Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
M/S. Uma Forging Works (P) Ltd vs The State Of West Bengal And Others on 31 March, 2026
Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
2026:CHC-AS:521-DB
Form No.J(2)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present : The Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
&
The Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
WPLRT No. 52 of 2026
with
WPLRT No. 53 of 2026
M/s. Uma Forging Works (P) Ltd.
-vs-
The State of West Bengal and others
For the writ petitioner : Mr. Supratim Dhar, Sr. Adv.,appell
Mr. Shouvik Naskar.
For the State
in WPLRT No. 52 of 2026 : Mr. Lalit Mohan Mahata, AGP.,
Mr. Rudranil De.
For the State
in WPLRT No. 53 of 2026 : Sk. Md. Galib, Sr. Govt. Adv.,
Mr. Tamal Taru Panda.
For the respondent no. 5 : Mr. Soumyadeb Sinha,
Mr. Hiranyak Gangopadhyay.
For the respondent no. 6 : Mr. Aditya Kanodia.
For the respondent no. 7 : Mr. Rudrajit Sarkar.
Heard on : March 31, 2026.
Judgment on : March 31, 2026.
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Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:
1. Affidavit-of-service filed in Court today be kept on record.
2. The present challenge has been preferred against an order
whereby the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal has allowed a challenge against an order passed by
the Appellate Authority confirming the order of the concerned
Block Land & Land Reforms Officer (BL & LRO) and directing
the BL & LRO to decide the mutation application filed by the
present respondent no. 5 in accordance with law.
3. The BL & LRO as well as the Appellate Authority had turned
down the application for mutation primarily on the premise of
pendency of a civil suit at the behest of the writ petitioner.
4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner
submits that in view of the pendency of the dispute between
the parties before the civil court with regard to the selfsame
property, it would not be proper if the mutation application is
decided by the Revenue Officer during such pendency.
5. In support of such proposition, learned counsel cites three
unreported coordinate Bench judgments of this Court,
respectively in the matters of WPLRT No. 300 of 2014,
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WPLRT No. 140 of 2014 (Akriti Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs.
Priyanath Saha and ors.) and WPLRT No. 356 of 2014 (Sri
Chandranath Khan Vs. The State of West Bengal and Ors.) as
well as an order of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in SLP (C)
Diary No. 68933 of 2025 [Lipika Dutta & Ors. Vs. State of West
Bengal & Ors.].
6. Learned senior counsel next contends that in terms of the
order of status quo granted by the civil court, the parties are to
maintain status quo with regard to the nature, character and
possession of the suit property. It is submitted that in the event
mutation is effected in the teeth of such order; the same will be
in gross contravention of the said order.
7. Learned senior counsel cites Rule 59 of the West Bengal Land
and Land Reforms Manual, 1991 (in short “the 1991 Manual”)
to argue that the process of mutation requires an enquiry to
verify physical possession of the applicant, examination of the
registered transfer deed and other modes of collection of
evidence in respect of matters which are the subject matter in
the civil suit itself.
8. Thus, it is argued that since the scope of such enquiry
overlaps with the examination before the civil court, the
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Appellate Authority as well as the BL & LRO were justified in
staying their hands insofar as the mutation case is concerned,
in view of the pendency of the civil litigation.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 5, who is
defendant no. 1 in the suit filed by the writ petitioner (bearing
Title Suit No. 178 of 2014), argues that there has been
suppression of material facts before this Court. It is contended
that in the status quo order dated March 15, 2023 itself, it was
recorded by the civil court that the defendant no. 1-respondent
no. 5 is now in physical possession of the suit property as well
as the owner of the same. Thus, it is argued that the mutation,
if granted in the name of respondent no. 5, shall not be
contrary to the order of status quo passed by the civil court.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 6 hands
over a copy of an order dated March 15, 2023 whereby the
civil court, in the suit filed by the present petitioner, had
observed that it cannot be said that by trying to mutate his
name, the defendant no. 1-present respondent no. 5 is
violating the order of status quo, which necessitates the
interference of the said court under Section 94( c) of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
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11. Thus, in the perception of the civil court as well, the
mutation in respect of the subject property would not amount
to contravention of the civil court‟s order.
