The Pr. Secy. Revenue To The Govt. Of H.P. … vs Sant Ram & Others on 19 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

The Pr. Secy. Revenue To The Govt. Of H.P. … vs Sant Ram & Others on 19 March, 2026

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
                              RSA No. 10 of 2026
                              Date of decision: 19.03.2026.




                                                               .
    The Pr. Secy. Revenue to the Govt. of H.P. & others





                                                               ...Appellants.
                              Versus





    Sant Ram & others                                         ...Respondents.

    Coram:




                                       of
    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.

    Whether approved for reporting?1
                   rt
    For the appellants        :       Mr.    Diwakar     Dev    Sharma,
                                      Additional Advocate General.

    For the respondents           :   Mr. Malay Kaushal, Advocate, for
                                      respondents No.1, 3 & 4.


    Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):

The present appeal arises out of the judgment and

decree, dated 08.07.2024 as passed by the learned District

Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 32/13 of 2023,

whereby the appeal preferred by the present

appellants/defendants has been ordered to be dismissed and

the judgment and decree dated 15.05.2023, as passed by the

learned Senior Civil Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 74­1

of 2015, titled as Sant Ram & others vs. The Principal

Secretary, Revenue & others, have been affirmed, whereby the

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents for declaration and

mandatory injunction was decreed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the

.

plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit for declaration and

mandatory injunction in the Court of learned Senior Civil

Judge, Bilaspur, on 27.05.2015 on the ground that the land

of
comprised in Khata/Khatoni No. 21/21, Khasra No. 162,

measuring 5­12 bighas, situated at Village Tramari, Pargna
rt
Rattanpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. is owned and

possessed by the plaintiffs. In the year 1980, the defendants

had constructed Deoth­Lag Ghat Jamli link road and for that

purpose, the land owned and possessed by the plaintiffs was

utilized. The officials of the defendants assured the plaintiffs to

compensate them for utilization of their land, however no steps

were taken by them. Further, it has been averred in the plaint

that the lands of Surjan Ram and Chet Ram were also acquired

and utilized by the defendants for construction of the road in

question in the year 1987 vide Award No. 1/87. When the

plaintiffs approached the defendants for the grant of

compensation, no steps were taken by them for the reasons

best known to them. Though, assurance was given to the

plaintiffs to compensate them, but till date, no compensation

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amount has been paid, therefore, the plaintiffs were

constrained to file a suit for declaration to the effect that they

are owners in possession of the suit land and for mandatory

.

injunction that since the defendants have utilized the suit land,

therefore, the plaintiffs sought vacant possession of the suit

land.

of

3. The suit was contested by the defendants/State by

raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus stand,

estoppel
rt
etc. On merits, it was averred that the

defendants/appellants had constructed the road in question

with the consent of the plaintiffs in the year 1980 and the

defendants had not given any assurance to the plaintiffs to pay

the compensation for the suit land. Lands of Surjan Ram and

Chet Ram were acquired during the construction of the road in

question and other portion of the road was constructed with the

consent of the plaintiffs. At the time of construction of the road,

the plaintiffs never raised any objection and now they cannot be

permitted to raise objection that too after elapse of more than

35 years of the construction of road and consequently, the

defendants sought dismissal of the suit.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial

court on 02.07.2018 framed the following issues:­

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“1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of
declaration to the effect that plaintiffs are recorded
owner in possession qua the suit land, as prayed?
OPP

.

2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of
mandatory injunction, as prayed? OPP

3. Whether the suit is not maintainable, as alleged?

OPD

4. Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the Court

of
with clean hands, as alleged? OPD

5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation, as
rt alleged? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the
present suit by their own act and conducts, as

alleged? OPD

7. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file
the present suit, as alleged? OPD

8. Relief.”

5. The learned trial court directed the respective

parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions to

corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the learned

trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 15.05.2023

decreed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents and it was held

that the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the suit land

comprised in Khata/Khatoni No. 21/21, Khasra No. 162,

measuring 5­12 bighas, situated at Village Tramari, Pargna

Rattanpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. and are entitled

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for compensation from the defendants for the suit land utilized

by the defendants/State for the construction of the road in

question in the same manner as the lands of Surjan and Chet

.

