Chattisgarh High Court
Krishn Kumar Shrivastava @ K.K … vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 17 March, 2026
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2026:CGHC:12783
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MCRC No. 1716 of 2026
1 - Krishn Kumar Shrivastava @ K.K Shrivastava S/o. Late S.P.
Shrivastava, Aged About 65 Years R/o Ward No. 11, Near Aayappa
Mandir Bhartiya Nagar, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Applicant(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O., P.S.- EOW/ACB, District
Raipur C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant (s) : Mr. Sunil Otwani, Sr. Counsel assisted by
Shri Ankush Borkar, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Dy. AG
(Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma)
Order on Board
17/03/2026
The present application arises out of FIR No. 04/2024 dated
17.01.2024 registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.), in connection with an alleged
large-scale liquor scam pertaining to the State of Chhattisgarh. The
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said FIR invokes offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 7
and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
2. As per the prosecution case, the said FIR came to be registered
on the basis of allegations that a large-scale conspiracy was hatched
by certain public servants in connivance with private individuals,
whereby illegal gratification was allegedly collected and undue
pecuniary advantage was extended through manipulation of the excise
system, causing wrongful loss to the State exchequer. It is alleged that
the conspiracy involved several persons, including officials of the
Excise Department, intermediaries and private entities, who, acting in
concert, facilitated illegal collection and distribution of proceeds
generated from the liquor trade. During the course of investigation, the
name of the present Applicant surfaced, and he has been implicated as
one of the accused in the aforesaid crime. The role attributed to the
Applicant is stated to be connected with the alleged larger conspiracy,
though the same is subject matter of investigation.
3. The record reflects that the investigation in the present case is
extensive in nature, involving multiple accused persons and voluminous
documentary evidence. It is further evident that the prosecution has
filed charge-sheets against certain co-accused persons, while further
investigation in respect of other accused persons is stated to be
continuing. The Applicant came to be arrested on 09.01.2026 by the
respondent agency, namely EOW/ACB, Raipur, and since then he is in
judicial custody.
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4. It is also borne out from the record that, as on date, no charge-
sheet has been filed against the present Applicant. Consequently,
cognizance in respect of the Applicant has not yet been taken by the
competent Court. The material available on record further indicates that
the investigation in the present case has been continuing over a period
of time and is yet to attain finality. It is also reflected that further
investigation is still in progress in relation to the said FIR. It further
transpires that the case involves a large number of accused persons
and witnesses, and multiple charge-sheets have already been filed,
thereby indicating that the proceedings are at a preliminary stage and
the trial is yet to commence.
5. From the material placed before this Court, it is also discernible
that the investigation in the present case has been protracted. On
earlier occasions, the investigating agency had sought time before the
Supreme Court for completion of investigation, and extensions were
granted from time to time. Despite such indulgence, the investigation is
still stated to be ongoing. It further transpires that the trial in the present
matter is not likely to commence in the near future. The case involves
more than 50 accused persons and a voluminous body of evidence,
including more than 300 witnesses, thereby indicating that the
conclusion of trial is likely to take considerable time.
6. It is also borne out from the record that several co-accused
persons, similarly placed or otherwise, have already been enlarged on
bail by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, inter alia, on the
ground of prolonged incarceration and the likelihood of delay in
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commencement and conclusion of trial. The material further reflects
that in respect of certain other accused persons, further investigation is
still pending and supplementary charge-sheets are yet to be filed,
thereby demonstrating that the entire prosecution case is still evolving
and has not attained finality. Additionally, it has been alleged that in
respect of certain key individuals allegedly involved in the said scam,
either no effective coercive action has been taken or their custodial
interrogation has not been secured, which, according to the Applicant,
further contributes to the delay in culmination of the investigation and
trial. Thus, the present case pertains to a complex and large-scale
economic offence involving multiple accused persons, continuing
investigation, non-filing of charge-sheet qua the Applicant, absence of
cognizance and no immediate likelihood of commencement or
conclusion of trial, while the Applicant has remained in judicial custody
since 09.01.2026.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
7. Shri Otwani, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant while
assailing the continued incarceration of the applicant, has made the
following submissions:
I. False Implication and Absence of Direct Role
8. It is vehemently submitted that the Applicant has been falsely
implicated in the instant case and bears no role whatsoever in the
alleged offences. The Applicant is neither a public servant nor has any
association, direct or indirect with the Excise Department or any policy-
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making authority pertaining to liquor administration. It is further
submitted that the Applicant was not arrayed as an accused in the FIR,
but has been roped in subsequently during investigation, sans any
substantive material or incriminating evidence linking him to the alleged
conspiracy. The prosecution’s case against the Applicant, in its entirety,
hinges on vague, omnibus, and wholly uncorroborated allegations,
which remain untested and liable to be demolished upon scrutiny at
trial.
9. At the very threshold, it is submitted that the Applicant stands
falsely implicated in the present case, with no prima facie material
whatsoever available on record to connect him with the alleged
offences as mentioned above. The prosecution’s narrative, bereft of any
tangible evidence, appears to be a classic instance of roping in
innocent individuals to inflate the scale of an alleged conspiracy, a
practice deprecated by this Court time and again. It is trite to state that
the Applicant is neither a public servant within the meaning of Section
2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, nor has he ever
occupied any position, official or otherwise, in the Excise Department or
any allied authority entrusted with the formulation, approval, or
implementation of the impugned liquor policy. A bare perusal of the
records reveals that the Applicant’s name figures nowhere in the official
notifications, policy documents, or departmental communications
pertaining to the liquor policy in question. His alleged involvement is a
figment of the prosecution’s imagination, unsupported by even a
whisper of corroborative evidence such as minutes of meetings,
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financial trails, or witness statements attributing specific acts to him. In
this backdrop, the invocation of Sections 120B, 420, and allied
provisions against the Applicant is wholly misconceived and liable to be
termed as a gross overreach.
