Patna High Court – Orders
Kamni Devi vs The State Of Bihar And Ors on 24 March, 2026
Author: Sunil Dutta Mishra
Bench: Sunil Dutta Mishra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.28160 of 2018
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-486 Year-2017 Thana- DARBHANGA COMPLAINT CASE
District- Darbhanga
======================================================
Kamni Devi Wife of Shri Bhola Sahni, D/o Sri Ramesh Sahni, Resident of
Village- Rebra, Police Station- Khanpur, District- Samastipur. At present
residing at Village- Muksudpur, Police Station- Hayaghat, District-
Darbhanga.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Bhola Sahni, Son of Late Yogendra Sahni,
3. Sibia Devi, Wife of Late Yogendra Sahni,
4. Binod Sahni, Son of Late Yogendra Sahni,
5. Indu Devi, Wife of Binod Sahni. All are Residents of Village- Rebra, Police
Station- Khanpur, District- Samastipur.
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Upendra Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the Opposite Party/s : Mr. Ram Naresh Ray, APP
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL DUTTA MISHRA
ORAL ORDER
7 24-03-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as
well as the learned A.P.P for the State.
2. The present application has been filed under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the
order dated 16.12.2017 (hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned
order’) passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge,
Darbhanga in Criminal Revision No. 384 of 2017 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Revisional Court’), whereby the learned
Revisional Court set aside the order dated 14.11.2017 passed by
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
2/16
the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Darbhanga
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’) in Complaint Case No.
486 of 2017 taking cognizance of offences under Section 323 of
the Indian Penal Code, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 against
the accused persons (O.P. Nos. 2 to 5).
3. The prosecution case, in brief, that the
complainant(petitioner herein) was married to accused Bhola
Sahni (O.P. No.2) on 27.06.2014 and sufficient gifts were given
by her parents at the time of marriage according to their
capacity. After the marriage, when the petitioner went to her
matrimonial home, she was allegedly subjected to cruelty and
harassment by her husband and his family members on account
of non-fulfillment of their demand for a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- as
dowry. It is further alleged that on 13.03.2015 the accused
persons abused and assaulted the complainant and attempted to
set her on fire by pouring kerosene oil, however, on her alarm
nearby persons arrived and her life was saved. The petitioner
thereafter informed her parents about the occurrence and efforts
were made through local villagers to settle the dispute. A
Panchayati was also held, pursuant to which the complainant
returned to her matrimonial home, but the demand of dowry and
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
3/16
alleged ill-treatment continued. Subsequently, on 14.03.2017 the
petitioner was again assaulted by her husband and was
ultimately driven out from her matrimonial home after snatching
her belongings.
4. On the basis of the said allegations, the
complaint petition was filed in the court of learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate and it was transferred to the Trial Court for
enquiry and disposal. The learned Trial Court, after examining
the solemn affirmation of complainant and two inquiry
witnesses under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
and upon perusal of the materials available on record, found
sufficient grounds to proceed and accordingly took cognizance
of the offences under Sections 323, 498A of the Indian Penal
Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and
directed issuance of summons to the accused persons(O.P. Nos.
2 to 5) to face trial vide order dated 14.11.2017.
5. Being aggrieved by the order dated 14.11.2017
of taking cognizance and directing issuance of summons, the
O.P. Nos. 2 to 5 preferred Criminal Revision before the learned
Revisional Court assailing the legality and propriety of the said
order. The learned Revisional Court after hearing the
contentions of parties and on perusal of materials on record
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
4/16
inter alia observed that entire alleged occurrence took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of Samastipur district and set
aside the cognizance order on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction vide order dated 16.12.2007. Petitioner, being
aggrieved, has preferred this application praying to quash the
impugned order.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the impugned order dated 16.12.2017 passed by the learned
Revisional Court is wholly unsustainable in the eye of law. He
further submits that although the petitioner/complainant was
impleaded as Opposite Party No. 2 in the said revision, the
learned Revisional Court proceeded to set aside the order dated
14.11.2017 passed by the learned Trial Court without issuing
notice to the petitioner and without affording her any
opportunity of hearing which is a sheer violation of the settled
principles of natural justice and has caused serious prejudice to
the petitioner.
