Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/22 vs The State Of Assam on 20 March, 2026
Page No.# 1/22
GAHC010160752022
2026:GAU-AS:4156-DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./198/2022
MD. AZIZUR HAQUE
S/O. MD. MAINUL HAQUE, VILL. KACHARI PAM, P.S. BOKO, DIST. KAMRUP
(M), ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM.
2:SMTI RENU DEVI
W/O SRI HARI DEV NATH
C/O SRI SARU BHARALI
BHARALI COMPOUND
MALIGAON
PS JALUKBARI
DIST KAMRUP (METRO)
PIN 78101
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A M BORA, MR. B RAHMAN,MR. V A CHOWDHURY,MR.
M S HUSSAIN
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, MS S SHARMA, LEGAL AID COUNSEL, R2
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Date : 20-03-2026
(A.D. CHOUDHURY, J)
1. Heard Mr. V.A Chowdhury, learned counsel for the
Page No.# 2/22
appellant. Also heard Ms. B Bhuyan, learned Public Prosecutor,
Assam and Ms. S Sarma, learned Legal Aid Counsel for
respondent No.2.
2. The present appeal under section 374(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is preferred against the
judgment and order dated 05.07.2022, passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, cum Special Judge, POCSO Kamrup
(M) in Sessions Case No.401/2018, whereby the learned
Additional Sessions Judge convicted the accused person under
section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
(POCSO) Act and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous
imprisonment for 20 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in
default, simple imprisonment for another three months.
3. The prosecution case in brief is that an ejahar was
lodged by the informant (PW-1) on 28.08.2018 before the O/C,
Jalukbari PS, alleging that on 27.08.2018, the accused, Md. Azizul
Haque sexually abused her minor daughter aged about 8 years.
4. On receipt of the Ejahar, Jalukbari PS case
No.1159/2018 under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012, was
registered. During the investigation, the IO visited the place of
the occurrence, drew a sketch map of the scene, and recorded
statements from the victim and other witnesses. The statement
of the victim was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C as well.
The Investigating Officer got the victim medically examined.
5. Upon completion of the investigation, the IO
submitted a charge sheet against the accused-appellant under
Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
Page No.# 3/22
6. After receiving the charge sheet, the case was
transferred to the learned Special Judge, POCSO. The accused
appeared before the learned Special Judge, and the trial court
framed charges against the accused appellant under section 4
of the POCSO Act, 2012 and read over and explained the same
to the accused person, to which the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried and accordingly, the trial
proceeded.
7. During the trial, the prosecution examined 6
witnesses and presented 9 documents. After the closure of the
prosecution case, the statement of the accused was recorded
under section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused pleaded total
denial. The accused also examined defence witness and
exhibited documents in support of his case.
8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties
and perusing the materials on record, the learned trial court
convicted and sentenced the accused as recorded
hereinabove.
9. Mr. VU Chowdhury, learned counsel for the
appellant, argues that the learned Trial court failed to note the
serious contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses. According to Mr. Chowdhury, in the version of the
informant mother (PW-1) in the FIR, she did not mention that she
was informed about the incident by the victim girl herself, but
while deposing before the court, the informant stated that the
whole incident was narrated to her by the victim girl. According
to him, the version in the FIR and the evidence of PW-1 are
Page No.# 4/22
different.
10. The learned counsel further contends that the only
eyewitness (PW-3) apart from the victim was declared hostile by
the prosecution. According to Mr. Chowdhury, the evidence of
the PW-1 and PW-4 is hearsay evidence and therefore, the
conviction of the appellant based on such evidence is not
sustainable in law.
11. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant
that the non-examination of vital witnesses creates a doubt in
the prosecution’s case. In this regard, the learned counsel
contends that though the victim in her statement recorded
under section 164 Cr.P.C disclosed the presence of her sister
Jayanti Devi, such person was not examined.
12. According to him, the reliance of the learned
Special Judge on the 164 Cr.P.C statement of the victim is
absolutely erroneous; at best, such a statement has only
corroborative value. The reliance on the medical evidence is
also vitiated inasmuch as such evidence is not conclusive.
