Delhi High Court
Rahul Pandey vs Badarpur Service Station on 30 March, 2026
Author: Sachin Datta
Bench: Sachin Datta
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment pronounced on: 30.03.2026
+ W.P.(C) 6739/2025, CM APPLs.30622/2025, 30623/2025
RAHUL PANDEY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinay Rathi, Advocate.
versus
BADARPUR SERVICE STATION .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Anil Kumar Hajelay and Mr.
Anant Kumar Hajelay, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing an
award dated 03.05.2024 rendered by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court –
IV, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi, in LIR No. 2306/2022, whereby the
petitioner’s claim for reinstatement and full back wages was rejected.
2. The factual background set out by the petitioner is that the petitioner
was employed as a Salesman with the respondent on 30.11.2006. Allegedly,
however, the respondent-management deliberately recorded a later date of
joining and issued ESIC Card No. 11-7205618 reflecting an incorrect date of
joining. It is submitted that despite repeated demands, the respondent failed
to provide statutory benefits such as appointment letter, attendance cards and
pay slips.
3. On 27.02.2020, while proceeding to his workplace, the petitioner met
with an accident and sustained grievous injuries. Upon recovery, when the
petitioner sought to resume duty, the respondent advised him to wait in view
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of the Covid-19 lockdown. After the lockdown restrictions were lifted, the
petitioner again approached the respondent on 25.04.2020 to resume duty.
However, the management continued to defer the petitioner’s rejoining and
ultimately, on 25.08.2021, orally refused to reinstate the petitioner in
service.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner served a demand notice dated 08.11.2021
upon the respondent which elicited no response. Consequently, the petitioner
approached the Conciliation Officer, but to no avail. The Labour
Commissioner thereafter referred the dispute to the Labour Court.
5. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner/ workman sought
reinstatement, full back wages and consequential benefits. The respondent,
on the other hand, contended that the petitioner had taken several breaks in
service, his last engagement was on 01.05.2017 and that the petitioner
voluntarily left employment on 25.02.2020. It was further submitted that
after a gap of nearly one and a half years, the petitioner re-approached the
management on 26.08.2021 but failed to satisfactorily explain his prolonged
absence. The respondent/ management contended that the petitioner/
workman had abandoned employment of his own volition.
6. In the above background, the Labour Court framed the points that
arose for consideration as under:
“8. Thereafter, vide order dated 02.05.2023, the following issues
were framed in view of pleadings of the parties and terms of
reference:
(i) In terms of reference.
“Whether the workman Sh. Rahul Pandey S/o Sh. Ram Badan
Pandey have been absenting from his duties on his own, and/or, if
not whether his services have been terminated illegally and/or,
unjustifiably by the Management and, if so, to what relief is he
entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect?”.
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(ii) Relief.”
7. The Labour Court examined the rival contentions of the parties in
considerable detail and rendered a categorical finding that the petitioner/
workman had voluntarily abandoned the services of the respondent/
management with effect from 25.02.2020. It was observed that the workman
had remained absent for a continuous period of approximately one and a half
years without furnishing any cogent or satisfactory explanation for such
prolonged absence. In light of the aforesaid, the Labour Court held that the
issue of illegal termination did not arise, as it was not a case of dismissal or
discharge by the management but rather one of voluntary abandonment of
service by the workman himself. In this regard, the relevant extracts of the
impugned award are as under:
“10. In order to prove its case, the claimant appeared as witness
and filed evidence by way of affidavit Ex. WW1/A wherein he
reiterated the contents of his statement of claim on solemn
affirmation. Besides this, he had also relied on following
documents in his evidence: –
(i) Ex.WW1/1 is the legal demand-notice dated 08.11.2021.
(ii) Ex.WW1/2 is the receipt of speed post vide which the legal
demand notice dated 08.11.2021 was sent to the management.
(iii) Ex.WW1/3 and Ex.WW1/4 are the copies of ESI cards issued
through the management.
(iv) Ex.WW1/4 is the copy of letter written by workman to the
management for the job of Helper.
(v) Ex.WW1/5 is the copy of MLC no.3179 of workman.
(vi) Ex.WW1/6 to Ex.WW1/8 are the copies of medical treatment
of workman.