12. It is further argued that the decisions cited by the writ
petitioner did not lay down any proposition of law as such, but
such orders were passed in the circumstances of each case.
13. Even otherwise, it is submitted that the scope of
adjudication in the civil suit is different and distinct from that of
an enquiry for the purpose of mutation under the West Bengal
Land Reforms Act, 1955 (the Act of 1955).
14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 relies on an
unreported judgment of this Court in WPLRT No. 206 of 2025
(Sohel Ahammed Vs. The State of West Bengal and others)
where it was held by this Court that it is well-settled that an
order of injunction binds only the parties and not any Tribunal
or forum, and, in any event, an adjudication by the Tribunal
shall only affect the legal nature of the possession of the
parties and not the nature, character and possession of the
suit property in its corporeal sense; hence, such adjudication
shall not be violative of the status quo order passed by the civil
court in any event.
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15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no. 7 herein
argues, by placing reliance on the existing records of rights as
they now stand, extracts of which are annexed to the writ
petitions, that the subject property is now recorded in the name
of the erstwhile owners, that is, the respondent no. 6 and
respondent no. 7 respectively in the two writ petitions.
16. As such, even if mutation takes place in the name of the
respondent no. 5 herein, who is the subsequent purchaser
from the said erstwhile owners, there would be no affectation
of the writ petitioner‟s right in any manner whatsoever.
17. Even otherwise, learned counsel cites Jitendra Singh Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported at 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 802, where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated
the proposition that the mutation of property in revenue
records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the property,
nor has it any presumptive value on title and it is only for the
purpose of collecting land revenue.
18. Insofar as the title of the property is concerned, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that it can only be decided by a
competent civil court.
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19. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners argues
in reply that in the affidavit-in-opposition filed before the
Tribunal to the Original Application which is the genesis of the
present challenge, the respondent no. 6 had admitted that in
view of the pendency of the civil litigations, the Revenue
Officer should not proceed with the mutation proceedings.
20. However, to this, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6
respondents that such affidavit was filed prior to a settlement
between the respondent no. 6 and respondent no. 7 in the two
writ petitions as well as the other erstwhile owners with the
respondent no. 5, the purchaser of the subject property from
the said owners.
21. Thereafter, a suit initially filed by the erstwhile owners
challenging the purchase deed of the respondent no.
5/subsequent purchaser was withdrawn and the matter was
settled between the parties.
22. As such, it is submitted that the stand taken in the affidavit-
in-opposition filed prior to the said settlement cannot be taken
into consideration to reflect the current stand of the erstwhile
owners.
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23. Upon considering the arguments of the parties, it transpires
that the cardinal issue involved is two-fold – first, as to whether
it would be proper for the Revenue Officer to proceed with the
mutation proceeding in terms of the impugned judgment of the
Tribunal during pendency of the civil suit and secondly, as to
whether, in the teeth of the status quo order passed by the civil
court, such further proceeding with the mutation case should
be deemed to stand debarred.
24. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, with deepest respect,
in the judgments of coordinate Benches of this Court cited by
the writ petitioner, no general proposition of law was laid down
as such.
25. The observation in a judgment is a binding precedent only
when it forms a part of the ratio. To comprise the ratio of a
decision, an issue has to be raised, considered and decided
on merits.
26. However, in WPLRT No. 300 of 2014, it was merely
recorded by the coordinate Bench that by the order impugned
therein, the Tribunal had disposed of the original application
and directed the BL & LRO to dispose of the application for
correction of revenue settlement records of rights filed by the
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private respondents and that the court was informed that some
of the private respondents had instituted a title suit, which was
pending, where ad interim injunction was refused. The
coordinate Bench further observed that the court is
empowered to pass a decree of declaration of title and
therefore the decree of the civil court, particularly when in such
suit the State is a party, is relevant for correction of the
settlement record of rights and accordingly restrained the BL &
LRO from considering the application for correction of
settlement recordd of rights filed by the private respondents till
disposal of the suit pending before the trial court.
