Gujarat High Court
Masuriben @ Mamuriben Wd/O Kodarbhai … vs Special Land Acquisition Officer on 12 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/6296/2024 JUDGMENT DATED: 12/03/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 6296 of 2024
In F/FIRST APPEAL/32595/2024
With
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 32595 of 2024
With
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 32685 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2024
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 32685 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 1 of 2025
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of
2024
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 32685 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 2 of 2024
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS)
NO. 1 of 2024
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 32685 of 2024
With
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 847 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 847 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 2 of 2025
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS)
NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 847 of 2025
With
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 881 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 881 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 2 of 2025
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS)
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NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 881 of 2025
With
F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 921 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 921 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 2 of 2025
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS)
NO. 1 of 2025
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 921 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Sd/-
=====================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
Yes
=====================================================
MASURIBEN @ MAMURIBEN WD/O KODARBHAI KOHYABHAI
(DIED) & ORS.
Versus
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.
=====================================================
Appearance:
MR YN RAVANI(718) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
MS. URVASHI PUROHIT, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR DIPAK R DAVE(1232) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
=====================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 12/03/2026
JUDGMENT
1. This common judgment governs the disposal of the
captioned Civil Applications filed for the condonation of the delay
as all the matters arise from the common judgment in a group of
the Land reference matters.
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2. In respective Civil Applications, the applicants have
prayed to condone the delay in the following terms for preferring
the first appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and
also for bringing the respective legal heirs and legal
representatives on record as under:-
“In CA No. 6296 of 2024 in F/FA NO. 32595 of 2024
9.) Applicants, therefore, most respectfully pray that
A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow
this application;
B) Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay
of 3117 days caused in preferring the First Appeal
arising out of the Award passed by the learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kheda at Nadiad relating
to LAR Case No.225/1991 decided on 30.12.2015, in
the interest of justice;
C) Such other and further reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem just, fit and expedient be granted in favour of the
applicants.
In CA NO. 2 of 2024 in CA NO.1 of 2024 In
F/FA NO.32685 of 2024
12) Applicants, therefore, most respectfully pray that
A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow
this application;
B) Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay
of 7722 days caused in preferring the application for
bringing the heirs and legal representatives of original
deceased applicant No.2, 2.2 & 4 on the record of the
case, as shown in the cause title hereinabove, in the
record of the case, in the interest of justice;
C) Such other and further reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem just, fit and expedient be granted in favour of the
applicants.
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In CA No. 2 of 2025 in CA NO. 1 of 2025 in
F/FA NO.847 of 2025
16) Applicants, therefore, most respectfully pray that
A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow
this application;
B) Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay
of 12239 days caused in preferring the application for
bringing the heirs and legal representatives of original
deceased applicant Nos.4, 5, 6 & 7 on the record of the
case, as shown in the cause title hereinabove, in the
record of the case, in the interest of justice;
C) Such other and further reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem just, fit and expedient be granted in favour of the
applicants.
In CA NO. 2 of 2025 in CA NO. 1 of 2025 in
F/FA NO.881 of 2025
13) Applicants, therefore, most respectfully pray that
A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow
this application;
B) Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay
of 5519 days caused in preferring the application for
bringing the heirs and legal representatives of original
deceased applicant No.1 on the record of the case, as
shown in the cause title hereinabove, in the record of
the case, in the interest of justice;
C) Such other and further reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem just, fit and expedient be granted in favour of the
applicants.
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In CA NO. 2 of 2025 in CA NO. 1 of 2025 in
F/FA NO.921 of 2025
13) Applicants, therefore, most respectfully pray that
A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow
this application;
B) Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay
of 3151 days caused in preferring the application for
bringing the heirs and legal representatives of original
deceased applicants No.1 & 4 on the record of the
case, as shown in the cause title hereinabove, in the
record of the case, in the interest of justice;
C) Such other and further reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem just, fit and expedient be granted in favour of the
applicants.”
3. Heard learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani appearing for
the applicants, learned advocate Mr. Dipak R. Dave appearing
for the respondent No.2 – acquiring body – Gujarat State
Electricity Corporation and learned AGP Ms. Urvashi Purohit for
the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
3.1 It is a case where the applicants sought to condone
the aforesaid huge and colossal delay in preferring the first
appeals against the common judgment and award passed in
group of the matters being LAR Case No.216 of 1991 to LAR
Case No.231 of 1991 by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kheda
at Nadiad, considering the LAR Case No.216 of 1991 as the lead
matter.
3.2 The cases arise from award passed by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Vanakbori Thermal Power Station,
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District: Kheda, under LAQ Case No.2481/Vashi in respect of
the agricultural land situated at Village Sangol, Taluka: Thasra,
District: Kheda, for the land which was acquired for the purpose
of Ash Diek for Vanakbori Thermal Power Station.
3.3 The Land Acquisition Officer assessed the amount of
Rs.200/- per Hectare and awarded the amount for acquisition of
the land made in LAQ case. The claimants were not happy and
satisfied by the assessment of the amount of compensation and
thus, the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
was made to the Reference Court claiming Rs.2,000/- as a
compensation per Hectare.
3.4 The common judgment and order was passed by the
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Nadiad on 30.12.2015 partly
allowing the LAR cases and fixed the rate of the compensation at
Rs.4.34/- per sq. mtr. from the date of the Notification under
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and directed the Land
Acquisition Officer and Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd.
to pay jointly and severally the additional amount of
compensation at Rs.2.34/- per sq. mtr with additional benefit of
solatium and interest.
3.5 It is this award, claimants intend to challenge by way
of First Appeal. However, the delay mentioned hereinabove
occurred in challenging the impugned judgment and award.
3.6 The reasons stated in all the delay condonation
applications for preferring the main first appeals are verbatim.
Para 3, 4 and 5 of the Civil Application No. 6296 of 2024 are
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referred by learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani to be a reason for
condoning the aforesaid huge and inordinate delay. They are
reproduced hereinunder :-
“3) Applicants respectfully state that the impugned award
was passed below Exh. 105 on 31.12.2015. However, it is
respectfully submitted that, the learned advocate for the
applicants, who appeared before the learned trial court did
not inform the appellants about the award passed in such
reference cases and the applicants came to know about the
same, only somewhere in the month of September, 2019.
Thereafter, application for certified copies were applied,
which were delivered on 05.10.2019.
4) Applicants respectfully state that the applicants were
informed that the further proceeding is required to be filed
before the Hon’ble High Court. Therefore, the. appellants
contacted each other and decided to file appeal before this
Hon’ble High Court. That sufficiently long time had passed
in arranging for he funds to prefer appeal before this Hon’ble
Court. However, later on, Corona pandemic struck the
regular line all throughout the country. In view thereof, the
amount spared by the appellants for preferring the appeal,
was utilized by them for their survival during the Corona
pandemic and that the applicants even could not contact
their lawyer. Later on, they had sought further advice of the
advocate at the High Court and have preferred the present
appeal.
5) Applicants respectfully submit that, even the Hon’ble
Apex Court has been pleased to extend the limitation of all
such litigations during the said Corona Pandemic period
upto 28.02.2022 and also gave a grace period of further 90
days i.e. upto 31.05.2022. Applicants respectfully submit
that, it is only after resumption of normalcy that the
applicants could once again try to make arrangements for
funds for preferring the present First Appeal. Under the
circumstance, the delay caused in preferring the present
First Appeal was neither deliberate nor the applicants were
indolent. On the contrary the applicants were very much
vigilant and determined to file the present appeal.”
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3.7 Learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani, in support of the
aforesaid reasons, would submit that the statement and object of
the Land Acquisition Act has been duly discussed and
considered by the coordinate Bench of this Court in case of
Heirs of Decd. Mandan Kanabhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat
in Civil Application (For condonation of delay) No.2464 of
2024 in F/First Appeal No. 6539 of 2024, wherein it has been
held that since the land owner have lost their land, and thereby
their valuable assets, the aspect of delay has to be seen from the
eyes of liberal approach. Generally, Court has to adopt a liberal
approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to
impart substantial justice among the parties. This phrase would
assume the significance when the Land Acquisition proceedings
are initiated and culminated in a grant of a meagre awards.
3.8 He further submits that the coordinate Bench in the
Heirs of Heirs of Decd. Mandan Kanabhai (Supra) referred to
a slew of authorities to condone the delay. It was a case where
delay of approximately 12 to 17 years was caused in filing the
appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act
3.9 Learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani submits that the
Supreme Court in case of K. Subbarayudu & Ors. v. Special
Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), reported in (2017) 12
SCC 840 also emphasized the obligation of the Court dealing
with the application for condonation of the delay in Land
Acquisition matters for enhancement of the compensation and
granted the delay of 367 days in filing the appeal. He would
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submit that the judgment of K. Subbarayudu (Supra) is the
main foundation for the coordinate Bench for condoning the
huge delay of 12 to 17 years.