11. Thereafter workman’s evidence was closed at his request.
12. The management has examined Sh. Kapil Sachdeva, Managing
Partner of management as MW-1 who has filed his evidence
affidavit Ex. MW1/A wherein he reiterated the contents of written
statement. Besides this, he had also relied on the documents which
are as under:-
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(i) Ex.MW1/1 is the copy of statement of claim filed before
Conciliation Officer.
(ii) Ex. MW1/2 is the copy of reply to the demand notice dated
08.11.2021.
(iii) Ex.MW1/3 is the postal receipt vide which above said reply was
sent.
(iv) Ex.MW1/4 is the copy of attendance register for the month of
February 2020 to May 2020.
(vi) Ex.MW1/5 is the copy of attendance· register for the month of
April2013 to June 2013.
(v) Ex.MW1/6 is the copy of attendance register for the month of
September 2016 to June 2017.
(vi) Ex.MW1/7 is the copy of wage register for the month of January
2020 to February 2020.
14. The first part of issue no.1 framed in the present case is whether
the workman had been absenting from his duties on his own’ and this
objection was taken by the management in its reply to the statement
of claim of the workman as the management has contended that the
workman had joined the services of the management lastly from
01.05.2017 and had left his employment voluntarily on 25.02.2020
and thereafter almost after a gap of one and half year, the workman
had again appeared before management on 26.08.2021 and had not
even given any explanation for his absence for such a long period to
the management and had instead issued demand notice two months
thereafter.
15. On the other hand, the workman has claimed that he has been in
the employment of the management since 30.11.2016 as Salesman at
monthly salary of Rs.15,500/- and was terminated vide verbal order
on 25.04.2020 by the management and that he had sent legal demand
notice dated 08.11.2021 to the management claiming his
reinstatement alongwith his back wages and legal entitlements.
16. It is relevant to point out that the workman in his rejoinder has
taken a different stand from his version in his statement of claim as
he had stated in rejoinder that on 27.02.2020, while going to the
management; he had met with an accident and was admitted in
hospital at Noida and was under medical treatment and that after
complete recovery, when he approached the management for joining
his duty, the management kept deferring his joining on the pretext of
Covid-19 and that management had finally refused to take him back
in the services. However, no such plea that he had met with an
accident on 27.02.2020 was taken by the workman in his statement of
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claim. Moreover, the rejonder of the workman is conspicuously silent
regarding the date of his alleged termination by the management.
17. In order to discharge its onus and prove its plea of absenteeism
of the workman from 25.02.2020, management had examined Sh.
Kapil Sachdeva, its managing partner as MW-1 who has stated on
oath in his evidence affidavit Ex.MW1/A that workman had worked
with the management from 01.09.2007 till 18.08.2009, thereafter
from 01.06.2013 till 08.10.2016 and finally from 01.05.2017 till
24.02.2020 and he had voluntary absented from duty from
25.02.2020 and in support of his oral testimony, MW-1 has also
relied upon attendance register of the management from February
2020 to May 2020 as Ex.MW1/4 as well as wages register of
management from January 2020 to February 2020 as Ex.MW1/7.
MW-1 Kapil Sachdeva had statedin his evidence affidavit
Ex.MW1/A that the workman had mentioned in his claim statement
filed before Conciliation Officer that his services were terminated
on 25.08.2021 by the management, which is contrary to the version
of the workman in his statement of claim filed in the present case,
wherein the workman had stated that he was terminated from
service by the management on 25.04.2020. MW1 in support of his
oral testimony on this point has relied on copy of claim statement
Ex.MW1/1 of the workman filed before Conciliation Officer.
20. The testimony of MW1 on point of absence of workman from
duty of management since 25.02.2020 has not only remained
unchallenged and uncontroverted, as no suggestion was put to him
on this point in his cross-examination but has even been admitted
by workman during his cross-examination as workman has
admitted that his last working day with management was
27.02.2020, which lends substantial credence to version of
management, that workman had lastly · worked with management
in February 2020 and not till 25.04.2020. The workman had further
admitted in his cross-examination, that after 25.02.2020, he had
visited the management only on 26.08.2021 and this admission of
workman lends credence to management’s claim and contradicts
previous statement of workman in cross-examination that he had
visited the management in 20-25March 2020 and in November
2020. Apparently, this ·admission of workman also runs
contradictory to his version in his evidence affidavit Ex.WW1/A that
after his accident of 27.02.2020, he had visited the management
only on 25.04.2020.
