Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Satish Sasan vs State Of J&K on 25 February, 2026
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
OWP No. 1547/2018 Reserved on: 10.02.2026
CM No. 4465/2020 Pronounced on: 25.02.2026
CM No. 2900/2019 Uploaded on: 26.02.2026
CM No. 5123/2018
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
1. Satish Sasan, Aged 48 years,
S/o Sh Sukhraj, R/o Mohalla Panditan;
Ward No.11, Poonch,Tehsil & District Poonch.
2. Sanjay Raina, Aged 53 years,
S/o Sh. Hari Krishna Raina,
R/o Mohalla Panditan,Ward No.11, Poonch
Tehsil & District Poonch.
3. Hardev Lal, Aged 62 years,
S/o Late Sh. Kaka Ram, R/o Mohalla T. T.
School, Ward No.13, Poonch,
Tehsil & District Poonch. .... Petitioner(s)
Through:- None.
Vs.
1. State of J&K,
Through Commissioner/Secretary
Department of Revenue,
(In-charge Haj & Auqaf),
Civil Secretariat, Jammu
2. Deputy Commissioner, Poonch
3. Administrator,
Auqaf Islamia, Poonch Haveli,
Tehsil, Poonch
4. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Poonch
5. Divisional Commissioner,
Jammu .....Respondent(s)
Through:- Mrs. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG.
Mr. Ayjaz Lone, Advocate.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to examine the
preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding the
1|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
maintainability of the present petition. Since the issue of
maintainability lies at the very foundation of the matter, the Court
considers it proper to adjudicate the same before entering into the
merits of the controversy.
2. It is further relevant to note that despite repeated opportunities, the
petitioners have chosen not to appear and have remained
unrepresented. Nevertheless, as the respondents have specifically
pressed the objection concerning maintainability, this Court proceeds
to decide the said issue on the basis of the pleadings and material
available on record.
Prayer:
3. The petitioners, through the medium of the present petition, have
sought the following reliefs:
“a)Declaring SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985 issued by Secretary to
Government Haj & Auqaf along-with all acts, deeds and things
done pursuant there-to or in consequent there-of, including all
revenue entries, notifications, agreements etc, as bad in law,
illegal, unconstitutional, null and void ab-initio.
b) Commanding the Respondents to strike-off all revenue entries
made in favour of Auqaf as a consequence to the passage of
impugned SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985 issued by Secretary to
Government Haj &Auqaf.
c) Commanding the Respondents to retrieve the lands and
properties (including the Rent) occupied by the Department of
Haj and Auqaf as a consequence to the passage of impugned
SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985.
Certiorari:
1) Quashing the communication No.DCP/SQ/1319 dated
02.11.2012 written by Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.5
recommending handing over of 5 Kanals; 13 Marlas land
2|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550(MaqboozaMekhama Janglat- Gair Mumking Building)
comprised in Khasra No.1436 Shehar Khas Poonch to Auqaf
Committee.
Mandamus:
1) Directing the Respondents to retrieve the land measuring 5
Kanals; 13 Marlas (MaqboozaMekhama Janglat- Gair
Mumkin Building) comprised in Khasra No.1436 Shehar Khas
Poonch from the encroachers/ Auqaf Committee within
some specified time frame.”
4. Petitioner No. 1 claims to be the President of Shri Sanatan Dharma
Sabha, District Poonch. Petitioner No. 2 is an Advocate by
profession and is also a social activist, writer and opinion maker.
Petitioner No. 3 is a prominent citizen and social worker.
5. The petitioners have preferred the present writ petition being
aggrieved of the issuance of SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985 by the
respondents, whereby a list of Wakaf properties pertaining to eleven
villages of Tehsil Poonch was published.
Brief facts of the case:
6. It is the case of the petitioners that the SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985
was issued in violation of the provisions of the J&K Wakafs Act,
1978, particularly without conducting proper enquiry or preparing
the report as required under Section 4(3) of the Act, and according to
the petitioners, the respondents, by abuse of statutory powers,
included several lands and properties as Wakaf properties in an
illegal and fraudulent manner.
