Criminal Procedure Code vs State Of Odisha on 27 February, 2026

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    Orissa High Court

    Criminal Procedure Code vs State Of Odisha on 27 February, 2026

    Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

    Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

                                                                        Signature Not Verified
                                                                        Digitally Signed
                                                                        Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                                        Reason: Authentication
                                                                        Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
                                                                        CUTTACK
                                                                        Date: 18-Mar-2026 10:22:36
    
    
    
    
                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
    
                                 CRLA No.154 of 2025
           (In the matter of an application under Section 415(2) of Bharatiya
           Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 corresponding to Section 374(2) of
           Criminal Procedure Code, 1973).
           Mana Challan                               ....              Appellant (s)
                                           -versus-
    
           State of Odisha                            ....             Respondent (s)
    
         Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
    
           For Appellant (s)           :               Mr. PVS Nanaji Achary, Adv.
    
    
           For Respondent (s)          :                   Ms. Sarita Moharana, ASC
                                                                                   .
                     CORAM:
                     DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
    
                         DATE OF HEARING:-20.02.2026
                        DATE OF JUDGMENT:-27.02.2026
         Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
    

    1. The Appellant has filed the instant Criminal Appeal under Section

    374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973/ Section 415(2) of

    SPONSORED

    Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, invoking the appellate

    jurisdiction of this Court. The appeal is preferred against the

    Judgment dated 08.08.2024 passed by the learned Ad hoc Additional

    District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Special Court, Jeypore, in

    connection with T.R. Case No. 146 of 2017 arising out of Jeypore

    Mahila P.S. Case No. 56 of 2016, whereby the appellant was convicted

    for the offences under Section 376(2)(n)of Indian Penal Code and was

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    Date: 18-Mar-2026 10:22:36

    sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay

    fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine undergo rigorous

    imprisonment for two months.

    I.    FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
    
     2.   The brief facts of the case are as follows:
    
          (i)     The informant, being the mother of the victim, lodged a written
    
    

    report before the Inspector-in-charge of Jeypore Mahila P.S., on

    the basis of which a case registered under Section 376(2)(n),

    506,34,109 of IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

    (ii) The Appellant and Victim belong to the same village and were

    well acquainted with each other prior to the alleged occurrence.

    It is the prosecution case that in the month of Magha, 2016,

    during the night hours, the Appellant came to the house of the

    Victim, induced and seduced the her on the promise of

    marriage, and on such assurance, established sexual intercourse

    with her.

    (iii) It is further alleged that the Appellant continued the physical

    relationship for a considerable period of time, as a result of

    which the victim became pregnant. The informant, upon

    noticing the physical symptoms indicative of pregnancy, being

    questioned the victim, whereupon she discloses the entire

    incident and attributed the same to the Appellant.

    (iv) Thereupon, the Victim was taken to the hospital for medical care

    and on 03.01.2016 she delivered a female child. Subsequently, on

    07.11.2016, a village meeting was convened in which the family

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    Date: 18-Mar-2026 10:22:36

    members of the Appellant were present. It is alleged that during

    the said meeting, the family members of the Appellant refused

    to accept the victim and the child, and further demanded a sum

    of Rs 3000/- from the informant for not disclosing the incident to

    thers.

    (v) Thereafter, the I.O. conducted a detailed investigation into the

    matter and submitted the chargesheet before the competent

    Court. Upon perusal of the materials, the learned Trial Court

    took cognizance of the offence and the trial commenced. After

    due consideration of the evidence, the Appellant was found

    guilty of committing the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC

    and was convicted to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10

    years and to pay a fine of Rs 5000/- and in default of payment of

    the fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period

    of two months.

    Being aggrieved by the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the

    Petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court by way of the

    present criminal appeal.

    II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:

    3. The learned counsel for the Appellant respectfully and earnestly made

    the following submissions in support of his contentions:

    (i) The Appellant contends that the judgment of conviction and the

    order of sentence passed by the learned Ad-Hoc Additional

    District and Sessions Judge, Jeypore, in T.R. No. 146 of 2017,

    whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to

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    undergo rigorous imprisonment along with imposition of fine, is

    wholly erroneous, contrary to law, and unsustainable on the

    facts of the case. The Appellant submits that the said judgment

    and order are liable to be set aside in the inherent of justice.