7. Learned counsel further submits that the learned
Revisional Court set aside the order taking cognizance merely
on the ground of territorial jurisdiction without considering the
materials available on record and without hearing the
complainant, whose rights were directly affected by the said
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
5/16
order. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Niranjan Lal Chippa v. Ajay Kumar Joshi and Ors. reported in
(2015) 13 SCC 609, wherein it has been held that before passing
any order in revision which adversely affects a party, an
opportunity of hearing must be afforded to such party. The
Learned counsel has also relied on Hon’ble Supreme Court
Judgments in case of Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors. reported in (2019) 5 SCC 384 ; Ruhi v. Anees Ahmad and
Ors. reported in (2022) 15 SCC 787 wherein it was held that
courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving the
matrimonial home due to cruelty would also have jurisdiction to
entertain a complaint under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code, as the consequence of the cruelty continue to operate at
that place. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order is
liable to be set aside in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. Per contra, learned A.P.P for the State submits
that the learned Revisional Court has rightly exercised the
revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the order dated
14.11.2017 passed by the learned trial court, taking cognizance
of the alleged offences. It is submitted that the allegations made
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
6/16
in the complaint petition clearly disclose that the entire alleged
occurrence, including the demand of dowry and the alleged acts
of cruelty, had taken place at the matrimonial home of the
complainant which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction
of District Samastipur. He further submitted that since no part of
the alleged occurrence took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of Darbhanga, the learned Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or to take cognizance of
the alleged offences.
9. Learned A.P.P further submits that the Revisional
Court, upon careful examination of the allegations made in the
complaint petition and the materials available on record, rightly
came to the conclusion that the Court at Darbhanga lacked
territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. It is submitted
that the Revisional Court has merely corrected the jurisdictional
error committed by the learned Trial Court and the impugned
order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is,
therefore, submitted that the present application is devoid of
merit and is liable to be dismissed.
10. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
7/16
to deal with the settled position of law with regard to the
exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It is well settled that the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is of
wide amplitude, however, such power is required to be
exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in exceptional
cases, so as to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioner
as well as the learned A.P.P for the State and upon perusal of the
materials available on record, the issue which falls for
consideration is as to “whether the impugned order of the
Revisional Court calls for interference by this Court in exercise
of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.”.
12. It is appropriate here to discuss to the
provisions relating to territorial jurisdiction under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. Ordinarily, in terms of Section 177 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, every offence shall be inquired
into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the
offence was committed. However, the said rule is not absolute
and is subject to the exceptions provided under Sections 178 and
179 of the Code, which stipulate that where an offence is a
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
8/16
continuing one, or where the consequence of an act ensues in
another place, the courts within whose jurisdiction such
consequences occur would also have the jurisdiction to inquire
into and try the offence.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Rupali
Devi(supra) has vividly explained the issue of jurisdiction with
regard to matrimonial offences and has held as under:
“8. Section 178 creates an exception to the
“ordinary rule” engrafted in Section 177 by
permitting the courts in another local area
where the offence is partly committed to take
cognizance. Also if the offence committed in
one local area continues in another local
area, the courts in the latter place would be
competent to take cognizance of the matter.
Under Section 179, if by reason of the
consequences emanating from a criminal act
an offence is occasioned in another
jurisdiction, the court in that jurisdiction
would also be competent to take cognizance.
Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one
place and partly in another; or if the offence
is a continuing offence or where the
consequences of a criminal act result in an
offence being committed at another place,
the exception to the “ordinary rule” would
be attracted and the courts within whose
jurisdiction the criminal act is committed
will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to
try the offence.
14.”Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence
under Section 498-A IPC is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “the
intentional and malicious infliction of mental
or physical suffering on a living creature,
esp. a human; abusive treatment; outrage
(abuse, inhuman treatment, indignity)”.
