire charge-sheet dated 16.03.2021
filed before the learned trial Court.
3. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking for the
following reliefs:-
“i. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly pleased to
allow the instant petition under section 528 of
B.N.S.S. 2023 filed by the petitioner.
ii. The Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
quash the F.I.R. bearing no. 138/2021 u/s 376,
420 of I.P.C.
iii. That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly pleased to
quash entire charge sheet filed on dated
316.03.2021 before Learned Special Judge (FTC)
Bilaspur (in Session Trial case no. 159/2021).
iv. That, Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
quash the impugned order dated 25.11.2021,
wherein the learned trial court has framed the
charges under section 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506,
4. The facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings of the petition are
that, on 25.01.2021, the respondent No.2/prosecutrix lodged a complaint
before Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur alleging that the present
petitioner had entered into a relationship with her and had fraudulently
performed a love marriage with her in the year 2014. It was further
alleged that on the pretext of such relationship, the petitioner established
physical relations with her and continued to exploit her over a period of
time. The prosecutrix also alleged that she had borne the entire
expenses of the medical education of the petitioner’s daughter and had,
on several occasions, given money to the petitioner.
******* On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, an FIR bearing Crime
No. 138/2021 was registered against the petitioner for the offences
punishable under Sections 376 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code at
Police Station Civil Lines, Bilaspur. During the course of investigation,
the statements of as many as 11 witnesses were recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., and the statement of the prosecutrix was also
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the competent Magistrate.
4
******* After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet
against the petitioner on 16.03.2021. During investigation, additional
offences under Sections 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the IPC were also
incorporated. The matter was thereafter committed to the Court of
Sessions and registered as Sessions Trial No. 159/2021 before the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Bilaspur.
******* At the stage of framing of charge, the petitioner raised objections
and sought to rely upon certain documents to demonstrate that he had
been falsely implicated in the case. It was contended that the prosecutrix
was his legally wedded wife and that the relationship between them was
consensual, and therefore, no offence under Section 376 IPC was made
out. It was further contended that the prosecutrix had voluntarily
provided financial assistance towards the education of the petitioner’s
daughter and there was no element of cheating or inducement so as to
attract the offence under Section 420 IPC.
******* However, the learned trial Court, without adequately considering
the defence raised by the petitioner and the material placed on record,
proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 25.11.2021, whereby
charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 of the
IPC were framed against the petitioner.
******* Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, filing of the
charge-sheet, and the order framing charges, the petitioner has
preferred the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashment of the aforesaid
proceedings.
5
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order
dated 25.11.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
(FTC), Bilaspur is wholly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the settled
principles governing framing of charge, inasmuch as the learned trial
Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available on record
and has mechanically framed charges against the petitioner without
there being sufficient ground for proceeding. It is submitted that the
entire prosecution case, even if taken at its face value and accepted in
its entirety, does not disclose the commission of any offence under
Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel would
contend that the respondent No.2/prosecutrix herself has admitted in
earlier proceedings that she had solemnized a love marriage with the
petitioner and was fully aware of his marital status. Therefore, the
essential ingredient of “misconception of fact” as required for constituting
the offence of rape on the pretext of marriage is completely absent in the
present case. The relationship between the parties, at best, was
consensual in nature and continued for a considerable period of time,
and thus, the same cannot be given a criminal colour so as to attract the
provisions of Section 376 IPC.
******* It is further submitted that the prosecutrix has, in fact, initiated
proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
seeking maintenance from the petitioner, thereby acknowledging the
status of the petitioner as her husband. This conduct of the prosecutrix
clearly demolishes the allegation that the petitioner had deceitfully
established physical relations with her on a false promise of marriage.
6
The said fact has not been properly considered by the learned trial Court
while passing the impugned order.
******* Learned counsel would further submit that the ingredients of the
offence under Section 420 IPC are also not made out, as there is no
material to show that the petitioner had any dishonest intention from the
very inception of the alleged transaction. It is contended that the
prosecutrix voluntarily extended financial assistance towards the
education of the petitioner’s daughter out of her own free will and
affection, and at no point of time was there any inducement or fraudulent
misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner. In absence of mens rea
at the inception, the offence of cheating cannot be sustained. It is also
argued that the learned trial Court has failed to consider the
documentary evidence placed by the petitioner, which clearly indicates
that the prosecutrix has been using different identities at different points
of time. Reference is made to the documents filed along with the
petition, including the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, wherein the prosecutrix has described herself as Rekha
Verma, wife of Jitendra Verma, and the documents obtained through RTI
showing different names of her child and herself. These documents
create serious doubt about the credibility and veracity of the prosecutrix
and indicate that the petitioner has been falsely implicated.
******* Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecutrix was
also involved in a criminal case under the provisions of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, which further casts a serious doubt on her
conduct and credibility. The said aspect has also been ignored by the
learned trial Court while framing charges against the petitioner. It is next
7
contended that even in the earlier complaint made by the prosecutrix in
the year 2020, she had clearly stated that she was aware of the fact that
the petitioner was already married at the time when she entered into a
relationship with him. On the basis of such complaint, the police had
registered a non-cognizable offence, which clearly demonstrates that the
present FIR is an afterthought and has been lodged with an ulterior
motive to harass and pressurize the petitioner.
******* Learned counsel would also submit that the conduct of the
prosecutrix in not appearing before the trial Court in Sessions Trial No.
159/2021 and simultaneously pursuing the maintenance proceedings
shows that the present criminal case has been initiated only to exert
pressure upon the petitioner and is nothing but an abuse of the process
of law. It is further argued that the learned trial Court, while framing
charges, has not applied its judicial mind and has failed to consider
whether there exists a prima facie case against the petitioner. The order
impugned is cryptic and non-speaking, and does not reflect any
reasoning as to how the ingredients of the alleged offences are made
out. It is settled law that though at the stage of framing of charge,
detailed appreciation of evidence is not required, however, the Court is
duty bound to see whether the basic ingredients of the offence are prima
facie disclosed, which has not been done in the present case.
******* In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner would pray that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to exercise
its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., 2023, to
prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice,
and accordingly quash the FIR bearing Crime No. 138/2021, the charge-
8
sheet dated 16.03.2021, as well as the impugned order dated
25.11.2021 framing charges against the petitioner.
6. Learned State counsel would submit that the present petition seeking
quashment of FIR, charge-sheet and the order framing charges is wholly
misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is contended that the FIR
bearing Crime No. 138/2021 was registered on the basis of a written
complaint disclosing commission of cognizable offences under the
Indian Penal Code, and the police authorities have acted strictly in
accordance with law in registering the same and proceeding with the
investigation. It is further submitted that at the stage of registration of
FIR and investigation, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations
cannot be examined in detail, and the FIR is only intended to set the
criminal law into motion.
******* Learned counsel would further submit that the allegations made
by the prosecutrix clearly disclose a prima facie case against the
petitioner, including allegations of continuous exploitation on the pretext
of marriage and financial inducement. During the course of investigation,
statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as the
statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. have been
recorded, and upon due consideration of the material collected, the
police have filed the charge-sheet. It is thus submitted that there exists
sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner and the learned trial
Court has rightly framed charges after considering the record of the
case. At this stage, meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudication
on disputed facts is impermissible.
9
******* It is further argued that the law with regard to quashment of FIR is
well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein it has been
held that the inherent powers of the High Court are to be exercised
sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The present case does not fall
within any of the categories warranting interference. The defence sought
to be raised by the petitioner involves disputed questions of fact, which
can only be adjudicated during trial on the basis of evidence. Therefore,
in absence of any patent illegality or abuse of process of law, this
Hon’ble Court may not exercise its inherent jurisdiction at this stage and
the petition, being premature and devoid of merit, deserves to be
dismissed.
7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 would submit that the
present petition filed by the petitioner is wholly misconceived, devoid of
merit and liable to be dismissed at the threshold, as the same has been
filed with mala fide intention and by suppressing material facts from this
Hon’ble Court. It is contended that the respondent No.2 is legally
wedded wife of the petitioner, and after the death of her first husband,
she solemnized marriage with the petitioner in the year 2014 and both of
them lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period. The
petitioner himself has admitted the said relationship in earlier
proceedings, including his bail application, wherein he has specifically
acknowledged cohabitation and marital relations with respondent No.2.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioner disputing the relationship is
false and contrary to record.
