Jharkhand High Court
Babulal Marandi vs The State Of Jharkhand on 18 March, 2026
Author: Anil Kumar Choudhary
Bench: Anil Kumar Choudhary
( 2026:JHHC:7755 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No.988 of 2024
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Babulal Marandi, aged about 62 years, Son of Late Chhotu Marandi,
at Present MLA of Raj Dhanwar (Giridih) and Leader of Bhartiya
Janta Party in Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha, Resident of Morabadi, P.O.-
Morabadi & P.S.-Barityatu & District-Ranchi.
... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Sonu Tirki, age not known, Son of Vishnu Tirki, Resident of
Village-Patratoli, P.O. & P.S.-Kanke & District-Ranchi.
... Opposite Parties
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate
: Ms. Akriti Shree, Advocate
: Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Manoj Kumar, GA-III
: Mr. Deepankar, AC to GA-III
: Mr. V.K. Vashistha, Spl.P.P.
For the OP 2 : Mr. Gaurav Abhishekh, Advocate
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PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
By the Court:- Heard the parties.
2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure with the prayer to quash and set aside the entire criminal
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proceeding in connection with Kanke P.S. Case No.210 of 2023 registered
for the offences punishable under Sections 500, 504 & 505(2) of the Indian
Penal Code against the petitioner.
3. The brief fact of the case is that the informant has submitted a
written report to the Officer-in-charge of Kanke Police Station alleging
therein that the petitioner being the leader of the BJP and the State
President of BJP has made a statement that “The entire Family of my Leader
are looters”. It is alleged that the said statement was made against the
leaders of the informant namely Sibu Soren and Hemant Soren.
4. On the basis of the written report submitted by the informant police
registered Kanke P.S. Case No.210 of 2023 and took up investigation of
the case.
5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
investigation of the case is still going on and charge sheet has not yet been
submitted.
6. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.
Khushboo vs. Kanniammal & Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 600 and
submits that in para-37 of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
has reiterated that in respect of the offence of defamation, Section 199
CrPC mandates that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence
only upon receiving a complaint by a person who is aggrieved and this
limitation on the power to take cognizance of defamation serves the
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rational purpose of discouraging the filing of frivolous complaints which
would otherwise clog the Magistrate’s Court.
7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that an FIR
that too by a person other than the person aggrieved is not maintainable
in respect of the offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal
Code. In this respect, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also
relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law &
Others reported in (2016) 7 SCC 221 and submits that in para-207 of
which the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in no uncertain manner
held that Section 199 of CrPC envisages filing of a complaint in court. In
case of criminal defamation neither can any FIR be filed nor can any
direction be issued under Section 156(3) of CrPC, hence, it is submitted
that FIR in respect of offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian
Penal Code is not maintainable.
8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Arnab
Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India & Others reported in (2020) 14 SCC
12 and submits that in para-31 of the said judgement, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India has reiterated that “there can be no second FIR”
where the information concerns the same cognizable offence alleged in
the first FIR for the same occurrence or incident which gives rise to one or
more cognizable offences.
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9. It is next submitted that in para-33 of that judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India has held that barring situations in which a
counter-case is filed, a fresh investigation or a second FIR on the basis of
the same or connected cognizable offence would constitute an “abuse of
the statutory power of investigation” and in para-36 of that judgment, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has relied upon its own judgment in the
case of Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 12 SCC 254 in
para-21 of which it was held that if there are two FIRs, the Court has to
examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the
test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate
to the same incident, in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to
the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction, if the
answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed.
10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Patricia
Mukhim vs. State of Meghalaya & Others reported in (2021) 15 SCC 35
and submits that in that case in para-12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India relied upon its own judgement in the case of Pravasi Bhalai
Sangathan vs. Union of India reported in (2014) 11 SCC 477, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India referred to a judgement of the Canadian
Supreme Court in the case of Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) vs. William Whatcott reported in 2013 1 SCR 467, wherein
in order to find out whether there is any hate speech, three main
prescriptions have been laid down; firstly, the courts must apply the hate
4 Cr. M.P. No.988 of 2024
( 2026:JHHC:7755 )speech prohibition objectively and in so doing, ask whether a reasonable
person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the
expression as exposing the protected group to hatred and the second test
was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term “hatred” to those
extreme manifestations of the emotion described by the words
“detestation” and “vilification”. This would filter out and protect speech
which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not incite the level of
abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks causing
discrimination or injury.
11. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that
altogether six FIRs have been registered against the petitioner, the details
of which has been mentioned in para-5 of this Cr.M.P. It is then submitted
that even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are
considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under
Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out.
12. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner next submits that the
petitioner’s statement has been blown out of proportion by the informant
for political motives. It is next submitted that the petitioner has never
used the word “family” (Parivaar) in his entire speech. It is next
submitted that the present criminal proceeding has been instituted for the
purpose of wreaking vengeance. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as
prayed for in this Cr.M.P., be allowed.
13. Learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State and the learned counsel for
the opposite party no.2 on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer
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( 2026:JHHC:7755 )of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P and submits that if the
allegations made in the FIR are considered to be true in their entirety, then
each of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered is
made out and since the investigation of the case is going on, at this
nascent stage, the entire criminal proceeding ought not to be nipped in the
bud. Therefore, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit,
be dismissed.
14. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after
carefully going through the materials available in the record, so far as the
offences punishable under Sections 500 of the Indian Penal Code is
concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that Section 199 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure bars any court from taking cognizance of the offences
punishable under Chapter-XXI of the Indian Penal Code; except upon a
complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence except for the
persons aggrieved, some other can also file, but the fact remains that the
complaint is to be filed.
15. Now it is needless to mention that Section 500 of the IPC falls under
Chapter-XXI of the IPC, therefore, registration of the FIR in respect of the
offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code is not
permissible in law as has been categorically held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in para-207 of the Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of
India, Ministry of Law & Others (supra).
16. So far as the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian
Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that as has been
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( 2026:JHHC:7755 )held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207,
paragraph no.24 of which reads as under :-
“24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the
complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the
appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of
whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant’s
house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to
assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the
appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the
spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not
satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been
enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The
intentional insult must be of such a degree that should
provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any
other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and
abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid
down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona
Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra,
(2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] .
that the intentional insult must be of such a degree that should
provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other
offence.
17. Now coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no
allegation against the petitioner of perpetrating any intentional insult to
any person of such a degree that should provoke that person to break
public peace or commit any other offence and in the absence of this
essential ingredient, this Court is of the considered view that even if the
entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in
their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian
Penal Code is not made out.
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18. So far as the offence punishable under Section 505(2) of the Indian
Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said
offence are as under:-
(1) The accused made, published or circulated any statement, rumour
or report;
(2) He did so-
i. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause
any officer, soldier, sailor or airman to mutiny or otherwise
disregard or fail in his duty;
ii. With intent to cause or which he knew to be likely to cause
fear or alarm to the public thereby inducing any person to
commit an offence against the State or public tranquillity;
iii. With intent to incite or which he knew to be likely to incite
any class or community to commit any offence against any
other class or community.
19. Now coming to the facts of the case, in the considered opinion of
this Court, the allegation is that “The entire Family of my Leader are looters”
is insufficient to fulfil the essential ingredients to constitute the offence
punishable under Section 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code.
20. Besides the fact that for the self-same occurrence, this is the
subsequent FIR in respect of the self-same occurrence, more so, because
this is the subsequent FIR in respect of the offence for which the FIR of
Ramgarh P.S. Case No.196 of 2023 has been registered.
21. In view of the discussions made above, since none of the offences in
respect of which the FIR has been registered, is made out against the
petitioner even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are
considered to be true in their entirety, so this Court is of the considered
view that the continuation of this criminal proceeding against the
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petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law and this is a fit case
where the entire criminal proceeding in connection with Kanke P.S. Case
No.210 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 500,
504 & 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, be quashed
and set aside.
22. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding in connection with
Kanke P.S. Case No.210 of 2023 registered for the offences punishable
under Sections 500, 504 & 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code against the
petitioner, is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner.
23. In the result, this Cr.M.P., stands allowed.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated the 18th of March, 2026
AFR/ Abhiraj
Uploaded on 28/03/2026
9 Cr. M.P. No.988 of 2024