13. While concluding Mr. Chowdhury argues that the
testimony of the victim cannot be termed as “startling in quality”
inasmuch as her statement that PW-3 witnessed the incident
and took her back to her residence was not supported by the
PW-4 herself. Though PW-4 was declared hostile and
prosecution had duly cross-examined her, the said witness
remained firm as regards her statement made before the
learned trial court.
14. Per contra, Ms. Bhuyan learned Addl. PP argues that
Page No.# 5/22
in a case like the present one, a person can be convicted only
on the victim’s sole testimony. According to her, the victim
remained firm throughout, regarding the accused’s
involvement, as reflected in her statement recorded under
sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., as well as in her statements before
the trial court.
15. While endorsing the arguments advanced by the
learned Addl. PP, Ms. S Sarma, learned counsel for respondent
No.2 argues that the penetration has been established beyond
any reasonable doubt inasmuch as, the accused failed to rebut
the initial presumption.
16. Before dealing with the arguments advanced, let
this Court first scrutinise the evidence led by the parties, in the
following sub-paragraphs:
I. PW-1 Runu Devi, the mother of the victim, is
also the informant, who deposed that the victim had
informed her that the accused took her (the victim) to
his house and asked her to remove her pants and
attempted to commit rape on her. One nearby woman,
namely. Dalimi Das (PW-3) witnessed the incident and
informed her about it; thereafter, PW-1 lodged the FIR.
She proved the FIR as Exhibit-1 and her signature as
Exhibit-1(1).
In her cross-examination, she deposed that she had not
witnessed the occurrence.
II. PW-2 is the victim girl. The victim is a minor
girl, but she responded maturely to some of the
Page No.# 6/22questions offered to her by the learned Trial Court, and
therefore, she was examined as a witness without
administering an oath.
The victim in her deposition stated that she knew the
accused person, and one day, while playing with her
sister, the accused took her to his house and tried to do
bad things with her. One lady, namely, Dalimi (sister in
law) PW-3, arrived there, saw the same, and then sent
her home.
PW-2, in her cross-examination, deposed that her parents
had not tutored her to depose against the accused.
The victim, in her 164 Cr.P.C. statement, further stated
that on 27.08.2018 at about 1 PM, she was playing near
her house, when one person named Geda/Azizul Haque
approached her, took her to his home, and made her lie
on the bed. He opened both of his pants and inserted
his genitals into her. Suddenly, her sister-in-law (PW-3)
came and took her out. The victim girl further deposed
that in the evening, she informed her mother about the
incident, and when her mother confronted the accused,
the accused fled the scene by breaking the fence.
III. PW-3 Dalimi Namasudra @ Dalimi Das is
projected as the eyewitness of this case. She deposed
that on the day of the occurrence, at about 12.30 pm,
when she went to the accused’s house to fetch some
eggs, she saw the victim girl inside. PW-3 further
deposed that when she heard her mother complaining
Page No.# 7/22
about the girl’s stomach pain, she informed the mother
about seeing the victim lying in the bed of the accused
and advised the mother not to send the victim to the
house of the accused.
PW-3 was declared hostile and was cross-examined by
the prosecution. During the cross-examination, she
admitted that she had stated before the police about
seeing the victim lying on the bed of the accused. She
denied the suggestion that she had seen the accused
on top of the victim and that the wearing apparel of the
victim was completely removed. PW-3 admitted that
she had asked the mother of the victim not to send the
victim girl to the house of the accused.
IV. PW-4, namely, Saru Bharali, is a hearsay
witness. She deposed that on the day of the
occurrence, she heard a hue and cry raised by Dalimi
(PW-3), and on enquiry, PW-4 came to know that PW-3
saw the accused person and the victim girl in an
indecent/compromising position. PW-4, in her cross-
examination, denied the suggestion of the defence that
no incident occurred as alleged in the ejahar.
