Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 05.03.2026 vs State Of Hp And Others on 18 March, 2026
2026:HHC:7726
THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
LPA No.488 of 2024
Reserved on: 05.03.2026
Decided on : 18.03.2026
.
Hari Ram (deceased) through LRs ...Appellants
Versus
State of HP and others ...Respondents.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice.
of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellants
rt : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr.
Atharv Sharma, Advocate.
For the respondent(s) : Ms. Priyanka Chauhan, Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1-State.
: Mr. Mukul Sood and Mr. Het Ram,
Advocates, for respondents No. 2 to 4.
: Mr. Suneel Mohan Goel, Sr. Advocate,
with Mr. Paras Dhaulta, Advocate, for
respondents No. 5 to 7.
Bipin Chander Negi, Judge
During the pendency of the LPA now preferred, Hari
Ram, the original writ petitioner had died. Vide order dated 18.8.2025
the legal heirs of the erstwhile writ petitioner had been ordered to be
brought on record.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against the
impugned judgment dated 16.10.2024 passed by the learned Single
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?
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Judge, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ
petition filed by the predecessor in interest of the present appellant.
The claim in the writ petition filed by the father of the appellant of
.
being the sole Pujari in the Shri Shiv Mandir Nayas, Mahakal Tehsil
Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P, to the exclusion of his brothers i.e.
respondents No. 5 to 7, based on custom and on a Will stated to have
been executed by the late father of the predecessor in interest of the
of
present appellant and respondents No. 5 to 7, has been held by the
learned Single Judge to be not determinable in exercise of the writ
rt
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. Besides the aforesaid, no fault was found by the learned
Single Judge in the minutes of the meeting dated 28.3.2024
(Annexure P-8 in CWP No. 6424 of 2024), whereby the Committee
constituted in pursuance of the judgment dated 15.3.2024 passed by
the Court in CWP No. 381 of 2016, recommended to continue with the
system of month-wise rotation of Puja by all the stakeholders as per
the orders issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Temple-cum-SDO
Civil, Baijnath) dated 2.11.2013 and the consequent order passed
thereupon on 26.6.2024 whereby the aforesaid recommendations so
made were accepted.
4. At the very outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant/writ petitioner sought liberty to withdraw the writ
petition bearing CWP No. 6424 of 2024, wherein the impugned
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judgment dated 16.10.2024 assailed in the present appeal had been
passed, with liberty to lay a claim of the predecessor in interest of the
present appellant being a Mohtamin in the temple concerned by filing
.
a fresh petition. Liberty now being sought was tried to be justified by
drawing the attention of court to the nature of office of a Mohtamin
and the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984, (for the purpose of
of
brevity hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The same has been
vehemently opposed by the respondents in view of the factual matrix
rt
of the case at hand by arguing that in all previous litigations filed by
the writ petitioner such a claim had never been raised, the claim now
being sought to be raised was barred by limitation and the claim
raised was only triable by a civil court as had been rightly held in the
impugned judgment dated 16.10.2024.
5. Previously, deceased Hari Ram (original writ petitioner)
had earlier preferred a writ petition bearing No. 381 of 2016. In the
same, challenge had been laid to order dated 2.11.2013 passed by
the Assistant Commissioner-cum-Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), Shri
Shiv Mandir Nayas, Mahakal Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P,
whereby the work of Pujaris was redistributed on a month-wise
rotation basis inter se the writ petitioner and respondents No. 5 to 7.
Besides the aforesaid, order dated 20.10.2015 passed by the
Commissioner Temple-cum-Deputy Commissioner, District Kangra at
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Dharamshala, whereby the representation made by the writ petitioner
against the order dated 2.11.2013 was rejected, was also assailed in
the writ petition. Other than the aforesaid, a claim of being the sole
.
hereditary Pujari in the temple in question was also raised and
claimed in the said writ petition. Relief against respondents No. 5 to 7
not being hereditary co-pujaris in the temple was also claimed. No
relief, especially of being Mohtamin of the temple in question, was
of
ever raised in the writ petition so preferred in the year 2016. In the
affidavit appended along with the said petition (CWP No. 381 of
rt
2016), the writ petitioner claimed himself to be a Pujari.
6. During the pendency of the aforesaid petition, the
Additional Commissioner, vide communication dated 1.1.2024, had
expressed a desire to settle the matter amicably. In view of the
aforesaid, CWP No. 381 of 2016 was disposed of vide judgment
dated 15.3.2024, whereby directions were issued to the Additional
Commissioner to convene a meeting of all the stakeholders at the
earliest to decide the issue with respect to distribution of duty,
offering, as well as induction of respondents No. 5 to 7 as co-Pujaris.