Ram were acquired for the same road and ultimately, the

defendants were ordered to acquire the suit land and

compensate the plaintiffs.

of

6. Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree,

dated 15.05.2023, the defendants/State preferred an appeal
rt
before the learned first Appellate Court on 21.07.2023, which

came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated

08.07.2024.

7. Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments

and decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present

regular second appeal.

8. It is contended by Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, learned

Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants/State

that the learned courts below have not appreciated the real

point of controversy inter­se the parties and the impugned

judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below are

perverse and thus, liable to be quashed and set aside. He has

further contended that the learned Courts below have not

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appreciated oral as well as documentary evidence, therefore, on

that count, the instant appeal deserves to be allowed.

9. On the other hand, Mr. Malay Kaushal, learned

.

counsel for the respondents has defended the judgments and

decrees as passed by the learned courts below and has

submitted that since the land of the respondents was utilized

of
for the construction of the road in question, therefore, in view of

the mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
rt
whereby it has been repeatedly held that no person can be

deprived of his property without following the due process of

law, therefore, the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to

be upheld.

10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

have also gone through the material available on the case file.

11. With the consent of the parties, the case is finally

heard at admission stage.

12. It is admitted fact that the land of the plaintiff

/respondents has been utilized by the defendants/State for the

construction of road i.e. Deoth­Lag Ghat­Jamli link road.

13. The Court of the first instance as also the First

Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the

plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of Deoth­

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Lag Ghat­Jamli link road without payment of compensation to

them. No dispute has been raised as to such findings of fact. It

has only been contended on behalf of the defendants/State that

.

the suit was filed by the plaintiffs after almost 35 years and the

same was time barred. In alternative, it was contended that

since the plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long

of
period, they were estopped from raising the stale claim.

Principle of acquiescence has also been sought to be applied
rt
against the plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that the

plaintiffs/respondents were aware about the construction of

road and the road was constructed with their implied consent

and now they cannot, turn around to raise objections against

the construction of road.

14. The defendants/appellants are constituents of a

welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot

claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on

the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right

could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of

adverse possession by the other.

15. Admittedly, the respondents/plaintiffs are the title

holder of the suit property. Being owner of the suit property,

they may file a suit at any stage until and unless the said right

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is defeated by the present appellants/ defendants by perfection

of title by way of adverse possession.

16. Being the owners of the suit land, the

.

plaintiffs/respondents were well within their right to file a suit

for injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land

was utilized by the State for construction of the road in

of
question without adopting due process of law including the

payment of amount of compensation.

17.
rt
Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in

possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had

consented for construction of road through the suit land.

18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that

no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without

any legal sanction and without following the due process of law

and depriving her payment of just and fair compensation. The

State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot

arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the

Constitution. The Court has held as follows:

“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to
property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article

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31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State
Of Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could

.

not be deprived without due process of law and upon just

and fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental

right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a
welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300

of
A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
rt
property except in accordance with the procedure

established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be
inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v.

Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram
Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private

property, without following due process of law, would be

violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right
under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed

on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:

” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in
exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may
interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)

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12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this
Court held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right as also

.

a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken

away except in accordance with law. Article 300A
of the Constitution protects such right. The

provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of
the Constitution of India, must be strictly

of
construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC

627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of
rt
U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as

a basic human right in the following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of

property right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of the
Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty

cannot long subsist without the support of property.

“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist”

was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that

property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus
among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
this Court held as follows :

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There has to be no deprivation without any

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sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is
not acquisition or taking possession under Article
300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no

.

deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,

the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal

sanction, and without following due process of law,
there is no deprivation.”

12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been

of
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC
rt

596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental

right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is

completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,

the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed

on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State
must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The
State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not

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only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right

.

to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human

rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State

before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a

of
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
rt
over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be

permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case.

12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a

case of a continuing cause of action, or if the

circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,

which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no
period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its

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jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.