V. PW-5 Dr. Reshma Talukdar is the doctor who
examined the victim on 29.08.2018. She deposed that at
the relevant point of time, she was working as an MO in
the department of Forensic Medicine, Guwahati
Medical College and Hospital. At around 1.25 pm, she
had examined the victim as produced by the Woman
Page No.# 8/22
Police, WHG Fatima Begum. She recorded the following:
i. Genital organs healthy. ii. Vulva is healthy but swollen, tender to the touch, and red. iii. Hymen is having fresh tears at 11, 2 o'clock position; iv. In Vagina redness is present on the inner wall; v. Cervix can't be accessed. vi. Uterus not palpable P/A vii. Evidence of venereal disease was not detected at the time of examination.
viii. Vaginal swabs were collected from around the
vaginal swab.
This expert witness opined that although radiological
data supporting age was not found; however, based on
clinical/dental examination, the age of the victim is
approximately 6 years and below 12 years. No evidence
of recent sexual intercourse on her person at the time of
examination was found; however, a sign of penetration
is present, which means that there was no presence of
spermatozoa or gonococci, which may remain up to 72
hours. But if the victim takes a bath or washes her
undergarments, there may be no spermatozoa or
gonococci present.
The doctor, in her cross-examination, deposed that the
accused was not examined, whereas the victim was
examined as detailed in the medical report. She further
Page No.# 9/22
deposed that penetration usually occurs due to sexual
penetration, as it is of a very serious nature. She denied
the defence’s suggestion that injury to the hymen may
occur from cycling. She further deposed that the hymen
tear as found may sustain because of any reason other
than penetration.
VI. PW-6 is the Investigating Officer of this case.
According to her, on the fateful day, she was working as
WSI at Jalukbari PS. The informant, namely, Runu Devi,
lodged an ejahar before the O/C Jalukbari PS and the
same was registered as Jalukbari PS case No.1159/2018
under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and was
entrusted with the investigation to PW-6.
The IO accordingly recorded the statement of the victim
girl along with the informant and sent the victim girl for
medical examination. The statement of the victim girl
under section 164 Cr.P.C was also recorded. During the
investigation, the IO visited the place of occurrence,
recorded the statements of the witnesses and drew a
sketch map. She proved the Exhibit-5 sketch map.
The accused was arrested. She proved Exhibit-6 as the
arrest memo.
The IO collected the victim’s birth certificate as proof of
age.
After completion of the investigation and finding
sufficient materials against the accused person, namely,
Azizul Haque, a charge sheet was submitted under
Page No.# 10/22
section 376(A/B) IPC read with section 4 of the POCSO
Act vide charge sheet No.230/2018 dated 30.03.2018.
She proved the charge sheet as Exhibit-9.
PW-6, in her cross-examination, deposed that she did not
make any prayer for the recording of the confessional
statement of the accused.
She stated that none of the witnesses in their statement
recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C disclosed that they
had seen the accused taking away the victim girl to the
house of the accused or calling the victim to the house
of the accused.
She further deposed that she did not seize the birth
certificate of the victim girl to ascertain her age. The IO
further deposed that she drew the sketch map after
visiting the place of occurrence and did not inspect the
body parts (internal) of the victim girl, and therefore, she
could not say anything about the external injury on the
body of the victim.
PW-6 further deposed that she did not seize the wearing
apparel of the victim girl, nor did she seize the accused
person’s apparel.
17. Now let us examine the evidence of the
defence witness recorded as DW-1.
1. DW-1 Rumi Parbin is the wife of the accused.
she knows all the other witnesses. She affirms that on
the date of incident, she, her son and her husband
were in their residence and the victim girl did not come
Page No.# 11/22
to their house and she has also never visited their
house. It was projected that the informant borrows
eggs from her husband but never pays and on the day
of the incident her husband asked the informant for
money and later the informant made the allegation
and she is not aware what happened thereafter.
During cross examination She denies that she deposed
falsely, she also deposed that PW-3 did come to their
house to fetch eggs on that day.
18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties,
perused the material available on record, and re-appreciated
the evidence.
19. At the outset, the edifice of the prosecution’s case
rests upon the testimony of the child victim, PW2.
20. Before dealing with her evidence, let us briefly
state the principle as regards the reliability of a child witness.
21. The principle that the sole testimony of a child
victim of sexual assault can form the basis of a conviction is
firmly embedded in criminal jurisprudence and has, over time,
been refined to balance sensitivity with judicial caution. At its
core lies the recognition that sexual offences, particularly
against children, are typically committed in seclusion away
from public gaze. To insist upon independent corroboration as
a rule would, in many cases, render the law sterile and
incapable of responding to the realities of such crime.
