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Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Babu (Died) … vs Union Of India on 18 March, 2026

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Chattisgarh High Court

Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Babu (Died) … vs Union Of India on 18 March, 2026

                                 1




                                                    2026:CGHC:12943




     The date when The date when       The date when the
    the judgment is the judgment is judgment is uploaded on
       reserved       pronounced          the website
                                       Operative          Full
      10.02.2026       18.03.2026          --           18.03.2026



                                                                 AFR


         HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                       CRA No. 860 of 2006

1 - Jitendra Nath Mukherjee Babu (Died) Through LRs. (As Per
Honble Court Order Dated- 22-09-2011 and 23-07-2025)

1.1 - Chandna Mukharjee, W/o Jitendra Nath Mukherjee, aged
about 55 Years, R/o Dumurkunda, P.S. - Chirkunda, District-
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
                                              ... Appellant

                              versus

      Union of India Through CBI Jabalpur (M.P.)
                                                     ... Respondent

For Appellant. – Mr. Leekesh Kumar and Mr. Manish Kumar
Chandra, on behalf of Ms. Renu Kochar,
Advocate.

For Respondent – Mr. Vaibhav Goverdhan, Advocate.

SPONSORED

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
2

(C.A.V. Judgment)

1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence dated 21.11.2006 passed by the Special

Judge (C.B.I.), Raipur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case

No.54/2004 convicting and sentencing the

accused/appellant as under :-

           CONVICTION                        SENTENCE
     Section    7   of    the R.I. for one year and fine of

Prevention of Corruption Rs.5000/-, in default of payment
Act. of fine amount, additional R.I.
for 04 months.

Section 13(2) r/w 13 (1)(D) R.I. for 01 year with fine of
of the Prevention of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment
Corruption Act. of fine amount, additional R.I.
for 04 months.

All the sentenced were
directed to run concurrently.

2. During the pendency of the appeal, the original appellant

expired and his wife, being his legal representative, was

permitted to continue the present appeal.

3. The prosecution story, in brief, is that complainant, Michael

Masih, was posted as Electrical Fitter Grade-IV at Korea

Colliery under S.E.C.L., Chirimiri Area. He had submitted an

application seeking withdrawal of an advance amount of Rs.

2,50,000/- from his Provident Fund account. At the relevant

time, accused, J. N. Mukherjee (since deceased), was
3

posted as Personal Manager at West Chirimiri Colliery. The

application of the complainant for sanction of provident fund

advance was required to be processed and approved

through the office of the accused. It was alleged that the

accused demanded illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/- from

the complainant for facilitating and approving the said

advance application. Being aggrieved by the demand of

bribe, the complainant approached the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI) and lodged a complaint. Upon receipt of

the complaint, the CBI organized a trap proceeding to

apprehend the accused while accepting the bribe amount.

On 27.02.2004, at the residential premises of the accused,

being Quarter No. 2 situated at Korea Colliery, the accused

allegedly demanded and accepted the bribe amount of Rs.

5,000/- from complainant, Michael Masih, in the presence of

an independent witness, S.S. Kashyap. Immediately

thereafter, the CBI trap team apprehended the accused red-

handed and recovered the bribe amount from his

possession. It was further alleged that in order to screen

himself from legal punishment, the accused caused

disappearance of the original provident fund advance

application submitted by the complainant.

4. After completion of usual investigation, the CBI obtained
4

prior sanction for prosecuting the accused from the

competent authority, namely the Chairman of Coal India

Limited, being the disciplinary authority of the accused, and

thereafter filed a charge-sheet before this Special Court for

offences punishable under Sections 7 and Section 13(2)

read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, (for short ‘the PC Act‘) and Section 201 of the

Indian Penal Code. The learned Trial Court framed charges

against the accused/appellant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)

(d) read with section 13 (2) of the P.C. Act., to which he

abjured his guilt and pleaded for trial.

5. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution

examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the

accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of

Cr.P.C. in which he denied the incriminating circumstances

appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded

innocence and false implication. No witness was examined

by the accused/appellant in his defence.

6. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective

parties and considering the material available on record has

convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as

mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
5

prosecution has utterly failed to prove the essential

ingredients of the alleged offences beyond reasonable

doubt. It is contended that the foundational facts necessary

to sustain conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read

with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act have not been

established by cogent and reliable evidence. It is further

submitted that the prosecution has not been able to

substantiate the alleged demand of Rs. 5,000/- by way of

illegal gratification by the appellant from the complainant.