12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &

.

Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact

situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put

forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for

of
educational facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few
authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a
rt
citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right

has been violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.
State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32
or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a

different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State
took over possession of the land belonging to the
Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants

had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of

compensation. The State must either comply with the
procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any

other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)

13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has
been deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily

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expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present
case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling

.

since the State has admitted that the land was taken over

without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any
procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary

jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the
Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to
the appellant.

of

19. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
rt
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.

State of H.P. and others has held as under:

“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due

process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this
dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s

Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in
Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18.

Further, in several judgments, this court has repeatedly
held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of

lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility in
demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of
legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of
the rule of law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this
court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.
State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that

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the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be
removed by an executive order, and instead concluded
that the executive action taken by the State and its

.

officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule

of law. This court, in another case ­ State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held:

“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra­judicially by use of force, from a lessee,
even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by

of
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re­entry’
in the lease­deed does not authorise extrajudicial
methods to resume possession. Under law, the
rt
possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier

termination is juridical possession and forcible
dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the

present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not
place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it
is under an additional inhibition stemming from the

requirement that all actions of Government and

Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal pedigree'”.

16. Given the important protection extended to an

individual vis­a­vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300­A), and the high threshold the State must meet
while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade
its legal responsibility towards those from whom private
property has been expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be

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unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds
of equity and fairness.

17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s

.

actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the

injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them
to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of

acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend

of
the benefit of the court’s directions to those who
specifically approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of
rt
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in

respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in

CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.
1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,
the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring

land required for public use in the manner prescribed by

law.

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches

which conclude either way – as contended by both sides
in the present dispute – however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant­land owners. The State cannot shield itself
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice.
This court in a much earlier case ­ Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, held:

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’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give a

.

remedy, either because the party has, by his

conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his

conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to

of
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.

rt But in every case, if an argument against

relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,

the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,

are, the length of the delay and the nature of the

acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or

injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy.”

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article

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31 right (at the time of cause of action),
undoubtedly warranted consideration, and
intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226

.

jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) ­ a

similar case where the name of the aggrieved had
been deleted from revenue records leading to his

dispossession from the land without payment of
compensation – held: 6″Having heard the learned
counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the

of
case projected before the court by the appellants is
utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from
any State which professes the least regard to being
rt
a welfare State. When we pointed out to the

learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the
State should be gracious enough to accept its
mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the

respondent, the State has taken an intractable
attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to
be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.

Ours is a constitutional democracy and the

rights available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted

by the Forty­fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300­A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300­A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.–No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent’s property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an

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eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…

.

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while

dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held
as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)

“11”There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most of these authorities pertain to service

of
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and other
rt
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true

that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been

violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,
the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over

possession of the land belonging to the appellants

without any sanction of law. The appellants had
asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of

compensation. The State must either comply with
the procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”

21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the State,
do not inspire confidence and deserve to be
rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of

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objection, but has not placed any material on record
to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
unable to produce any evidence indicating that the

.

land of the appellants had been taken over or

acquired in the manner known to law, or that they
had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to

note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.”

of

20. The similar position has been reiterated and relied
rt
upon in the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court by the Hon’ble

Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022, titled as

Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

& another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the judgment

of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi & SukhDutt Ratra‘s case, the

Court held as follows:

“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that contention advanced by the State

of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court
is liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute
that petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with
the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to
initiate acquisition proceedings.

8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it
clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of
their land, without following due process of law. If it is so,
ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have

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made their land available with consent, is of no
consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the
fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the

.

construction of road in question, is compelled to agree

with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners
that her clients are entitled for compensation qua the land

utilized by respondents for construction of road in
question.