10. Further, it is submitted with utmost deference that the Applicant
was conspicuously absent from the FIR dated [17.01.2024], which
named specific individuals based on preliminary intelligence. He was
surreptitiously roped in only during the course of investigation,
purportedly on the basis of custodial statements of co-accused–
statements that are inherently suspect, self-serving, and inadmissible at
this stage under Section 25 of the Evidence Act,1872, as held by the
Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (AIR 1960 SC
1125). No independent or cogent material–be it documentary, digital
footprints, or forensic evidence–has been unearthed to lend even a
semblance of credibility to these allegations. The case diary entries,
insofar as they pertain to the Applicant, are conspicuously silent on any
direct or proximate link, relying instead on vague insinuations that fail to
withstand judicial scrutiny. The allegations levelled against the Applicant
are general, omnibus and bereft of specificity, a vice repeatedly
frowned upon by constitutional courts. There is no averment, much less
proof, delineating the Applicant’s precise role in the alleged conspiracy
–whether as a principal offender, abettor, or mere spectator. No details
emerge regarding his participation in policy formulation meetings,
receipt of undue benefits, or orchestration of tenders. Such nebulous
averments, echoing the prosecution’s broad-brush approach, cannot
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constitute the bedrock of a criminal charge, as observed by the
Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4
SCC 659, wherein it was held that “vague and general allegations
without specific attribution of acts cannot form the basis for framing
charges, let alone detention.”It is a settled canon of bail jurisprudence
that at the interlocutory stage of bail, the court is not to embark on a
mini-trial or minutely dissect the prosecution evidence to determine guilt
or innocence.
11. The sole inquiry is whether a prima facie case exists, as
crystallized in the landmark exposition by the Supreme Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Anil Ramchand Chhabria (2019) 13 SCC 10, and
more recently in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2022) 10SCC 51. The touchstone is not the boasting of
the prosecution but the quality and credibility of material placed before
the court. Tested on this anvil, the prosecution’s case against the
Applicant crumbles ab initio:(i) No direct evidence: Absence of
recovered incriminating documents, call data records, or bank
transactions linking the Applicant to the conspiracy.(ii) Reliance on
tainted disclosures: Custodial confessions of co-accused, lacking
independent corroboration, as cautioned in Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569.(iii) Non-application of mind: Mechanical
addition of the Applicant without matching the ingredients of the
offences to his conduct.(iv) Delay and motive: The belated implication,
post several months of investigation, smacks of an ulterior motive to
bolster a weakening case. In the above circumstances, continuation of
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the Applicant’s incarceration would amount to punishment without trial,
offending Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court, in exercise
of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Section 439
Cr.P.C., is beseeched to apply the scalpel of reason to sever the
Applicant from this web of false implication, securing his liberty pending
trial.
II. Prosecution rests on weak and inadmissible Evidence :
12. It is submitted that the entire edifice of the prosecution’s case
against the Applicant is erected on a precariously frail foundation,
comprising naught but:(i) Selectively extracted WhatsApp chats, cherry-
picked and wrested from context; and(ii) Statements of co-accused
persons, recorded in the nebulous confines of custody. Such material,
far from constituting a prima facie case, is riddled with patent legal
infirmities, rendering it inadmissible and unworthy of judicial reliance at
the bail stage.
A. Electronic Evidence: A Mirage of Legitimacy Turning first to the so-
called electronic evidence in the form of WhatsApp chats, the
prosecution’s case unravels upon a plain reading of Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872–the indispensable gateway for admissibility
of computer-generated records. The tendered chats suffer from grave
and fatal lacunae, namely:Non-compliance with mandatory certification
under Section 65B(4): No contemporaneous certificate from the device
owner or custodian authenticating the device’s functionality, integrity of
data, and manner of extraction, as mandated by the Supreme Court in
Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473. The absence of this
“safeguard against tampering” is not a mere technicality but a
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substantive vice vitiating admissibility ab initio.
Lack of forensic verification: No hash value matching, metadata
analysis, or report from a certified forensic lab under the Information
Technology Act, 2000, to rule out manipulation–a deficiency
spotlighted in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1, where the Apex Court reiterated that
uncorroborated screenshots are “wholly inadmissible. “Break in the
chain of custody: The chats’ provenance is shrouded in mystery–no
explanation of seizure procedure under Section 100 Cr.P.C., continuity
of possession, or sealing protocols, rendering them suspect as per
State (NCTof Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 (Parliament
Attack case).
13. Compounding these flaws, there exists no direct communication
between the Applicant and the alleged co-accused. The prosecution
desperately stitches together speculative inferences from disconnected
threads–group chats sans attribution, ambiguous emojis, and out-of-
context snippets– in a bid to conjure a conspiracy. Such “guilt by
association” via digital detritus cannot pass muster, as held in Sanjay
Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024 SCC OnLine SC 656),
where the Supreme Court cautioned against “fishing expeditions based
on unverified electronic records.”
B. Statements of Co-Accused: Inherently Weak and Corroboration-
Deficient The prosecution’s fallback–statements of co-accused fares
no better. It is a settled proposition of law that such statements are
weak, secondary evidence, permissible only for corroboration under
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Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and never as substantive proof.
The Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964
SC 1184) unequivocally held: “The confession of a co-accused is
admissible only in a very limited sense… it cannot be the basis of
conviction unless corroborated in material particulars by independent
evidence.”
14. In the instant case, these statements are custodial in nature,
extracted under the shadow of coercion, and lack the independent
corroboration essential for even prima facie weight. No linking material
be it call records, financial flows, or witness testimony–bridges the
evidentiary chasm. Reliance is placed on Sanjay Jain v. Directorate
of Enforcement (supra), wherein a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
affirmed by the Apex Court, granted bail observing that “uncorroborated
co-accused statements, absent direct evidence, cannot justify pre-trial
incarceration in economic offence cases.”The prosecution’s case thus
reduces to a house of cards, collapsible under the mildest scrutiny. As
pithily observed in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. Stateof Punjab (1980) 2
SCC 565, bail is the rule and jail the exception; where the prosecution’s
arsenal comprises inadmissible whispers and speculative inferences,
continued detention offends Article 21 and the doctrine of presumption
of innocence. This Court is therefore urged to accord the material its
due–nil probative value and mould relief in favour of the Applicant,
securing his liberty to defend himself unfettered.
III. Complete Absence Of Recovery Or Incriminating Material
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15. It is submitted that despite months of relentless investigation by
specialized agencies, including raids, searches, and summons under
the stringent provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (PMLA), no recovery whatsoever–incriminating or otherwise has
been effected from the Applicant or his premises. This stark evidentiary
void is not a peripheral omission but the Achilles’ heel of the
prosecution’s narrative, demolishing any pretence of a prima facie
case. A meticulous scrutiny of the case diary and charge-sheet
unmasks the following glaring absentees:
No cash or proceeds of crime: In an alleged racket involving the
circulation of crores of rupees as kickbacks or policy favours, not a
single paisa, hawala note, or unexplained credit has been traced to the
Applicant. No bank statements, DEMAT accounts, or benami
properties stand attached under Section 8 PMLA.
No documents or financial instruments: Absent are policy
tenders, MoUs, sanction files, or ledgers implicating the Applicant in the
formulation or upgradation of the liquor policy. No WhatsApp forwards,
emails, or digital footprints evince his hand in the alleged irregularities.
