Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Dinesh Soni on 10 March, 2026
1
Digitally signed
RAGHVENDRA by
2026:CGHC:11359-DB
JAT RAGHVENDRA
JAT
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 102 of 2012
• State Of Chhattisgarh, through the District Magistrate District
Korba, C.G. ... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Dinesh Soni S/o Netalal Soni Aged About 24 Years R/o.
Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
2. Ashok Choudhari S/o Chhotelal Choudhari Aged About 28 Years
R/o. Shanti Nagar, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
3. Vijay Kumar S/o Dhaniram Manjhawar Aged About 25 Years R/o.
Padimar, Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
4. Dilip Baghel S/o S/o. Bahoran Baghel Aged About 24 Years R/o.
Bhadarapara, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
5. Raju Uike S/o Shiv Prasad Pradhan Aged About 23 Years R/o.
Sector 2, B, 308, Balco Nagar, Korba (C.G.).
6. Montu Khalkho S/o S/o. Anad Pal Aged About 23 Years R/o. Sada
Colony, Balco Nagar, Police Station Kotwali, District - Korba
(C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
2
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Kanwaljeet Singh Saini, Dy. G.A.
For Respondent(s) No. 6 : Ms. Aditi Joshi, Advocate.
DB: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal and
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Judgment on Board
Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
10/03/2026
1. This acquittal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State
against the judgment dated 3.1.2011 passed by the learned 2 nd
Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C, District-Korba, (C.G.), in S.T.
No. 87/2010 by which respondents herein has been acquitted of
the charges punishable under Sections 395 and 412 of IPC.
2. Brief facts of the case, is that, the complainant, Saman Singh,
lodged a report at Police Station Balco on 12.02.2010 at about
21:00 hours stating that he is a resident of Village Risdi and earns
his livelihood by doing labour work. He reported that on
12.01.2010, while he was returning to his house at Risdi on his
motorcycle bearing registration No. CG-12-A-5631 along with his
companion Ramnarayan, at about 7:00 PM, when they reached
near Risdi Nala, three persons riding a motorcycle intercepted
them on the road. The said persons threatened them by stating
that they would beat them and thereafter assaulted and
intimidated them, demanding that the motorcycle be handed over
to them. Out of fear and under coercion, the complainant was
compelled to give them the motorcycle bearing registration No.
CG-12-A-5631, after which the three persons fled away from the
3
spot along with the motorcycle. The incident was witnessed by
Ramnarayan Kanwar and Jai Singh, who were present at the time
of occurrence, and the complainant stated that he would be able
to identify the assailants if they were produced before him. On the
basis of the said report, Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe
registered an offence under Sections 384/34 of the Indian Penal
Code. During the course of investigation, on 20.02.2010 the
memorandum statement of accused Dinesh Soni was recorded by
Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe in the presence of witnesses
Jai Singh and Moti Lal. On 13.02.2010, the motorcycle was seized
from the complainant Saman Singh in the presence of witnesses
Ramnarayan and Jai Singh. Thereafter, on 14.02.2010, the
memorandum statement of accused Dilip Baghel was recorded by
Sub-Inspector Dilip Baghel in the presence of witnesses Jai Singh
and Ramnarayan, and on the same date Sub-Inspector Divakar
Upadhyay conducted the seizure proceedings of motorcycle
bearing registration No. CG-12-A-5631 in the presence of the said
witnesses. Subsequently, on 30.04.2010, an identification parade
was conducted by the Additional Tehsildar, Sonit Meria, wherein
the complainant Saman Singh identified accused Dinesh, Ashok
and U.K. Raju. Further, on 14.02.2010, the accused persons
namely Dinesh Soni, Ashok Choudhary, Vijay Kumar, Dilip Baghel,
Raju and Bhodu were arrested by Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip
Dhirhe. On 28.04.2010, a proclamation of absconding was
prepared against accused Suresh Yadav by Sub-Inspector Dilip
4
Dhirhe in the presence of witnesses Shravan Ratre and
Jagannath Prasad. The statements of Ramnarayan, Jai Singh,
Ramkumar Lahare and the complainant Saman Singh were
recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on
13.02.2010 by Assistant Sub-Inspector Dilip Dhirhe. Upon
completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections
395 and 412 of the Indian Penal Code was prepared against the
accused persons and was filed on 11.05.2010 before the Court of
Smt. Saroj Nand Das, who thereafter committed the case to the
Court of the learned Sessions Judge on 20.08.2010. The case
was subsequently received by this Court on transfer on the said
date, and thereafter charges under Sections 395 and 412 of the
Indian Penal Code were framed against the accused persons on
22.10.2010, which were duly read over and explained to them;
however, the accused persons denied the charges and pleaded
not guilty, thereby necessitating the trial.
3. So as to hold the accused/respondents guilty, the prosecution has
examined as many as 9 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents.
The statement of the accused persons/respondents was also
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which they denied
the charges levelled against them and pleaded innocence and
false implication in the case.