    (ii) The Appellant further submits that the learned Trial Court has

    failed to properly appreciate the materials and evidences

    available on record and, as a consequence, erroneously recorded

    the conviction. It is contended that the learned Court below did

    not apply the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence and

    the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence,

    resulting in a judgment that is legally unsustainable and liable to

    be set aside.

    (iii) The Appellant contends that the informant (P.W.1), who is the

    mother of the victim, has admitted in her deposition that she

    was unaware of the contents of the F.I.R., and that the report

    was prepared by an Advocate. The Appellant submits that such

    admission casts serious doubt on the veracity and authenticity

    of the prosecution case.

    (iv) The Appellant further contends that the learned Trial Court

    acquitted him of the allegation under POCSO Act and convicted

    the accused under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. It is submitted that,

    as per the ossification test, the victim was a major at the time of

    the alleged incident, which led to his acquittal under Section 6 of

    the POCSO Act, and consequently, the conviction under Section

    376(2)(n) IPC is liable to be reconsidered.

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    (v) The Appellant further submits that the learned Trial Court

    ought to have considered that no stage during the alleged

    relationship was any force applied upon the victim. It is

    contended that the relationship between the Appellant and the

    victim was entirely consensual, and, as such, the provision of

    Section 376 of IPC are not attracted.

    (vi) The Appellant contends that the P.W.2, the Victim, has admitted

    in her deposition that the Appellant maintained a physical

    relationship with her for over a prolonged period on the

    assurance of marriage. It is further submitted that the victim

    herself admitted that she did not disclose her pregnancy to her

    mother and only informed her after a period of six months. The

    Appellant submits that such admission indicate concealment on

    part of the victim and cast doubt on the prosecution narrative.

    (vii) The Appellant submits that he and the Victim were involved in

    a love relationship of wholly consensual nature. It is further

    contended that the Appellant never disputed the paternity of the

    child during the course of the trial, which remains undisputed,

    thereby underscoring the consensual character of the

    relationship.

    III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:

    4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent earnestly made the

    submission that the present CRLA deserves to be rejected in limine.

    (i) The Respondent submits that, the learned Trial Court, upon

    proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence

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    available on record, has rightly passed the impugned judgment

    of conviction and order of sentence against the Appellant. The

    findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are well-reasoned,

    based on cogent and credible evidence. Therefore, it is humbly

    prayed that the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by

    the learned Trial Court be upheld and the appeal preferred by

    the Appellant be dismissed.

    (ii) It is vehemently contented on behalf of the Respondent that the

    prosecution has successfully established the commission of the

    offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC by adducing cogent and

    reliable evidences, proving the case beyond all reasonable

    doubts.

    (iii) It is further submitted that the testimony of the victim, is in

    itself, sufficient to sustain the conviction. The same stands duly

    corroborated by the evidence of other prosecution witnesses as

    well as the surrounding circumstances brought on record.

    Hence, the learned Trial Court has rightly arrived at the

    conclusion that the Appellant had committed the offence as

    alleged.

    (iv) The Respondent submits that the informant being a widow, had

    gone to her native village and remained there for a period of

    seven months. Upon her return, she observed that the victim’s

    menstruation had ceased. Concerned about the situation, she

    took the victim to a medical practitioner at Kotpad, who, upon

    examination, opined that the victim was pregnant.

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    (v) The Respondent further submits that, upon being questioned by

    the informant, the victim disclosed the occurrence and stated

    that the Appellant had been frequently visiting her residence

    and had maintained a physical relationship with her under the

    pretext of marrying her.

    (vi) Thereafter, the informed organized a village meeting to seek a

    resolution of the matter, in which the accused and his family

    were present. It is submitted that the accused and his family

    refused to acknowledge the parentage of the child born to the

    victim, and notwithstanding such denial, the victim proceeded

    to give birth to the child.

    (vii) The Respondent submits that when the Appellant refused to

    agree to a resolution at the village meeting, the Informant

    lodged a report at the P.S. Subsequent investigation was

    conducted, a chargesheet was filed, and cognizance was taken

    by the learned Court. Upon conclusion of the trail, the Appellant

    was found guilty of the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

    IV. FINDINGS OF THE AD HOC ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE
    (FAST TRACK SPECIAL COURT ), JEYPORE:

    5. The learned Trial Court framed charges under Sections 376(2)(i),

    396(2)(n), 506 of the Indian Penal Code r/w Section 6 of the POCSO

    Act. The allegations in the chargesheet were that the accused had

    repeatedly committed rape upon a minor victim, who was under 16

    years of age, against her will and without her consent; had committed

    criminal intimidation by threatening the victim with injury to her

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    person with intent to cause alarm to her; and had sexually assaulted

    the minor victim repeatedly.

