Equality In Caregiving: A Constitutional Reassessmentof Maternity Benefits – DSK Legal : True Value, True Values

Authors: Mr. Suyash Srivastava (Partner), Mr. Kumar Prem Anand (Associate Partner), and  Ms.Tisha Agrawal (Associate).

In a deeply humane and progressive judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“Court”) on 17 March 20261, the Court has re-defined how the law and our judiciary understand motherhood, adoption, and parental care.

SPONSORED

Background
The matter at hand arose from a Civil Writ Petition bearing number 960 of 2021, which was filed in public interest, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an adoptive mother (“Petitioner”), challenging the constitutional validity of the provision governing maternity benefits for adoptive mothers. Originally, the challenge was directed against Section 5(4)2 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (“Maternity Act”), but it was subsequently extended to its corresponding provision under Section 60(4)3 of the Social Security Code, 2020 (“SS Code”)4 . The impugned provision granted maternity leave of twelve (12) weeks5 only to those adoptive mothers who adopted a child under the age of three (3) months. Thereby, excluding those adopting children of three (3) months or more. The Petitioner contended that this classification was without any rational nexus to the objective of the Maternity Act and the SS Code and therefore, violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Especially, when, as a matter of fact, children above three (3) months of age equally require sustained
care, constant attention, and emotional integration into the family.

Maternity Protection As Facets of Dignity
While examining the constitutional validity of Section 60(4) of the SS Code, the Court has unequivocally placed maternity benefits within the framework of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, labelling maternity rights as a facet of dignity and substantive equality. The Court stated that “the right of maternity protection recognizes the biological as well as caregiving realities associated with motherhood, and seeks to correct structural inequalities that women face in employment. It represents the State’s commitment to uphold human dignity, equal treatment at work, and broader ideals of social justice.”

Building upon this constitutional foundation, the Court undertook a detailed examination of the very purpose underlying maternity benefits. It identified the period of maternity leaves not as an isolated biologically driven entitlement but as three distinct yet interrelated components; first, the period required for physical recovery post child-birth; second, the time necessary for the development of an emotional bond between the mother and the child and; third, the period essential for attending to the child’s physical and emotional needs. While these elements may operate simultaneously in cases of biological motherhood, the Court emphasized that in cases of adoption, although the first element may not arise, the latter two assume great importance and cannot be disregarded. The Court’s assessment is particularly significant in its rejection of a narrow, biologically centered understanding of maternityrelated provisions.

Arbitrariness of the Three (2)-Month Classification
It is against the above backdrop that the Court has examined the validity of the impugned classification under Section 60(4) of the SS Code. The restriction of maternity benefits to adoptive mothers of children under three (3) months of age was held to be constitutionally untenable. The Court noted that such a classification has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved under the SS Code, which broadly includes, facilitating caregiving and ensuring the welfare of the child while maintaining financial independence and economic security of a woman.

Towards A Gender-Neutral Framework
In a crucial obiter, the Court also highlighted the need to recognize the role of fathers in the upbringing of a child. The Court drew attention to the deeply rooted assumptions against the role of fathers in nurturing of a child, while stating that “Society has historically attributed caregiving and nurturing responsibilities almost exclusively to mothers” and “Parenthood is not a solitary function performed by one parent but rather a shared responsibility in which each parent contributes to the child’s holistic development.”
Significantly, the Court goes beyond a generic assertion and exposes the far-reaching consequences of this imbalance. It is observed that the perceived absence of fathers in upbringing of a child is not merely incidental but is often the result of institutional framework. The lack of paternity leave constrains fathers from meaningfully participating in the formative stages of a child’s life.
The Court further took note of emerging legislative developments, including a recent private member’s bill, the Paternity and Parental Benefit Bill, 2025 (“Bill”) which proposes a more robust framework, including extended paternity leave and its applicability to adoptive fathers. Even though the Bill is not binding, the acknowledgement by the Court itself signals a clear judicial endorsement of a more comprehensive parental leave regime. The Court however did not merely stop at the observation but expressly urged the Union government to introduce a statutory framework recognizing paternity leave as a social security benefit. Further, it emphasized that the duration and design of such leave must be responsive to the needs of both the parent and the child.
This dialogue is significant as it signals a shift from viewing maternity benefits as a women-centric benefit to understanding them as part of a larger framework of shared parental responsibility.

Implications for Employers and the Road Ahead
At the core, the decision marks a pivotal shift in constitutional thinking i.e., from a narrow, biologically rooted understanding to recognizing caregiving as a shared social function. In our view, this judgement does more than correcting an under-inclusive classification by laying the groundwork for a coherent
and balanced framework of parental benefits in the country.

For employers, the judgment signals towards an imminent shift in compliance and workplace policy design. Organizations will need to re-visit their leave frameworks to accommodate a broader understanding of maternity benefits under the SS Code, particularly for adoptive mothers. This is necessitated because the Court has revised sub-section (4)6 of Section 60 of the SS Code. While this may entail costs and operational adjustments, it presents an opportunity to build more inclusive, equitable and progressive workplace. However, the true impact will depend ultimately on how legislature transforms this constitutional momentum into a broader regime, providing further clarity and certainty to both employers and employees.

1. Hamsaanandini Nanduri versus Union of India & Others, 2026 INSC 246.
2. Inserted by the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017.
3. Section 60(4) of SS Code – A woman who legally adopts a child below the age of three months or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.
4. Upon implementation of the SS Code w.e.f. 21 November 2025, the Maternity Act has been repealed and subsumed under the said Code. The provisions relating to maternity benefits are consolidated into the SS Code and remains largely unchanged.
5. The period of twelve (12) weeks starts from the day the child is handed over to an adoptive mother.
6. A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over to the adopting mother or the commissioning mother, as the case may be.

Disclaimer: This update is general in nature and is not intended to be a substitute for specific legal advice. Please contact the author(s) for specific legal advice in this regard