4. After appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the
learned trial Court found that the prosecution has failed to prove
5
its case beyond reasonable doubt and by the impugned judgment
dated 3.1.2011, acquitted the accused persons/respondents from
the aforesaid charges. Hence, this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned
trial Court has committed a serious error of law in acquitting the
accused persons/respondents. It is contended that the trial Court
has failed to properly appreciate and consider the material
evidence available on record and has consequently passed the
impugned judgment of acquittal in a palpably illegal and erroneous
manner. Learned counsel further submits that the complainant,
Saman Singh (PW-1), who is also the victim in the present case,
has categorically deposed regarding the commission of the
offence and has clearly supported the prosecution case in his
testimony. Despite such clear and cogent evidence, and further
despite the fact that the accused persons were subjected to Test
Identification Parade vide Ex. P/2, the trial Court has erroneously
acquitted the respondents/accused persons. It is also submitted
that the trial Court has unjustifiably disbelieved the statements of
Ramnarayan (PW-7) and Jai Singh (PW-9), who have also
categorically narrated the incident and have supported the
prosecution version in their evidence, thereby rendering the
impugned judgment unsustainable in the eyes of law. However,
the acquittal recorded by the trial Court is based on improper
appreciation of evidence, as the material evidence produced by
6
the prosecution has been overlooked, resulting in an erroneous
judgment. Hence, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 6 submits
that the FIR was initially lodged against three unknown persons
and, thereafter, during the course of investigation, the concerned
police authorities filed the charge-sheet against the accused
persons/respondents for the commission of the offence of robbery
without there being any cogent or reliable material evidence
against them. It is further submitted that the allegations made by
the complainant, Saman Singh (PW-1), do not corroborate with
the statements of Ramnarayan (PW-7) and Jai Singh (PW-9), and
there exist material omissions and contradictions in their
testimonies. Learned counsel also contends that the alleged
memorandum and seizure have not been duly proved in
accordance with law and the prosecution has failed to establish
the same through reliable evidence. It is further argued that the
FIR itself was lodged after an inordinate and unexplained delay of
about 20 days, which casts serious doubt on the prosecution
case. Moreover, the Test Identification Parade was neither
conducted properly nor proved by the witnesses during trial. In
view of these significant infirmities and inconsistencies in the
prosecution evidence, it is submitted that the learned trial Court
has rightly acquitted the accused persons/respondents and the
impugned judgment of acquittal does not call for any interference
by this Court.
7
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
8. The Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in
cases of acquittal in several matters and has passed several
guidelines for considering the appeals arising out of acquittal of
accused persons in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs.
State of Kerala1 has considered the scope of interference in
Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-
“25. While dealing with an appeal against
acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the
appellate court has to consider whether the
trial court’s view can be terms as a possible
one, particularly when evidence on record
has been analysed. The reason is that an
order of acquittal adds up to the presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus,
the appellate court has to be relatively slow
in reversing the order of the trial court
rendering acquittal. Therefore, the
presumption in favour of the accused does
not get weakened but only strengthened.
Such a double presumption that enures in
favour of the accused has to be disturbed
only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted
legal parameters.”
9. In the matter of Kali Ram vs State of H.P. 2, the Supreme Court
has held in para 25 which reads as under:-
1 (2022) 8 SCC 440
2 (1973) 2 SCC 808
8“25.Another golden thread which runs through
the web of the administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one
pointing to the guilt of the accused and the
other to his innocence, the view which is
favorable to the accused should be adopted.
This principle has a special relevance in cases
where the guilt of the accused is sought to be
established by circumstantial evidence.”
10. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024
(Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors.
Versus State of Karnataka has held in para 36 as under:-
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially
based on the promise that no innocent shall be
condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the
jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended
to prevent any failure of justice. The principles
which come into play while deciding an appeal
from acquittal could be summarized as:-
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core
element of a criminal trial and such
appreciation must be comprehensive–
inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of
evidence may result in a miscarriage of
justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of
evidence, finds that two views are possible,
9the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally
plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary
view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse
the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of
evidence, it must specifically address all the
reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal
and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to
conviction, the appellate Court must
demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of
law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.
11. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Surendra Singh and
another v. State of Uttarakhand 3, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has
been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of
acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on
misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka,
(2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one
of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion
to consider the legal position with regard to the scope
of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was
observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the
principles laid down by this Court governing the3 2025 5 SCC 433
10scope of interference by the High Court in an
appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal
of the accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar
[Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal
position covering the field after considering various
earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-
83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of
acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa
case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4
SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432,
para 42
42. From the above decisions, in our
considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an
order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts
no limitation, restriction or condition on
exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions of fact and
of law.
11
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”, “very strong circumstances”,
“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of “flourishes of language”
to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail
the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall
be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are
possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
court.’ ”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023)
3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles
12governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8)“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an
appeal against acquittal, is entitled to
reappreciate the oral and documentary
evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an
appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating
the evidence, is required to consider whether
the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view which could have been taken on the
basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was
also possible; and8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the
order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding
that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on
record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no
other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers
13from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record; and41.3. That no two reasonable views are
possible and only the view consistent with the
guilt of the accused is possible from the
evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that
the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the
learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court
only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and that no two
reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent
with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence
available on record.”