Demand of bribe being sine qua non for conviction under

the aforesaid provisions, its non-proof is fatal to the case of

the prosecution. Learned counsel also contends that the

prosecution has failed to properly obtain and prove the valid

sanction for prosecution of the appellant as required under

law, thereby vitiating the entire trial. It is further argued that

the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the alleged

currency notes amounting to Rs. 5,000/- were seized from

the exclusive possession and with the conscious knowledge

of the appellant. In this regard, attention was invited to

paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of the deposition of PW-5 Michael

Masih and paragraphs 19 to 22 of the deposition of PW-10

B. Panir Selbum, which, according to the appellant, create

serious doubt about such alleged recovery. It is submitted
6

that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence

on record in its proper perspective.

8. It is also contended that the prosecution has withheld

material witnesses, namely Arvind Kumar and S.D.

Devasthale, whose non-examination has caused serious

prejudice to the defence. Learned counsel further submits

that there are material contradictions and omissions in the

statements of prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-5

Michael Masih (complainant), PW-4 Upendra Narayan

Singh, PW-7 Ramshanker Tiwari, PW-8 K.C. Sahu, PW-3

Ashok Sahu and PW-10 B. Panir Selbum. In view of such

inconsistencies, no implicit reliance could have been placed

upon their testimonies. It is further argued that the statement

of PW-5, the complainant, has not been corroborated by

independent and reliable evidence on material particulars. In

absence of such corroboration, the conviction recorded by

the learned Trial Court is wholly illegal and unsustainable in

law. Learned counsel also submits that there was no prior

action such as seizure, panchanama, or any official

proceeding initiated by the appellant against the

complainant so as to create any circumstance for coercion

or compulsion for demand of bribe. It is further contended

that no independent witness has been examined by the
7

prosecution to prove the actual delivery of the alleged bribe

amount of Rs. 5,000/-. The solitary testimony of PW-5

Michael Masih is insufficient to establish payment beyond

reasonable doubt. The appellant’s case, as argued, is that

on 27.02.2004 the complainant was eager to get his work

done and himself offered the money, which was refused by

the appellant. However, the learned Trial Court has

erroneously disbelieved this defence and held otherwise.

9. It is further submitted that the alleged phenolphthalein test

has not been duly proved in accordance with law. The pink-

coloured solution was neither marked nor exhibited as a

material article before the Court. The primary evidence,

namely the sealed bottle containing the solution, was not

proved and produced with proper seal and signature, and no

explanation has been offered for such non-production.

Hence, the alleged chemical test remains unproved.

Learned counsel argues that neither the demand nor the

payment of bribe has been proved beyond reasonable

doubt. In such circumstances, the presumption under

Section 4(1) of the P.C. Act cannot be invoked against the

appellant. It is further submitted that mere recovery of

certain currency notes from the premises of the appellant,

without proof of voluntary acceptance pursuant to demand,
8

is insufficient to raise any statutory presumption. In this

context, reliance is placed upon the judgments of the

Hon’ble Apex Court in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan

reported in AIR 1975 SC 1432, Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi

Administration) reported in AIR 1979 SC 1498, Banshi Lal

Yadav v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1981 SC 1235

(1981) 3 SCC 69, P. Somaraju Vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 and this

Court judgment dated 19.08.2025 passed in CRA

No.294/2009 and other connected appeal [Umesh Kumar

Yadav Vs. Union of India (Neutral Citation No.

2025:CGHC:41830)], wherein it has been held that mere

recovery of money separated from proof of demand and

voluntary acceptance is not sufficient to sustain conviction,

and that before raising statutory presumption, the

prosecution must first prove that the accused accepted

gratification for himself. It is lastly contended that the

learned Trial Court erred in shifting the burden upon the

appellant to disprove the demand of illegal gratification,

whereas in law the initial burden squarely lies upon the

prosecution to establish demand and acceptance by reliable

and independent evidence. These facts cannot be said to

have been proved merely on the basis of circumstantial
9

evidence and the uncorroborated testimony of the

complainant. Thus, the impugned judgment of conviction

and order of sentence is liable to be set aside.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent/C.B.I. submits that the judgment of conviction

passed by the learned Special Judge is well-reasoned, legal

and based upon proper appreciation of oral and

documentary evidence available on record. It is contended

that the prosecution has successfully established all the

essential ingredients of the offences punishable under

Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of

the P.C. Act beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that

the demand of illegal gratification of Rs. 5,000/- by the

appellant has been clearly and consistently proved through

the testimony of the complainant (PW-5), which inspires

confidence and remains unshaken on material particulars.