7. In pursuance of the aforesaid directions issued, a
meeting was convened on 28.3.2024 in the office of the Assistant
Commissioner (Temple-cum-SDM, Baijnath). At the said meeting, the
objections of the writ petitioner (Hari Ram) were heard and
considered. On behalf of the writ petitioner, his son, one Sh. Sushil
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Kumar, had been heard by the Committee with respect to the writ
petitioner’s grievances.
8. From the record available, it came to light that a
.
committee had been formed by the Government to manage the affairs
of the temple from 1987 onwards. As per the record, the writ
petitioner, respondents No. 5, 6 and their mother, one Smt. Mansa
Devi, had been performing Puja. The Pujari share was being shared
of
amongst the aforesaid four. After the demise of the mother, the
pattern of distribution was changed.
9.
rt
Subsequent thereto the temple having been taken over
by the Government of Himachal Pradesh vide Notification dated 9 th
March, 2006 under the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious
Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1984,(for the purpose of
brevity hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) a temple trust was formed
for the smooth functioning of the temple and thereafter the Pujaris
were being given an equal share. In the year 2012, vide an order
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the share of the Pujaris had
been reduced from 40% to 30%. As per Section 21 of the Act (under
which the temple had been acquired) all the Pujaris were put on the
rolls of the temple and in the share of the offering to the Pujaris they
were given an equal share. The aforesaid system continued till the
year 2013.
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10. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances it is
evident that even at the meeting convened on 28.3.2024 the plea of
the writ petitioner being a Mohtamin of the temple in question was
.
conspicuous by absence. The terms of reference of the meeting
convened on 28.3.2024 were specified vide judgment dated
15.3.2024 passed in CWP No. 381 of 2016 stated supra in paragraph
six.
of
11. As has already been stated (supra), on 2.11.2013, the
duty roster of the hereditary Pujaris i.e. writ petitioner, respondents
rt
No. 5 to 7 had been fixed which was the subject matter of challenge in
CWP No. 381 of 2016. The father of the writ petitioner and
respondents No. 5 to 7 had been recorded as vahetman Mohtamin.
Subsequent to his death, the writ petitioner, being the elder son, was
appointed as Mohatmim of the temple by the Deputy Commissioner
vide letter dated 11.10.1983. Accordingly, mutation was also attested
in the revenue record bearing No. 123 dated 23.10.1991 in favour of
the writ petitioner.
12. On the taking over of the temple in the case at hand vide
Notification dated 9th March, 2006, the aforesaid revenue record
pertaining to Mohatmim and Pujari was deleted from the revenue
records and replaced with “Shri Mahakal Mandir Nayas”. In view of
the aforesaid, in the meeting convened on 28.3.2024 in pursuance of
the judgment dated 15.3.2024passed by the Court in CWP No. 381 of
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2016, the Committee recommended to continue with the present
system of month-wise rotation of Puja by all the stakeholders as per
the orders issued by the Assistant Commissioner (Temple-cum-SDO
.
Civil, Baijnath) dated 2.11.2013. The said recommendations so made
were accepted vide order dated 26.6.2024 (Annexure P-9 in CWP No.
6424 of 2024). Thereby, the hereditary claim of the writ petitioner
along with his brothers i.e. respondents No. 5 to 7 as being Pujaris in
of
terms of Section 21 of the Act has been recognized.
13. Feeling aggrieved of the minutes of the meeting dated
rt
28.3.2024 (Annexure P-8 in CWP No. 6424 of 2024) and the
subsequent order accepting the same dated 26.6.2024 (Annexure P-9
in CWP No. 6424 of 2024), a challenge was made to the same by the
writ petitioner. Other than the aforesaid, the writ petitioner claimed
himself to be the sole Pujari and sought entitlement to the entire 40%
of the collection being distributed amongst the writ petitioner and
respondents No. 5 to 7. Even in the said writ petition, from the affidavit
it is evident that the writ petitioner claimed himself to be the Pujari of
the temple and the claim as such was only limited to that of being a
Pujari.
14. In the aforesaid backdrop, the present petitioner can now
not be permitted to raise a new plea of being the Mohtamin of the
temple which was never claimed by him in any of the litigations filed
previously. Under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
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if the plaintiff omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for any
particular relief which he is entitled to get, he will not afterwards be
allowed to sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
.