3.10 Learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani taking to the facts
of the present case submits that the appellants being the
peasants and agriculturists, did not know the intricacies of the
provision of law and since were informed to file the appeal for
enhancing the compensation, they intended to file the appeal
before the High Court. However, the the funds was the problem
and the second problem was the Pandemic of Covid-19, which
has exhausted the entire fund of the appellants. In that way, the
delay has occurred.
3.11 In light of the aforesaid submission, learned advocate
Mr. Y.N. Ravani submits to take the sympathetic view in favor of
the applicants with the usual submission that the applicants are
ready to forego the interest for a delayed period and are also
ready to fix any condition, which may be imposed by this Court.
3.12 Upon above submission, learned advocate Mr. Y.N.
Ravani submits to allow all these applications.
4. As against the aforesaid submission, learned
advocate Mr. Dipak R. Dave appearing for the respondent No.2 –
Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Ltd. referred to the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pathapati Subba
Reddy (Died) LRs & Ors. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA),
reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 and submitted that the Supreme
Court, in absence of any sufficient reasons, declined to condone
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the delay of 5 to 6 years in filing an appeal against the Reference
Court’s order.
4.1 He submits that under the garb of taking liberal
approach, the Limitation Act and its rigors cannot be repealed.
The Section 3 of the Limitation Act having a sufficient force that,
if a suit, appeal or application is not filed within the limitation, it
has to be dismissed on the ground of application of law of
limitation, which is founded on public policy and enshrined on
the legal maxim, “Interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is
for the general welfare that the period of limitation be put to
litigation and there is object to put an end to every legal
proceeding and to have fixed period of life for every litigation, as
it would be futile to keep the litigation hover upon the other side.
Thus, if a right has not been exercised within the stipulated
time-period, the issue of limitation comes into the picture and
the litigant seeking the condonation of the delay is required to
follow the command of Section 5 of the Limitation Act that a
sufficient cause to be explained for the condonation of the delay.
4.2 He also referred to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah
since Deceased by LRs, reported in 2025 INSC 53 as well as
the judgment of the coordinate Bench in case of Amrutlal
Virabhai Shah Thro POA & Ors. v. Shah Hansraj Gosar &
Ors., reported in 2025 LawSuit(Guj) 1738.
4.3 Learned advocate Mr. Dipak Dave further submits
that, according to the instructions he has received, the award,
which was passed in the year 2015, has been materialized by the
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applicants in the year 2017. In other words, he submits that the
applicants have withdrawn the amount of award in the year
2017, but did not mention the same in the applications/appeals,
which demonstrates that the applicants have suppressed the
material facts. It also demonstrates that the applicants was
aware of passing of the award in the year 2017 and yet, they
have filed the appeals after many years, which is sufficient to say
that it is a speculative appeals filed on the ill-advise.
4.4 Learned advocate Mr. Dipak Dave having referred to
para 3, 4 and 5 of the delay condonation applications would
submit that none of the reasons are found to be a reason
sufficient to condone the inordinate delay caused in preferring
the appeals. Lastly, learned advocate Mr. Dipak Dave submits
that there are no appeals filed and admitted challenging the very
same award.
4.5 In view of that, he would submit that the present
applications are bereft of merit and requires to be dismissed.
5. Learned AGP Ms. Urvashi Purohit adopted the
aforesaid arguments and submitted to pass the appropriate
order for dismissal of the applications.
6. At the outset, let me observe in black and blue that,
it is a huge and colossal delay, which the applicants sought to
condone by way of these applications. The reasons, which are
reproduced hereinabove stated for the purpose or calling them
as ‘sufficient cause’, are short of rationale and plausible reasons.
What could also be noticeable that the applicants, who have
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withdrawn the award amount in the year 2017, did not mention
the same in the application memo. The reply filed by the
Executive Engineer in the applications sufficiently state that the
applicants were well aware about the passing of the award when
they have withdrawn the amount. There is no sufficient
explanation that why the applicants have suppressed this fact
from the Court while seeking the discretionary order of this
Court.
7. Be that as it may, if we go through the reasons stated
by the applicants in para 3, it is stated by the applicants that
they were not aware of passing of the award in the Reference
Cases and only came to know about it somewhere in September,
2019 when the applicants applied for the certified copy. The
statement proves to be false on the ground that the applicants
approached the very Reference Court in the year 2017 for
withdrawal of the awarded amount, even otherwise putting a
blame upon their learned advocate that, the applicants have not
been informed by the learned advocate is no reason to condone
the delay. Applicant, who filed the litigation before the Court is
expected to come with clean hands before this Court and remain
vigilant throughout the litigation period.