7. According to the petitioners, the general public, including the
petitioners and even certain Government departments, came to know
3|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
about the issuance and implications of the impugned SRO only in
March 2017, when the Administrator, Auqaf Islamia, issued an
eviction notice dated 24.03.2017 under Section 45 of the J&K
Wakafs Act, 2001, to the District Information Officer, Poonch,
alleging unauthorized occupation of land measuring 03 Kanals and
08 Marlas comprised in Khasra No. 1389, which was claimed by the
Wakaf Department to be Wakaf property.
8. The further case of the petitioners is similar eviction notices and
demands were also issued to other Government institutions,
including Government Degree College, Poonch, as well as to private
individuals, and in certain cases, rent was also demanded by the
Wakaf authorities on the basis of the impugned SRO.
9. Petitioners are particularly aggrieved by the inclusion of various
Government lands and public utility properties in the impugned
SRO, including Government Airfield Ground, Government Degree
College ground, Government Media Complex, Government Parade
Ground, Deputy Commissioner’s Office and residence, Government
schools, PWD roads, and other public lands, which, according to the
petitioners, were wrongly and fraudulently declared as Wakaf
properties.
10. It is also averred that the land measuring 08 Kanals and 07 Marlas
comprised in Khasra No. 1436, including land previously belonging
to the Forest Department and having a Fire Brigade Building, along
with additional vacant land measuring 05 Kanals and 13 Marlas, has
been illegally occupied by the Auqaf authorities without lawful
4|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
sanction or transfer in their favour. It is stated that the Deputy
Commissioner, Poonch, vide communication dated 02.11.2012,
recommended grant of additional land measuring 05 Kanals and 13
Marlas in favour of Eid Gah/Auqaf Committee, despite
acknowledging that certain lands notified under SRO 320 were
actually Government lands pertaining to public institutions and
utilities.
11. As per the stand of the petitioners, the said land belonged to the Raja
of Poonch and was later recorded as State land, and could not have
been declared as Wakaf property. It is alleged that the respondents,
in connivance with certain officials, managed to have these lands
recorded as Wakaf property in the revenue records, and have
initiated steps to assert possession over lands on which Government
institutions and public utilities are situated.
12. The petitioners further submit that, upon gaining knowledge of the
impugned SRO and its consequences, they submitted various
representations dated 11.01.2018, 06.02.2018 and 04.07.2018 before
the concerned authorities, seeking revocation of the impugned SRO
and conducting of a proper enquiry into the matter. Pursuant thereto,
the Deputy Commissioner, Poonch, constituted a committee vide
order dated 11.01.2018, which submitted its report to the authorities.
13. The petitioners also raised their grievances before the then Chief
Minister during a Public Durbar held at Poonch on 04.03.2018,
whereupon directions were issued to the concerned authorities to
examine the issue. However, according to the petitioners, no effective
5|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
action was taken by the respondents to redress their grievances.
Aggrieved of the issuance of impugned SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985, the
consequential revenue entries, communications, and actions taken by
the respondents asserting Wakaf ownership over various Government
and public lands, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of
the present writ petition.
14. The petitioners have challenged the impugned SRO and
consequential actions, inter alia, on the ground that the State cannot
confer illegal benefits on any particular class of persons on
communal or religious grounds, as the same would be violative of
the principle of secularism and the Right to Equality guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the
State cannot make improper discrimination by conferring privileges
upon a class of persons selected on religious considerations.
According to the petitioners, the respondents have acted arbitrarily
and in violation of constitutional guarantees by conferring benefits
upon a chosen class without lawful justification. It is further
contended that the impugned SRO and the impugned communication
are also inconsistent with the Directive Principles of State Policy,
particularly Articles 38(2) and 39(b) of the Constitution of India.
15. The petitioners have further pleaded that any governmental action
which fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest is
liable to be struck down as invalid, and that the State cannot act in a
manner which benefits a chosen group at the cost of public interest.
6|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
16. The petitioners have also contended that even matters of
governmental policy are subject to judicial review, and that any
action of the State which fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness
would be unconstitutional.