10
******* Learned counsel would further submit that the allegations made
by the petitioner regarding different names and identities of respondent
No.2 are completely baseless and misleading. It is clarified that the
respondent No.2 is known as Rekha Verma, daughter of Late Bacchulal
Verma, and the documents relied upon by the petitioner have either
been misinterpreted or do not pertain to the respondent No.2 at all. The
documents forming part of the charge-sheet, including statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as bank records, clearly
establish the identity of respondent No.2. It is further submitted that the
petitioner has deliberately placed irrelevant and unrelated documents on
record to create confusion and to malign the reputation of respondent
No.2.
******* It is also argued that there is sufficient prima facie material
available on record to proceed against the petitioner for the offences
alleged, and the learned trial Court has rightly framed charges after due
consideration of the evidence collected during investigation. The
respondent No.2 has been diligently pursuing her legal remedies,
including proceedings for maintenance, and the present petition has
been filed only to delay the trial and to evade the petitioner’s legal
obligations. It is thus submitted that the petition deserves to be
dismissed with exemplary costs, as it amounts to abuse of the process
of law and an attempt to obstruct the course of justice.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire
record of the case including the FIR, charge-sheet, statements recorded
during investigation and the impugned order framing charges.
11
9. At the outset, it is well settled that the power of this Court under Section
528 of the B.N.S.S. (pari materia to Section 482 Cr.P.C.) is to be
exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends
of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haji Iqbal @ Bala v. State of
U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 946, has held that while exercising such
jurisdiction, the Court is not required to confine itself only to the
averments in the FIR, but may also examine the attending
circumstances and material collected during investigation to ascertain
whether the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious. In Para 14 of its
judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :
“14. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused
comes before the Court invoking either the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to
get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed
essentially on the ground that such proceedings
are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted
with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance,
then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty
to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely. We say so because once the complainant
decides to proceed against the accused with an
ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance,
etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint
12is very well drafted with all the necessary
pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the
averments made in the FIR/complaint are such
that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will
not be just enough for the Court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to
look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and
above the averments and, if need be, with due
care and circumspection try to read in between
the lines. The Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or
Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict
itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration
of the case as well as the materials collected in
the course of investigation. Take for instance the
case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered
over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of multiple
FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the
13issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.”
10. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2
was not a case of forcible exploitation, but rather a long-standing
association between two adults. The material available on record,
including the earlier complaint and surrounding circumstances, indicates
that the respondent No.2 was aware of the marital status of the
petitioner and had voluntarily entered into a relationship with him. The
conduct of the parties further reveals that they lived together for a
considerable period, thereby indicating conscious and voluntary
participation on the part of respondent No.2.
11. At this juncture, it is also appropriate to take note of subsequent judicial
proceedings between the parties, which have a direct bearing on the
nature of their relationship. This Court finds that in Criminal Revision No.
177 of 2024 (Rekha Verma v. Sanjay Shrivastava), decided on
12.11.2024, a Single Bench of this Court, upon due consideration of the
material available on record, has recorded a categorical finding that the
respondent No.2 and the present petitioner had lived together in a live-in
relationship for a considerable period and that, for the purposes of
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the respondent No.2 is to be
treated as the wife of the petitioner. Consequently, an amount of
Rs.15,000/- per month has been awarded as interim maintenance in
favour of respondent No.2.
14
12. It is further borne out from the record, including the proceedings before
the learned Family Court in MJC Case No. 245/2025 (arising out of MJC
No. 457/2021), that pursuant to the aforesaid order, the respondent No.2
is receiving maintenance from the petitioner, and the petitioner has been
complying with the said order by making payment of maintenance
amount. The order-sheet dated 26.04.2025 reflects payment of
Rs.15,000/- towards maintenance, thereby reinforcing the subsistence
and acknowledgment of such relationship between the parties.
13. The aforesaid judicial determination and the conduct of the parties
assume considerable significance, as they prima facie establish that the
relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was not
clandestine or induced by deception, but rather a long-standing
cohabitation akin to marriage. It is well settled that where a man and
woman live together for a considerable period as husband and wife, a
presumption of marriage arises in favour of such relationship, unless
rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case, such presumption not
only arises but also stands fortified by a judicial finding granting
maintenance to respondent No.2 by treating her as the wife of the
petitioner.