22. The law, therefore, does not treat a child witness as
inherently unreliable. On the contrary, if the testimony of the
Page No.# 12/22
child is found to be natural, consistent, and free from material
embellishment, it can be acted upon even in the absence
of corroboration.
23. As a note of caution, it is recorded that such a
principle is not unqualified. Courts are enjoined to subject
such testimony to careful scrutiny, not because of any
presumption of falsity, but owing to the susceptibility of
children to tutoring, imagination, or external influence.
24. The test, therefore, is one of the intrinsic worth;
whether the statement bears the ring of truth; indicators which
amounts significance are spontaneity, coherence, absence of
major contradictions, and inconsistencies across statements,
including under section 164 Cr.P.C. and before the court.
25. Minor discrepancies, particularly in peripheral
details, are not only tolerable but expected given the age
and trauma of the victims. In this context, the requirement of
corroboration has been consciously diluted. It is not a rule of
law but a rule of prudence to be applied only where the court
finds it unsafe to rely upon the testimony in isolation.
26. Where the deposition of the child victim inspires
confidence, it stands at par with that of an injured witness
entitled to great weight, as it is unlikely that a victim of such an
offence would falsely implicate an innocent person while
shielding the real perpetrator.
27. Medical or circumstantial evidence, where
available, serves a corroborative role but is not indispensable.
28. Indeed, the absence of medical evidence or even
Page No.# 13/22
inconclusive medical findings cannot override a trustworthy
ocular account of the victim in case of a sexual offence
against a child. Conversely, medical evidence supporting the
possibility of the act lends assurance to the child’s version.
29. The approach, therefore, is one of calibrated
judicial assessment; neither to approach the testimony with
suspicion merely because of the age of the witness nor to
accept it uncritically.
30. Where, upon the scrutiny, the court finds the
evidence of the child victim to be credible and of sterling
quality, a conviction can safely be reached upon.
31. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled
proposition of law, let us analyse the deposition of PW2.
32. At the threshold, it is to be noted that the trial
court, upon interacting with the victim, found her capable of
understanding and responding to questions, and therefore
rightly proceeded to record her evidence without oath.
33. Her deposition in court is natural, consistent, and
free from material contradictions. She has clearly identified
the accused and narrated the sequence of events in a
manner that is commensurate with her age and
understanding, stating that while she was playing, the
accused took her to his house and attempted to do “bad
things” with her.
34. This version stands materially fortified by her
statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein she
has given a more detailed account of the occurrence,
Page No.# 14/22
including the act of penetration and the circumstances in
which she was rescued. The consistency between her
statements at different stages lends strong assurance to her
credibility.
35. Importantly, in her cross-examination, nothing has
been elicited to discredit her testimony. Rather, she has
categorically denied any tutoring, thereby ruling out the
possibility of fabrication. The minor variations, if any, are but
natural for a child of tender years, recounting a traumatic
incident and do not affect the core of the prosecution case.
36. Her evidence finds corroboration from the
surrounding circumstances, including the presence of PW-3 at
the relevant time and the medical findings indicating signs of
penetration. In such circumstances, the testimony of PW-2 is
wholly reliable, of sterling quality, and sufficient to form the
basis of conviction.
37. To summaries, the deposition of PW2, read in
conjunction with her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C.,
discloses a consistent narrative as to the identity of the
accused, the place of occurrence and the nature of the
complaint.
38. The trustworthiness of PW2’s deposition, based on
the alleged discrepancy between the narrative in the FIR and
her deposition is equally without substance.
39. The FIR is not an encyclopedia of facts; it is only the
earliest version intended to set the criminal law in motion. The
omission as to the precise source of information, whether
Page No.# 15/22
directly from the victim or through another, does not render
the prosecution case suspect, particularly when the
substratum of the allegation remains unaltered.
40. The submissions regarding the so-called hostility of
PW3, projected as eye witness, also do not carry the case of
defence any further.
