Orissa High Court
Murali Chhatrapal And Another vs State Of Odisha on 26 March, 2026
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.393 of 2005
(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)
Murali Chhatrapal and another ....... Appellants
-Versus-
State of Odisha ....... Respondent
For the Appellants : Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra,
Amicus Curiae
For the Respondent : Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, ASC
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 24.03.2026 :: Date of Judgment: 26.03.2026S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.08.2005 passed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court,
Bhawanipatna in Sessions Case No. 20/13 of 2005, arising out of G.R.
Case No.472/2004, whereby the accused persons were acquitted of thecharges under Sections 452/34, 394/398 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms
Act, but were convicted under Sections 385/34 and 427/34 IPC and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine of
Rs.200/- (Rupees two hundred) only in default, to undergo R.I. for
further period of one month on each count.
2. As the written instruction received from the I.I.C., Town P.S.,
Bhawanipatna, dated 25.07.2025 indicates that the appellant No.l-Murali
Chhatrapal has expired on 29.07.2011, the present appeal qua the
appellant No.l stands abated in the absence of any application under
Section 394 of Cr. P.C. In so far as the appellant No.2 is concerned, he is
alive. Accordingly, consideration of the present appeal is confined to the
appellant No.2-Susant Mahanand only.
3. The present appeal has been pending since 2005. When the matter
was called for hearing consistently, none appeared for the appellants.
Therefore, on 24.03.2026, this Court requested Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra,
learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist in the matter as
Page 2 of 12
Amicus Curiae. She has readily accepted the same and after obtaining
entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records
appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Mrs. Mohapatra.
4. Heard Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra, learned Amicus Curiae for the
appellants and Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, learned Additional Standing
Counsel for the State.
5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 27.10.2004 at about 6.00
P.M., the accused persons allegedly demanded a sum of Rs.2000/- from
the son of the informant and, upon his refusal, assaulted him and
thereafter entered the house of the informant, damaged the roof tiles and
caused injuries to the informant. On the basis of the written report,
investigation was taken up and charge-sheet was submitted under
Sections 452/427/394/398/34 of the IPC read with Section 27 of the
Arms Act. The accused took a stance of denial of charges and claim trial.
6. To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses including the informant (P.W.1), his family members (P.Ws.2,
3 and 4), an independent witness (P.W.6), the doctor (P.W.7) and the
Page 3 of 12
Investigating Officer (P.W.8). The defence examined two witnesses and
took the plea that the incident arose out of a dispute relating to collection
of festival subscription (chanda).
7. The learned trial court, upon appreciation of evidence, disbelieved
the prosecution case in so far as the allegations relating to house trespass,
robbery and use of deadly weapon are concerned, mainly due to
inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence and lack of reliable
corroboration. However, it held that the prosecution succeeded in
establishing that the accused persons had put the informant and his son
in fear of injury for the purpose of extortion and had caused damage to
the house, thereby committed the offences under Sections 385/34 and
427/34 IPC. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is extracted
herein below for ready reference:-
“12. The plea of the accused persons is that they
had been to the house of P.W.3 to collect the
balance amount of Dasara Puja chanda and P.W.3
alongwith his family members picked up quarrel
with them and have foisted a case. To substantiate
their plea, they have examined two witnesses; D.W.1
and D.W.2. P.W.3 has admitted in his evidence that
D.Ws.1 and 2 are his friends. D.W.1 has stated inPage 4 of 12
his examination-in-chief that in the previous year
one day, the accused persons went to the house of
the informant to request his son, Bhuja Sunani to
refund the collected money, which was collected on
the occasion of Lakhmara puja. The informant and
his family members picked up quarrel with the
accused persons. In his cross examination D.W.1
has admitted that Lakhmara puja is arranged by the
King family of Kalahandi and they meet the
required expenditure. He has further admitted that
personally he had not accompanied the accused
persons while they went to the house of the
informant.
D.W.2 has stated in his examination in-chief that in
the previous year in the month of Dasara, he
alongwith D.W.1, P.W.3 and one Lebi had been to
T.V. Centre-pada, Bhawanipatna to collect Chanda
for the occasion of Lakhmare puja. The accused
persons came to their club, where he alongwith
Bhuja (P.w.3) were present and told them to give the
collected amount (chanda) to them to utilise the
same for the Lakhmara Puja which was with P.w.3,
who thereafter run away to his house and when they
went to his house to request him to return the
collected amount, his family members picked up
quarrel. In his cross examination, he has admitted
that for the Lakhmare puja under the Presidentship
of Collector, Kalahandi always a committee
constitutes in consultation of Maharaja of
Kalahandi, but he has denied that the committee
which functions under the Presidentship of
Collector, Kalahandi oragnises the Lakhmara puja.
Page 5 of 12
According to the Prosecution case, the
occurrence taken place on 27.10.04. From the
Calendar of the year 2004 it reveals that 22.10.2004
was Nabami Puja of that year which is also the day
of Lakhmara Puja and 23.10.04 was Dasara.
Therefore, the occurrence has taken place after
Dasara of the year 2004. The plea of the accused
persons is inconsistent with the evidence of D.W.2
and so far as the evidence of D.W.1 is concerned
that is hear-say. Thus their plea is not established.