21. The workman has in his evidence affidavit Ex.WW1/A that he
had met with an accident on 27.02.2020, while going to office and
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could not attend duty and subsequently he had visited the
management for joining duty only on25.04.2020, when National
Lockdown due to Covid-19 was eased, but he was asked by
management to come later and finally management had terminated
his services on25.08.2021, by verbal orders. This version of the
workman is contrary to his version in his statement of claim,
wherein he had stated that services were terminated on 25.04.2020,
by verbal order. It is pertinent to mention here that the statement of
claim of the workman is silent regarding his alleged accident of
27.02.2020. Further, in the testimony of workman adduced by way
of his evidence affidavit Ex.WW1/A mentions the date of his
termination as25.08.2021 and thus testimony of workman is
contradictory his statement of claim, where date of termination is
mentioned as 25.04.2020 and thus renders the version of the
workman doubtful and unreliable on this aspect.
23. Besides, it is relevant to point out that even demand notice
dated 08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1 sent by workman to management was
in respect of his grievance of his illegal termination by management
on 25.08.2021 and it does not raise grievance of his illegal
termination by management on 25.042020 though, statement of
claim of workman in present case has been filed in respect of his
alleged illegal termination on 25.02.2020.
24. In this regard, it is relevant to note that it is settled principle of
Labour Law jurisprudence is that an industrial dispute comes into
existence only after a demand raised by the claimant/workman
regarding his grievances or illegal termination by way of service of
demand notice upon the management, is declined by the
management.
28. In the present case, evidently the· workman had sent legal
notice dated 08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1 to the management regarding
his grievance of illegal termination by management on 25.08.2021.
Evidently demand notice dated 08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1, was not in
respect of alleged illegal termination of workman on 25.04.2020.
Therefore, since the workman had never raised demand on
management regarding his illegal termination on 25.04.2020 by the
management, therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judicial
precedents it can be safely concluded that in absence of any
demand notice in this regard, there was no industrial dispute in
respect of alleged illegal termination of workman from 25.04.2020
and accordingly, the present statement of claim of workman is
liable to be dismissed, on this ground alone.
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29. Further, it is relevant to point out that the workman had stated
for the first time during his cross-examination that he had visited
the management for joining his duty on 20-25 March, 2020 and in
November 2020. However, this plea of the workman is not
substantiated from his deposition in his evidence affidavit
Ex.WWl/A nor from his pleadings and also stands negated by his
admission in later part of his cross-examination by Ld. AR for the
management, wherein the workman had admitted that after
25.02.2020, he had visited the management only on 26.08.2021.
Thus, in view of aforesaid admission of the workman during his
cross-examination, the management’s claim that workman had
remained absent from duty from 25.02.2020 till 26.08.2021 also
stands proved; Thus management has been able to discharge its
onus of proving its claim of absenteeism of workman by standard of
preponderance of probabilities by establishing that workman had
remained absent from duty of management for about one year and
six months, from 25.02.2020 till 26.08.2021.
30. Moreover, even during recording of testimony in Court, the
workman had not been able to give any satisfactory explanation for
such· long absence from duty from 25.02.2020 as well as his failure
to take necessary legal action against the management, immediately
after the management had allegedly refused to allow workman to
join duties.
32. As far as the question that the management had not conducted
internal inquiry against the workman for his alleged absenteeism or
abandonment is concerned, this Court is of the opinion that such
inquiry is only required when the management intends to inflict
some punishment upon the workman.
33. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to judgment of the Hon’ble
Delhi High Court in Diamond Toys Company (P.) Ltd. Vs. Toofani
Ram and Anr., W:P. (C) No. 4501/04, decided on 07.02.2007
wherein it was held that-
“6. It is commonly known that a person, who is working in
the industry keeps on trying for better jobs and better
opportunities. The moment he gets better job, he is free to
leave his previous employer. The industrial law does not
require him to pay any compensation to the employer
while leaving his job, as the industrial laws require an
employer to pay retrenchment compensation when
employer wants to terminate the workman. Thus, there are
no fetters on the workman on leaving· the job while thereSignature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6739/2025 Page 7 of 19
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are fetters on the employer in terminating the service of an
employee. If a workman leaves his job all of a sudden and
stops attending the workplace of the employer, Industrial
Dispute Act does not put any obligation on the employer
to call back the workman and request him to come and
join his duties. Such a request can be made by the
employer only when employer considers that a useful
workman should not leave job or where a workman is
governed by certain rules and regulations under State
employment and the employer is supposed to hold an
enquiry under the service rule before termination of
service of an employee. Where the workman is tree to
leave and join another employer without even a notice and
without obtaining a no objection from his employer, the
employer cannot be compelled to call such a workman for
joining the duties or to conduct an enquiry into the
absence of the workman and then terminate his services.