No illegal liquor, counterfeit holograms, or physical contraband: Zero
seizures of unaccounted liquor stock, fake seals, or adulterated
consignments from the Applicant’s possession, control or vicinity,
hallmarks of any genuine excise scam investigation.
16. This complete barrenness of recovery assumes cataclysmic
proportions in the context of the prosecution’s bombast: a conspiracy
purporting to siphon crores through policy manipulation. Where is the
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proceeds of crime mandated under Section 2(1)(u) PMLA and Where
the tainted assets under Section 3. The Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) 10 SCC 1, while
upholding PMLA rigours, nonetheless emphasized that “attachment and
recovery form the sine qua non of the offence; mere allegation sans
recovery is insufficient.” Echoing this, in P. Chidambaram v.
Directorate of Enforcement (2020) 3 SCC 280 (INX Media), bail was
granted inter alia for want of concrete recovery linking the accused. The
prosecution’s case thus hangs by the threadbare gossamer of
insinuation, (ladsrksa dk f?klkfiVk tky) unanchored by the smoking
gun of tangible recovery. As held by this Court in analogous excise
policy matters, “absence of recovery from the accused, in a case
screaming financial malfeasance, renders the allegations
unsubstantiated and the detention punitive”. Such a vacuum cannot
sustain pre-trial incarceration, lest Article 21 be reduced to a parchment
promise. In sum, the Applicant’s clean slate of no recovery, no assets,
no contraband stands in thunderous contrast to the prosecution’s tall
tales, compelling the grant of bail as a matter of elementary justice.
IV. Prolonged Incarceration And Trial Delay — Egregious Violation
Of Article 21
17. It is submitted that the Applicant languishes in judicial custody
since 09.01.2026 over two months of unadulterated pre-trial detention
without the faintest whisper of trial commencement. This protracted
incarceration, in the teeth of constitutional safeguards, cries out for
immediate redress, as it metamorphoses from preventive measure to
punitive retribution. Learned counsel for the applicant lays bare the
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glacial inertia of the prosecution machinery:Charge-sheet has not been
filed qua the Applicant despite statutory mandate under Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C./Section 19 PMLA; Cognizance not taken by the learned Special
Judge;Charges not framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C.; Trial yet to
commence, with not a single witness examined.
18. The Herculean proportions of this case furnish no justification for
such physiological state, but rather underscore the vanishing horizon of
justice: Over 50 accused persons, necessitating protracted cross-
examination and severance applications; more than 1,100 witnesses,
many protected/high-profile, portending years of evidence recording;
Multiple charge-sheets and supplementary reports, spawning
interlocutory skirmishes;Voluminous documentary evidence (lakh-
pages strong), demanding forensic sifting and translation. In this
labyrinthine slack, the likelihood of trial commencement and the
conclusion in the near or foreseeable future is a mirage, reducing the
Applicant’s fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 to hollow
verbiage.
A. Constitutional Infirmity: Pre-Conviction Punishment
19. The Supreme Court has consistently interdicted such de facto life
sentences before conviction. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab
(1977) 4 SCC 291, the Apex Court held: “Where the trial is not likely to
conclude within a reasonable time, continued detention would be
unjustified… it would amount to punishment without trial.” Here, with
trial light-years away, the dictum applies with redoubled force.
Reiterating this salutary principle in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central
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Bureau of Investigation (2022) 10 SCC 51, a Constitution Bench
proclaimed bail as the rule, jail the exception, mandating statutory bail
under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. where charge-sheet delays persist, and
decrying “prolonged incarceration sans trial commencement” as
antithetical to innocence presumption. The 2022 guidelines, binding on
all courts, categorically direct default bail in such scenarios. Most
appositely, in the cognate Delhi Excise Policy saga, the Supreme Court
in Manish Sisodia v. CBI & ED (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1393) granted
bail to a prime accused after analogous delays, observing: “In cases
involving 100+ witnesses and mega-trials, pre-trial detention beyond 6-
12 months offends Article 21… liberty cannot be hostage to
prosecutorial lethargy.” The parallels are ineluctable, same policy
matrix, similar evidentiary sprawl, identical stasis.
B. Impermissible Pre-Judgement on Guilt
20. Continued incarceration of the Applicant thus constitutes
punishment before conviction, anathema to criminal jurisprudence. As
crystallized in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2
SCC 565, “Refusal of bail is not meant to punish… but to ensure trial
presence.” Here, in the instant case, with the Applicant–a man of
strawberry clean antecedents, stable roots, and compliance history
posing zero flight risk or tampering threat, denial of bail would mock
these tenets. This Court, as sentinel of Part III rights, is implored to
intervene, granting bail to avert irreparable prejudice under Article 21.
The scales of justice demand no less.
V. Parity with Co-accused- the imperative of equitable justice
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21. It is submitted that the doctrine of parity, a cardinal pillar of Article
14 compels the Applicant’s immediate enlargement, mirroring the
cascade of bail grants to co-accused arrayed at the epicenter of the
alleged conspiracy. This Court, as the great leveler, cannot brook the
anomaly of peripheral players in chains while architects of the racket
breathe free air. Such bifurcated dispensation would not merely be
inequitable but constitutionally infirm. The prosecution’s charge-sheet
narrative itself accords the Applicant a manifestly subordinate role:
omnibus whispers of “association,” sans specificity, recovery, or direct
attribution. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that a large
number of co-accused persons, including those having graver and
more direct roles, have already been granted bail. It is submitted that
the Key officials and alleged principal conspirators have been enlarged
on bail by the Supreme Court and this Court; the Applicant’s role, even
as per prosecution, is comparatively limited. The principle of parity is a
well-recognized ground for grant of bail. Reliance is placed on
Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 1 SCC 684 and Vipin
Yadav v. ED, Bail Appl. No. 1763/2025.
22. It is thus submitted that denial of bail to the present Applicant
would amount to hostile discrimination as has been held in Ravindra
Saxena (supra) “If similarly circumstanced co-accused are released on
bail, denial to petitioner would violate Article 14… parity is not mere
discretion but a recognized bail ground.” This was no stray remark but
a constitutional commandment, binding subordinate courts. Echoing
contemporaneously, this Court in Vipin Yadav v. Directorate of
16Enforcement (Bail Appl. No. 1763/2025, decided 15.02.2026) has
observed that “a near-identical excise policy module, granted bail to a
“logistics aide” observing: “Applicant’s role no deeper than those bailed
by SC/DHC; continued detention amid parity grants is discriminatory
and unsustainable.” The factual consonance is striking: same chats,
same delays, same evidentiary voids. The catena fortifies further: State
of Maharashtra v. Suresh Nivrutti Bhusare (2016) 14 SCC 682
(“Parity applies where roles analogous”); Prem Prakash v. Union
of India (2022) 10 SCC 291 (PMLA) context: “Bail to kingpins
mandates parity Liquor Policy saga, serial Supreme Court orders
[Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, SLP(Crl) No.