41. Even if the said witness did not fully support the
prosecution version in the court, her testimony, to the extent it
establishes the presence of the victim in the house of the
accused at the relevant time, lends assurance to the version
of the victim.
42. It is a settled principle of criminal law that testimony
of a hostile witness is not effaced from the record merely
because the witness has recanted in whole or in part from
their previous statement.
43. The court is duty-bound to shift the evidence with
care and may accept those portions of the testimony which
are found to be credible, consistent and in consonance with
the overall prosecution case.
44. Hostility does not render the witness wholly
unreliable; it only puts the court on guard to scrutinize the
evidence more cautiously.
45. If, upon such scrutiny, certain aspects of
the deposition receive corroboration from other evidence on
record, whether oral, documentary or circumstantial, those
portions can be safely relied upon. Conversely, the part which
is inconsistent, evasive or demonstratively false may be
Page No.# 16/22
discarded.
46. The approach, therefore, is not one of rejection but
of selective acceptance based on the touchstone of
reliability and truthfulness.
47. In the case in hand, as recorded hereinabove, the
testimony of the victim, PW-2, is found to be credible,
consistent, and in consonance with the overall prosecution
case. Similarly, testimony of the PW-3, to the extent it
establishes the presence of the victim in the house of the
accused at the relevant time, lends assurance to the version
of the victim.
48. The argument of non-examination of certain
witnesses, including the sister of the victim, is equally
untenable.
49. The non-examination of certain witnesses is not by
itself fatal to the prosecution case; it becomes so only when
the omission goes to the root of the matter and creates a
reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness or completeness of the
prosecution version.
50. The test is whether the witness withheld was a
material witness, one who could have unfolded the genesis of
the occurrence or whose testimony was essential to establish
a crucial link in the chain of events.
51. If such a witness is deliberately withheld without a
plausible explanation and the existing evidence suffers from
inherent consistencies or gaps that that witness alone could
have clarified, an adverse inference may legitimately be
Page No.# 17/22
drawn against the prosecution.
52. However, in the case in hand, the evidence of PW-
2 is otherwise cogent, reliable and sufficient to prove the case
beyond a reasonable doubt, supported by the corroborative
medical examination and therefore, non-examination of such
witness (the sister) who was stated to be playing with the
victim, in the opinion of this court, is merely cumulative and
does not vitiate the prosecution case.
53. In our estimation, in the present case, the non-
examination of the said witness does not create any dent in
the prosecution case, particularly when the testimony of the
victim is cogent and trustworthy.
54. Now coming to the medical evidence (PW5), it is
far from contradicting the prosecution case, lending
significant corroboration.
55. The presence of fresh hymenal tears, redness and
tenderness in the genital region clearly indicates penetration.
The absence of spermatozoa, as explained by the PW-5, is not
determinative, especially having regard to the possibility of
delay, washing or other intervening factors. The suggestion
that such injuries could be caused otherwise, remains a mere
theoretical possibility and does not probabalize the defence.
56. Coming to the alleged lapses in the
investigation, as highlighted in the cross-examination of the
investigating officer, such as non-seizure of wearing apparel or
failure to examine the accused medically, are indeed matters
of concern.
Page No.# 18/22
57. Such deficiencies undoubtedly reflect on the
fairness or thoroughness of the investigation; yet the court’s
primary duty is to evaluate whether the evidence that has
actually come on record is sufficient to establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
58. If the testimony of material witnesses, particularly
that of the victim, is found to be cogent, credible and
trustworthy and is supported by surrounding circumstances or
medical opinion, such lapses do not corrode the sub-stratum
of the prosecution case.
59. At the same time, where the investigation is so
perfunctory or tainted that it creates serious doubts about the
veracity of the prosecution version, or where vital gaps
remain unfilled which go to the root of the case, the benefit
must be ensured to the accused.
60. The doctrine, therefore, is one of balance.
61. The court must remain alive to
investigative shortcomings, but cannot allow the fate of a
criminal trial to be determined solely by the competence or
lack thereof of the investigating agency, lest it result in
rewarding inefficiency and undermining substantive justice.
62. In the case in hand, based on the evidence that
was available, more particularly of the PW-2 and PW-5, in the
opinion of this court, the lapses, as highlighted, are not fatal to
the prosecution case.