Leaving the services of an employer by the workman is a
valid mode of his abandonment and there is no illegality
attached to a workman leaving the services of his previous
employer and joining another employer. If the employer
does not consider the abandonment of service or leaving
the service by a workman as a misconduct, the law cannot
force the employer to consider such abandonment as a
misconduct and hold an enquiry. Misconduct of an
employee is the one which an employer considers as the
misconduct. An enquiry is required to be held only where
an employer intends to impose punishment on the
employee for an alleged misconduct. if an employer does
not intend to impose any punishment on the employee and
considers that if the employee has left his service, let it be
so, the law cannot compel the employer to hold an enquiry
and punish an employee for the misconduct.
7. I consider that it was not necessary for the employer to
hold an enquiry into the abandonment of the service by the
respondent. It was for the respondent to prove’ that his.
services were terminated for some reasons by the
employer or without any reason by the employer. The
respondent had taken. a stand which was fow1d to be
false. Under these circumstances, the Labour Court’s
conclusion that it was a case of retrenchment is perverse”.
34. The ratio of the judgment is squarely applicable to the facts and
circumstances of this case and therefore, in light of aforesaid
judicial precedent, the fact that management had not conducted any
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inquiry regarding absenteeism or abandonment of job by workman,
shall not render its action as illegality.
35. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of “Tej Pal Vs.
Gopal Narain & Sons &Anr”, (2006) 132 DLT 311 decided on
28.08.2006 had observed that only if employer does not allow its
workman to join duty on his reporting, it can be said that there was
termination of workman and relevant extract of judgment are as
under-
”2(oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the
employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by
way of disciplinary action but does not include –
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
superannuation if the contract of employment between the
employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result
of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between
the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or
of such contract being terminated under the stipulation in
that behalf contained therein or)
(c) termination of the· service of a workman on the ground
of continued ill-health.”
8. A perusal of Section 2(oo) of the Act shows retrenchment
means the termination of services of a workman by
management. Where management does not terminate
services of the workman and writes a letter to the workman
to come and join duties, no inference can be drawn that
services of the workman were terminated. It was not the
case of the workman before the Labour Court that after
receiving letter of the management asking him to join
duties, he had gone to join duties and was not allowed to
join duties. The contention of the workman that employer
was supposed to initiate an inquiry into his absence before
terminating his services, is baseless because in this case
employer had not terminated services. An employer who
writes a letter to the workman to join duties since he was
absent, cannot be said to have terminated the services of
the petitioner. Only if the petitioner had not been allowed
to join duties on his reporting, it could have been said that
his services were terminated”.
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36. It is relevant to refer observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vijay S. Sathaye Vs. Indian Air Lines Ltd. & Ors., SLP (C) No.
24220-24221 of 2007 and the relevant paras of the judgment has
been reproduced as under –
“9. It is a settled law that an employee cannot be termed as
a slave, he has a right to abandon the service. any time
voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively,
not joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence
from duty in the beginning may be a misconduct but when
absence is for a very long period, it may amount to
voluntarily abandonment of service and in that eventuality,
the bonds of service come to an end automatically without
requiring any order to be passed by the employer.
38. In view of the aforesaid legal authorities, it is clear that in case of
abandonment or prolonged absenteeism where workman has left his
job, no inquiry was required to be conducted by management into ·his
absence without intimation, when management did not intend to
impose any punishment on him.
40. It is relevant to point out that there is an observation, in para 14
of the Vijay S. Sathaye Vs. Indian Air Lines Ltd. & Ors., SLP (C) No.