13443/2024 et al.] have liberated even “key players” on parity-cum-
delay, rendering the Applicant’s case unassailable.
VI. Investigation — Arbitrariness And Selective Targeting
23. Learned counsel for the Applicant has strenuously contended
that the investigation conducted by the Respondent Agency is vitiated
by manifest arbitrariness and suffers from a selective and
discriminatory approach, which strikes at the very root of a fair and
impartial investigation. It is submitted that the record itself reveals that
the alleged scam, as projected by the prosecution, is of a wide
magnitude involving multiple stakeholders, including distillers,
manufacturers of holograms, manpower supply agencies, cash
collection entities and other intermediaries, who are alleged to have
played a pivotal and substantive role in the generation and circulation
of illicit proceeds. However, despite such allegations, it is evident that
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several of these key players, who are stated to be primary beneficiaries
of the alleged illegal gains running into hundreds of crores, have neither
been arrested nor subjected to any meaningful coercive action.
24. He submits that even as per the prosecution’s own case, certain
individuals are alleged to have derived enormous pecuniary advantage
from the alleged transactions, and yet no effective steps appear to have
been taken to secure their custodial interrogation or to bring them
within the ambit of the present proceedings. In fact, some of the
persons alleged to be central to the operation of the purported
syndicate are stated to be absconding, and despite the passage of
considerable time, the investigating agency has failed to take effective
measures to apprehend them.
25. It is further submitted that while such persons, who are alleged to
be the principal beneficiaries or key facilitators, have been spared from
arrest or stringent action, the present Applicant–who is neither a public
servant nor shown to have any direct or substantive role in the alleged
policy or its execution–has been singled out and subjected to custodial
incarceration. This, according to learned counsel, clearly reflects a “pick
and choose” approach, where the investigative focus has been
disproportionately directed towards certain individuals while others,
allegedly more culpable, have been left untouched.
26. It is submitted that such selective targeting is not merely a matter
of investigative discretion, but amounts to arbitrary exercise of power,
which is impermissible in law. A fair investigation is not only a statutory
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requirement but also a constitutional mandate flowing from Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, which guarantees fairness, reasonableness
and non-arbitrariness in State action. In this regard, reliance is placed
upon the settled principle that fair investigation is an integral facet of
fair trial, and any investigation which is biased, selective or motivated
would stand vitiated. The Supreme Court in Manoj Narula v. Union of
India (2014) 9 SCC 1 and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12
SCC 254 has emphasized that investigation must be fair, impartial and
free from any extraneous influence.
27. It is further submitted that the manner in which the investigation
has been conducted in the present case raises serious doubts as to its
neutrality, inasmuch as: similarly situated or more seriously placed
individuals have not been proceeded against with the same rigor; no
uniform standard appears to have been applied in deciding whom to
arrest and whom to spare; and the investigative process appears to
have been guided by objective assessment of material.
28. Such an approach, it is submitted, not only undermines the
credibility of the investigation but also infringes the fundamental rights
of the Applicant. The law does not countenance a situation where
liberty of an individual is curtailed on the basis of a selective, uneven
and discriminatory investigation. In these circumstances, learned
counsel for the applicant submits that the arbitrary and selective
manner in which the investigation has been carried out constitutes an
independent ground for grant of bail, as continued incarceration of the
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Applicant on the basis of such tainted investigation would be wholly
unjustified and contrary to the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence.
VII. Applicant Satisfies The Triple Test For Grant Of Bail
29. Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that the Applicant
squarely satisfies the well-settled “triple test” governing the grant of
bail, namely: (i) likelihood of fleeing from justice, (ii) possibility of
tampering with evidence, and (iii) likelihood of influencing witnesses. It
is contended that none of these conditions are attracted in the present
case, and therefore, continued incarceration of the Applicant is wholly
unwarranted.
(a) No Flight Risk
30. It is submitted that the Applicant is a permanent resident of
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, having deep and longstanding roots in society.
He is a senior citizen,engaged in lawful business activities, and resides
with his family at a fixed and known address. The Applicant has
substantial social and familial ties within the jurisdiction of this Court,
which effectively negate any possibility of absconding.
31. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that the
Applicant has, at all times, cooperated with the investigating agency
and has neither attempted to evade the process of law nor shown any
inclination to do so. Even in other cases where the Applicant has been
granted bail, he has faithfully adhered to all conditions imposed by the
courts, thereby demonstrating his respect for the rule of law. In such
circumstances, the apprehension of flight risk is not only unfounded but
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entirely speculative.
(b) No Possibility of Tampering with Evidence
32. It is submitted that the entire case of the prosecution is
predominantly based on documentary and electronic evidence, which is
already in the custody and control of the investigating agency. The
charge-sheets filed in the matter, along with supplementary reports,
clearly indicate that the material relied upon by the prosecution has
been collected and secured.
33. He submits that once the evidence is documentary in nature and
already forms part of the record, there remains no possibility of the
Applicant tampering with the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
consistently held that in such cases, the ground of tampering with
evidence loses much of its significance. Further, there is no allegation,
much less any material, to suggest that the Applicant has ever
attempted to interfere with the investigation or manipulate any evidence
at any stage.
(c) No Likelihood of Influencing Witnesses
34. It is submitted that there is no material whatsoever on record to
indicate that the Applicant is in a position to influence any witness or
has made any attempt to do so. The witnesses cited by the prosecution
are largely official witnesses or persons whose statements have
already been recorded during the course of investigation. He submits
that a bald and unsubstantiated apprehension of influence cannot be a
ground to deny bail. There must be cogent material demonstrating a
real and imminent likelihood of such interference, which is
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conspicuously absent in the present case.
(d) Settled Legal Position
35. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance is placed upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Central
Bureau of Investigation, (2020) 13 SCC 791, wherein it has been
categorically held that “mere apprehension of the investigating agency,
in the absence of any material to substantiate the same, cannot be a
ground to deny bail.”
This Court further emphasized that the conditions of bail must be
assessed on the basis of tangible material and not on conjectures or
speculative fears.
36. In view of the above, it is submitted that the Applicant is not a
flight risk and has deep roots in society;there is no possibility of
tampering with evidence, which is already secured;there is no material
to suggest any likelihood of influencing witnesses; thus, the Applicant
fully satisfies the triple test for grant of bail, and there exists no legal or
factual impediment in enlarging him on bail.
VIII. Criminal Antecedents — Not Decisive For Denial Of Bail
37. Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that the mere
existence or pendency of criminal antecedents cannot, by itself, be
treated as a determinative ground for denial of bail, particularly when
the Applicant has already been granted bail in such matters and has
scrupulously complied with all conditions imposed by the competent
courts. It is submitted that the Applicant has been implicated in certain
22
other cases; however, in all such matters, he has been enlarged on bail
by the concerned courts, including this Court, and there is not even a
whisper of allegation that the Applicant has misused the liberty so
granted. The conduct of the Applicant, therefore, demonstrates that he
is a law-abiding citizen who respects the process of law and can be
safely trusted to abide by any condition that may be imposed by this
Court.
38. He submits that it is a settled principle of law that bail cannot be
refused as a measure of punishment nor can it be denied merely on
account of antecedents, unless such antecedents demonstrate a clear
and imminent likelihood of the accused absconding, tampering with
evidence, or repeating the offence. In the absence of such material,
antecedents lose their determinative significance. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P., (2020) SCC OnLine SC 75,
wherein it has been categorically held that:
“Mere pendency of several criminal cases against an accused cannot
be the sole basis for refusal of bail.”
39. The Court further emphasized that each case must be examined
on its own merits, and the antecedents of the accused cannot
overshadow the requirement of assessing the evidence in the present
case and the parameters governing grant of bail. Similarly, in Ayub
Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, the
Supreme Court reiterated that “criminal antecedents, though a relevant
consideration, cannot be treated as an absolute bar to grant of bail,
23
particularly when the accused is already on bail in those cases and
there is no material to indicate misuse of liberty.”
40. It is further submitted that the underlying rationale of these
judgments is that the criminal justice system proceeds on the
presumption of innocence, and the mere fact that an accused is
involved in other cases cannot be equated with guilt, nor can it justify
indefinite incarceration. In the present case, learned counsel submits
that the Applicant is already on bail in the other cases; he has never
violated any bail condition; he has cooperated with the investigation
whenever required; there is no allegation of absconding or influencing
witnesses in any matter. Thus, it is submitted that the antecedents of
the Applicant, far from being adverse, actually reinforce his entitlement
to bail, as they demonstrate his consistent compliance with the process
of law.
41. In these circumstances, it is submitted that reliance upon criminal
antecedents to deny bail to the Applicant would be contrary to the
settled legal position and would amount to imposing a pre-trial punitive
detention, which is impermissible under law.
IX. Principles Governing Bail In Economic Offences
42. Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that although the
allegations in the present case pertain to an economic offence, it is a
settled proposition of law that the gravity of the offence, by itself, cannot
be the sole ground for denial of bail. The seriousness of allegations,
howsoever grave, cannot eclipse the fundamental principles governing
grant of bail, particularly when the other relevant considerations weigh
24
in favour of the accused.
43. It is submitted that the jurisprudence relating to bail in economic
offences has now been well crystallized by the Supreme Court, wherein
it has been consistently held that even in cases involving allegations of
financial irregularities or economic fraud, the Court is required to
balance the seriousness of the accusation with the established
parameters governing bail, including the nature of evidence, possibility
of tampering, and the period of incarceration.
44. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement,
(2020) 13 SCC 337, wherein it has been held that “economic offences,
though serious in nature, do not stand on a different footing so as to
justify denial of bail as a matter of course, and the Court must consider
the overall facts and circumstances, including the nature of evidence,
the possibility of tampering, and the period of custody.”
45. The Supreme Court, in the said judgment, has further
emphasized that bail cannot be withheld as a measure of punishment,
and that pre-trial detention must not be resorted to merely on account
of the seriousness of the allegations. Applying the aforesaid principles
to the facts of the present case, learned Senior counsel for the
applicant submits that all the relevant factors unequivocally operate in
favour of the Applicant:
Firstly, the nature of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is
predominantly documentary and electronic in character, which has
25already been collected and is in the custody of the investigating agency.
There is no recovery from the Applicant, nor is there any direct material
linking him to the alleged transactions. Thus, the evidentiary foundation
of the prosecution case, insofar as the Applicant is concerned, is
neither direct nor compelling.
Secondly, the possibility of tampering with evidence is wholly illusory.
As the entire case rests on documentary material already seized, there
is no conceivable manner in which the Applicant, if enlarged on bail,
can interfere with the same. There is also no allegation or material to
suggest that the Applicant has ever attempted to obstruct the
investigation.
Thirdly, the length of custody is a significant factor which cannot be
ignored. The Applicant has been in judicial custody since 09.01.2026,
and despite the lapse of considerable time, charge-sheet has not been
filed qua him. The trial has not commenced, and in view of the
voluminous nature of the case involving numerous accused and
witnesses, there is no likelihood of early conclusion of trial.
46. Learned Senior counsel submits that the continued incarceration
of the Applicant, in such circumstances, would amount to pre-trial
punishment, which is impermissible under the settled principles of
criminal jurisprudence and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. It is thus submitted that when the case of the Applicant is tested
on the touchstone of the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court,
namely, nature of evidence, possibility of tampering, and length of
custody, it becomes evident that all these factors operate decisively in
26
favour he Applicant.
In such view of the matter, the mere label of the offence as an
“economic offence” cannot be used as a ground to deny bail,
particularly when the foundational requirements justifying continued
detention are conspicuously absent.
47. Shri Otwani, learned counsel for the Applicant, in culmination of
the aforesaid submissions, contends that a holistic and cumulative
assessment of the material available on record, read in light of the
settled principles governing grant of bail, unmistakably demonstrates
that the continued incarceration of the Applicant is wholly unwarranted
and legally unsustainable.
48. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to place on record
any direct or cogent evidence linking the Applicant with the alleged
offence. The case, insofar as the present Applicant is concerned, rests
primarily on weak, inferential and uncorroborated material, which does
not meet even the threshold of a prima facie case warranting prolonged
custodial detention. It is further submitted that there has been no
recovery whatsoever from the Applicant, despite extensive
investigation. In a case alleging large-scale financial irregularities, the
absence of any incriminating recovery significantly undermines the
prosecution’s case against the Applicant. He reiterates that the
Applicant was not named in the FIR and has been subsequently
implicated during the course of investigation, without any independent
or substantive material establishing his involvement in the alleged
conspiracy.