The evidence of the complainant is duly corroborated by the

independent witness present at the time of trap proceedings

as well as by the members of the trap team. Learned

counsel further submits that the acceptance of the bribe

amount by the appellant stands conclusively established.

The appellant was apprehended red-handed immediately

after accepting the tainted currency notes. The recovery of
10

the said amount from his possession has been proved by

cogent evidence. The phenolphthalein test conducted during

the trap proceedings yielded positive results, thereby

scientifically corroborating the prosecution case regarding

handling of the tainted currency notes by the appellant. It is

contended that minor discrepancies or omissions in the

testimonies of prosecution witnesses are natural and do not

affect the substratum of the prosecution case. The learned

Trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence in its proper

perspective and has recorded findings after careful scrutiny

of the entire material on record. Learned counsel further

submits that once demand and acceptance of illegal

gratification have been proved, the statutory presumption

under Section 20 of the P.C. Act squarely applies. The

appellant has failed to rebut the said presumption by leading

any reliable defence evidence or by eliciting material

contradictions in cross-examination sufficient to probabilise

his defence. It is argued that the defence plea that the

complainant voluntarily offered money which was refused by

the appellant is an afterthought and is not supported by any

credible evidence. The learned Trial Court has rightly

disbelieved such defence, as the circumstances of the trap

and the recovery of tainted currency notes clearly negate
11

the said contention. It is submitted that the findings recorded

by the learned Trial Court are based on evidence and do not

suffer from perversity or misappreciation warranting

interference in appeal. Thus, the appeal being devoid of

merit deserves is liable to be dismissed.

11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material available on record.

12. It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that the

learned trial Court framed charges against the

accused/appellant under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with

section 13 (2) of the P.C. Act. & after appreciation of oral

and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court convicted

the accused/appellant accordingly.

13. Complainant Michael Masih (PW-5) has stated that on

19.01.2004, he had submitted an application (Ex.P-8) for

CPF loan along with the requisite documents in the office of

the Superintendent, Koriya Colliery. After submitting the loan

application, he approached the accused/appellant to

ascertain the status of his application. However, the

accused allegedly demanded Rs. 5,000/- and stated that no

action would be taken on the application unless the amount

was paid. Thereafter, the witness informed the accused that

he would return once he had arranged the money.
12

14. He has further stated that on a subsequent occasion, he

went to meet the accused, but the accused was not present

in the office. Later, he met the accused near the Central

Bank, where this witness informed the accused that he had

arranged the money and asked where he should meet him.

The accused then asked whether he had seen his house.

Thereafter, the witness went to the house of the accused.

Prior to this, the witness had already contacted the CBI. The

CBI officials came to his house, where he narrated the

entire incident and conversation regarding demand of bribe.

He has further stated that on 27.02.2004, he submitted a

written complaint (Ex.P-1) to the CBI stating that the

accused had demanded Rs. 5,000/- for processing his CPF

loan application and that he was unwilling to pay the bribe.

15. He also stated that he handed over a copy of his loan

application (Ex.P-8) to Inspector Devsthale of the CBI,

which was seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P-6). Thereafter,

the CBI officials demonstrated the trap procedure and

prepared the pre-trap memorandum (Ex.P-2) at his house.

The witness further stated that he, along with the CBI

personnel, proceeded on foot towards the house of the

accused. He and one Kashyap went to the accused’s

house, knocked the door, and the accused came out. The
13

accused asked whether he had brought the money, to which

the witness replied in the affirmative. Upon handing over the

amount to the accused, Kashyap gave a pre-arranged

signal to the CBI team. After that, the CBI trap party

immediately entered the house and apprehended the

accused red-handed.

16. He further stated that Inspector Devsthale caught hold of the

left hand of the accused, disclosed his identity as a CBI

Inspector, and informed the accused that he had been

caught while accepting a bribe. The accused, however,

stated that he had not taken any bribe from the complainant

and claimed that the money was repayment of a loan given

to the complainant.

