9.3.2026 vs Of on 19 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 9.3.2026 vs Of on 19 March, 2026

                                                                                    2026:HHC:7728



     IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                              Cr. MP(M) No. 2873 of 2025




                                                                                   .
                                              Reserved on: 9.3.2026





                                              Date of Decision: 19.3.2026.





    Sanju                                                               .... Petitioner
                                     Versus




                                                     of
    State of HP                                                         .... Respondent


    Coram                  rt
    Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting?1                   No.

    For the Petitioner                          :      Mr Sohail Khan, Advocate,
                                                       Legal Aid Counsel.
    For the Respondent/State                    :      Mr     Jitender   Sharma,



                                                       Additional Advocate General.

    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

seeking regular bail in FIR No. 15 of 2023, dated 3.3.2023,

SPONSORED

registered at the Police Station Sainj, District Kullu, H.P., for the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 25 of

the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS

Act).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the

police had set up a naka at Dhaman Pul, Sainj. The police

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intercepted the petitioner’s vehicle bearing registration No. HP-

01K-7535 and recovered 2.603 kilograms of charas. The police

arrested the petitioner. These allegations are false. The

prosecution has cited 26 witnesses, out of whom 09 have been

of
examined. The petitioner is a taxi driver and the family’s sole

earner. The petitioner has been behind bars since 3.3.2023, and
rt
his right to a speedy trial is being violated. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be

released on bail.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report

asserting that the police had set up a Naka near Dhaman bridge

on 2.3.2023 at 9.45 PM. They stopped the vehicle bearing

registration No. HP-01K-7535 at 10.15 PM. The driver identified

himself as Sanju (the present petitioner). He tried to move a bag

with his feet. The police became suspicious and searched the

vehicle in the presence of two independent witnesses. The police

recovered 2.603 kilograms of charas during the search. As per the

report of analysis, the exhibit was found to be charas, having

30.14% w/w resin in it. The statements of 09 out of 26 witnesses

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have been recorded. The matter is listed for prosecution evidence

on 20.4.2026. Hence, the status report.

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4. I have heard Mr Sohail Khan, Advocate, learned Legal

Aid Counsel, for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned

Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

of

5. Mr Sohail Khan, Advocate, learned Legal Aid Counsel

for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and
rt
that he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to

complete evidence despite the lapse of three years, which

violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, he

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be

released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of Rabi Prakash Vs.

State of Odisha 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 533 in support of his

submission.

6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State, submitted that the prosecution

has examined nine witnesses and the matter is listed for

recording the statements of witnesses on 20.4.2026. There is no

delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, he prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

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7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:

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(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
rt
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be

considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also

pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice

would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.

[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a

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thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise

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in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various

aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
rt
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction

will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the

witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail

the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the

court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the

accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.

.

Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case

to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should

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always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
rt
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and

an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that

where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of

mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court’s decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this

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Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:

.

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable

ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if

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released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;

rt

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being

influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :

(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this

Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856

and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima

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facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due

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consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a

conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

of
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
rt
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests

otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not

jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences

or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not

intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely

to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.

So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

11. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a

bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 284 of 2025

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and was dismissed on 7.4.2025. It was held in State of

Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC

.

605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a

subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a

change of circumstances. It was observed:

“Once that application was rejected, there was no question

of
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
rt
substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. ‘Between the two orders, there was

a gap of only two days, and it is nobody’s case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the

impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any

substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that

the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure

an order which had hitherto eluded him.

12. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.

Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an

earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to

consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then

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consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.

It was held:

.

“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by

noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the

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said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite
of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application
should be granted.”

13. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
rt
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:

9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that

order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have

been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of

course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of

circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

14. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was

observed:

“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for the
grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the reasons and

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grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

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15. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of

Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail

application can be filed if there is a material change in the

of
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It

was observed:

rt
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence

of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non
for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change
in circumstances. A material change in circumstances
settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that

requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the
earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of

judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to
be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at

the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the
power of a judge to consider the application and a person’s
right based on a material change in circumstances. A

material change in circumstance creates in a person
accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail
application. But the power to decide such a subsequent
application operates in a completely different sphere,
unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based
on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that
if successive bail applications on the same subject are
permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there
would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be
pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking
resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence

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of the other side being put in issue and there would be
wastage of Court’s time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of

.

material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated
by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether

there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the
applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail
application.”

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16. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be

considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
rt
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.

17. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress

of the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being

violated. This submission cannot be accepted. A perusal of the

earlier order shows that the prosecution had examined six

witnesses, and now the statements of nine witnesses have been

recorded. The matter is listed for recording the statement of

prosecution witnesses on 20.4.2026; therefore, there is no delay

in the progress of the trial. The petitioner has also not filed the

certified copies of the order sheets to show the cause of the delay.

Hence, the plea that the petitioner is entitled to bail because of

the delay cannot be accepted.

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18. The petitioner was found in possession of 2.603

kilograms of cannabis, which is a huge quantity. It was laid down

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by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K.

Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the

ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin

conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was

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observed: –

“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
rt
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the

alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold

under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion
of this nature, if returned without addressing the

prosecution’s assertions of operative control and

antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.

18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated

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22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the

.

present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the

consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
Section 37(1)(b).”

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19. A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo

Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025,
rt
wherein it was observed:

“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet the
allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the

recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but
the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities
ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the

contraband.

12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an
organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing

with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act is made out in the present matter.”

20. Therefore, it is impermissible to grant bail on the

ground of delay alone when the petitioner has not satisfied the

requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

21. In Ravi Prakash, the prosecution had only examined

one out of nineteen witnesses within four years. In the present

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case, nine witnesses have been examined, and the cited judgment

will not help the petitioner.

.

22. No other point was urged.

23. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it

is dismissed.

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24. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
rt
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
19th March, 2026
(Chander)

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