10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for

of
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid
any amount, which action of the respondent­State
certainly amounts to forcible dispossession of the
rt
petitioners from their land, which is violative of provision

contained under Art. 300­A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed
Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has

held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area
and without workable roads, no communication is
possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined in

Article 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has

right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to
move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the

residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life
itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a
policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a
favour to them on conditions that they would not claim
compensation, cannot be sustained because such stand is
violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that though right to property is not a

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-22-

fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right
under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a
human right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no

.

person can be deprived of his property save by the

authority of law. No doubt, State possesses the power to
take or control the property of the owner of the land for

the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to
compensate the injury by making just compensation.”

of

21. The Courts below, after appreciating the oral as well

as documentary evidence placed on record and on the basis of
rt
the title, decreed the suit as filed by the respondents and have

rightly came to the conclusion that they are entitled for

mandatory injunction with the direction to acquire the portion

of the suit land which has been utilized by the present

appellants for the construction of the road.

22. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no

person can be deprived of his property without adopting due

process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, the plea

as set up by the appellants­State is not tenable in the facts and

circumstances of the case, once they have utilized the land of

the villagers without adopting due process of law. Now the plea

as raised by the present appellants is not permissible that too

at the stage of Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent

findings of fact by the Courts below.

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-23-

23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments

has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No

doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under

.

Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on

limited grounds such as ­ (a) where the finding is based on

inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the

of
relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on

misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not

case in hand.

rt

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope

of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.

Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:

“18. It has been noted time and again that without

insisting for the statement of such a substantial question
of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the

same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been
issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals

without adhering to the procedure prescribed under
Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a
number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish
between a question of law and a substantial question of
law. In exercise of the powers under this section in
several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate
court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept
in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an
inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a

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substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The
conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly

.

fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no

court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds.
The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable

grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be
disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers
under this section. Further, a substantial question of law

of
has to be distinguished from a substantial question of
fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held
rt
that : “The proper test for determining whether a question

of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our
opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of

the parties and if so whether it is either an open question
in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or
by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free

from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.

If the question is settled by the highest court or the
general principles to be applied in determining the

question are well settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plea raised is
palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial
question of law.

” 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were
arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court
should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the

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trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has
rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the
same is no ground for interference in second appeal when

.

it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory

reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of
circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one

drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered
by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other
approach is not permissible. The High Court will,

of
however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions
drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being
contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or
rt
its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made

by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible
evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20.
to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a
binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on

the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar

as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a
question of law “involving in the case” there must be first

a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question
should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact
arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and proper decision
of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time
before the High Court is not a question involved in the
case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each
case whether a question of law is a substantial one and

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-26-

involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall
consideration being the need for striking a judicious
balance between the indispensable obligation to do

.

justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding

prolongation in the life of any lis.”

25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:­

“16. Whether D­1 and D­2 were able to discharge the

of
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the
rt
evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate
court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second

appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC
can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds,
such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible

evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant
admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading

of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not
the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement

(Exb. A­2) made on the back of a registered document
(Exb. A­1) after considering the oral evidence led by the
plaintiff­appellant and the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark of D­1 and D­2 were not
disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank
paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in
paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the
High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy
defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that

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genuineness of Exb. A­2 is not proved. In our view, the
High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers
under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered

.

with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate

court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate
court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the

evidence available on record as also the circumstance
that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the
document (Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also,

of
while disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the
High Court did not hold that the finding returned by the
first appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence,
rt
or is in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse.

Thus, there existed no occasion for the High Court,
exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with
the finding of the first appellate court regarding payment

of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D­1 and D­2 over and above
the sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once
the finding regarding payment of additional sum of

Rs.1,95,000 to D­1 and D­2 recorded by the first appellate

court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold
that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to

perform its part under the contract particularly when Rs.
4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was
already paid and, over and above that, additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D­1 &
D­2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding
plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its part
under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of
proven facts and circumstances of a case including
conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming

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performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he
has treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to
fulfill his obligation and accept performance when the

.

time for performance arrives.”

26. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for

the parties.

27. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the

of
Point in controversy after considering the oral as well as

documentary evidence placed on record. No question of law
rt
much less substantial question of law arises in the present

case.

28. In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of

any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(Romesh Verma)
Judge

19th March, 2026.

(vt)

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