17. The further stand has been taken that the State authorities are bound
by the doctrine of public trust and are under an obligation to protect
public property and act in public interest, therefore, the impugned
SRO and consequential communications constitute an arbitrary and
unconstitutional exercise of power and are liable to be declared
illegal, null and void.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents:
18. Objections have been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2,
wherein it is their specific stand that SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985 was
issued strictly in accordance with the provisions of the J&K Wakafs
Act, 1978, and that the Wakaf properties existing in District Poonch
since decades were duly notified after following the prescribed
statutory procedure. It is further submitted that the said SRO was
published in the Government Gazette in the year 1985 and has
attained finality, and therefore, the petitioners cannot challenge the
same after an inordinate delay of more than three decades.
19. It is further submitted by the respondents that the Khasra numbers
mentioned by the petitioners are Wakaf properties, which have been
duly notified vide the impugned SRO, and that the allegations
regarding fraudulent inclusion or illegal entries in the revenue
records are incorrect and denied. It is also contended that the
7|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
petitioners have no personal or legal interest in the said properties
and, therefore, have no cause of action to challenge the same.
20. The respondents have further submitted that Wakaf properties,
including graveyards, shrines and Eidgahs, have existed since long
and were duly recognized and protected under law. It is submitted
that after the enactment of the Wakafs Act, surveys were conducted
and Wakaf properties were notified in accordance with law,
including through issuance of SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985.
21. It is stated that with regard to land measuring 5 Kanals and 13 Marlas
falling under Khasra No. 1436, the existing Eidgah was insufficient
to accommodate large gatherings for Eid prayers, and accordingly, a
proposal was submitted for extension of the Eidgah. It is submitted
that the additional land was provided for this purpose and that the
land is presently being used for religious purposes, and a Mosque,
namely Masjid Eidgah, has also been constructed thereupon.
22. The respondents have further contended that the Wakaf properties are
special properties recognized and protected under law, and that the
issuance of the impugned SRO and consequential revenue entries do
not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that
no illegal benefit has been conferred upon any person or group, and
that the impugned SRO was issued in conformity with the provisions
of the Wakafs Act, 1978 and the Constitution of India.
23. It is also submitted that the impugned SRO and consequential actions
have been undertaken in accordance with law and do not suffer from
any illegality, arbitrariness or unconstitutionality. The respondents
8|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
have denied that the impugned notification or subsequent actions
amount to conferment of undue benefit or constitute a colourable
exercise of power.
24. Respondent No. 3, i.e., Auqaf Islamia, Poonch, has also filed objections
to the writ petition, wherein preliminary objections have been raised
regarding the maintainability of the petition. It is contended that the
petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the instant writ petition, as
the properties in question are Wakaf properties and the petitioners have
no personal or legal interest in the same. It is submitted that no cause of
action has accrued to the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction of
this Court.
25. It is further submitted by respondent No. 3 that Auqaf Islamia is an
autonomous statutory body and does not fall within the definition of
“State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore,
the present writ petition is not maintainable against the answering
respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
26. Respondent No. 3 has also contended that the writ petition involves
disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon in writ
jurisdiction, and that the petition is liable to be dismissed on this
ground as well. It is further submitted that the impugned SRO dated
31.08.1985 has been challenged after an inordinate delay of more
than three decades, and as such, the petition is barred by delay and
laches and is liable to be dismissed.
27. It is further submitted that respondent No. 3, being a statutory
authority under the J&K Wakafs Act, 2001, is duty bound to protect
9|Page
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
Wakaf properties and is empowered to take action against
unauthorized occupants of such properties. It is submitted that
eviction notices issued under Section 45 of the Wakafs Act, 2001
were in accordance with law and within the jurisdiction of the
answering respondent.
28. Respondent No. 3 has also submitted that the Khasra numbers
mentioned by the petitioners are Wakaf properties which have been
duly notified and recorded as such. It is contended that the entries in
the revenue records were made in accordance with SRO 320 dated
31.08.1985, and that the Government had also issued necessary
circulars directing revenue authorities to update revenue records
accordingly.
29. However, with regard to the land measuring 5 Kanals and 13
Marlas comprised in Khasra No. 1436, same stand has been
taken by respondent No. 3 as is taken by respondents 1 and 2.
30. Respondent No. 3 has further submitted that Wakaf properties are
special properties recognized and protected under law, and that the
fact that certain portions of Wakaf properties were under occupation
of different Government departments or other authorities does not
alter the character of such properties. It is contended that respondent
No. 3 is legally bound to safeguard and protect Wakaf properties.
Legal Analysis:
31. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as
well as the material available on record.
10 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
32. The primary question which arises for consideration is whether the
present writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the petitioners
and whether the petitioners have the requisite locus standi to challenge
SRO 320 dated 31.08.1985 and the consequential actions taken
pursuant thereto.
33. From a bare perusal of the writ petition, it is evident that the
petitioners have neither pleaded nor demonstrated as to how any of
their legal, fundamental, or statutory rights have been infringed by
issuance of the impugned SRO or by the consequential actions taken
by the respondents. The pleadings are conspicuously silent with
regard to any personal, direct, or legally enforceable injury suffered
by the petitioners. In absence of infringement of any legally
protected right, the very foundation for invoking writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is rendered
unsustainable.
34. It is a settled principle of law that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is
primarily meant for enforcement of legal rights and cannot be invoked
at the instance of persons who are mere strangers to the subject matter
of dispute. The petitioners have not placed on record any material to
establish their legal interest in the properties in question, which are
admittedly notified as Wakaf properties. Mere assertion that petitioner
No. 1 is President of a Sabha, petitioner No. 2 is a social activist, and
petitioner No. 3 is a prominent citizen, does not confer upon them any
enforceable legal right so as to maintain the present writ petition. In
such circumstances, the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved
11 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
persons having the locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this
Court.
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs.
State of Maharashtra and others‘, 2013 SCC 4 465, has held that
the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked only by an
aggrieved person whose legal or statutory right has been infringed,
and not by a stranger having no enforceable legal right by holding as
under:
“Person aggrieved
7. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted
to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the authority/court,
that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person
who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the
act/action/order, etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of
enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the
appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of
the authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right
available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is
resorted to. The Court can, of course, enforce the performance of a
statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest
of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a
legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is
a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It
is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the
relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the
existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said
jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must
ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of
infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards
the same. [Vide The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta. AIR 1952
SC 12, Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P AIR 1954 SC 728, Calcutta Gas Co.
12 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550(Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B AIR 1962 SC 1044, Rajendra
Singh v. State of M.P (1996) 5 SCC 460, AIR 1996 SC 2736 and Tamilnad
Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn. (2) v. S.C Sekar (2009) 2
SCC 784.]
9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai (2008) 5 SCC
217, AIR 2008 SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court,
observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per
requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved
regarding the election or the selection of other persons.
12. In A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P (2011) 7 SCC 616, AIR 2011 SC
3031, this Court held:
“25. … The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and
an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a
rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning
depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and
intent of the statute of which the contravention is alleged, the
specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the
complainant’s interest and the nature and the extent of the
prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.”
36. This Court also finds merit in the preliminary objections raised by the
respondents that the petitioners lack locus standi to maintain the
present petition. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate any
personal, legal, or enforceable right in respect of the subject matter
of the writ petition. No material has been placed on record to show
that any legal injury has been caused to them or that any cause of
action has accrued in their favour. In absence of infringement of any
legal right, the petitioners cannot be held to be aggrieved persons so
as to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
37. The Hon’ble Apex Court in ‘Kishore Samrite vs. State of U.P. and
others‘, (2013) SCC 2 398, has held as under:
13 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550“52. On the analysis of the above principles, it is clear that a person
who brings a petition even for invocation of a fundamental right
must be a person having some direct or indirect interest in the
outcome of the petition on his behalf or on behalf of some person
under a disability and/or unable to have access to the justice
system for patent reasons. Still, such a person must act bona fide
and without abusing the process of law. Where a person is a
stranger/unknown to the parties and has no interest in the
outcome of the litigation, he can hardly claim locus standi to file
such petition. There could be cases where a public-spirited person
bona fide brings petition in relation to violation of fundamental
rights, particularly in habeas corpus petitions, but even in such
cases, the person should have some demonstrable interest or
relationship to the involved persons, personally or for the benefit of
the public at large, in a PIL. But in all such cases, it is essential that
the petitioner must exhibit bona fides, by truthful and cautious
exercise of such right. The courts would be expected to examine
such requirement at the threshold of the litigation in order to
prevent abuse of process of court. In the present case, both the
appellant and Respondent 8 are total strangers to the three
mentioned petitioners. The appellant, in fact, is a resident of
Madhya Pradesh, belonging to a political party and was elected
from Constituency Tehsil Lanji in District Balaghat at
Madhya Pradesh. He has no roots in Amethi and, in fact, he was a
stranger to that place. The appellant as well as Respondent 8 did
not even know that the persons on whose behalf they have acted
as next friend had shifted their residence in the year 2010 to
Hardoia in District Faizabad. They have made false averments in
the petition and have withheld true facts from the Court.”
38. Similarly, in ‘Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar and
others‘, (1976) SCC 1 671, has held as under:
“34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order
to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a14 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the
application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas
corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other
words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or
prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is
necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter,
(see The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta. AIR 1952 SC 12,
1952 SCR 28; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B AIR 1962 SC 1044,
1962 Supp (3) SCR 1; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board
of Revenue, Orissa (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadde Venkateswara Rao v.
Government of A.P AIR 1966 SC 828, (1966) 2 SCR 172; State of
Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall (1973) 3 SCC
739; Satyanarayana Sinha Dr v. S. Lal & Co. (1973) 2 SCC 696).”
39. Applying the aforesaid settled legal principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners
have failed to establish any legal right or legally protected interest in
respect of the subject matter of the writ petition. The petition,
therefore, suffers from lack of locus standi and is not maintainable.
40. Apart from the issue of locus standi, this Court also finds that the writ
petition involves serious disputed questions of fact relating to the
nature, character, and ownership of the properties in question, and
the validity of revenue entries made pursuant to the impugned SRO.
Such questions require appreciation of evidence and adjudication
upon disputed factual issues, which cannot be undertaken in exercise
of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Board of Wakf, West Bengal vs.
Anis Fatma Begum and another‘, 2010 SCC 14 588, held as
under:
15 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550“10. In our opinion, all matters pertaining to Wakfs should be
filed in the first instance before the Wakf Tribunal constituted
under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and should not be
entertained by the Civil Court or by the High Court straightaway
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
42. Another significant aspect which renders the present writ petition
liable to be dismissed is the inordinate and unexplained delay in
challenging the impugned SRO. The impugned SRO was issued on
31.08.1985 and has remained in force for more than three decades.
The present writ petition has been filed after an extraordinary lapse
of time without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for such
delay.
43. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable in
nature, and a person who approaches the Court after an inordinate and
unexplained delay is not entitled to invoke such extraordinary
jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Mrinmoy Maity vs
Chhanda Koley and others“, Civil Appeal No. 5027/2024, decided
on 18.04.2024, has held that writ petitions filed after considerable and
unexplained delay are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches alone by holding as under:
“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the
facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view
that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other
words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of
delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court
belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable
period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be
granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time
and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one16 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while
exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the
applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift
away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed
cause of action.”
44. Similarly, in ‘Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage
Board and others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, has
held as under:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation
offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or
pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances
delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who
knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the
basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time”
and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a
phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
Conclusion:
45. In the present case, the impugned notification has attained finality
over a long period of time, and entertaining such belated challenge
17 | P a g e
2026:JKLHC-JMU:550
would unsettle settled rights and legal positions, which is
impermissible in law.
46. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and without entering into the
merits of the controversy, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the petitioners have failed to establish that they are aggrieved persons
having the requisite locus standi to maintain the present writ petition.
The writ petition is, accordingly, held to be not maintainable.
47. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed along with all
connected applications, if any.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Jammu:
25.02.2026
Michal Sharma/PSWhether approved for reporting : Yes/No
Whether order is speaking : Yes18 | P a g e