27. However, it is not clear from the said judgment as to what
was the exact scope of the suit and the reliefs claimed therein.
The coordinate Bench proceeded on the premise that the
State was a party in the suit and as such, it would not be
appropriate, before the civil court decided the rights of the
parties, for the BL & LRO to proceed with the correction of
revenue settlement records.
28. In Akriti Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the coordinate Bench,
without any reference to the scope of the factual matrix
therein, merely observed that having regard to the fact that
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civil suits are pending between the private respondents and
the writ petitioners concerning their respective claims for title
over the suit property, the BL & LRO cannot correct the record
of rights in the manner as it was prayed for by the private
respondents as the dispute regarding title between the parties
cannot be decided by the BL & LRO.
29. Sri Chandranath Khan (supra), the Division Bench,
similarly, expressed its opinion that justice would be sub-
served if the record of rights was corrected immediately after
disposal of the suit generally.
30. In Lipika Dutta (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
observed that the issue brought before the High Court was
only the refusal to grant interim relief by the Tribunal, upon
consideration of the appeal filed by the respondent no. 6
therein and it appeared that the High Court was not apprised
of the fact that one Panchanan Mondal had sold 6 bighas 18
kathas of land pursuant to a decree passed in a preemption
suit filed by Panchanan Mondal.
31. In the facts of the case, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court went on
to hold that the WBLRTT is only seized of the appeal in
relation to mutation proceedings and it was the civil court
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which would ultimately decide the rights of the parties in
relation to the subject property and that the decision of the civil
court would be binding upon the revenue authorities
concerned insofar as the mutation entries are concerned.
32. Consequentially, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court allowed the
appeal directing the authorities concerned to maintain status
quo insofar as the existing mutation entries are concerned
without prejudice and await the decision of the civil court in the
pending suit of the year 2022.
33. It is notable that in none of the said judgments, the specific
scopes of the respective suits and/or the interplay between the
suit and the mutation proceedings was considered, nor were
the effect of the specific provisions of the 1955 Act taken into
account. In the absence of any such consideration, none of the
said judgments can be said to be a binding precedent on the
scope of adjudication of a civil suit versus that of a Revenue
Officer under Section 50 of the 1955 Act, read in the context of
Section 61 thereof.
34. A judgment is a binding precedent only in the factual
context of the same and the proposition of law laid down
directly, and not what can be inferred therefrom. The general
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discussions in the cited judgments, without particular reference
to the respective scopes of the suits and the factual matrices
thereof, and without any issue being raised or decided on the
effect of the relevant provisions of the 1955 Act, cannot, with
respect, be construed as binding precedents in the present
context and in the facts of the instant lis.
35. Section 50 of the 1955 Act empowers the prescribed
authority to maintain up-to-date in the prescribed manner the
village records of rights by incorporating therein changes on
account of mutation of names as a result of transfer or
inheritance etc.
36. Thus, the scope of enquiry by the prescribed authority
under Section 50 is in the nature of an administrative process,
limited to an enquiry as to the actual possession and the
transfer deeds of the parties, which is also borne out by Rule
59 of the 1991 Manual, relied on by the writ petitioner. It is to
be noted that such exercise is merely procedural and
ministerial in nature and does not have any element of judicial
or quasi-judicial adjudication, contrary to the scope of a civil
suit.
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37. In any event, the recordings in the records of rights are
always subject to a decree passed by a civil court, which
conclusively determines the rights of the parties, which has
also been recognized in the judgment of the Tribunal
impugned before us.
38. However, the question here is whether the Revenue Officer
or the prescribed authority should stay its hands insofar as
mutation is concerned, merely because of pendency of a civil
suit.
39. Section 61 of the 1955 Act specifically debars the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court, preceded by a non-obstante
clause, from determining any question relating to any land or
connected with any matter which is required to be or which has
been enquired into or decided by any Revenue Officer or
prescribed authority under the provisions of the said Act. The
non-obstante clause overrides any other law for the time being
in force or any decree, judgment, decision or award of any
court, Tribunal or authority.