17. In paragraph 16 of his cross-examination, the witness stated

that on 19.01.2004, he had submitted his CPF loan

application to clerk Upendra Kumar in the receipt and

dispatch section, and an acknowledgment was given on

another copy bearing seal and signature. He further stated

that although the application was submitted on 19.01.2004,

the acknowledgment was issued on 20.01.2004, and he did

not submit the application on 20.01.2004.

18. He has also stated that on 22.01.2004, he visited the office

to inquire about the status of his loan application, where
14

Rama Shankar informed him that the application had been

forwarded to the Personnel Department.

19. In paragraph 17, the witness stated that upon being

informed by clerk Rama Shankar about certain errors in the

Patwari documents, he approached the Patwari on the

same day, got the errors corrected, and resubmitted the

documents in the office on the very same day. He further

stated that before approaching the Patwari, he had met the

accused and informed him about the errors, upon which the

accused instructed him to get the documents corrected from

the Patwari and also asked him to arrange Rs. 5,000/-. In

paragraph 18, the witness admitted that he did not lodge

any complaint with any higher authority regarding the

alleged demand of bribe on 22.01.2004.

20. In paragraph 19, the witness admitted that he had informed

Satpujan Mishra, President, who had accompanied him to

meet the accused. However, he denied the suggestion that

he, along with Satpujan Mishra, had conspired to falsely

implicate the accused in the bribery case.

21. Upendra Narayan Singh (PW-4) is the Senior Clerk posted

in Koriya Colliery at Receipt and Dispatch Section. He has

stated that entry in register (Article ‘F’) at Sl. No.1665 was

made by him on 20.01.2004, according to which, an
15

application of complainant Michael Masih of CPF loan was

received. He has also stated that after receiving the said

application, he immediately entered the said application in

the dak-book and sent it to Shri Sahu, Manager. He has also

stated that he does not know where is the original copy of

application whose entry was made in the Article-F. He has

also stated that the photocopy (Ex.P-8) is the copy of

original application which was submitted by complainant

Michael Masih (PW-5). This witness, in para 6 of his cross-

examination, has admitted that there is no entry for

19.01.2004 in the register (Article -‘F’), whereas the date

was written. He has denied this suggestion that he made

entry at Sl.No.1666 for 20.01.2004 leaving 4 lines empty

after writing 19.01.2004.

22. Ramashankar Tiwari (PW-7) is the Senior Clerk who at the

relevant time was posted in S.E.C.L. Chirmiri. He has stated

that he look after the work of provident fund and its loan

regarding work of the employees. This witness in para 2 of

his examination-in-chief has explained the mode and

manner in which applications of employees for CPF loan are

being processes and disposed of. He has stated that on

20.01.2004, complainant Michael Masih (PW-5) had

submitted an application (Ex.P-8) for CPF loan of
16

Rs.2,50,000/-. He has also stated that in the first week of

February, 2004, the complainant had come to him and

inquired about status of his application, on which, he told

him that his application has not come yet. Thereafter, the

complainant went to Personal Officer (accused) and came

back to him and showing enclosed documents with

application asked him whether the enclosed documents are

correct or not. This witness in para 6 has stated that old

application of complainant had not come to him, therefore,

he did not take any action thereon. In para 8, this witness

has admitted that he did not receive any application of

complainant on 19.01.2004, however, he only showed

documents to him. He has also admitted that no application

of complainant dated 20.01.2004 was received by him

through Superintendent Khan. He has also admitted that if

any loan application is received by the Personal Officer, it is

not sent to the Area Manager for approval until the

accompanying documents are rectified.

23. S.S. Kashyap (PW-1) is the Assistant Administrative Officer

who at the relevant time was posted in Life Insurance

Corporation, Chirmiri. He has admitted his signature on

complaint (Ex.P-1) of Michael Masih, preliminary proceeding

(Ex.P-2), memorandum of entire proceeding in the house of
17

accused (Ex.P-3), spot map (Ex.P-4) and arrest memo of

accused (Ex.P-5). This witness has stated that he went to

the house of accused with complainant Michael Masih and

accused had asked about him then complainant Michael

Masih introduced him as his relative. This witness has

denied this suggestion that complainant forcibly gave money

to the accused.