27
49. It is also submitted that the Applicant has been in judicial custody
since 09.01.2026, and despite the lapse of considerable time, the
investigation qua the Applicant remains incomplete, with no charge-
sheet filed against him. The proceedings are still at a nascent stage, as
cognizance has not been taken and charges have not been framed.
50. Having regard to the magnitude of the case, involving a large
number of accused persons, voluminous documentary evidence, and
an extensive list of witnesses, it is evident that the trial is not likely to
commence in the near future, much less conclude within a reasonable
timeframe. In such circumstances, continued detention of the Applicant
would amount to pre-trial punishment, which is impermissible in law.
51. It is further submitted that several co-accused persons, including
those attributed with more serious and direct roles in the alleged
offence, have already been granted bail by the Supreme Court as well
as by this Court. The principle of parity, therefore, squarely applies in
favour of the present Applicant. Lastly, he submits that the Applicant
fully satisfies the triple test for grant of bail. There is no likelihood of the
Applicant absconding, tampering with evidence or influencing
witnesses. The entire case is based on documentary material already in
the custody of the prosecution, and there is no material to suggest any
misuse of liberty by the Applicant.
52. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is submitted that the
continued detention of the Applicant is arbitrary, disproportionate and
violative of his fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under
28
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The law does not sanction
indefinite incarceration in the absence of compelling reasons,
particularly when the trial is likely to be protracted. In the light of the
foregoing submissions and the settled legal position, the applicant may
be enlarged on bail in connection with FIR No. 04/2024 registered at
Police Station EOW/ACB, Raipur (C.G.).
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/STATE
53. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent/State
has vehemently opposed the bail application and submits that the
present case pertains to a grave and large-scale economic offence of
enormous magnitude, involving deep-rooted conspiracy, systematic
abuse of official position, and generation as well as circulation of illicit
funds through an organized syndicate.
54. It is submitted that the investigation conducted thus far has
revealed a well-structured and meticulously executed mechanism
whereby illegal proceeds generated through manipulation of the excise
system were collected, transported, and ultimately channelized through
hawala networks. The magnitude of the offence, coupled with its impact
on public revenue and institutional integrity, warrants a cautious and
stringent approach in the matter of grant of bail.
55. He submits that the role attributed to the present Applicant is not
peripheral or incidental, but rather central to the operational aspect of
the alleged conspiracy. It is contended that the Applicant acted as a
crucial link in the chain of collection, handling, transportation, and final
29
delivery of illicit cash generated by the syndicate.
Role of the Applicant in the Conspiracy
56. It is submitted that the Applicant, leveraging his proximity and
access to influential persons in power, was entrusted with sensitive
responsibilities relating to management and movement of syndicate
funds. The investigation reveals that the Applicant was not merely a
passive recipient, but an active participant who knowingly facilitated the
movement of illegal cash through clandestine channels. Particular
emphasis is placed on the material collected during investigation which,
according to the prosecution, establishes that:
• The Applicant received substantial amounts of illicit cash,
including involvement in channelizing funds to the tune of
approximately Rs. 72 crores, at the instance of co-accused
persons;
• He acted on instructions of key accused persons, namely Anwar
Debar, Soumya Chaurasia and Dipen Chawda, thereby forming
an integral part of the syndicate’s financial operations;
• The Applicant was entrusted with the responsibility of handling
and further routing the collected cash, including its ultimate
delivery through hawala channels.
Chain of Events and Modus Operandi
57. Learned counsel submits that the investigation has uncovered a
structured and multi-layered modus operandi, clearly demonstrating the
Applicant’s active involvement. The sequence of events, as emerging
from the material on record, is as follows:
30
Collection Stage: Illegal cash was collected and packed in bags/cartons
under the directions of key conspirators;
Routing Stage: Such cash was transported through pre-arranged
routes up to designated locations, particularly in the Bhilai region;
Intermediate Handling: The cash consignments were then managed
and temporarily held under arrangements facilitated by intermediaries,
including Pappu Bansal;
Transfer to Applicant co-accused persons, the said cash was handed
over to the present Applicant or his drivers;
Final Delivery Mechanism: The Applicant would then personally ensure
further transportation, often by changing vehicles, altering routes, and
separating drivers, and ultimately facilitating delivery to persons
involved in hawala transactions.
58. It is submitted that this deliberate and calculated conduct,
particularly the act of isolating the final stage of delivery and ensuring
secrecy, clearly demonstrates conscious involvement and mens rea,
and rules out any possibility of the Applicant being an unwitting
participant.
Corroborative Material and Witness Statements
59. Learned counsel for the State submits that the prosecution case
is not based on conjectures but is supported by multiple independent
sources of evidence, which cumulatively establish the Applicant’s role.
Reliance is placed on:
• Statements of key witnesses, including Prakash Sharma @
Chhotu and Sohan Verma, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,
31which disclose the mechanism of illegal cash collection and its
handling;
• Statements of drivers employed by the Applicant, namely
Ashwini Vaishnav, Ishwar Gandharva and Harigir Goswami,
who have consistently stated that:
• the Applicant used multiple vehicles for transportation of cash;
• cash bags were received from designated locations and
transported under his instructions;
• after reaching certain points the Applicant would separate the
driver, change the vehicle or route, and personally undertake the
final delivery;
• Identification proceedings, panchnamas and videographic
evidence, which corroborate the movement pattern and handling
of cash consignments;
Statements recorded before the Enforcement Directorate, further
affirming the handling, routing and delivery of funds in furtherance of
hawala transactions. It is submitted that the consistency and interlinking
nature of these statements establish a complete chain pointing towards
the active involvement of the Applicant.
Conduct and Incriminating Circumstances
60. It is further submitted that the conduct of the Applicant, as
revealed from the material collected, is highly incriminating. The
Applicant frequently visited the residence of highly placed public
functionaries, indicating his proximity and influence; acted as a
trusted handler of illicit funds, entrusted with sensitive tasks
involving large sums of money; deliberately adopted covert
32
methods, such as changing routes, isolating drivers, and ensuring
confidential delivery, thereby indicating knowledge of illegality
and intent to conceal. Such conduct, it is submitted, clearly
establishes that the Applicant was an active and trusted link in the
illegal financial chain, and not a mere facilitator.
Stage of Investigation and Necessity of Custodial Interrogation
61. It is further submitted that the investigation is still ongoing and at
a crucial stage, and further leads are being pursued for:
• identification of additional accused persons;
• tracing of the proceeds of crime;
• recovery of further incriminating material; and
• unraveling the complete conspiracy.
Learned counsel submits that the custodial presence of the
Applicant is necessary to ensure that the investigation proceeds
unhindered and the entire conspiracy is unearthed in its entirety.