40. Thus, the language of Section 61 is couched in the widest
possible amplitude.
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41. Hence, it is evident from the provisions of the 1955 Act that
the scope of enquiry and adjudication falling within the domain
of the authorities prescribed under the said Act are completely
different in scope from the adjudication of title in a civil suit.
Despite the decree of a civil court being conclusive in nature
and binding between the parties, per se the pendency of a civil
suit before a competent civil court cannot operate as a bar to a
proceeding falling within the exclusive domain of the
authorities under the 1955 Act. A conjoint reading of Sections
50 and 61 of the 1955 Act unerringly indicates that an enquiry
for the purpose of mutation and the adjudication of title in a
civil suit operate in different spheres.
42. Also, in Jitendra Singh (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
categorically reiterated the well-settled principle of law that
mutation of property in revenue records neither creates nor
extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive
value on title and such entries are relevant only for the
purpose of collecting land revenue. It was further observed
that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only
be decided by a competent civil court. Thus, there is no
overlap of jurisdiction of the authorities under the 1955 Act in a
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mutation proceeding and that of a civil court in a regular civil
suit.
43. Thus, mere pendency of civil suits cannot per se be
considered to be a bar to the continuance of a mutation
proceeding.
44. Coming to the next issue, a question arises as to whether
the status quo order passed by the civil court in the present
case would operate as a bar to mutation of the name of
respondent no. 5 in respect of the subject property.
45. In Sohail Ahmed (supra), it was considered by the Court
that an order of injunction binds only the parties and not any
Tribunal or forum and, in any event, an adjudication by the
Tribunal only affects the legal nature of the possession of the
parties and not the nature, character and possession of the
suit property in its corporeal sense.
46. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for respondent no.
7, it is evident from the extracts of the records of rights
annexed to the writ petitions by the writ petitioner itself that the
records, at present, stand in the name of the erstwhile owners,
who have transferred the property in favour of respondent no.
5.
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47. The erstwhile owners support the stand of respondent no. 5
and have withdrawn the suit challenging the sale deed in
favour of the latter and as such there cannot be any affectation
of the rights of the plaintiff / writ petitioner in any manner
whatsoever if the names in the records of rights are altered
from that of the erstwhile owners to the current purchaser,
being the respondent no. 5.
48. It might have been otherwise, though, if the alteration was
sought from the name of the present petitioner to that of
respondent no. 5. However, it being not so, the alteration does
not have any material bearing on the rights of the plaintiff/writ
petitioner as claimed in the suit in any event.
49. Secondly, the status quo order was passed in the suit in
respect of the nature, character and possession of the suit
property.
50. Insofar as the nature and character of the suit property, in
its corporeal sense, is concerned, as held in Sohel Ahammed
(supra), there would not be any material change in the event
mutation is effected in the name of a particular person. It
would only be relevant for the purpose of revenue collection,
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and not create, extinguish or confer any title, as reiterated in
Jitendra Singh (supra) by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
51. The term „possession‟, as normally used in a status quo or
injunction order passed by the civil court, pertains specifically
to the physical possession of the property.
52. Even in the status quo order dated July 24, 2024, relied on
so heavily by the writ petitioner, it was recorded that the
plaintiff/petitioner is merely in constructive possession of the
suit property whereas the physical possession of the suit
property lies with defendant no. 1 / respondent no. 5. Hence,
mutation of the property in the name of respondent no. 5 would
merely recognize such possession and not create any
alteration in the state of affairs.
53. That apart, the scope of the suit filed by the writ petitioner
cannot also be overlooked. The primary relief sought by the
writ petitioner is a declaration that it is an irrevocable licensee
in respect of the suit property. The other principal relief sought
is a decree for declaration that the plaintiff/company is the
absolute owner of the entire factory shed together with plant
and machinery installed therein, lying and situate in the suit
property.
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54. Thus, the plaintiff / writ petitioner, in its own suit,
categorically distinguishes between the rights asserted by it in
respect of the subject land and the factory shed along with the
plant and machinery installed thereon.