The general principles made in the Civil Procedure Code apply even
to writ petitions. Especially when the High Court is not exercising suo
motu powers under Article 226 of the Constitution where for example
the court would be dealing with a petition from a person languishing in
of
jail or from a bonded labourer or a party in person or public-spirited
citizen seeking to bring a gross injustice to the notice of the Court.
rt
Besides power to mould reliefs does not mean that the drafting of a
writ petition should be a mindless act and the entire burden to seek
proper relief should be thrown upon the court. In this regard it would
be appropriate to refer to the apex court judgement in Bharat
Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC
234 relevant extract whereof reads as under;
29. The approach of the High Court in granting relief not
prayed for cannot be approved by this Court. Every petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution must contain a relief
clause. Whenever the petitioner is entitled to or is claiming
more than one relief, he must pray for all the reliefs. Under
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if the
plaintiff omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for
any particular relief which he is entitled to get, he will not
afterwards be allowed to sue in respect of the portion so
omitted or relinquished.
30. Though the provisions of the Code are not made
applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the general principles made in the Civil
Procedure Code will apply even to writ petitions. It is,
therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to claim all reliefs he
seeks from the court. Normally, the court will grant only
those reliefs specifically prayed for by the petitioner. Though
the court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the
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court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the
norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief
not even prayed for by the petitioner.
31. In Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow1,
overlooking the rule relating to grant of admission to
.
postgraduate course in Medical College, the High Court in
the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
directed the Medical Council to grant provisional admission
to the petitioner. This Court set aside the order passed by
the High Court observing that: (SCC p. 319, para 26)
“26. … in his own petition in the High Court, the respondent
had merely prayed for a writ directing the State or the
college to consider his case for admission yet the High Court
went a step further and straightaway issued a writ of
of
mandamus directing the college to admit him to the MS
course and thus granted a relief to the respondent which he
himself never prayed for and could not have prayed for.”
32. Again, in Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar, this Court
rt
observed: (SCC p. 445, para 4)
“4. … A party cannot be granted a relief which is not
claimed, if the circumstances of the case are such that the
granting of such relief would result in serious prejudice to the
interested party and deprive him of the valuable rights under
the statute.”
33. Though a High Court has power to mould reliefs to meet
the requirements of each case, that does not mean that the
draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the
proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire
burden of it upon the court.
34. It is relevant to notice that the High Court was not
exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution suo
motu but was examining the validity of the order passed by
the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate refusing to grant
custody of goats and sheep to Respondents 1 to 6, in the
special criminal application, which was filed by them under
Article 226 of the Constitution through a seasoned lawyer.
Respondents 1 to 6 were represented by a Senior Counsel
practising in the Gujarat High Court and having regard to the
facts of the case, the learned lawyer was justified only in
claiming those reliefs to which reference is made earlier.
35. Respondents 1 to 6 were seeking a writ of certiorari or
mandamus to declare that order dated 5-7-2008, passed by
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Deesa, refusing to
hand over custody of the goats and sheep seized to them,
was illegal and were also seeking quashing of the said
order. At no point of time, had the learned advocate for
Respondents 1 to 6 moved any application seeking
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permission of the Court to amend the prayer clause
contained in the petition so as to enable Respondents 1 to 6
to claim compensation from Appellant 1.
36. A fair reading of the petition makes it more than clear
that no factual data whatsoever was laid by Respondents 1
.
to 6 for claiming compensation from Appellant 1. No facts
were mentioned as to in which manner they or any of them
had suffered damage or loss because of the handing over of
custody of goats and sheep to Appellant 1 and ultimately to
Respondent 8, Pinjrapole situated at Patan nor was
Appellant 1 permitted to controvert that in fact no damage or
loss was suffered by Respondents 1 to 6 or any of them.
37. There is no manner of doubt that the High Court was too
indulgent in this matter. After all, it was not a petition from a
of
person languishing in jail or from a bonded labourer or a
party in person or public-spirited citizen seeking to bring a
gross injustice to the notice of the Court. Here, the High
Court had before it Respondents 1 to 6 as petitioners. The
rt question whether Respondents 1 to 6 suffered damage or
loss because of handing over of goats and sheep to
Appellant 1 and/or to Respondent 8, depends upon facts to
be proved. Normally, such an exercise cannot be
undertaken in a writ filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
15. Besides the aforesaid the principle of constructive res
judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is also applicable to writ case. As the general principle
underlying the doctrine of res judicata i.e to prevent an abuse of the
process of court is ultimately based on considerations of public policy.