24220-24221 of 2007 to the effect that abandonment of service
cannot be termed as ”retrenchment’: The said observation has,
however, been returned, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by placing
reliance on judgment of State of Haryana v. Om Prakash, (1998) 8
sec 733 in which, the employer did nothing whatsoever, towards
disengaging the employee, who, of his own volition, never reported
for work and, thereafter, sought to raise an industrial dispute on the
ground of “retrenchment”. The Supreme Court, in order to return the
finding that it did, essentially relied on the opening words of Section
2( oo) of the ID Act, which contemplated “retrenchment” as an act
done by the employer. Where, therefore, the employer did nothing,
and the employee voluntarily never chose to report for work, the
Supreme Court held that the question of invoking Section 2(oo) did
not arise at all and held that where, however, the employer does the
positive act of terminating the workman from service, by striking the
name of the workman off its rolls or otherwise, it would tantamount
to “retrenchment”, unless and until one or the other of the
exceptions, statutory in Section 2(oo) of the ID Act, could be
legitimately pressed into service by the employer.
41. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judicial precedents in Vijay S.
Sathaye Vs. Indian Air Lines Ltd. & Ors. (Supra) and State ofSignature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6739/2025 Page 10 of 19
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Haryana Vs. Om Prakash (Supra) to the facts of the present case, it is
relevant to note that MW1 had stated during his cross-examination
that name of workman was not struck off from rolls of management,
during his absence from duty and this oral testimony of MWl is also
substantiated by documentary evidence, that is, attendance register
of management from January to May 2020 Ex.MWl/4 which clearly
shows name of workman, on muster roll of management, during the
period of his absence from duty of management. This implies there
was no positive act of striking off the name of workman from muster
roll of management to indicate his termination from service of the
management and thus, falsifies the claim of that he was terminated by
management. Also, in absence of any ‘positive act like striking off
name of workman from muster roll, on part of management to
terminate workman, it cannot be termed as “retrenchment” in the
light of the ratio of State of Haryana v. Om Prakash & Ant., (1998) 8
sec 733).
44. This Court has already observed hereinabove that the workman
had voluntarily left the services of the management w.e.f. 25.02.2020
and he had continued to remain absent for a period of one and half
year, without any satisfactory explanation, for such a long period of
absence. Therefore, consequent upon abovesaid observation, it is
abundantly clear that no question of illegal termination of workman
by the management arises at it was the workman himself who had
remained absent from duty for period of one and half years, without
any satisfactory justification. Accordingly, second part of the Issue
no.1 regarding illegal or unjustified termination of the workman by
management, is decided against the workman and in favour of the
management.
ISSUE No.2
Relief.
45.Consequent to decisions on both parts of Issue no.1, this Court
holds that the workman/claimant is not entitled to any relief.”
8. The impugned award categorically records that the testimony of
MW‑1 regarding the petitioner’s absence from work/ duty w.e.f. 25.02.2020
remained unchallenged and was even admitted by the workman/ petitioner
himself. The Court regarded this observation as affording substantial support
to the stand of the respondent/management and as diminishing the
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credibility of the petitioner’s claim of termination. In this regard, the Labour
Court observed as under:
“20. The testimony of MW1 on point of absence of workman from
duty of management since 25.02.2020 has not only remained
unchallenged and uncontroverted, as no suggestion was put to
him on this point in his cross-examination but has even been
admitted by workman during his cross-examination as workman
has admitted that his last working day with management was
27.02.2020, which lends substantial credence to version of
management, that workman had lastly · worked with management
in February 2020 and not till 25.04.2020. The workman had
further admitted in his cross-examination, that after 25.02.2020,
he had visited the management only on 26.08.2021 and this
admission of workman lends credence to management’s claim and
contradicts previous statement of workman in cross-examination
that he had visited the management in 20-25 March 2020 and in
November 2020. Apparently, this · admission of workman also
runs contradictory to his version in his evidence affidavit
Ex.WW1/A that after his accident of 27.02.2020, he had visited
the management only on 25.04.2020.”
9. The Labour Court further noted the contradictions in the petitioner’s
pleadings and evidence regarding the date of alleged termination. The award
also records that the demand notice dated 08.11.2021 referred only to
alleged termination on 25.08.2021 and did not raise any grievance regarding
alleged termination on 25.04.2020. The relevant portion of the award reads
as under:
“16.1t is relevant to point out that the workman in his rejoinder has
taken a different stand from his version in his statement of claim as
he had stated in rejoinder that on 27.02.2020, while going to the
management; he had met with an accident and was admitted in
hospital at Noida and was under medical treatment and that after
complete recovery, when he approached the management for joining
his duty, the management kept deferring his joining on the pretext of
Covid-19 and that management had finally refused to take him back
in the services. However, no such plea that he had met with an
accident on 27.02.2020 was taken by the workman in his statement of
claim. Moreover, the rejonder of the workman is conspicuously silent
regarding the date of his alleged termination by the management.