55. Ownership of the plaintiff has been claimed, even as per the
plaintiff / writ petitioner‟s own version, only in respect of the
factory shed and the plant and machinery installed thereupon
whereas with regard to the subject land, the plaintiff merely
claims right as an irrevocable licensee and not as the owner.
56. Thus, even if the suit were to be decreed in favour of the
plaintiff, the best relief which could be obtained by the plaintiff
would be a declaration of its right to irrevocable licence,
pertaining to possession of the suit property, and not any
ownership right in respect of the same.
57. Hence, the ownership of the subject property of respondent
no. 5 stands undisputed, be it from the perception of the
erstwhile owners or the plaintiff /petitioner itself.
58. Accordingly, in the facts of the present case, even the final
outcome of the suit would not have a material bearing in
respect of the ownership of the subject property, which is an
important determinant insofar as mutation is concerned.
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59. Secondly, vide order dated March 15, 2023, the learned
Trial Judge, while interpreting its previous status quo order,
categorically observed that it could not be said that by praying
to mutate his name, defendant no. 1 is violating the order of
status quo.
60. It may be noted that the nature of the status quo order
passed at that juncture was similar to the present status quo,
granted subsequently.
61. The civil court clearly elaborated that it cannot pass any
order upon the mutating authority to restrain it from mutating
the name of any person and even if the right of a person upon
a property is established after the trial and eventually he gets a
decree of declaration that he is the true owner, the civil court
cannot direct the BL & LRO to correct any mutation entry
which is against the interest of such person. What the decree
holder can do is to make an application before the BL & LRO
intimating the fact of the decree passed in his favour and to
pray for necessary correction of the record of rights. The
process of mutation entry is governed by a specific statute,
that is, the 1955 Act, and the Revenue Officer is empowered
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by this Act to mutate the name of the person in the records of
rights.
62. In our view, such observation of the civil court was a perfect
exposition of the law on the subject and cannot be faulted.
63. Hence, even in the perception of the civil court itself, its
status quo order would not be flouted in the event mutation
was effected in respect of the subject property.
64. Hence, the second issue has also to be decided against the
writ petitioner, since the mere mutation in respect of the
property, if ultimately effected, would not tantamount to
violation of the status quo order passed by the civil court in any
manner whatsoever.
65. Another aspect of the matter cannot be overlooked
altogether. The learned Tribunal, by the impugned judgment,
has correctly not directed the Revenue Officer to mutate the
records in the name of the respondent no. 5 outright but has
merely remanded the matter to the concerned Bl & LRO,
Domjur, to reconsider the process of mutation application
strictly in accordance with law on the basis of the registered
deed of conveyance without being influenced by mere
pendency of the civil suit.
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66. In our view, in the facts of the present case, the said
direction was the only plausible and correct direction to be
passed in the circumstances of the case.
67. Neither the prescribed authority nor the Appellate Authority
took into consideration all the above facets of the matter, as
opposed to the Tribunal, which took into account all the
relevant aspects of the case as well as correctly interpreted
the law governing the lis.
68. Thus, we cannot find any fault with the impugned judgment
of the Tribunal.
69. Hence, WPLRT No. 52 of 2026 and WPLRT No. 53 of 2026
are dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned
common judgment dated February 19, 2026 passed by the
Third Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal in OA No. 3896 of 2023 and OA No. 3897 of 2023
(LRTT).
70. In view of the pendency of the writ petitions till now, the
period of eight weeks for the entire exercise to be completed
by the BL & LRO, as granted by the Tribunal, is extended for a
further period of ten weeks from date. Such further time is also
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granted in view of the prayer made by the learned AGP on the
ground of the upcoming Elections in the State.
71. It is made clear that the observations in this judgment have
been arrived at only for the purpose of present adjudication
and shall not affect the rights and contentions of the parties in
any manner either before the civil court or before any other
forum.
72. There will be no order as to costs.
73. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for,
be supplied to the parties at an early date.
I agree.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