24. Sanjay Dongaonkar (PW-6) is another witness of trap party.

He has stated that he had gone to the house of accused

with complainant Michael Masih (PW-5) and S.S. Kashyap

(PW-1) as witness. Complainant Michael Masih gave money

to accused in his house and thereafter gestured us then he

along with CBI team entered the house of accused and

seized money from the accused.

25. K.C. Sahu (PW-8) who at the relevant time was posted as

Superintendent Mines/Manager at Koriya Colliery has stated

that he used to endorse all application forms for PF advance

received through the receipt and dispatch section by writing

note in english, ‘Forwarded to the Personnel Manager for

necessary action,’ and then affixing his signature. At this

stage, when the witness was shown loan application (Ex. P-

8) and questioned, he stated as follows:

‘;g fdlh vkosnu dh QksVks dkih gS] ftlds Åij nkfgus
18

dksus ij esjs dk;kZy; ds vkod tkod ‘kk[kk dh lhy rFkk
fjlhIV uacj vkfn vafdr gSA ;g vkosnu i= dHkh esjs le{k
j[kk x;k Fkk ;k ugha ;g eS ugh crk ldrkA ;fn esjs lkeus
;g vkosnu i= izLrqr gksrk] rks eS bl ij vius gkFk ls
ilZuy eSustj dks ekdZ djus dk ys[k fy[krkA bl vkosnu
i= esa dgh Hkh esjs gkFk dk dksbZ ys[k ugh gS] blfy, eS ;g
dg ldrk gwa fd ;g vkosnu esjs le{k dHkh dksbZ fopkj gsrq
ugha vk;k FkkA ‘

26. H.L. Soni (PW-9) is the witness who at the relevant time

was posted as Mines Superintendent/Manager in Koriya

Colliery. He has stated that CBI Officer had summoned him

with documents relating to loan application of complainant

Michael Masih (PW-5). Thereafter, he along with K.C. Sahu

and concerned dealing clerk had gone to CBI Office with

documents. He has also stated that the CBI Officials had

seized concerned documents under Ex.P-9 and obtained his

signature thereon. He has also stated that he attested the

complainant’s certified copy of the application which the

complainant submitted to the office on 02.03.2004. He has

also stated that the complainant’s previous application was

not available at the office. The dealing clerk took photocopy

of this application and photographs of other documents with

him. The CBI Officer asked him to attest and sign the said

photocopies. So, he signed them immediately, writing

‘attested’ on 33 documents. His signature is on all the

seized documents.

19

27. P. Panir Selvam (PW-10) is the Inspector (C.B.I.). He has

stated I n his examination-in-chief the mode and manner in

which the preliminary proceeding and trap proceeding was

conducted. In para 6 of his cross-examination, this witness

has admitted that he did not note on Ex.P-1 that when and

on what date this complaint was given to me. He has

admitted that on Ex.P-1, the two witnesses S.S. Kashyap

and Sanjay Dodgaonkar did not note that they had

confirmed the complaint with the complainant.

28. Close scrutiny of the evidence of prosecution witnesses as

discussed above makes it clear that in the entire case there

is no concrete proof of demand of bribe amount by the

accused. The trap witnesses have only deposed about the

recovery of bribe amount. Notably, according to the

complainant (PW-5), he had filed CPF loan application,

which forms the very basis of the alleged demand, but it is

surprising to note that original CPF loan application has not

been produced and only a photocopy (Ex.P-8) has been

brought on record, without proper foundational proof of its

submission or movement through official channels.

29. The defence of accused is that the complainant (PW-5) and

Union Leader have falsely implicated him in a false case.

The accused, in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement has answered to
20