Likelihood of Influence and Obstruction
62. It is submitted that in the backdrop of the grave and serious
nature of allegations levelled against the applicant, the position and
proximity with influential persons, and his demonstrated role in the
syndicate, there exists a real and substantial likelihood that, if released
on bail, the Applicant may influence witnesses; tamper with evidence;
or obstruct the course of investigation.
63. In view of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the State submits
that the material collected during investigation clearly establishes a
33
prima facie case of active involvement of the Applicant in a grave
economic offence of large magnitude, involving organized illegal
financial operations. Considering the grave nature of the allegations
and the extensive magnitude of the alleged offence, which appears to
have been committed on a large and organized scale; the specific and
active role attributed to the Applicant; the stage of investigation; and the
likelihood of interference with the course of justice, it is submitted that
the present case does not merit exercise of discretion in favour of the
Applicant, and the bail application deserves to be rejected.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
64. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused
the case diary, material collected during investigation, and duly
appreciated the rival submissions advanced with their characteristic
erudition and forensic precision, this Court now proceeds to adjudicate
the present application on the anvil of the triple test crystallized in
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, read with the
comprehensive guidelines in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10
SCC 51 ie. flight risk, tampering potential, and prima facie case.
Role of the Applicant in the present crime in question
65. At the threshold, as per prosecution story, from the cumulative
investigation, the sequence of events emerges in a structured manner:
(I) in the first stage, illegal cash bags/cartons are prepared and routed
through a predefined channel upto the Bhilai region; (ii) in the second
stage, such cash bags remain under the control/handling at the
Khursipar location under Pappu Bansal’s arrangement; (iii) in the third
34stage, as per directions of Soumya Chaurasia and /or other persons,
the same cash bags are handed over to the present applicant or his
drivers; (iv) in the fourth stage, such cash bags are transported to
Raipur and (v) in the fifth and final stage, the applicant deliberately
separates the driver and /or changes the location and thereafter
ensures the final delivery of the cash to persons involved in the Hawala
network. There is no mention that finally who has received the cash and
also there is no mention who is the Hawala operator. This Court is
enjoined to strike a delicate equilibrium between societal interest in
exemplary investigation and the sacrosanct Article 21, right to liberty,
lest bail metamorphose into “de facto conviction,” as cautioned by the
Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. ED (2019) 9 SCC 24 and
Manish Sisodia v. CBI (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1393).
Evidentiary Matrix: Fragile & Trial-Centric
66. A plain reading of the record reveals the FIR was registered on
17.01.2024 against 71 accused persons, predicated on information
forwarded by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under Section 66(2) of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Conspicuously,
the present applicant was not arrayed as an accused therein.
Thereafter, the respondent agency has filed the main charge-sheet
alongside seven supplementary final reports before the learned trial
Court, implicating 52 co-accused and relying on upwards of 90
documents and 1,194 witnesses. The seventh (and most recent)
supplementary charge-sheet bears the date 20.12.2025. In none of
these voluminous filings does the applicant’s name appear. Even
35
though no charges have been framed against the co-accused, yet the
trial remains stalled, symbolic of inexcusable protraction spanning
nearly two years from FIR registration.
67. Scrutinizing the material on record, no digital evidence–be it
electronic records, bank statements, or trail of proceeds of crime has
been recovered or linked to the applicant. Equally absent are any
recoveries of cash, immovable property, or assets attributable to him.
The ED’s narrative hinges exclusively on a statement attributed to co-
accused Shri Laxmi Narayan Bansal, which prompted summoning the
applicant for examination under Section 50 PMLA. This provision, while
enabling inquiry, does not ipso facto justify arrest absent tangible
recovery or flight risk (Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2022) 10 SCC 1; Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 748).
68. Paradoxically, the respondent/Investigating Agency has refrained
from arresting the co-accused Laxmi Narayan Bansal–despite the
fact that an open ended warrant has been issued by the Special Court
in this case against the co-accused Laxmi Narayan Bansal. This
selective non-arrest of the co-accused undermines the complaint’s
credibility, raising serious questions on investigative bona fides.
69. Concededly, the Applicant figures nowhere in the FIR, having
been roped in surreptitiously during investigation, a circumstance
repeatedly deprecated as furnishing prima facie ground for bail (State
36
of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, 1996) 4 SCC 659). The attributed
role generalized whispers of “association” cries out for strict proof
during trial, incapable of sustaining indefinite incarceration at this stage.
70. The prosecution’s linchpin contention of the Applicant’s nodal role
in a panoptic (all-inclusvie) conspiracy demands watertight evidence–
meetings, money trails, policy fingerprints–unfurling only at plenary
trial. As pithily held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005)
11 SCC 600, “allegations of conspiracy, absent direct evidence, cannot
justify pre-trial detention.” Such averments, at best inferential, cannot
graduate to conclusive certitude for bail negation.
71. This Court finds unassailable merit in the submission that no
incriminating material stands recovered from the Applicant despite
exhaustive raids/investigation. The prosecution case reduces to
“linkage in the chain”–a gossamer thread snapping under Sanjay Jain
v. ED (2024 SCC OnLine SC 656) scrutiny. Evidentiary worth of such
statements awaits trial-testing; their present invocation cannot
legitimize continued fetters.
72. No cognizance or charges framed; Trial embryonic, confronting:
50+ accused; 1100+ witnesses; thousand pages of documents; Multiple
supplements. In this elephantine sprawl, trial commencement “within
reasonable time” (Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, 1977) 4 SCC
291) is illusory, a mirage. The Applicant is in custody since 09.01.2026
(over 2½ months), confronts de facto pre-conviction punishment–an
Article 21 anathema (Satender Kumar Antil, supra; Manish Sisodia,
37supra). Notably, similarly circumstanced co-accused–including key
policy architects have secured liberty from this Court and the Supreme
Court on identical reasoning.
73. It is also not in dispute that the Applicant was not named in the
FIR and has been subsequently implicated during the course of
investigation. The role attributed to the Applicant is a matter of trial and
requires detailed appreciation of evidence, which cannot be undertaken
at this stage. So far as the contention of the prosecution regarding the
existence of a structured conspiracy and the role of the Applicant
therein is concerned, the same, in the opinion of this Court, would
require strict proof during trial, and at this stage, such allegations
cannot be treated as conclusive so as to justify indefinite pre-trial
incarceration.
74. This Court further finds substance in the submission of learned
counsel for the Applicant that no recovery has been effected from the
Applicant, and the prosecution case, insofar as he is concerned, rests
on statements and alleged linkage in the chain, the evidentiary value
whereof is to be tested during trial. It merits mention that the
investigation remains incomplete even after significant lapse of time,
with no charge-sheet filed against the present applicant to date.