Hence even on this account the plea seeking withdrawal of the writ
petition wherein the impugned judgement was passed to file a fresh
petition on the same cause of action cannot be permitted. In this
respect, it would be appropriate to refer to the apex court judgement
passed in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC
408 relevant extract whereof reads as under;
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16. It is nobody’s case that the appellant did not know the
contents of the FWA. From this it follows that it was open to
the appellant to question, in the previous proceeding filed by
it, that his land which was acquired was not included in the
FWA. No reasonable explanation was offered by the
appellant to indicate why he had not raised this issue.
.
Therefore, in our judgment, such an issue cannot be raised
in this proceeding in view of the doctrine of constructive res
judicata.
17. It may be noted in this context that while applying the
principles of res judicata the court should not be hampered
by any technical rules of interpretation. It has been very
categorically opined by Sir Lawrence Jenkins that:
“… the application of the rule by courts in India should be
of
influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by
matter of substance within the limits allowed by law.”
(See Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh, IA at p. 99 :
ILR at p. 706.)
rt
18. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in
breach of the principle of res judicata is prima facie a
proceeding which has been initiated in abuse of the process
of court.
19. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Devilal Modi v.
STO, has explained this principle in very clear terms: (AIR p.
1152, para 7)
“7. … But the question as to whether a citizen should be
allowed to challenge the validity of the same order by
successive petitions under Article 226, cannot be answered
merely in the light of the significance and importance of the
citizens’ fundamental rights. The general principle underlying
the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on
considerations of public policy. One important consideration
of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by courts of
competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are
modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other
principle is that no one should be made to face the same
kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would
be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice (vide
Daryao v. State of U.P.).”
20. This Court in AIMO case explained in clear terms that
principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent an
abuse of the process of court. In explaining the said principle
the Bench in AIMO case relied on the following formulation
of Somervell, L.J. in Greenhalgh v. Mallard (All ER p. 257 H):
(AIMO case, SCC p. 700, para 39)
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-12-“39. … ‘I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it
would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is
not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked
to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so
clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so
clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of.
the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be
started in respect of them.’ ”
(emphasis supplied in AIMO case)
The Bench in AIMO case also noted that the judgment of theCourt of Appeal in Greenhalgh was approved by this Court
in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain, SCC at p. 809, para 4.
21. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State
of
of Maharashtra8 laid down the following principle: (SCC p.
741, para 35)
“35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to
the actual matter determined but as to every other matter
rt
which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have
had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with
subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into
the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of
the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of
constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ
case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be
dismissed on the ground of res judicata.”
22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the
Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that
the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in
Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ
petitions.
23. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been
finally decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of
process of the court, regardless of the principles of res
judicata, as has been held by this Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N.
Modi. In SCC para 44 of the Report, this principle has been
very lucidly discussed by this Court and the relevant portions
whereof are extracted below: (SCC p. 592)
“44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process
of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the
court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to
relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and
decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not
be barred as res judicata.”
24. In coming to the aforementioned finding, this Court relied
on The Supreme Court Practice, 1995 published by Sweet &
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Maxwell (p. 344). The relevant principles laid down in the
aforesaid practice and which have been accepted by this
Court are as follows: (K.K. Modi case, SCC p. 592, para 43)
“43. … ‘This term connotes that the process of the court
must be used bona fide and properly and must not be
abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery
.
and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery
from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in
the process of litigation. … The categories of conduct
rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process
are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances.
And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the
interests of justice may be very material.’ ”
25. On the premises aforesaid, it is clear that the attempt by the
appellant to reagitate the same issues which were considered byof
this Court and were rejected expressly in the previous judgment in
AIMO case, is a clear instance of an abuse of process of this Court
apart from the fact that such issues are barred by principles of res
judicata or constructive res judicata and principles analogous
thereto.
16.
rt
Other than the aforesaid, his claim of being a Mohtaminis clearly barred by the law of limitation, as in the case at hand the
temple was taken over vide Notification dated 9th March, 2006 by the
Government of Himachal Pradesh and thereafter the entry of
Mohtamin and Pujari was deleted from the revenue records and
replaced by “Shri Mahakal Mandir Nayas”. The plea of being a
Mohtamin could have only been taken within 12 years of the same
having been denied in terms of Article 107 of the Limitation Act.