13. From the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 it is not
established that the accused persons have assaulted
P.w.3 in order to facilitate the attempt to commit
robbery. Therefore, the accused persons are not
liable Under Section 394 I.P.C., but from their
evidence it is established that the accused persons
have put PW 3 and P.W. 1 in fear of injury in order
to commit extortion and accordingly they are liable
Under section 385/34 I.P.C. From the evidence of
P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 it is further established that the
accused persons have committed mischief causing
damage to the amount of Rs.50/- by destroying the
tiles of the roof of the house of P.W.1. Therefore,
they are also liable U/s.427/34 I.P.C. However,
from the entire evidence of the P.Ws., the charges
under section 452/34, 394/398 I.P.C. read with
section 27 of the Arms Act have not been established
against the accused persons and they are acquitted
from those charges Under Section 235 (1) Cr.P.C.
I found the accused persons guilty of the
charges under sections 385/34,427/34 I.P.C and
convict them thereunder.”
Page 6 of 12
8. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the
learned Amicus Curiae for the appellants and the learned counsel for the
State and have gone through the records of the case, including the
depositions of the witnesses, the medical evidence and the documents
exhibited and other materials available on record.
9. On perusal of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the trial
court has already discarded the major part of the prosecution case
relating to serious offences such as robbery and house trespass. The
remaining conviction is based primarily on the consistent version that
there was a quarrel and demand for money accompanied by some degree
of intimidation and damage to property. The independent witness
(P.W.6) has also supported the occurrence of quarrel on the road.
10. Although there are some inconsistencies and exaggerations in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses, it is well accepted that the entire
evidence cannot be rejected merely because certain parts are not fully
reliable. The Court must carefully examine the evidence and accept those
Page 7 of 12
portions which appear to be truthful and supported by the record. In the
present case, the core allegation that the accused demanded money,
threatened the victims, and caused damage to the property appears to be
credible and has been rightly relied upon by the trial court. Accordingly,
this Court is not inclined to interfere with the finding of guilt of appellant
No.2 under Sections 385/34 and 427/34 IPC.
11. The trial court, while considering the question of sentence to be
imposed on the accused person, refused to grant the benefit of the P.O.
Act. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another
v. State represented by the Inspector of Police1 has elaborately
explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, while considering the question of extending the
benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to
1
2025 INSC 540
Page 8 of 12
provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform
themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. While
discussing the interplay between the aforesaid provisions, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has also clarified that courts are duty-bound to consider
the applicability of the Probation of Offenders Act in cases where the
circumstances justify such consideration, and if the court decides not to
extend the benefit of probation, it must record special reasons for such
refusal. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are
reproduced hereunder:
“26. On consideration of the precedents and based on a
comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-section (1)
of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the
latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former.
Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender,
more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is
sentenced to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine,
Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its
discretion in any case where the offender is found to have
committed an offence such that he is punishable with any
sentence other than death or life imprisonment. Additionally,
the non-obstante clause in sub-section gives overriding effect
to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time
being in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC
itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision
that in any case where the court could have dealt with an
accused under the provisions of the Probation Act but hasPage 9 of 12
not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special
reasons therefor.
27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361,
Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a
particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the
Probation Act would not be attracted.
28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while
an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a
matter of right but having noticed the object that the
statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation
and the several decisions of this Court on the point of
applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that,
unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the
circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the
Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to
omit from its consideration release of the offender on
probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the
court to consider whether the case before it warrants
releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated
circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be
decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion
decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon
considering the report of the probation officer impose such
conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the
answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper
for the court to record the reasons therefor.”
12. The occurrence took place in the year 2004, and more than two
decades have elapsed. The offences for which the appellant stands
convicted are not of a grave or heinous nature. The circumstances
indicate that the incident arose out of a local dispute relating to the
collection of festival subscriptions. It is further brought to the notice of
Page 10 of 12
this Court that the appellant No.2 has already undergone custody for a
period of 285 days during the investigation and trial out of sentenced
period of one year. There is no material to indicate that he is a habitual
offender or that his release on probation would be detrimental to society.
13. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the
appellant No.2 is entitled to the benefit of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958, particularly under Section 4 thereof, instead of being
subjected to further incarceration.
14. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction of appellant No.2
under Sections 385/34 and 427/34 IPC, the sentence imposed by the trial
court is set aside. This Court directs the appellant No.2 to be released
under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of six
months on his executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand)
within one month with one surety for the like amount to appear and
receive the sentence when called upon during such period and in the
meantime, the appellant No.2 shall keep peace and good behavior and he
Page 11 of 12
shall remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer
during the aforementioned period of six months.
15. With the above modification in the sentence, the Criminal Appeal
stands partly allowed.
16. This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance
rendered by Mrs. Shuvra Mohapatra, learned Amicus Curiae in this case.
Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/-
(Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of
appreciation.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 26th Day of March, 2026/ Subhasis Mohanty
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY Page 12 of 12
Designation: Personal Assistant
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Date: 26-Mar-2026 14:37:56