8. In the present case, at the cost of repetition, it can be
observed that the applicants were well aware of passing of the
award and also of the fact that when the award amount has
been deposited and thus, they moved to the Reference Court for
withdrawal of the amount, no sooner the awarded amount has
been deposited.
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9. In para 4, the applicants pleaded that they were short
of funds to file the appeals before the High Court and it took a
long time for arranging the funds to prefer the appeal and the
huge share of the funds has been chewed-up during the Corona
pandemic, this submission made in para 4 is unsubstantiated
by any documentary evidence in all the applications, whereby
any of the applicants, if suffered from Corona or not, is neither
brought on record nor even pleaded. Even it is not pleaded that
what amount the applicants were to arrange for filing of the
appeal, how they have arranged it, when their arrangement was
completed and when their fund, which was arranged, has been
chewed-up by the Corona pandemic.
10. Lastly, in para 5 also, the applicants reiterated the
earlier plea of making arrangement of the funds.
11. In Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram & Ors., reported in
2023 LiveLaw (SC) 69, the Supreme Court held that, being
short of sufficient funds to pay Court fee is not a reason to
condone delay in filing appeal. Para 5 thereof reads as under:-
“5. What we have here is a pure civil matter. An appeal has
to be filed within the stipulated period, prescribed under the
law. Belated appeals can only be condoned, when sufficient
reason is shown before the court for the delay. The appellant
who seeks condonation of delay therefore must explain the
delay of each day. It is true that the courts should not be
pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay, and
explanation of each day’s delay should not be taken
literally, but the fact remains that there must be a
reasonable explanation for the delay. In the present case,
this delay has not been explained to the satisfaction of the
court. The only reason assigned by the appellant for the
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not having sufficient funds to pay the court fee! This was not
found to be a sufficient reason for the condonation of delay
as the appellant was an affluent businessman and a
hotelier. In any case, even it is presumed for the sake of
argument that the appellant was short of funds, at the
relevant point of time and was not able to pay court fee,
nothing barred him from filing the appeal as there is
provision under the law for filing a defective appeal, i.e., an
appeal which is deficient as far as court fee is concerned,
provided the court fee is paid within the time given by the
Court. We would refer to Section 149 of Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 which reads as under :-
‘Section 149: Power to make up deficiency of Court Fees.-
Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any
document by the law for the time being in force relating to
court fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its
discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such
fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may
be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the
document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall
have the same force and effect as if such fee had been
paid in the first instance.’It also needs to be emphasized that this Court as well as
various High Courts, have held that Section 149 CPC acts as
an exception, or even a proviso to Section 4 of Court Fees Act
1870. In terms of Section 4, an appeal cannot be filed before
a High Court without court fee, if the same is prescribed. But
this provision has to be read along with Section 149 of CPC
which we have referred above. A short background to the
incorporation of Section 149 in CPC would explain this
aspect.”
12. Reason by applicant not being informed by his
advocate considered to be a growing tendency on the part of the
applicants to throw the blame on the learned advocate has been
negated as a reason for the condonation of delay by the Supreme
Court in the case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. v. Ved Prakash,
reported in 2024 INSC 891. The Supreme Court while saying so
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held that, litigant has to be vigilant and can’t throw entire blame
on the advocate for delay and negligence. Relevant para 10, 11
and 12 are as under:-
“[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on
the head of the advocate who was appearing for the
petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period
of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the
proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a
moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long
and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be
vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally
vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not
be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the
advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek
relief.”
11. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of
this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private
Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court
observed as under:-
“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given to
him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations,
the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a
dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the
negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where
it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is
no such absolute rule that a party can disown its
advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute
immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would
make the working of the system extremely difficult. The
observations made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not
be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have
mentioned hereinabove, this was an on-going suit posted
for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its
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residing away from the city, where the court is located.
The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a
private limited company with its head office at Calcutta
itself and managed by educated businessmen who know
where their interest lies. It is evident that when their
applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit
for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear
before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying
tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. May be not. But one
thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with the court.
Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the
defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the
entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out
as if they were totally unaware of the nature or
significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot
be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in
1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
‘The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence
documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to
contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to
the principle that law does not assist a person who is
inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without
asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which
forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum
vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws
give help to those who are watchful and not to those who
sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations
is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within
a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress
stale, fake or fraudulent claims.’ (emphasis supplied).”