Besides the aforesaid, as correctly noticed by the learned single judge
the claim of being the sole hereditary pujari and the exclusion of
respondents 5 to 7 as co-pujaris raised in the case at hand can be
only tried by a Civil Court (alternate remedy) and disputed questions
of fact cannot be raised or decided in a writ petition. Now at this
belated stage the attempt made to raise a claim of the writ petitioner
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mentioned hereinabove, cannot be allowed.In the aforesaid backdrop
a reference to the nature of office of a mohtamin and the provisions of
.
the Himachal Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and
Charitable Endowments Act, 1984 made by the appellant shall be an
academic exercise in futility, of no relevance and a sheer waste of
judicial time.
of
17. Last but not the least a reference to the apex court
judgment in R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman, (1999) 4 SCC
rt
89, would be relevant wherein a similar prayer for withdrawal madewas rejected. The relevant extract of the judgement where the
question was posed and the manner in which the same was
considered are being reproduced herein below:
8. The question in the present case is, however, a little
different. If the suit has already been decreed or, for that
matter, dismissed and a decree has been passed
determining the rights of the parties to the suit, which isunder challenge in an appeal, can the decree be destroyed
by making an application for dismissing the suit as notpressed or unconditionally withdrawing the suit at the
appellate stage? It is this question which is to be decided in
this appeal.
22. In view of the above discussion, it comes out that where
a decree passed by the trial court is challenged in appeal, it
would not be open to the plaintiff, at that stage, to withdraw
the suit so as to destroy that decree. The rights which have
come to be vested in the parties to the suit under the decree
cannot be taken away by withdrawal of the suit at that stage
unless very strong reasons are shown that the withdrawal
would not affect or prejudice anybody’s vested rights.
18. As a last ditch effort, it has been contended by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the entire journey of a Judge is
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has placed reliance upon (2013) 2 SCC 398 Kishore Samrite vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others. The relevant extract whereof
.
reads as follows:-
“34 It has been consistently stated by this Court that the entire
journey of a Judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings,documents and arguments of the parties, as truth is the basis of the
justice-delivery system “.
19. However, while placing reliance on the aforesaid
of
judgment, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant has failed to go through the subsequent paragraph of the
rt
aforesaid judgment, wherein it has been categorically held that a
litigant should approach the Court with clean hands by putting forth
sufficient factual details. The Writ Court should not become a source
of abuse of process by a disgruntled litigant, and dishonest attempts
to surpass the legal process must be effectively curbed. No litigant
can play “hide and seek” with the Court or adopt “pick and choose.”
The relevant extract in this regard from the judgment in Kishore
Samrite (supra) is being reproduced here-in-below:-
“35 With the passage of time, it has been realised that
people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the Courts,
irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer
proves true, in all cases. The Court does not sit simply as an
umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the
end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it
has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take
active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is
the foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the
truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue.
This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to
become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward
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-16-indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and
motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. The
parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the
extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and
exaggerated claims and a litigant must approach the Court
with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of the Court to.
ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal
process must be effectively curbed and the Court must
ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain
to anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the Court.
One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic orpunitive costs.
36. The party not approaching the Court with clean hands
would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has
also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by makingof
patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially
under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the
court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean
hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some
information, the source of such information must also be
rt
disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of
the process of the court and such a litigant is not required to
be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading andinaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose
amounts to abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is
bound to make “full and true disclosure of facts”. (Refer
: Tilokchand H.B. Motichand & Ors. v. Munshi & Anr. [1969
(1) SCC 110]; A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula
Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam &Anr. [(2012) 6 SCC 430]; Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar
Verma [(1995) SCC 1 421]; Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of
India & Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 145]; State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. [(2011) 7 SCC639]; Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India & Anr. [(2011) 3 SCC
287)].
37. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just
the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean
objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judiciouslitigation. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est
neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri
locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one
should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the
percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not
become a source of abuse of the process of law by the
disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to
ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by
extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon
the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court
with clean hands.
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38. No litigant can play ‘hide and seek’ with the courts or
adopt ‘pick and choose’. True facts ought to be disclosed as
the Court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come
with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the
court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of
material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even as a.
technique of advocacy. In such cases, the Court is duty
bound to discharge rule nisi and such applicant is required to
be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of
the court. {K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. &
Ors. [(2008) 12 SCC 481].
39. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that
no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process
by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited
drought upon the court time and public money in order to get
of
his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access
to justice should not be used as a licence to file
misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Buddhi Kota
Subbarao (Dr.) v. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530).
rt
In view of the aforesaid, the prayer of the appellant
seeking liberty to withdraw the writ petition, i.e. CWP No. 6424 of
2024, wherefrom the impugned judgment dated 16.10.2024 arises,
cannot be accepted, and no infirmity is found in the impugned
judgment dated 16.10.2024, therefore, the present Letters Patent
Appeal, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi)
Chief Justice Judge
18th March, 2026
(Tarun Singh)
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.
of
rt
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