63. The contention that the prosecution failed to
establish the age of the victim does not merit acceptance in
Page No.# 19/22
the facts of the present case.
64. It is significant that at no stage during the trial did
the defence raise any objection or even a suggestion
disputing the age of the victim.
65. The absence of a specific challenge to age in
cross-examination assumes significance, for it indicates that
the factum of minority was not seriously put in issue. In such
circumstances, prosecution cannot be faulted for not leading
more elaborate or technical evidence on that aspect. That
apart, the medical evidence on record lends sufficient
assurance to the minority of the victim.
66. The doctor (PW5), upon clinical and dental
examination, opined that the age of the victim was
approximately above 6 years but below 12 years. Though
such an opinion is not based on radiological assessment and
may not yield mathematical precision, it nonetheless
constitutes relevant and admissible evidence, more
particularly, when it is based on dental and overall clinical
examination of the victim that too which remained
unchallenged during trial.
67. When such medical opinion is considered
alongside the overall circumstances, namely, the consistent
description of the victim’s age at the time of occurrence as 7
years in the FIR, in her deposition before the court as 8 years
and the absence of any challenge from the defence, the
conclusion regarding minority stands sufficiently established.
68. The absence of any contra-evidence or even a
Page No.# 20/22
suggestion that the victim was above statutory age, the plea
now sought to be raised, appears to be an afterthought. The
court cannot be persuaded to discard otherwise reliable
evidence on a hyper-technical plea, particularly when the
materials on record, taken cumulatively, clearly indicate
that the victim was a child well within the protective ambit of
the statute.
69. In our opinion, though the accused tried to project
that through the DW-1 that the victim and PW-3 did not visit
their house on the fateful day, however, the defence failed to
dislodge the evidence of PW-2 and the medical evidence,
beyond that the projection made through the DW-1 was
never projected during the cross-examination of any of the
prosecution witnesses. Therefore, such defence testimony is to
of no avail to the accused.
70. Tested on the avail of these principles discussed
herein above, the testimony of the victim, duly corroborated
by the medical evidence and supported in material
particulars by surrounding circumstances, inspires confidence.
The defence has not been able to elicit any material
contradiction or improbability which would render her version
unworthy of credence. Nor could it dent the prosecution case
through their defence witness.
71. In our considered view, the appeal does not
warrant interference. The submissions urged on behalf of the
appellant, though not insubstantial, at first blush failed to
dislodge the core of the prosecution’s case when tested on
Page No.# 21/22
the touchstone of settled principles governing the
appreciation of evidence in cases under the POCSO regime.
72. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons, we
are satisfied that the Learned Trial Court has correctly
appreciated the evidence on record and arrived at a finding
of guilt which does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity.
73. The conviction of the appellant under Section 4
of the POCSO Act, 2012 is accordingly affirmed. The appeal is
therefore dismissed.
74. Now coming to the submission for leniency in
sentence earnestly advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant, does not command acceptance in the backdrop
of the present case.
75. The offence in question is one under the POCSO
Act, 2012 involving a child of tender age, where the
evidence on record establishes clear signs of penetrative
sexual assault.
76. The gravity of the offence, the vulnerability of the
victim and the breach of trust inherent in such acts weigh
heavily against the grant of any undue indulgence. The
statute itself reflects a legislative mandate of deterrence by
prescribing a stringent minimum sentence, thereby
circumscribing judicial discretion.
77. While factors such as absence of prior
antecedents or socio-economic background may be relevant
in appropriate cases, they cannot eclipse the paramount
consideration of the nature and seriousness of the crime.
Page No.# 22/22
78. In offences against children, the principle of
proportionality must be informed as much by the rights of the
victim as by the circumstances of the offender.
79. Any unwarranted reduction in sentence in such
cases would not only dilute the deterrent purpose of law but
also risk undermining public confidence in the administration
of criminal justice.
80. In the circumstances, the sentence imposed by the
learned trial court cannot be said to be excessive or
disproportionate so as to warrant interference at the hands of
this Appellate Court. Accordingly, such prayer stands
rejected.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant