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21. The workman has in his evidence affidavit Ex.WW1/A that he had
met with an accident on 27.02.2020, while going to office and could
not attend duty and subsequently he had visited the management for
joining duty only on 25.04.2020, when National Lockdown due to
Covid-19 was eased, but he was asked by management to come later
and finally management had terminated his services on 25.08.2021,
by verbal orders. This version of the workman is contrary to his
version in his statement of claim, wherein he had stated that services
were terminated on 25.04.2020, by verbal order. It is pertinent to
mention here that the statement of claim of the workman is silent
regarding his alleged accident of 27.02.2020. Further, in the
testimony of workman adduced by way of his evidence affidavit
Ex.WW1/A mentions the date of his termination as 25.08.2021 and
thus testimony of workman is contradictory his statement of claim,
where date of termination is mentioned as 25.04.2020 and thus
renders the version of the workman doubtful and unreliable on this
aspect.
23. Besides, it is relevant to point out that even demand notice dated
08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1 sent by workman to management was in
respect of his grievance of his illegal termination by management on
25.08.2021 and it does not raise grievance of his illegal termination
by management on 25.042020 though, statement of claim of workman
in present case has been filed in respect of his alleged illegal
termination on 25.02.2020.
28. In the present case, evidently the· workman had sent legal notice
dated 08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1 to the management regarding his
grievance of illegal termination by management on 25.08.2021.
Evidently demand notice dated 08.11.2021 Ex.WW1/1, was not in
respect of alleged illegal termination of workman on 25.04.2020.
Therefore, since the workman had never raised demand on
management regarding his illegal termination on 25.04.2020 by the
management, therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judicial
precedents it can be safely concluded that in absence of any demand
notice in this regard, there was no industrial dispute in respect of
alleged illegal termination of workman from 25.04.2020 and
accordingly, the present statement of claim of workman is liable to
be dismissed, on this ground alone.”
10. The Labour Court further found that the petitioner failed to furnish
any satisfactory explanation for his prolonged absence of nearly one and a
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half years. The relevant extract of the impugned award is as under:
“29. Further, it is relevant to point out that the workman had stated for
the first time during his cross-examination that he had visited the
management for joining his duty on 20-25 March, 2020 and in November
2020. However, this plea of the workman is not substantiated from his
deposition in his evidence affidavit Ex.WWl/A nor from his pleadings and
also stands negated by his admission in later part of his cross-
examination by Ld. AR for the management, wherein the workman had
admitted that after 25.02.2020, he had visited the management only on
26.08.2021. Thus, in view of aforesaid admission of the workman during
his cross-examination, the management’s claim that workman had
remained absent from duty from 25.02.2020 till 26.08.2021 also stands
proved; Thus management has been able to discharge its onus of proving
its claim of absenteeism of workman by standard of preponderance of
probabilities by establishing that workman had remained absent from duty
of management for about one year and six months, from 25.02.2020 till
26.08.2021.
30. Moreover, even during recording of testimony in Court, the workman
had not been able to give any satisfactory explanation for such· long
absence from duty from 25.02.2020 as well as his failure to take necessary
legal action against the management, immediately after the management
had allegedly refused to allow workman to join duties.
44.This Court has already observed hereinabove that the workman had
voluntarily left the services of the management w.e.f. 25.02.2020 and he
had continued to remain absent for a period of one and half year, without
any satisfactory explanation, for such a long period of absence. Therefore,
consequent upon abovesaid observation, it is abundantly clear that no
question of illegal termination of workman by the management arises at it
was the workman himself who had remained absent from duty for period
of one and half years, without any satisfactory justification. Accordingly,
second part of the Issue no.l regarding illegal or unjustified termination of
the workman by management, is decided against the workman and in
favour of the management.”
11. A perusal of the impugned award leaves no manner of doubt that the
Labour Court, upon a detailed appraisal of the evidence adduced by both the
parties and a thorough examination of the relevant facts and circumstances,
held that the workman/petitioner had voluntarily left the services of the
respondent/management with effect from 25.02.2020 and had remained
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absent for a period of nearly one and a half years without furnishing any
satisfactory explanation. The findings of the Labour Court rest on a reasoned
evaluation of the record. This Court finds that no ground is made out to
warrant interference with the same.
12. The petitioner has essentially sought to re-agitate the same issue/s
which have already been dealt with by the impugned award. It is well settled
that in writ jurisdiction, this Court does not undertake re-appraisal of
evidence or interfere with factual findings unless they are perverse or
contrary to law. This Court finds no patent illegality in the impugned award
so as to justify interference therewith. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24, it has been held as under:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in
issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these
are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals
without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise
of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or
properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to
principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction
and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court.
This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In
regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and
material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence
which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of
fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error ofSignature Not Verified W.P.(C) 6739/2025 Page 15 of 19
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law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with
this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient
or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ
Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad
Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner
of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240]
and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an
error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be
corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an
error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face
of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law
recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious
mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in
ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly
founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can
be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned
conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant
statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court
in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the
record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law
may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and
the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there
can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is
an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a
character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent
on the face of the record……”
13. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. v. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4
SCC 270, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“14. While discussing the power of the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the
facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in
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Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4
SCC 447] , held as under : (SCC pp. 458-59, para 17)
“17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not
interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution. Reference may be made to the
observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand
Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [(1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975
SC 1297] where this Court observed that the High Court
could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the
legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High
Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by
examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for
the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then
was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows :
(SCC p. 864, para 7)
‘7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant
was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is,
therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of
the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did
the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under
Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the
District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this
Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [(1954) 1 SCC 51 :
AIR 1954 SC 215] (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the
“power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as
pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways
Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [AIR 1951 Cal 193] , to be
exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in
order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of
their authority and not for correcting mere errors”.
This statement of law was quoted with approval in the
subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath
Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [AIR 1958 SC 398] and it
was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on
behalf of the Court in that case : (AIR p. 413, para 30)“30. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with
orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater
than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to
quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake
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apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of
the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to
seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its
authority.”‘”
XXX XXX XXX
16. In Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers’
Union [(2000) 4 SCC 245 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 471] , this Court
considered a similar question with regard to the power of the
High Court under Article 226 against the findings recorded by
the Industrial Tribunal. Reversing the decision of the Single
Judge and restoring the fact-finding decision of the Tribunal,
this Court held : (SCC pp. 259-60, para 17)
“17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken
an exercise, impermissible for him in exercising writ
jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence and
drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact,
unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not exercising any
appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a tribunal,
presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact
recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the
purpose and which ordinarily should be considered to have
become final, cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of
having been based on materials or evidence not sufficient
or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those
findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some
material which are relevant for the purpose or even on the
ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably
and possibly be taken. The Division Bench was not only
justified but well merited in its criticism of the order of the
learned Single Judge and in ordering restoration of the
award of the Tribunal. On being taken through the findings
of the Industrial Tribunal as well as the order of the
learned Single Judge and the judgment of the Division
Bench, we are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had
overwhelming materials which constituted ample and
sufficient basis for recording its findings, as it did, and the
manner of consideration undertaken, the objectivity of
approach adopted and reasonableness of findings recorded
seem to be unexceptionable. The only course, therefore,
open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or
otherwise of the relevant criteria laid down by this Court,
before sustaining the claim of the canteen workmen, on the
facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority and
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not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence
and arriving at findings of one’s own, altogether giving a
complete go-by even to the facts specifically found by the
Tribunal below.”
14. Further, the Supreme Court in Krishnanand v. Director of
Consolidation, (2015) 1 SCC 553, held as under:
“12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the
findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the
conclusion that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did
so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It is a settled law that such a jurisdiction cannot be
exercised for reappreciating the evidence and arrival of findings of
facts unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not
have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse. In the present case,
though the High Court reversed the concurrent findings of the
authorities below and came to the opposite conclusion on matter of
facts, the High Court did not do so on the ground that the authorities
below acted in excess of their jurisdiction or without jurisdiction or
that the finding is vitiated by perversity.”
15. In the circumstances, this Court finds no merit in the present petition;
the same is, accordingly, dismissed. All pending applications also stand
disposed of.
SACHIN DATTA, J
MARCH 30, 2026/ss
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