    6. Upon conclusion of the trial and a careful appraisal of the evidence on

    record, this Court notes that the accused was convicted under Section

    376(2)(n) of IPC. The conviction is premised, inter alia, on the

    ossification test, which established that the victim was a major at the

    relevant time. Consequently, the provisions of POCSO Act,2012 were

    not attracted, and the conviction under Section 376(2)(n) alone was

    upheld.

    7. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on

    record, the learned Trial Court held that sufficient materials were

    available to substantiate the charges framed against the accused. On a

    careful evaluation of the testimonies of the victim, the medical officers

    and the Investigating Officers, the learned Trial Court arrived at the

    conclusions that the accused has committed rape with impression to

    her to marry her. Accordingly, the Trial Court held that the charges

    under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC as well as Section 8 of POCSO Act

    stood proved.

    8. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the learned Trial Court

    concluded that the prosecution had successfully established the

    offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC. Consequently, the accused was

    convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

    period of 10 years and pay fine of Rs 5,000/- in default whereof he

    shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months.

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    V. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

    9. Upon bestowing anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival

    submissions advanced at the Bar, and upon an independent and

    comprehensive reappraisal of the entire evidentiary record, this Court

    finds that the learned Trial Court has meticulously analyzed the oral

    and documentary evidence on record in its correct perspective and in

    consonance with the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.

    10. The impugned judgment reflects a judicious, well-reasoned and

    legally sustainable appreciation of evidence. The conclusions arrived

    at by the learned Trial Court are founded upon cogent, reliable and

    legally admissible evidence and are supported by proper reasoning.

    This Court does not find any perversity, patent illegality or manifest

    error of law in findings so recorded. Accordingly, the findings of

    conviction do not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its

    appellate jurisdiction.

    11. The legal position governing determination of age is well crystallized

    in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana1, the Supreme Court has held that

    the date of birth entered in school records carries a presumption of

    correctness and must be accepted unless convincingly rebutted. This

    position was reiterated in Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra2, wherein

    the Court held that documentary evidence regarding age prevails over

    medical opinion in case of variance. This Court, upon independent

    scrutiny of the said materials, find no infirmity in the reliance so

    1
    (2013) 7 SCC 263
    2
    (2013) 14 SCC 637

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    placed by the learned Trial Court, and the conclusion regarding the

    minority of the victim des not suffer any legal or factual error.

    12. In the instant case, the question of the age of the victim at the time of

    the alleged occurrence assumes critical significance. It is noted that the

    victim did not fall within the definition of “child” as provided under

    Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, 2012. In view of the dispute regarding

    her age, an ossification test was conducted, which indicated that the

    victim’s age at the relevant time between 18 to 20 years. Consequently,

    the victim cannot be classified as a “child” under the POCSO Act.

    13. It is further observed that Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

    Protection of Children) Act, 2015 provides the procedural mechanism

    to be followed in cases of dispute regarding age, wherein ossification

    or other scientific tests may be employed to determine the age of the

    person when other reliable materials for verification are not available.

    The provisions of Section 94 are thus applicable to ascertain the age of

    the victim in the present case for the purpose of applicability of the

    POCSO Act.

    14. Section 376(2)(n) of IPC prescribes enhanced punishment in cases

    where rape is committed repeatedly upon the same woman. The provision

    mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which

    may extend to the remainder of the offender’s natural life. The object of this

    provision is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault, where

    the offence is not a single confined to a single act but occurs

    repeatedly on the same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed

    in the provision is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of

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    sexual assault, committed at different points in time on the same

    victim. Judicial pronouncements have consistently interpreted this

    expression to connote a series of acts that are separate and

    independent in nature, and not merely a continuation of a single

    transaction.

    15. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC, the pattern is usually

    manifest; an initial act of sexual assault is perpetrated, followed by

    multiple subsequent acts effected through fear, coercion, deception, or

    other means which render the victim vulnerable and unable to escape

    the perpetrator. The provision thus seeks to punish repeated

    violations of bodily integrity and sexual autonomy of a woman in an

    aggravated form.

    16. It is well settled that Courts must exercise extreme care and caution in

    adjudicating cases arising under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. In such

    cases, it is imperative to identify the essential indigents of the offence,

    which include, inter alia, that the accused made a promise of marriage

    to the victim solely with a view to obtain her consent of sexual

    intercourse, without any intention of fulfilling such promise from the

    very outset. Further, it must be established that the false promise of

    marriage had a direct and proximate bearing on the victim’s consent

    to engage in sexual relations. The Courts are enjoined to scrutinize the

    evidence meticulously to ensure that the prosecution proves beyond

    reasonable doubt that the accused exploited the victim’s trust through

    deliberate deception, thereby bringing the case squarely within the

    ambit of Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

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    17. In the case of rape committed under the false pretext of marriage, the

    essential contention is that the consent given by the woman was

    induced by a misconception of fact, namely, the representation that

    the accused would solemnize marriage with her. Such consent, being

    founded on a deliberate misrepresentation, cannot be regarded as free

    and voluntary within the meaning of Section 90 of IPC. Consequently,

    when sexual intercourse is obtained by deliberately misleading the

    victim into believing that a lawful marriage would ensue, the same

    constitutes rape, as the consent so procured is vitiated by fraud and

    deception. The Courts have consistently held that the exploitation of

    such trust and reliance falls squarely within the ambit of criminal

    liability under penal code.

    18. The provision Section 90 of IPC deals with legal concept of consent

    obtained under fear or misconception of fact, it provides that:

    “A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any
    section of this Codee, if the consent is given by a person
    under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and
    if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe,
    that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or
    misconception.; or….”.

    Consequently, where a woman does not give consent freely and

    voluntarily to the sexual acts contemplated under Section 376(2)(n)

    IPC, but consents under a misconception of fact, the consent is vitiated

    in law. The provision clarifies that consent obtained by deliberate

    misrepresentation or fraud is not true consent in the eyes of law, and

    sexual intercourse in such circumstances constitutes the offence of

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    rape. Section 90 IPC, therefore, embodies the principle that consent

    must be real, informed, and free from any inducement founded on

    fear, coercion, or deception.

    19. In the context of Section 376(2)(n) IPC, the concept of “consent” must

    necessarily must involve an active, informed and reasonable

    deliberation by the woman with respect to the proposed act. The

    question that arises is whether such consent was vitiated by a

    “misconception of fact”, for instance, arising from a false promise of

    marriage. In the present case, the primary contention advanced by the

    prosecutrix is that the Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with

    her on the assurance and false promise of marrying her. In view of

    this, her consent, being premised upon a material misconception of

    fact induced by the Appellant, is vitiated in law. The law is well

    settled that consent obtained under fraudulent misrepresentation

    cannot be regarded as free and voluntary, and sexual intercourse

    procured under such circumstances constitutes rape within the

    meaning of Section 376(2)(n) IPC.

    20. The Supreme Court has echoed on the similar contention in the Uday

    v. State of Karnataka,3, wherein it has been held that:

    “25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the
    prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
    conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section
    90
    IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was
    given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be
    proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or
    had reason to believe that the consent was given in

    3
    (2003) 4 SCC 46

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    consequence of such misconception. We have serious
    doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix
    to consent to having sexual intercourse with the
    appellant.”

    21. In the present case, the evidence on record demonstrates that the

    Appellant, by giving false assurance of marriage, maintained a

    physical relationship with the victim and committed sexual acts

    repeatedly, ultimately resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a

    child. The fraudulent promise of marriage, being deliberately

    calculated to deceive the victim and obtain her consent, directly

    vitiated her free consent. The acts of the Appellant, therefore, squarely

    fall within the ambit of the offences punishable under Section

    376(2)(n) IPC, as the sexual intercourse was procured by deliberate

    deception and misrepresentation.

    22. The question of delay in lodging the F.I.R. warrants careful scrutiny.

    In the present case, there is no substantial delay attributable to the

    informant. It is evident from the record that the informant, being the

    mother of the victim, was not present at home at the time of the

    alleged occurrence and had returned only after a period of seven

    months, during which the victim was left alone at home. Upon her

    return, the informant observing the victim’s pregnancy and the delay

    in her menstrual cycle, made inquiries, whereupon the victim

    disclosed the incident. the Court further notes that in cases of sexual

    assault, it is not uncommon for victims to delay disclosure due to

    social stigma, fear, or trauma. The initial nondisclosure by the victim,

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    under such circumstances, does not detract from the credibility of her

    testimony or the veracity of the prosecution case.