14. In such circumstances, the allegation that the physical relationship
between the parties was established on account of any “misconception
of fact” or fraudulent inducement becomes inherently doubtful. On the
contrary, the material on record indicates a consensual and
acknowledged domestic relationship, which has also been recognized in
collateral judicial proceedings.
15
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4
SCC 46, has categorically held that where a woman is a mature adult
and has consciously consented to a physical relationship despite being
aware of the consequences, such consent cannot be said to be vitiated
by misconception of fact. In paragraphs 23 and 25 of this judgment it
has been held that:
“23. Keeping in view the approach that the Court
must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to
consider the evidence on record. In the instant case,
the prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a
college. She was deeply in love with the appellant.
She was however aware of the fact that since they
belonged to different castes, marriage was not
possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage
was bound to be seriously opposed by their family
members. She admits having told so to the appellant
when he proposed to her the first time. She had
sufficient intelligence to understand the significance
and moral quality of the act she was consenting to.
That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could.
Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the
appellant, and in fact succumbed to it. She thus
freely exercised a choice between resistance and
assent. She must have known the consequences of
the act, particularly when she was conscious of the
fact that their marriage may not take place at all on
16account of caste considerations. All these
circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she
freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to
having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her
consent was not in consequence of any
misconception of fact.
25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the
prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
conditions must be fulfilled for the application of
Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the
consent was given under a misconception of fact.
Secondly, it must be proved that the person who
obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe
that the consent was given in consequence of such
misconception. We have serious doubts that the
promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent
to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She
knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage
with the appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet
with stiff opposition from members of both families.
There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which
she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not
take place at all despite the promise of the appellant.
The question still remains whether even if it were so,
the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the
17prosecutrix had consented to having sexual
intercourse with him only as a consequence of her
belief, based on his promise, that they will get
married in due course. There is hardly any evidence
to prove this fact. On the contrary the circumstances
of the case tend to support the conclusion that the
appellant had reason to believe that the consent
given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep
love for each other. It is not disputed that they were
deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear
that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if
at all, is permitted only to a person with whom one is
in deep love. It is also not without significance that
the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant
to a lonely place at 12 O’clock in the night. It usually
happens in such cases, when two young persons are
madly in love, that they promise to each other
several times that come what may, they will get
married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant
also made such a promise on more than one
occasion. In such circumstances the promise loses
all significance, particularly when they are over come
with emotions and passion and find themselves in
situations and circumstances where they, in a weak
moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual
relationship. This is what appears to have happened
in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly
18consented to having sexual intercourse with the
appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not
because he promised to marry her, but because she
also desired it. In these circumstances it would be
very difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge
that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence
of a misconception of fact arising from his promise.
In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to
know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when
she consented, because there were more reasons
than one for her to consent.”
16. Similarly, in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has drawn a clear
distinction between a false promise of marriage and a mere breach of
promise, holding that consensual physical relationship between adults
would not constitute rape unless it is established that the promise to
marry was false from the very inception and was made with a mala fide
intention to deceive. In paragraphs 15, 23 and 24 of this judgment, it has
been held that:
“15. Section 375 defines the offence of rape and
enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The first
clause operates where the women is in possession of
her senses and, therefore, capable of consenting but
the act is done against her will and the second where
it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and
fifth when there is consent but it is not such a consent
19as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by
putting her, or any person in whom she is interested,
in fear of death or of hurt. The expression “against
her ‘will'” means that the act must have been done in
spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as
to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or
probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to
be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It
denotes an active will in mind of a person to permit
the doing of the act complained of.
Section 90 of the IPC defines “consent” known
to be given under fear or misconception:-
“Section 90: Consent known to be given under
fear or misconception.–A consent is not such a
consent as it intended by any section of this
Code, if the consent is given by a person under
fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact,
and if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent was given in
consequence of such fear or misconception”
Thus, Section 90 though does not define
“consent”, but describes what is not “consent”.
Consent may be express or implied, coerced or
misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
If the consent is given by the complainant
under misconception of fact, it is vitiated.
20
Consent for the purpose of Section 375
requires voluntary participation not only after
the exercise of intelligence based on the
knowledge of the significance and moral quality
of the act, but also after having fully exercised
the choice between resistance and assent.