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tulasareddi @
Mudakappa and another vs. The State of Karnataka & others,
2026 SCC Online SC 89, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:-
“27. In the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149 this Court
held in paragraphs 39 to 42 as under:
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar
[Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC
471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the
legal position covering the field after considering
14various earlier judgments and held as below:
(SCC pp.482-83, para 29)
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments,
this Court culled out the following general
principles regarding the powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal
against an order of acquittal in the following
words: (Chandrappacase [Chandrappa v.
State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 :
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para
42)
’42. From the above decisions, in our
considered view, the following general
principles regarding powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full
power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 puts no limitation, restriction
15or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate court on
the evidence before it may reach
its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as,
“substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail
extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in
the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to
interfere with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to
review the evidence and to come to
its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however,
must bear in mind that in case of
16acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty
by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial
court.’
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023)
3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
17dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378
CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is
required to consider whether the view taken by the trial
court is a possible view which could have been taken
on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate court for reversing the
18
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accu
Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522
sed is possible from the evidence available on record.
42. The appellate court, in order to interfere with the
judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent
findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse
the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court.
28. In the case of Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20)
SCC 522, this Court has observed and held in para 19 & 20 as
under:
“19. In a case like this when the trial court acquitted the
accused persons of their charges, the High Court could
not have reversed the finding merely on the basis that
other view, as recorded by the High Court, appeared to
19it to be a plausible view. Such an approach by the High
Court, against the judgment of the acquittal, is
impermissible. In this context, we may usefully refer to
Kalyan v. State of U.P. [Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9
SCC 632 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 780] wherein it was held :
(SCC pp. 640-41, paras 15, 18 & 20)
“15. … The view taken by the trial court could have
been disturbed only if there were compelling reasons.
We do not find any compelling reason noticed [State of
U.P. v. Hari Lal, 1998 SCC OnLine All 1216 : 1999 All
LJ 142] by the High Court while setting aside the order
of acquittal.
18. Even if another view regarding the occurrence
was possible, as taken by the High Court, the same
could not be made a basis for setting aside the order
of the trial court in view of the settled position of law
on the point.
20. Under the circumstances, the appeal is allowed
by setting aside the judgment of the High Court
convicting the accused persons and sentencing
them to various imprisonments including life
imprisonment. We uphold the order of acquittal
passed by the trial court in favour of the appellants.”
20. In another judgment in Basappa v. State of Karnataka
20
[Basappa v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 154 : (2014) 2
SCC (Cri) 497], this Court noticed plethora of judgments where
this very principle had been adopted, as can be seen from the
following discussion therefrom : (SCC pp. 158-61, paras 11-12,
14 &; 17-18)
“11. In Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana [Bhim Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
1469], it has been clarified that interference by the
appellate court against an order of acquittal would be
justified only if the view taken by the trial court is one
which no reasonable person would in the given
circumstances, take.
12. In Kallu v. State of M.P. [Kallu v. State of M.P., (2006)
10 SCC 313 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 546], it has been held
by this Court that if the view taken by the trial court is a
plausible view, the High Court will not be justified in
reversing it merely because a different view is possible….
14. In Ganpat v. State of Haryana [Ganpat v. State of
Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 59 :(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 309],
SCC para 15, some of the above principles have been
restated. To quote : (SCC p. 62)
’15. The following principles have to be kept in mind by
the appellate court while dealing with appeals, particularly,
against an order of acquittal:
21
(iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling
reason for interference.’
17. … It is not the stand of the High Court that there had
been some miscarriage of justice in the way the trial
court has appreciated the evidence. On the contrary, it is
the only stand of the High Court that on the available
evidence, another view is also reasonably possible in the
sense that the appellant-accused could have been
convicted. In such circumstances, the High Court was not
justified in reversing the acquittal….
18. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
[State of Karnataka v. Basappa, 2010 SCC OnLine Kar
5110] is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.”
13. From the bare perusal of the record, it appears that, firstly, the FIR
was lodged after an inordinate delay of about 20 days from the
date of the alleged incident, and no satisfactory or plausible
explanation for such delay has been furnished by the prosecution.
Secondly, the FIR was initially registered against three unknown
persons and, therefore, a Test Identification Parade was
conducted during the course of investigation, however, the same
does not appear to have been conducted in accordance with the
settled principles of law. The Test Identification Parade has not
22
been properly proved and suffers from procedural irregularities,
thereby diminishing its evidentiary value. Furthermore, the entire
prosecution evidence appears to be shaky and unreliable in
nature, containing several inconsistencies and deficiencies. In
view of these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned
trial Court committed any error of law or perversity in appreciating
the evidence on record while acquitting the accused
persons/respondents herein, and therefore the impugned
judgment of acquittal does not warrant any interference.
14. This Court finds no illegality in the order impugned acquitting the
respondents particularly when there is a settled legal position that
if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere
with the judgment of acquittal, even otherwise, the prosecution
thus has utterly failed in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt
and the trial Court has fully justified in recording the finding of
acquittal which is based on proper appreciation of evidence
available on record.
15. In such facts and evidence, the trial court has, thus, not committed
any illegality in acquitting the respondents for the commission of
the alleged crime.
16. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/State is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Raghu Jat