Q. No.120 has as under :-

‘कोलि;kरी के कु छ नेता-नुमा कर्मचारी मुझसे चिढ़ते थे एवं
नाराज़ रहते थे। माइकल मसीह भी उन्हीं के ikVhZ का था।
वह मुझसे अपने एक झूठे आवेदन पत्र के आधार पर yksu
dh स्वीकृ त करवाना चाहता था जिसे मैंने badkj कर दिया
था। वह मेरे पास इसके बाद आवेदन पत्र लेकर dHkh नहीं
आया Fkk] और न ही मुझे कोई yksu आवेदन पत्र दिया Fkk।
लोन आवेदन पत्र प्रक्रिया के अनुसार मेरे पास आते हैं।
घटना दिनांक को मैं मध्यावकाश के कारण अपने घर में आराम
कर रहा था। उसी समय किसी ने दरवाज़ा खटखटाया, जिस पर
मैंने कहा कि दरवाज़ा खुला है तब दरवाज़ा खोलकर दो आदमी
आए थे तब तक मैं पलंग से उठकर खड़ा हो गया था। मैंने देखा
कि माइकल मसीह अपनी पैंट की जेब में हाथ डालकर नोट की
एक गड्डी निकाला और मेरी ओर बढ़ाया और बोला कि मेरा काम
कर दो। तब मैंने उसके हाथ में रखे नोटों समेत उसके हाथ को
उसकी ओर झटका, जिसके कारण नोट का बंडल माइकल के
हाथ से नीचे फर्श पर गिर गया। तब मैंने माइकल मसीह को डांटा
कि यह क्या कर रहे हो, मैंने तुमसे रुपये कभी नहीं मांगे, तुम मुझे
जबरदस्ती क्यों नोट दे रहे हो। इतने में चार-पांच लोग और कमरे
में आ गए और मुझे डांटने लगे कि मैंने रुपये लिए हैं, जिस पर
मैंने कहा कि मैंने रुपये नहीं लिए हैं, माइकल मुझे जबरदस्ती
रुपया दे रहा था, जिसको मैंने हाथ से झटका तो रुपया फर्श पर
गिर गया। इस पर एक व्यक्ति ने अपने आप को सीबीआई का
इंस्पेक्टर बताते हुए लिखापढ़ी करना चालू कर दिया और मेरे
हाथों को जबरन धुलवाया तथा 2 ढाई ?kaVs बाद मुझे कु छ
कागजों पर दस्तखत करने को बोला। तब मैंने इन कागजों को
पढ़ना चाहा, तब उन्होंने पढ़ने से मना कर दिया एवं के वल
21

दस्तखत करवा लिया। मैंने माइकल से रिश्वत नहीं मांगी थी और
न ही मैंने कोई रिश्वत ली थी। माइकल ने मुझे अपना आवेदन
नहीं दिया था। इस कारण मेरे द्वारा उसके दिए गए किसी आवेदन
पत्र को नष्ट करने का कोई सवाल ही नहीं था। मैंने माइकल
मसीह के किसी आवेदन पत्र को नष्ट नहीं किया था।

30. From the aforesaid answer to Question No.120, it is

apparent that the accused has categorically denied having

received any CPF loan application from the complainant and

has further asserted that no demand or acceptance of bribe

was ever made by him, instead that the complainant

attempted to thrust money upon him. This defence version

finds substantial corroboration from the evidence of

prosecution witnesses Upendra Narayan Singh (PW-4),

Ramashankar Tiwari (PW-7) and K.C. Sahu (PW-8), who

have explained the prescribed procedure for processing

loan applications and have not confirmed that any such

application of the complainant was ever placed before the

accused. In particular, PW-8 has stated that the noting

ordinarily made by him on CPF loan application is absent on

Ex.P-8, which also raised suspicion that any such

application was filed. Furthermore, the original loan

application itself has not been produced by the prosecution

and only a photocopy (Ex.P-8) has been filed by the

prosecution, thereby gives further support to the defence
22

plea and creating a serious doubt regarding the very

existence and movement of the alleged application.

31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Somaraju (supra) has held in

para 20 and 21 as under :-

“20. In the present case, too, the sole basis of
the prosecution to prove demand and
acceptance is the narration of the complainant, a
close scrutiny of which reveals serious infirmities.
At the outset, the complainant has no proof other
than his own oral statement that he visited the
appellant on 25.09.1997, wherein the appellant
allegedly made his first demand for a bribe. His
nephew also admits he does not know when the
complainant first informed him that the appellant
had demanded a bribe. Moreover, as the Trial
Court has already noted:

(a) There is a material discrepancy as to when
the complaint was written, as the complainant
claims it was drafted on the morning of
25.09.1997. Yet, the alleged demand is said to
have occurred in the evening of that very day.