Whether there was any consent or not is to be
ascertained only on a careful study of all
relevant circumstances.
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape
and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must
very carefully examine whether the complainant had
actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide
motives and had made a false promise to this effect
only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the
ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a
distinction between mere breach of a promise and not
fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made
the promise with the sole intention to seduce the
prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act
would not amount to rape. There may be a case
where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for the
accused and not solely on account of the
misconception created by accused, or where an
accused, on account of circumstances which he could
21
not have foreseen or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her despite having every
intention to do. Such cases must be treated
differently. If the complainant had any mala fide
intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a
clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual
physical relationship between the parties would not
constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that
the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the
Primary Health Centre and the complainant was
working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health
centre and that the is a widow. It was alleged by her
that the appellant informed her that he is a married
man and that he has differences with his wife.
Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is
also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a
month’s time to get their marriage registered. The
complainant further states that she had fallen in love
with the appellant and that she needed a companion
as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that
“as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a
companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then
we were having love affair and accordingly we started
residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my
home whereas some time at his home.” Thus, they
22
were living together, sometimes at her house and
sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They
were in a relationship with each other for quite some
time and enjoyed each other’s company. It is also
clear that they had been living as such for quite some
time together. When she came to know that the
appellant had married some other woman, she lodged
the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant
has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious
decision after active application of mind to the things
that had happened. It is not a case of a passive
submission in the face of any psychological pressure
exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit
consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the
view that, even if the allegations made in the
complaint are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, they do not make out a case against
the appellant. We are also of the view that since
complainant has failed to prima facie show the
commission of rape, the complaint registered under
Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.”
17. Further, in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of U.P. 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 181 and Shambhu Kharwar v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1032, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that prolonged
23
consensual relationships between adults, even if they subsequently fail,
do not attract the offence under Section 376 IPC.
18. Recently also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that mere
failure of a relationship or refusal to marry cannot be given a criminal
colour, and consensual relationships cannot be converted into criminal
offences in absence of clear evidence of deception from inception.
19. In light of the foregoing discussion, particularly considering (i) the long-
standing cohabitation between the parties, (ii) the judicial finding
rendered in Criminal Revision No. 177 of 2024 recognizing respondent
No.2 as wife for the purpose of maintenance, and (iii) the admitted
payment and receipt of maintenance pursuant thereto, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the relationship between the parties was
consensual and bore the attributes of a marital relationship.
20. Once such a relationship is evident and stands prima facie recognized in
judicial proceedings, the essential ingredients of the offence under
Section 376 IPC, namely absence of consent or consent obtained under
misconception of fact, are not satisfied. The material on record does not
disclose that the petitioner had any fraudulent or dishonest intention at
the inception of the relationship. Rather, it reflects a voluntary
association between two adults over a considerable period of time.
21. So far as the offences under Sections 420, 496, 506, 294 and 323 IPC
are concerned, the allegations are either omnibus in nature or do not
disclose the essential ingredients of the said offences. No specific
material has been brought on record to prima facie establish dishonest
intention at the inception so as to constitute the offence of cheating. In
24
the backdrop of the admitted relationship and financial dealings between
the parties, continuation of criminal proceedings on such allegations
would not be justified.
22. Continuation of the criminal proceedings in such circumstances,
particularly when the relationship has been judicially recognized for the
purpose of maintenance and is being acted upon by the parties, would
amount to permitting misuse of the criminal justice process for settling
personal disputes arising out of a failed relationship.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion and in light of the principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haji Iqbal @ Bala, Uday, Dr.
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar, Sonu @ Subhash Kumar and
Shambhu Kharwar (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that
the present case is a fit case for exercising inherent jurisdiction.
24. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The FIR
bearing Crime No. 138/2021 registered at Police Station Civil Lines,
Bilaspur, the charge-sheet dated 16.03.2021 filed in Sessions Trial No.
159/2021, and the impugned order dated 25.11.2021 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bilaspur framing charges
against the petitioner under Sections 376(2)(n), 420, 496, 506, 294 and
323 IPC are hereby quashed.
25. A copy of this order be forwarded to the trial Court for necessary steps
and information.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved