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
9/16
Cruelty can be both physical or mental
cruelty. The impact on the mental health of
the wife by overt acts on the part of the
husband or his relatives; the mental stress
and trauma of being driven away from the
matrimonial home and her helplessness to
go back to the same home for fear of being
ill-treated are aspects that cannot be ignored
while understanding the meaning of the
expression “cruelty” appearing in Section
498-A of the Penal Code. The emotional
distress or psychological effect on the wife, if
not the physical injury, is bound to continue
to traumatise the wife even after she leaves
the matrimonial home and takes shelter at
the parental home. Even if the acts of
physical cruelty committed in the
matrimonial house may have ceased and
such acts do not occur at the parental home,
there can be no doubt that the mental trauma
and the psychological distress caused by the
acts of the husband including verbal
exchanges, if any, that had compelled the
wife to leave the matrimonial home and take
shelter with her parents would continue to
persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty
borne out of physical cruelty or abusive and
humiliating verbal exchanges would
continue in the parental home even though
there may not be any overt act of physical
cruelty at such place.
15. The Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, as the object behind its
enactment would indicate, is to provide a
civil remedy to victims of domestic violence
as against the remedy in criminal law which
is what is provided under Section 498-A of
the Penal Code. The definition of “domestic
violence” in the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates
harm or injuries that endanger the health,
safety, life, limb or well-being, whether
mental or physical, as well as emotional
abuse. The said definition would certainly,
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
10/16
for reasons stated above, have a close
connection with Explanations (a) & (b) to
Section 498-A of the Penal Code which
define “cruelty”. The provisions contained
in Section 498-A of the Penal Code,
undoubtedly, encompass both mental as well
as the physical well-being of the wife. Even
the silence of the wife may have an
underlying element of an emotional distress
and mental agony. Her sufferings at the
parental home though may be directly
attributable to commission of acts of cruelty
by the husband at the matrimonial home
would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of
the acts committed at the matrimonial home.
Such consequences, by itself, would amount
to distinct offences committed at the parental
home where she has taken shelter. The
adverse effects on the mental health in the
parental home though on account of the acts
committed in the matrimonial home would,
in our considered view, amount to
commission of cruelty within the meaning of
Section 498-A at the parental home. The
consequences of the cruelty committed at the
matrimonial home results in repeated
offences being committed at the parental
home. This is the kind of offences
contemplated under Section 179 CrPC
which would squarely be applicable to the
present case as an answer to the question
raised.
(emphasis supplied )”
14. The law laid down in Rupali Devi(supra) has
been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme in case of Ruhi v. Anees
Ahmad and Ors. reported in (2022) 15 SCC 787.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priya Indoria v.
State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in (2024) 4 SCC 749 has
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
11/16held as under:
“105. Another issue that calls for reiteration
is, whether, the ordinary place of inquiry and
trial would include the place where the
complainant wife resides after being
separated from her husband. The position of
law regarding the ordinary place of
investigation and trial as per Section
177CrPC, especially in matrimonial cases
alleging cruelty and domestic violence,
alleged by the wife, has advanced from the
view held in State of Biharv.Deokaran
Nenshi [State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi,
(1972) 2 SCC 890 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 114] ;
Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee [Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant
Kumar Mukherjee, (1997) 5 SCC 30 : 1997
SCC (Cri) 673] ; Y. Abraham Ajith v. State of
T.N. [Y. Abraham Ajith v. State of T.N.,
(2004) 8 SCC 100 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2134] ,
Ramesh v. State of T.N. [Ramesh v. State of
T.N., (2005) 3 SCC 507 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
735] ; Manish Ratan v. State of M.P.
[Manish Ratan v. State of M.P., (2007) 1
SCC 262 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] that if
none of the ingredients constituting the
offence can be said to have occurred within
the local jurisdiction, that jurisdiction
cannot be the ordinary place of investigation
and trial of a matrimonial offence. A three-
Judge Bench of this Court has however
clarified in Rupali Devi v. State of U.P.
[Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC
384 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 558] (“Rupali
Devi”) that adverse effects on mental health
of the wife even while residing in her
parental home on account of the acts
committed in the matrimonial home would
amount to commission of cruelty within the
meaning of Section 498-A at the parental
home. It was held that the courts at the place
where the wife takes shelter after leaving or
being driven away from the matrimonial
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
12/16
home on account of acts of cruelty
committed by the husband or his relatives,
would, depending on the factual situation,
also have jurisdiction to entertain a
complaint alleging commission of offences
under Section 498-A IPC.”
