Chattisgarh High Court
Pramod Nahak vs South Eastern Coal Field Limited on 1 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:14965
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 3052 of 2021
ï‚· Pramod Nahak S/o Late Prafull Nahak Aged About 26 Years R/o
Ward No. 15, West Negal Gate, Near Kaliya Provision Store,
Charcha Colliery Post Office Charcha Colliery District Koria
Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1. South Eastern Coal Field Limited Through Its Chairman Cum
Managing Director, South Eastern Coal Field Limited,
Headquarters, Seepat Road Bilaspur District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
2. General Manager South Eastern Coal Field Limited Headquarters,
Seepat Road Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District :
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
3. Director Personnel, South Eastern Coal Field Limited,
Headquarters, Seepat Road Bilaspur District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
4. General Manager South Eastern Coal Field Limited, Chirmiri Area
District Koria Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur),
Chhattisgarh
5. Area Manager (Personnel) South Eastern Coal Field Limited,
Chirmiri Area, District Koria Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya
(Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
6. Sub Area Manager South Eastern Coal Field Limited, Sub Area
Bartunga Colliery, Chirmiri Area, District Koria Chhattisgarh.,
District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
7. Assistant Manager (Hr /p) South Eastern Coal Field Limited,
Underground Sub Area, Chirmiri, Area, Chirmiri, District Koria
Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
2
(Cause Title is taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Govind Dewangan, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board
1.4.2026
1. By way of this petition, petitioner has sought following reliefs:-
10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to call for the entire records in relates
to the case of the petitioner from the
possession of respondents for its kind perusal.
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to set aside the impugned order dated
25.3.2018 (Annexure P/1) issued by the
respondent No. 7 and further be pleased to
direct the respondents to reconsider the name
of the petitioner for grant of compassionate, in
the interest of justice.
10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to grant any other relief/ reliefs in
favour of the petitioners, which the Hon’ble
Court deemed fit and just in the facts and
circumstances of the case, including awarding
of the costs to the petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner’s father,
namely, Prafull Nahak who was working on the post of General
Mazdoor, Category-I under the respondents died in harness on
8.11.1999 and petitioner moved the application for grant of
dependent employment on 23.12.2016 which was rejected by
respondent No. 7 vide order dated 25.3.2018 on the ground that
application was moved after period of 17 years. He further submits
3
that at the time of death of petitioner’s father, petitioner was aged
5 years 7 months and 3 days and he moved application for grant
of dependent employment immediately after attaining majority. He
contends that authority concerned has rejected the application
moved by petitioner without assigning sufficient reasons. He prays
to set aside the order impugned.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
submits that application was moved by petitioner after 17 years.
He further submits that at the time of death of petitioner’s father,
petitioner had not attained the age of 12 years, therefore his name
was not kept in live roster and that was the reason, his application
was rejected. He contends that this petition has been filed in the
year 2021 whereas petitioner’s father died in year 1999, therefore
this petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and
latches.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
5. Petitioner’s father who was working under respondents died in
harness on 8.11.1999 and on the date of demise, petitioner was
aged 5 years 7 months and 3 days, therefore his name was not
kept in live roster and that was the reason, application moved by
petitioner was rejected. Be that as it may, application was moved
by petitioner for grant of dependent employment after 16 years i.e.
on 23.12.2016 and this petition has been filed in year 2021.
4
6. In the matter of State of Maharastra and another Vs. Ms.
Madhuri Maruti Vidhate1, Hon’ble Supreme Court held at
paragraph Nos. 7 & 8 as under :
“7.Thus, as per the law laid down by this
Court in the aforesaid decisions,
compassionate appointment is an exception
to the general rule of appointment in the
public services and is in favour of the
dependents of a deceased dying in harness
and leaving his family in penury and without
any means of livelihood, and in such cases,
out of pure humanitarian consideration taking
into consideration the fact that unless some
source of livelihood is provided, the family
would not be able to make both ends meet, a
provision is made in the rules to provide
gainful employment to one of the dependents
of the deceased who may be eligible for such
employment. The whole object of granting
compassionate employment is, thus, to
enable the family to tide over the sudden
crisis. The object is not to give such family a
post much less a post held by the deceased.
7.1. Applying the law laid down by
this Court in the aforesaid decisions
to the facts of the case on hand, to
appoint the respondent now on
compassionate ground shall be
contrary to the object and purpose of
appointment on compassionate
ground. The respondent cannot be
said to be dependent on the
deceased employee, i.e., her mother.
Even otherwise, she shall not be
entitled to appointment on
compassionate ground after a
number of years from the death of the
deceased employee.
8. Under the circumstances and in the facts
and circumstances of the case narrated
hereinabove, the Tribunal as well as the
High Court have committed serious error in
directing the appellants to appoint the
respondent on compassionate ground. The
1
. AIROnLine 2022 SC 471
5
judgment and order passed by the Tribunal
confirmed by the High Court directing the
appellants to consider the case of the
respondent for appointment on
compassionate ground after a number of
years is unsustainable.”
The very object of providing compassionate appointment
is to ameliorate the condition of the family at the relevant time
and same has been achieved as the family has already
survived for such a long period. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India has ruled that compassionate appointment is a
way to provide immediate financial assistance to families who
have experienced sudden hardship.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of J&K Versus
Sajad Ahmed Mir2, while dealing with the issue of delay, in para
11 held as under:-
“11. We may also observe that when the Division
Bench of the High Court was considering the case
of the applicant holding that he had sought
‘compassion’, the Bench ought to have
considered the larger issue as well and it is that
such an appointment is an exception to the
general rule. Normally, an employment in
Government or other public sectors should be
open to all eligible candidates who can come
forward to apply and compete with each other. It
is in consonance with Article 14 of the
Constitution. On the basis of competitive merits,
an appointment should be made to public office.
This general rule should not be departed except
where compelling circumstances demand, such
as, death of sole bread earner and likelihood of
the family suffering because of the setback. Once
it is proved that in spite of death of bread earner,
the family survived and substantial period is over,
there is no necessity to say ‘goodbye’ to normal
2
. (2006) 5 SCC 766
6rule of appointment and to show favour to one at
the cost of interests of several others ignoring the
mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing the issue of delay and
laches in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu 3 held as
under:-
’17. In the case at hand, though there has been
four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the
writ court chose not to address the same. It is the
duty of the court to scrutinize whether such
enormous delay is to be ignored without any
justification. That apart, in the present case, such
belated approach gains more significance as the
respondent employee being absolutely careless to
his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to
the responsibility had remain unauthorizedly
absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health.
We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not
foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it
brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others.
Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened
rights and may unnecessarily drag others into
litigation which in acceptable realm of probability,
may have been treated to have attained finality. A
court is not expected to give indulgence to such
indolent persons -who compete with
“Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”
. In our considered opinion, such delay does not
deserve any indulgence and on the said ground
alone the writ court should have thrown the
petition overboard at the very threshold.
9. Recently, the Apex Court in the matter of Rushibhai
Jagdishbhai Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation 4
held as under:-
3
. (2014) 4 SCC 108
4
. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 64
7‘9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that
matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be
statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though
some contrary opinions have been expressed (in
Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961
SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view
that the law of limitation rests on the foundations
of greater public interest for three reasons,
namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to
disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons
with good causes of action (who are able to
enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R.
Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28,
para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68
(2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto
position or character, creation of third party rights
over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and
need to ensure certitude in dealings, are
equitable public policy considerations why period
of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation
does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the
discretion vested with a constitutional court is
exercised with caution as delay and laches
principle is applied with the aim to secure the
quiet of the community, suppress fraud and
perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent
oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs.
State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7
SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and
judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and
laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases
where the persons suffer from adeptness, or
incapacity to approach the courts for relief.
However, other decisions, while accepting the
rules of limitation as well as delay and laches,
have observed that such rules are not meant to
destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger
public interest and are founded on public policy.
There must be a lifespan during which a person
must approach the court for their remedy.
Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty
as to the rights and obligations of the parties.