The High Court has dismissed this inconsistency
as “innocuous” by reasoning that it may be
attributed to the lapse of five years between
incident and deposition;

(b) The complainant itself refers to “Rama
Raju” rather than the appellant, a mistake not
corrected at the pre-trap stage on 26.09.1997.
On this point, the High Court has said:

23

“14) … Criminal law does not attach importance
on names of the accused, but gives importance
to identity of the accused. One person may be
called with many names, but all those names
refer to one and the same person and not
different persons. It cannot be a circumstance
either to disbelieve the prosecution case or to
discredit P.W.-1’s evidence.”

21. Needless to say, the above observations
are not tenable in law. Moreover, what we find
particularly troubling is the complainant’s conduct
in directing Rajender, the mediator and
accompanying independent witness, to remain
outside the appellant’s office during the crucial
half-hour in which the alleged demand and
acceptance occurred. This was contrary to the
explicit instructions of the DSP. Rajender could
consequently make no positive statement on
whether the appellant demanded or accepted
any bribe, and this gap is candidly admitted by
the prosecution itself.”

32. This High Court in the matter of Umesh Kumar (supra)

held in para 16 to 22 as under :-

“16. S.I. Hussain (P.W.-9) stated that the bribe
notes were recovered from the junk room.

In his cross-examination, he admitted
this suggestion of defence that the
conversation between the accused and
24

Budga were going on in a low voice,
therefore, he could not hear it.

17. B. Paneer Selvam (P.W.-10) stated that the
bribe money was recovered from the junk room
at the instance of the accused persons.

18. Close scrutiny of statements of all
witnesses makes it clear that there is no proof of
any demand in this case and recovery of tainted
notes was made from junk room.

19. In the matter of B. Jayaraj (supra) , Hon’ble
Apex Court held in para 7 as under:-

“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that
demand of illegal gratification is sine qua
non to constitute the said offence and mere
recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7
unless it is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted
the money knowing it to be a bribe. The
above position has been succinctly laid
down in several judgments of this Court. By
way of illustration reference may be made
to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of
A.P.2
[(2010) 15 SCC 1] and C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI3
[(2009) 3 SCC 779].”

20. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter
of Mukhtiar Singh (supra) held in paras 13 and
14 which are reproduced here in below:-

13. The indispensability of the proof of
demand and illegal gratification in
establishing a charge under Sections 7
and 13 of the Act, has by now engaged the
25

attention of this Court on umpteen
occasions. In A. Subair v. State of Kerala 5;

(2009) 6 SCC 587, this Court propounded
that the prosecution in order to prove the
charge under the above provisions has to
establish by proper proof, the demand and
acceptance of the illegal gratification and
till that is accomplished, the accused
should be considered to be innocent.

Carrying this enunciation further, it was
exposited in State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao6;
(2011) 6 SCC 450 that mere recovery by
itself of the amount said to have been paid
by way of illegal gratification would not
prove the charge against the accused and
in absence of any evidence to prove
payment of bribe or to show that the
accused had voluntarily accepted the
money knowing it to be bribe, conviction
cannot be sustained.

14. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy2; (2015)
10 SCC 152 this Court took note of its
verdict in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.7;

(2014) 13 SCC 55 underlining that mere
possession and recovery of currency notes
from an accused without proof of demand
would not establish an offence under
Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. It was recounted as well
that in the absence of any proof of demand
for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or
illegal means or abuse of position as a
public servant to obtain any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to
be proved. Not only the proof of demand
thus was held to be an indispensable
essentiality and an inflexible statutory
mandate for an offence under Sections 7
and 13 of the Act, it was held as well qua
Section 20 of the Act, that any
26

presumption thereunder would arise only
on such proof of demand. This Court thus
in P. Satyanarayana Murthy2; (2015) 10
SCC 152 on a survey of its earlier
decisions on the pre-requisites of Sections
7
and 13 and the proof thereof summed up
its conclusions as hereunder: (SCC p. 159,
para 23)
“23 The proof of demand of illegal
gratification, thus, is the gravamen of
the offence under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in
absence thereof, unmistakably the
charge therefor, would fail. Mere
acceptance of any amount allegedly
by way of illegal gratification or
recovery thereof, dehors the proof of
demand, ipso facto, would thus not
be sufficient to bring home the charge
under these two sections of the Act.