16. This Court has given anxious consideration to
the materials available on record as well as the reasoning
assigned by the learned Revisional Court while passing the
impugned order. It appears that the learned Revisional Court set
aside the order dated 14.11.2017 passed by the learned Trial
Court taking cognizance of the offences on the ground that the
alleged acts of cruelty and demand of dowry had taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of District Samastipur and,
therefore, the court at Darbhanga lacked territorial jurisdiction
to entertain the complaint. The Revisional Court accordingly
concluded that the order taking cognizance was without
jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. However, upon careful
scrutiny, this Court finds that the approach adopted by the
learned Revisional Court while determining the question of
territorial jurisdiction does not appear to be in consonance with
the settled legal principles governing matrimonial offences,
particularly those arising under the provisions relating to cruelty
against a married woman.
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
13/16
17. It is now well settled that offences relating to
cruelty inflicted upon a married woman within the meaning of
Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot always be
restricted to the place where the physical acts of cruelty were
initially committed. Matrimonial cruelty often manifests itself
not only in the form of physical assault but also through
persistent harassment, humiliation, mental torture and coercive
demands for dowry. The mental stress and trauma of being
driven away from the matrimonial home and her helplessness to
go back to the same home for fear of being ill-treated are
aspects that cannot be ignored while understanding the meaning
of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code. The consequences of such conduct
frequently extend beyond the confines of the matrimonial home
and continue to affect the mental and emotional well-being of
the aggrieved woman even after she is forced to leave the
matrimonial house. Thus, the determination of territorial
jurisdiction in such cases cannot be confined to a narrow or
technical interpretation limited only to the place where the
initial acts were committed.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately
considered this aspect in Rupali Devi (supra) wherein it has
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
14/16
been held that the impact of cruelty inflicted upon a married
woman at her matrimonial home does not cease merely because
she leaves that place. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed
that when a woman, having been subjected to cruelty at her
matrimonial home, is compelled to take shelter at her parental
home, the mental trauma and emotional distress suffered by her
at that place are direct consequences of the acts of cruelty
committed by the husband or his relatives. Therefore, the courts
within whose territorial jurisdiction the aggrieved woman
resides after leaving the matrimonial home would also have
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Supreme Court has
thus recognized that the offence under Section 498A of I.P.C.
may, in appropriate cases, partake the character of a continuing
offence, extending its effects to the place where the victim takes
refuge.
19. The aforesaid legal position has been reiterated
and further explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ruhi(supra) and Priya Indoria(supra), wherein it has been
emphasized that the place where the aggrieved woman is
compelled to reside after being driven out from her matrimonial
home cannot be ignored while determining territorial
jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when the
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
15/16
wife is forced to take shelter at her parental home due to acts of
cruelty committed at the matrimonial home, the consequences
suffered by her at the parental home constitute part of the same
transaction and, therefore, the courts having jurisdiction over
that area would also be competent to entertain the complaint.
20. Applying the aforesaid well-settled principles
to the facts of the present case, it appears from the allegations
made in the complaint petition that the complainant was
subjected to cruelty, harassment and assault on account of
dowry demand at her matrimonial home and was ultimately
driven out therefrom. Thereafter she took shelter at her parental
home and from there initiated the complaint proceedings before
the competent court at Darbhanga. In such circumstances, the
place where the complainant took refuge and where she
continued to suffer the consequences of the alleged cruelty
would clearly constitute a part of the cause of action.
21. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial court cannot
be said to have lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint petition and proceed with the matter in accordance
with law. The learned Revisional Court, while setting aside the
order taking cognizance, failed to properly appreciate the scope
Patna High Court CR. MISC. No.28160 of 2018(7) dt.24-03-2026
16/16
and ambit of the law governing territorial jurisdiction in
matrimonial offences as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid decisions. The impugned order thus
suffers from a manifest error of law and cannot be sustained.
Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Learned
Revisional Court setting aside the cognizance order on the
ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction is liable to be interfered
with and set aside in the end of justice.
22. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned
Revisional Court dated 16.12.2017 is hereby quashed and set-
aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Revisional
court to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after hearing
the parties.
23. The present application is, accordingly,
allowed.
24. Let a copy of this order be communicated to
the Court concerned forthwith.
(Sunil Dutta Mishra, J)
utkarsh/-
U T
