Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 12.03.2026 vs Of on 20 March, 2026
2026:HHC:7982
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MP(M) No. 282 of 2026
.
Reserved on: 12.03.2026
Date of Decision: 20.03.2026
Parveen ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr Yug Singhal, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 150 of 2025, dated 14.09.2025,
registered at Police Station Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P,
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and
29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
(hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that the police had recovered
1.30 kgs of charas from the car of the main accused. The
.
petitioner was arrested based on the suspicion that he was
involved in the commission of the crime. The allegations against
the petitioner are false, and there is nothing to connect the
petitioner to the present case. The petitioner was arrested on
of
14.09.2025. The investigation is complete, and the police have
filed the charge sheet on 12.11.2025. The matter is listed for
rt
consideration of the charge on 21.04.2026. The prosecution has
cited 20 witnesses, and their examination would take a
considerable time. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family,
and his family would suffer in his absence. The petitioner would
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had set up a nakka at Balloh Toll Plaza
on 14.09.2025at about 6:30 PM and were checking the vehicles. A
vehicle bearing registration No. T0725HR2992 BD came to the
spot at about 7:15 am. The police signalled the driver to stop, but
he tried to speed away. The police stopped the vehicle and
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demanded the documents from the driver. However, he could not
produce any document. He also could not give any reason for
.
trying to speed away. The police associated Pramod Kumar as an
independent person and enquired about the names and addresses
of the occupants of the vehicle. The driver identified himself as
Sandeep, and the person sitting in the front seat identified
of
himself as Praveen (the present petitioner). The police checked
the vehicle and recovered a carry bag kept beneath the front
rt
passenger’s seat. The police checked the carry bag and recovered
1kg and 30 grams of charas. The police seized the charas and
arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to the
SFSL, and as per the analysis, it was confirmed to be an abstract
of cannabis and a sample of charas. The police filed the charge
sheet before the Court on 12.11.2025. The matter is listed before
the learned Trial Court on 21.04.2026. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr Yug Singhal, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State.
5. Mr Yug Singhal, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
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implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime, and his further detention is not
.
justified. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
of
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in
possession of a commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of
rt
Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The
petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be::: Downloaded on – 20/03/2026 20:42:03 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:7982considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the.
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
of
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
rt
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
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thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
.
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
of
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
rt
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the
grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
.
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
of
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
rt
to have guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed theoffence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
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(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
.
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
of
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
rt
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sightof the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous orvexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported byreasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-Ã -vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
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261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
.
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offencesof
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
rt
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. The status report mentions that the police had
recovered a carry bag kept beneath the front passenger’s seat,
which contained 1 kg 30 grams of charas. The petitioner and the
driver belong to the same village. They were found at a distance
from their native place. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7
SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the
contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all
the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of
the contraband. It was observed:
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“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record.
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a
vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to
each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to
how they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
of
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
rt
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may
carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the
Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition
of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in
the context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
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498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother’s flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
.
be considered to be in possession of the same.
(See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976
QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
of
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from
possession of illicit articles.
rt
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
12. Therefore, the prosecution’s version that the
petitioner was found in possession of 1 kg 30 grams of charas has
to be prima facie accepted as correct.
13. The Central Government has notified 1 Kilogram of
charas as a commercial quantity. Therefore, the petitioner was
found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and the
rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case.
14. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and
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is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
.
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
of
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
rt
unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he isnot likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
15. This Section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was observed:
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“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:
.
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
of
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
rt
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
16. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder
case, the accused commits the murder of one or two
persons, while those persons who are dealing in::: Downloaded on – 20/03/2026 20:42:03 :::CIS
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2026:HHC:7982narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or
in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent
young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes.
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they
are released temporarily, in all probability, they
would continue their nefarious activities oftrafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants
clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with theof
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy.
Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
rt 24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld andthe clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among asizeable section of the public, particularly the
adolescents and students of both sexes and the
menace has assumed serious and alarmingproportions in the recent years. Therefore, in
order to effectively control and eradicate thisproliferating and booming devastating
menace, causing deleterious effects and adeadly impact on society as a whole,
Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective
provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985
specifying mandatory minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
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(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
.
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not abiding
by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the
release of the respondent accused on bail.
Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic consequences
of
and health hazards which would accompany
trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the
court should implement the law in the spirit
with which Parliament, after due deliberation,
rt has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires the existence of
such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High
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Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying
object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations
provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time
.
being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal
approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed
uncalled for.”
17. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
of
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24
rt
or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of
this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv
Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505],
held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this
reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of
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satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
.
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
of
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
rt
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para
7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, which depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
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and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
.
and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused has not committed an offence and
whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.
of
Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the
NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the
grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
18.
rt
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 ofthe NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid downtherein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any such
offence while on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow: —
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
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(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
.
be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19 or section 24 or
section 27A, and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless-
of
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
rt application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on
bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
19. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
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2026:HHC:7982ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)
(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus: —
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
.
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
of
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus: —
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
rt
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs andpsychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on NarcoticDrugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with
regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it
was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
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grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail it was held therein that they are
.
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under
of
the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that
the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that
the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
rt
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act.
Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the
mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for
granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be
avoided while passing orders on such applications.”
20. In the present case, the prosecution has collected
sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioner with the
commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to show
that the petitioner will not indulge in the commission of an
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offence if released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the twin
conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
.
21. It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner, as he
of
is prima facie involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
rt
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act involving
the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the rule and its
grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of
this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is
punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, theaccused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of
bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While
considering the application for bail, the court has to bear
in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
which are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings
as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting
bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said
Act.”
22. It was submitted that the petitioner was arrested on
15.09.2025, and the trial is likely to take some time. The
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petitioner should not be kept behind bars till the conclusion of
the trial. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid
.
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K.
Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the
ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin
conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
of
observed: –
rt
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of thealleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory thresholdunder Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusionof this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control andantecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
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22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
.
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”
of
23. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo
Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
rt
wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is therecovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but
the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal thecontraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensingwith the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”
24. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the
ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the
requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
25. No other point was urged.
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26. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to
bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
.
27. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
rt Judge
20th March, 2026
(Nikita)
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