(See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy,
(1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of
delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons
Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial
8
Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred
to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in
The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John
Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words:
” Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy,
either because the party has, by his conduct,
done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this
conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case,if
an argument against relief, which otherwise
would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important
in such cases, are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval,
which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bichitrananda
Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others5, under relevant para 21
held as under:-
“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant
passagesfrom certain decisions of this Court:
(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 648:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service
related claim will be rejected on the ground of
delay and laches (where remedy is sought by
filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy
is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions
to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing
wrong. Where a service related claim is based
5
. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 883
9on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy,
with reference to the date on which the
continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing source
of injury. But there is an exception to the
exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related
to or affected several others also, and if the
reopening of the issue would affect the settled
rights of third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue relates to
payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief
may be granted in spite of delay as it does not
affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim
involved issues relating to seniority or
promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would
render the claim stale and doctrine of
laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a
past period is concerned, the principles relating
to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally
to a period of three years prior to the date of
filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis
supplied)
(B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2
SCC 25
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus
to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However,
there may be a case where acquiescence is
involved, but not laches. These principles are
common law principles, and perhaps one could
identify that these principles find place in
various statutes which restrict the period of
limitation and create non consideration of
condonation in certain circumstances. They are
bound to be applied by way of practice
requiring prudence of the court than of a strict
application of law. The underlying principle
10
governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an
important issue to be taken note of by the
court.
Laches
21. The word “laches” is derived from the
French language meaning “remissness and
slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay
or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to
do an act which law requires while asserting a
right, and therefore, must stand in the way of
the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the nature of acts done
during the interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would
be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a
remedy on a party who knocks its doors when
his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right.
By his conduct, he has put the other party in a
particular position, and therefore, it would be
unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before
the court. Thus, a man responsible for his
conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed
to avail a remedy.
23. A defence of laches can only be allowed
when there is no statutory bar. The question as
to whether there exists a clear case of laches
on the part of a person seeking a remedy is
one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The
said principle may not have any application
when the existence of fraud is pleaded and
proved by the other side. To determine the
difference between the concept of laches and
acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere
laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to
all the defences that are available to a party.
Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the
various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an
issue concerned alone would be amenable to
acquiescence.
Acquiescence
11
24. We have already discussed the relationship
between acquiescence on the one hand and
delay and laches on the other.
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or
passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant
consent to an act. In other words, such an
action would qualify a passive assent. Thus,
when acquiescence takes place, it
presupposes knowledge against a particular
act. From the knowledge comes passive
acceptance, therefore instead of taking any
action against any alleged refusal to perform
the original contract, despite adequate
knowledge of its terms, and instead being
allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it
and thereafter proceeding further,
acquiescence does take place. As a
consequence, it reintroduces a new implied
agreement between the parties. Once such a
situation arises, it is not open to the party that
acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance
of the original terms. Hence, what is essential,
is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with
the distinction involving a mere acquiescence.
When acquiescence is followed by delay, it
may become laches. Here again, we are
inclined to hold that the concept of
acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case
basis.” (emphasis supplied)
(C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J
James, (2022) 2 SCC 301:
“36. What is a reasonable time is not to
be put in a straitjacket formula or
judicially codified in the form of days, etc.
as it depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. A right not
exercised for a long time is nonexistent.
Doctrine of delay and laches as well as
acquiescence are applied to non-suit the
litigants who approach the
court/appellate authorities belatedly
without any justifiable explanation for
bringing action after unreasonable delay.
In the present case, challenge to the
order of dismissal from service by way of
appeal was after four years and five
months, which is certainly highly belated
and beyond justifiable time. Without
12satisfactory explanation justifying the
delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal
was preferred within a reasonable time.
Pertinently, the challenge was primarily
on the ground that the respondent was
not allowed to be represented by a
representative of his choice. The
respondent knew that even if he were to
succeed on this ground, as has
happened in the writ proceedings, fresh
inquiry would not be prohibited as finality
is not attached unless there is a legal or
statutory bar, an aspect which has been
also noticed in the impugned judgment.
This is highlighted to show the prejudice
caused to the appellants by the delayed
challenge. We would, subsequently,
examine the question of acquiescence
and its judicial effect in the context of the
present case.
Xxx
38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram
Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] and
State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v.
Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126] this Court
observed that if the statutory authority has not
performed its duty within a reasonable time, it
cannot justify the same by taking the plea that
the person who has been deprived of his rights
has not approached the appropriate forum for
relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any
orders and thereby fails to comply with the
statutory mandate within reasonable time, they
normally should not be permitted to take the
defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such
cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action,
which in some cases as elucidated in Union of
India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem
Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S)
765] may be continuing cause of action.The
State being a virtuous litigant should meet the
genuine claims and not deny them for want of
action on their part. However, this general
principle would not apply when, on
consideration of the facts, the court concludes
that the respondent had abandoned his rights,
which may be either express or implied from
his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional
13act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6
of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v.
State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979
SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of
acquiescence to the precept of delay and
laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v.Jaswant
Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006)
11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after
referring to several judgments, has accepted
the following elucidation in Halsbury’s Laws of
England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam
v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007)
1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras
1213)
“12. The statement of law has also been
summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England,
Para 911,p. 395 as follows:
In determining whether there has been such
delay as to amount to laches, the chief points
to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part;and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on
the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean
standing by while the violation of a right is in
progress,but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become
aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a
remedy where, by his conduct, he has done
that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his
conduct and neglect, though not waiving the
remedy, he has put the other party in a position
in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’
13. In view of the statement of law as
summarised above, the respondents are guilty
since the respondents have acquiesced in
accepting the retirement and did not challenge
the same in time. If they would have been
vigilant enough, they could have filed writ
petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore,
whenever it appears that the claimants lost
time or whiled it away and did not rise to the
14
occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then
in such cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly,
it has also to be taken into consideration the
question of acquiescence or waiver on the part
of the incumbent whether other parties are
going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In
the present case, if the respondents would
have challenged their retirement being violative
of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam
could have taken appropriate steps to raise
funds so as to meet the liability but by not
asserting their rights the respondents have
allowed time to pass and after a lapse of
couple of years, they have filed writ petitions
claiming the benefit for two years. That will
definitely require the Nigam to raise funds
which is going to have serious financial
repercussions on the financial management of
the Nigam. Why should the court come to the
rescue of such persons when they themselves
are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?”
39. Before proceeding further, it is important to
clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and
“delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is
an equitable doctrine which applies when a
party having a right stands by and sees
another dealing in a manner inconsistent with
that right, while the act is in progress and after
violation is completed, which conduct reflects
his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards
complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt.,
(2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149.
Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v.
Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 :
AIR 1925 Cal 1107] In literal sense, the term
acquiescence means silent assent, tacit
consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See
Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC
OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584] which
denotes conduct that is evidence of an
intention of a party to abandon an equitable
right and also to denote conduct from which
another party will be justified in inferring such
an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari,
1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34]
Acquiescence can be either direct with full
knowledge and express approbation, or indirect
where a person having the right to set aside
15the action stands by and sees another dealing
in a manner inconsistent with that right and in
spite of the infringement takes no action
mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N.
Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of
Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn.,
2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if
lapse of time is of no importance or
consequence.
40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible.
However, both limitation and laches destroy the
remedy but not the right. Laches like
acquiescence is based upon equitable
considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence
imports even simple passivity. On the other
hand, acquiescence implies active assent and
is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a
form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from
complaining of the violation of the right. Even
indirect acquiescence implies almost active
consent, which is not to be inferred by mere
silence or inaction which is involved in laches.
Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct
from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the
right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor
Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 :
(1992) 194 ITR 584] Given the aforesaid legal
position, inactive acquiescence on the part of
the respondent can be inferred till the filing of
the appeal, and not for the period post filing of
the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence
being in the nature of estoppel bars the
respondent from claiming violation of the right
of fair representation.”
11. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous
delay is to be ignored without any justification. Remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of
justice. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent
persons, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the
said ground alone this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss this
petition at the very threshold. The doctrine of delay and laches, or
16
for that matter statutes of limitation are considered to be statutes
of repose and statutes of peace. There must be a lifespan during
which a person must approach the court for their remedy.
Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights
and obligations of the parties.
12. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and the delay caused by the petitioner in
approaching this Court, I am not inclined to interfere in the present
matter. Consequently, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No
order as to cost(s).
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
JUDGE
Ajinkya
Digitally signed
by AJINKYA
PANSARE
Date:
2026.04.02
16:50:14
+0530
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