As a corollary, failure of the
prosecution to prove the demand for
illegal b gratification would be fatal
and mere recovery of the amount
from the person accused of the
offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the
Act would not entail his conviction
thereunder.” (emphasis supplied)

21. This Court in the matter of Shivprasad
Kuldeep (supra) held in paras 14, 15 and 16 as
under:-

“14. in (2009) 3 SCC 779 (C.M. Girish Babu v.
CBI, Cochin, High
Court of Kerala), the Supreme
Court held thus:

“18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi
Admn
.), (1979) 4 SCC 725, this Court
took the view that (at SCC p. 727,
27

para 2) mere recovery of tainted
money divorced from the
circumstances under which it is paid
is not sufficient to convict the accused
when the substantive evidence in the
case is not reliable. The mere
recovery by itself cannot prove the
charge of the prosecution against the
accused, in the absence of any
evidence to prove payment of bribe
or to show that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money
knowing it to be bribe.”

15. Further, in (2014) 13 SCC 55 (B. Jayaraj v.
State of Andhra Pradesh
), it was held by the
Supreme Court as under:

“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7
is concerned, it is a settled position in law
that demand of illegal gratification is sine
qua non to constitute the said offence and
mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7
unless it is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted
the money knowing it to be a bribe. The
above position has been succinctly laid
down in
several judgments of this Court.
By
way of illustration reference may be made
to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of
A.P.
, (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI
, (2009) 3 SCC 779.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible
to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is
concerned, such presumption can only be
in respect of the offence under Section 7
and not the offences under Sections 13(1)

(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is
only on proof of acceptance of illegal
28

gratification that presumption can be drawn
under Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing or
forbearing to do any official act. Proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification can follow
only if there is proof of demand. As the
same is lacking in the present case the
primary facts on the basis of which the
legal presumption under Section 20 can be
drawn are wholly absent.”

16. Recently, in (2021) 3 SCC 687 (N.
Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu
), reiterating
the judgment of C.M. Girish Babu case (supra)
and B. Jayaraj
case (supra), it was held by the
Supreme Court as follows:

“26. It is equally well settled that mere
recovery by itself cannot prove the charge
of the prosecution against the accused.
Reference can be made to the judgments
of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI,
(2009) 3 SCC 779 and in B. Jayaraj v.

State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55. In the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while
considering the case under Sections 7,
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988
it is reiterated that to
prove the charge, it has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be
bribe. Absence of proof of demand for
illegal gratification and mere possession or
recovery of currency notes is not sufficient
to constitute such offence. In the said
judgments it is also held that even the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act
can be drawn only after demand for and
acceptance of illegal gratification is proved.
It is also fairly well settled that initial
29

presumption of innocence in the criminal
jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”

22. In light of above, in the present case, it is
quite vivid that there is no proof of demand as it
appears that the currency notes were recovered
from junk room and statements of panch
witnesses and investigating officer are
contradictory to each other and other present
witnesses did not support the prosecution case. It
is also clear that the complainant stated in his
application that the demand was made on
06.11.2004 but as per Ashish Adhikari (P.W.-4),
accused Umesh Kumar was on leave on
06.11.2004 and the said fact is evident from
Ex.D/1 and Ex.D/2. Thus, the prosecution has
failed to prove the demand and acceptance of
bribe by the appellants from the complainant
beyond reasonable doubt.”

33. In the light of above, in the present case, it is quite vivid that

the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredient

of demand of bribe. The evidence on record shows that the

original CPF loan application of the complainant (PW-5) was

missing and only a photocopy (Ex.P-8) was filed, which

weakens the prosecution case and raised serious doubt.

Further, the prosecution witnesses dealing with the CPF

loan application have not established that any such

application was ever pending before the accused at the
30

relevant time of loan sanction. These circumstances gives

support to the defence version made in answer to Q. No.120

in 313 Cr.P.C. statement that no application was received by

the accused. Consequently, in the absence of reliable proof

of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the

prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable

doubt.

34. For the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed.

Conviction of the accused/appellant under Sections 7 and

13(2) r/w 13(1)(D) of the P.C. Act and sentenced imposed

thereunder are hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the said

charges.

35. Since, the instant appeal was prosecuted by the legal

representative on account of death of the

accused/appellant, therefore, after allowing the appeal, no

direction is required for the LRs to furnish personal bond

under Section 481 BNSS.

36. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be

sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for

compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey)
Digitally signed by
JUDGE
VIJAYpekde
BHARATRAO
PEKDE
Date: 2026.03.18
15:35:51 +0530



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