Notably, while charge-sheets have been submitted against certain
accused persons and cognizance taken thereon, proceedings against
all implicated persons remain pending, resulting in protracted trial over
two years.
38
75. Having regard to the voluminous nature of the case, involving
multiple accused persons and a large number of witnesses, this Court
is of the view that the trial is not likely to commence in the near future,
much less conclude within a reasonable time. This Court also cannot
lose sight of the fact that several co-accused persons have already
been enlarged on bail by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court.
Though parity is not to be applied mechanically, yet, in the absence of
distinguishing features brought on record by the prosecution, the
Applicant is entitled to seek parity.
76. Notably, the Supreme Court has granted bail to co-accused
persons including Arun Pati Tripathi (A-1), alleged to be the
mastermind of the syndicate; Trilok Singh Dhillon (A-5) and Anurag
Dwivedi (A-5), described as principal beneficiaries and handlers of
illicit proceeds; Arvind Singh (A-2), having direct linkage with the
Excise Department; Deepak Duari, and Amit Singh, vide orders
passed in respective Special Leave Petitions.
Further, this Court has extended the benefit of bail to several
other co-accused persons, including Sanjay Kumar Mishra (A-4) and
Manish Mishra, alleged to have played coordinating roles; Vijay
Bhatia (A-41) and Sunil Dutt (A-10); Abhishek Singh, Chaitanya
Baghel, Atul Singh, Mukesh Manchanda, Dipen Chawda, Nitesh
Purohit and Yash Purohit. It is also noteworthy that as many as 29
Excise Officials, alleged to be directly involved in the very same scam
and occupying official positions, have already been enlarged on bail by
the Supreme Court vide order dated 29.08.2025 in SLP (Crl.) No.
39
12801/2025 and connected matters, which was subsequently
confirmed vide order dated 12.11.2025.
77. This Court finds the Applicants’ plea of parity not merely attractive
but constitutionally compelling. The doctrine of parity flows directly from
Article 14 of the Constitution, which mandates equal treatment for
similarly situated persons in matters of personal liberty. In a prosecution
of this magnitude spanning one main charge sheet and seven
supplementary charge-sheets and numerous accused–the selective
incarceration of a few, while others with demonstrably graver roles
remain at liberty, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
78. As regards the apprehension expressed by the prosecution that
the Applicant may tamper with evidence or influence witnesses, this
Court finds that the same is not supported by any concrete material.
The entire case is based on documentary evidence already in the
custody of the prosecution, and there is no material to indicate that the
Applicant has attempted to interfere with the investigation at any stage.
The Applicant appears to have deep roots in society, and there is
nothing on record to suggest that he is a flight risk. He has also been
granted bail in other cases and there is no allegation of misuse of
liberty.
79. This Court also takes note of the settled legal position as laid
down by the Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. CBI, (2020) 13
SCC 791, P. Chidambaram v. ED, (2020) 13 SCC 337, and
Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P., (2020) SCC OnLine SC 75,
40
wherein it has been held that mere seriousness of allegations is not
sufficient to deny bail; bail cannot be withheld as a measure of
punishment; and unsubstantiated apprehensions cannot form the basis
for denial of bail.
80. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and having regard to the
nature of allegations, the absence of direct recovery, the fact that the
Applicant was not named in the FIR, the prolonged custody, the stage
of investigation, the likelihood of delay in trial the parity with co-
accused, and the fact that the Applicant satisfies the triple test, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the Applicant has made out a
case for grant of bail.
81. Applying the settled principles governing grant of bail, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the continued detention of the
applicant during the pendency of investigation would not advance the
cause of justice. Pre-trial incarceration, particularly when the
investigation is still in progress, ought not to be resorted to as a matter
of course, unless compelling circumstances so warrant. In the present
case, no such exceptional grounds are discernible which would justify
further curtailment of the applicant’s liberty.
82. At the same time, this Court is conscious of the necessity to
ensure that the ongoing investigation is conducted in a fair, free, and
uninfluenced manner. The record reflects that the investigation is still
underway and certain material witnesses have already been examined
by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, to safeguard the integrity of the
41
investigative process and to obviate any possibility of interference and
to ensure that the course of investigation and the administration of
criminal justice remain unaffected in any manner, it is deemed
appropriate to impose suitable and stringent conditions while granting
bail.
83. Upon an overall evaluation of the material available on record,
the nature of allegations, and the stage of investigation, this Court finds
that the balance of discretion leans in favour of granting bail to the
applicant. Accordingly, it is held that the applicant is entitled to be
enlarged on bail from the date of filing of the charge sheet against him
subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the
learned Special Judge, so as to ensure that the administration of
criminal justice remains unimpeded and the investigation proceeds in
accordance with law.
CONCLUSION
84. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid discussion and having
regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the present
application is allowed. It is directed that the Applicant shall be enlarged
on bail in connection with FIR No. 04/2024 registered at Police Station
EOW/ACB, Raipur (C.G.), upon furnishing a personal bond in the sum
of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) along with one solvent surety in
the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.
85. However, having regard to the nature and gravity of the
allegations, and with a view to ensure that the administration of justice
42
remains unimpeded, the release of the Applicant shall be subject to the
following stringent conditions:
(i) he shall surrender his passport, if any,
before the Trial Court;
(b) the applicant must cooperate with the
investigation and the trial proceedings;
(c) he shall not directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case;
(d) he shall commit no offence whatsoever
during the period he is on bail; and
(e) in case of change of residential address
and/or mobile number, the same shall be
intimated to the Court concerned by way of an
affidavit.
(f) any stringent conditions as may be imposed
by the trial court.
86. Any breach of these conditions shall entitle the prosecution to
move for immediate bail cancellation under Section 483(3) BNSS.
Liberty is granted subject to strict compliance, harmonizing Article 21
rights with trial integrity. The Applicant shall be produced before the
concerned special court on the date of charge-sheet filing. Upon
production, the Special Court shall release him on bail forthwith,
incorporating the above conditions plus such additional stringent terms
as deemed necessary to ensure his continued availability throughout
trial and preclude prejudice to prosecution.
43
87. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined
solely to the adjudication of the present bail applications and shall not
be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The
Trial Court shall proceed independently and uninfluenced by any
observation contained in this order.
The bail application stands allowed in the above terms.
Sd/-
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
Digitally signed
by SUGUNA
DUBEY
SUGUNA Date:
DUBEY 2026.03.19
17:26:16
+0530