    23. The inherent bashfulness of females and tendency to conceal outrage

    of sexual aggression are the factors, which the Court cannot overlook.

    The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital. Unless and until it is

    shown that there are compelling reasons, which necessitate

    corroboration of testimony, the testimony of the victim can be relied

    upon to base the conviction. Moreover, it has also been recorded that

    Appellant had extended threats to kill her if she confined the matter to

    anyone and upon which also his family wanted to give Rs 3000/- to

    settle the matter.

    24. The Supreme Court also relied upon to reiterate in Satpal Singh V.

    State of Haryana,4, wherein it has been held that:

    “13. In a rape case the prosecutrix remains worried about
    her future. She remains in traumatic state of mind. The
    family of the victim generally shows reluctance to go to
    the police station because of society’s attitude towards
    such a woman. It casts doubts and shame upon her rather
    than comfort and sympathise with her. Family remains
    concern about the its honour and reputation of the
    prosecutrix. After only having a cool thought it is
    possible for the family to lodge a complaint in sexual
    offences.”

    25. The victim in the present case was utterly helpless. One can well

    envisages the immense pain, and trauma endured by her in the

    aftermath of the Appellant’s reprehensible acts. She must have

    4
    (2003) 4 SCC 46

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    suffered the shock of her life on account of such an outrageous

    violation of her bodily integrity and personal dignity. It is further will

    recognized that in cases od sexual assault, no self-respecting woman

    would voluntarily appear in Court to subject herself to the ordeal of

    recounting humiliating and degrading details of the offence

    committed upon her. The very act of testifying under such

    circumstances underscores the veracity of her allegations and the

    courage with which she has faced the traumatic experience.

    26. The record further reveals that, being a single widow mother and

    without any external support, upheld the welfare of her daughter and

    ensured that the child was delivered safely, all the while relying upon

    the assurance of the Appellant that he would solemnize marriage with

    the victim. Thereafter, the informant brought the matter to the notice

    of the villagers, and a village meeting was convened, in which the

    family members of the Appellant were also present. During the said

    meeting, both the Appellant and his family categorically denied any

    obligation to accept the victim and the child.

    27. Such a conduct on the part of the Appellant and his family inflicts

    irreparable harm upon the emotional and psychological well-being of

    the victim. It not only shatters her trust in humanity but also

    perpetuates a social milieu that demeans and dehumanizes women,

    undermining their dignity, autonomy, and sense od security. The

    adverse impact of such acts extends beyond the individual, striking at

    the very fabric of social morality and justice.

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    28. Upon an overall and cumulative evaluation of the oral and

    documentary evidence on record, this Court is satisfied that the

    prosecution has established, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the

    Appellant committed sexual assault upon the victim by induing her

    with false promise of marriage. The prosecutrix’s testimony is duly

    corroborated by her prompt disclosure to her mother, the attendant

    circumstances and other supporting evidence on record.

    29. Nothing substantial has been elicited in the course of cross-

    examination so as to discredit her version or to create any reasonable

    doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution case. The

    evidence of the victim inspires full judicial confidence and is found to

    be wholly trustworthy. In view of the above, this Court holds that the

    essential ingredients of the offences charged have been duly proved

    against the Appellant, warranting affirmation of the finding of guilt.

    VI. CONCLUSION:

    30. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon an anxious and

    meticulous of the material facts and circumstances of the case, this

    Court is of the considered and firm opinion that the judgment of

    conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Ad hoc

    Additional District and Sessions Judge (First Track Special Court),

    Jeypore, in T.R. No.146 of 2017, do not suffer from any illegality,

    infirmity or perversity warranting interference by this Court.

    31. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon a

    proper appreciation of the evidence on record and are well supported

    by the cogent and convincing reasons. Accordingly, the present

    Page 17
    Signature Not Verified
    Digitally Signed
    Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
    Reason: Authentication
    Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
    CUTTACK
    Date: 18-Mar-2026 10:22:36

    Criminal Appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. The

    judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned

    Trial Court are hereby affirmed. Consequently, this Court is not

    inclined to accede to the relief prayed for by the Appellant.

    32. Accordingly, the CRLA stands dismissed.

    33. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.

    (Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
    Judge
    Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
    Dated the 27th February, 2026/

    Page 18



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