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13. Learned advocate Mr. Y.N. Ravani heavily relied upon
the case of K. Subbarayudu (Supra), but in later case, in
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra), the Supreme Court referred
to the Law of Limitation as a law founded on the public policy
and declined to condone the delay of 5 to 6 years, which took
place in filing the appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act. Para 6 to 15 and 26 reads as under:-
“6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in
refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal
and to dismiss it as barred by limitation.
7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is
enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of
limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to
every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for
every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute
pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there
should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a
dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the
litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals.
8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation
and prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They
envisage that a right not exercised or the remedy not availed
for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting to
an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the
right with the passage of time.
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays
down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred
or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained
rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up
as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of
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convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow:
‘3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.’
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal
and application but since in this case we are concerned with
appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the
appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by
time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be
condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is
preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid
provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject
to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had
to be given effect to even though no objection regarding
limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the
pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the
court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The
exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive)
of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the
exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts
to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed
period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient
cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period
prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with
discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the
expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed
appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it
within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit
the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause
is shown based upon host of other factors such as
negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts
should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealingPage 18 of 25
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with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing
appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance
substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one
hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed
liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation
Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be
interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and
Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors., it has been
observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may
require different construction, as for example, the court
exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the
delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, however, the same may not be true while construing
Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that
though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing
Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3
of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of
limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation
and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3
and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine
and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal
approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay
to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply
law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs.
Katiji and Ors., this Court in advocating the liberal approach
in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that
ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay
in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone
delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is
necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to
be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberalPage 19 of 25
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approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of
‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a
condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to
condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-
oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of
‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of
limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact
dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing
‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of
the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of
a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly
disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding
with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption
creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal,
Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd has
emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown
by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the
delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court.
The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for
various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay
depending upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain
Singh and Ors. it had been held that the court cannot grant
an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or
on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again
repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied
with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and
convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on
sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh
Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. wherein
while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that
if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court
just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen,
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other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by
approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the
ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Ors., where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that
the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a
reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have
exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed
manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of
cause for delay should not be allowed to override
substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors.
vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., that the merits of the
case cannot be considered while dealing with the application
for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, this Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has
to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the
statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as
it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in
which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting
liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it
stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
’12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
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limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.” The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands
attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been
held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very
decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of
the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was
no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the
court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever,
amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied)Page 22 of 25
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26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the
law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is
evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or
availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease
to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary
in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter,
it does not mean that others are also entitled to the
same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause
shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on
the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions
have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision.”
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14. In a very recent judgment in the case of State Of
Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls
High School, reported in 2026 INSC 148, the Supreme Court
referred to the judgment of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra)
and reiterated the principle of law on condonation of inordinate
delay in presenting the appeal, observed in para 16 and 21 held
as under:-
“16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were
consistently followed by this Court until adoption of a
different and seemingly strict approach while dealing with
applications for condonation of delay during the last decade
and a half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, where a
delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition
was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India is
another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court)
where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While
upholding the decision of the relevant high court under
challenge refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner,
a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v.
Collector(LA) very recently reiterated that the law of
limitation is founded on public policy, the object is that a
legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains
pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing
from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered at the stage of considering the application for
condonation of delay.
xxx xxx xxx
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of
right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not
to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a
“State”, we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to
be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of discretion has
been set up.”
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15. It is important to observe that while condoning the
delay, be it long or short, a discretion ought to have been drawn
between the explanation and an excuse, that has proffered as
sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. In the present case,
the applicants have pleaded the excuse and not the explanation.
The excuse cannot be a reason to condone the delay and even if
the lenient view is taken, the excuse should not turn into
explanation and in absence of the explanation, much less
sufficient explanation, even the latitated view would not permit
the Court to exercise the discretion. The lame excuse cannot be
placed as ‘sufficient cause’.
16. In view of the aforesaid, these applications are bereft
of merit and deserve to be dismissed and accordingly, all these
applications are dismissed. Registry to maintain the copy of the
judgment in each of the matters.
17. The registration of the respective First Appeals is
refused.
18. All connected Civil Applications do not survive.
Sd/-
(J.C. DOSHI, J.)
Raj
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