Orissa High Court
Prodyamn Kumar Sarangi vs State Of Odisha on 17 March, 2026
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRA No.72 of 1994
(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)
Prodyamn Kumar Sarangi ....... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Odisha ....... Respondent
For the Appellant : Ms. Rakhi Mishra,
Amicus Curiae
For the Respondent : Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, ASC
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 19.02.2026 :: Date of Judgment: 17.03.2026
S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the
judgment and order dated 31.01.1994 passed by the learned Addl.
Sessions Judge, Paralakhemundi in Sessions Case No.23 of 1993,
whereby the appellant was convicted under Sections 451, 354 and 325
IPC (the charge under Section 307 IPC having been altered to Section
325 IPC), Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC &
ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. He was sentenced to 2 years R.I.
under Section 451 IPC, 7 years R.I. under Section 325 IPC, and 7 years
R.I. under Section 27 of the Arms Act. No separate sentence was given
for Section 354 IPC. Additionally, he received 5 years R.I. and a fine of
Rs. 2,000/- (with 6 months S.I. for default) under Section 3(1)(xii) of the
SC & ST (POA) Act. He was acquitted of the charge under Section 376
IPC.
2. The present appeal has been pending since 1994. When the matter
was called for hearing consistently, none appeared for the appellant.
Therefore, on 10.02.2026, this Court requested Ms. Rakhi Mishra,
learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist the Court as Amicus
Curiae. She has readily accepted the same and after obtaining entire
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record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records
appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Ms. Mishra.
3. Heard Ms. Rakhi Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant
and Mr. Sobhan Panigrahi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the
State.
4. The prosecution case in brief is that on 18.11.1992 at about 6.00
P.M., a platoon of 3rd Battalion OSAP, including the present appellant,
was proceeding towards Gangabada Anti-Naxalite Camp. On the way,
near Benga Sahi village, the appellant allegedly entered the dwelling
house of the informant (P.W.1), an Adivasi woman belonging to the
Scheduled Tribe community. At that time, P.W.2 (Sebati), another tribal
woman, was present with her. Their husbands were reportedly away
from home.
5. According to the FIR version, the appellant enquired about the
whereabouts of the husbands of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Upon learning that
they were not present, he allegedly dragged P.W.1. When she raised
alarm, the appellant fired from his service rifle, as a result of which she
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sustained a gunshot injury on her left arm near the elbow. Out of fear,
she took shelter in a neighboring house. The matter was reported on the
following day.
6. During investigation, an additional allegation emerged that after
P.W.1 escaped, the appellant caught hold of P.W.2 and committed
forcible rape upon her. On the basis of such allegations, charge-sheet
was submitted for the alleged commission of offences under Sections
450/376/354/307 IPC, Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3(1)(xi)
of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
7. The Investigating Officer seized the service rifle, bayonet, 19 live
cartridges and one empty cartridge case from the appellant. Pellets were
allegedly recovered from inside the house of the informant. A Test
Identification Parade (T.I. Parade) was conducted during the
investigation.
8. The defence plea was that while proceeding to camp, the platoon
suspected Naxalite presence and brought their rifles to firing position.
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The appellant claimed that he momentarily went aside to attend the call
of nature and, while moving hurriedly thereafter, his hand accidentally
came into contact with the trigger, causing misfiring. He denied entering
the house with any criminal intent and denied the allegation of rape.
9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 26 witnesses
including the informant (P.W.1), the alleged rape victim (P.W.2), their
husbands, independent villagers, police personnel, medical officers and
the Investigating Officer. The defence examined two witnesses to
support the plea of accidental misfire.
10. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of evidence, held that
the informant (P.W.1) had sustained a grievous gunshot injury caused by
the accused, rejecting the plea of accidental misfiring on the ground that
the rifle had to be consciously brought to firing position and discharged.
While disbelieving the charge of rape under Section 376 IPC due to lack
of medical corroboration and omissions in the FIR, the Court inferred
from the circumstances namely, the accused entering the house of tribal
women in the absence of their husbands and firing at close range that he
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had outraged their modesty and dishonoured them, thereby attracting
Sections 451, 354 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. It further altered the charge under Section 307 IPC to
Section 325 IPC, holding that though there was no intention to commit
murder, grievous hurt was voluntarily caused, and also convicted the
accused under Section 27 of the Arms Act for unlawful use of his service
firearm. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is extracted
herein below for ready reference:-
"12. Coming to the last point of determination it is
seen from the evidence of the doctor that the range
was within four feet and the injury was near the left
hand elbow of the P.W.1. Besides, it is seen from the
above evidence on record that the pallats were
found sticking to the ground. Under such
circumstances it is clear that due to firing from the
short range, the pallets had been scattered and one
of the pallets had pierced into the hand of P.W.1.
Thus, it is quite evident that the accused has got no
intention to cause, murder of P.W.1 or P.W.2 but he
had tried to threaten them so as to satisfy his desire.
12. ii) It is seen that accused being a sepoy knows
the consequences of his act. The act of the accused
that has been brought to the picture is enough to say
that the said act would have taken the life of any.
However, the said act of the person of P.W.1 as has
been opined by the doctor P.W.17. This injury has
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been caused voluntarily. Thus, it can be said that
the accused is liable to be punished u/s.325 I.P.C.
instead of 307 I.P.C.
iii) In view of the discussion above, while it has been
held that the accused had entered into the house and
has committed the offence under section 354, I am
to say that the ingredients of the offence u/s.451
I.P.C. are fulfilled instead the ingredient of the
offence u/s.450 I.P.C. as none of the offence
punishable with imprisonment for life has yet been
proved.
iv) So far the Section 27 of the Arms Act is
concerned, it is seen that without any authority the
accused has used the gun for unlawful purpose
causing injury on the person of P.W.1 and thus he is
liable u/s.27 of the Indian Arms Act.
v) So far the offence u/s. 3(1)(xi) of S.C./S.T.
Prevention of Atrocities Act is concerned the law
reads as follows :-
"Whoever, not being a member of Scheduled
caste or scheduled Tribe assaults or uses
force to any woman belonging to a
Scheduled caste or a scheduled Tribe with
intent to dishonour or outrage her modesty
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months
but which may extend to five years and with
fine.
Under Sec.3(2)(vii) reveals that whoever not
being a member of scheduled caste or
scheduled tribe being a public servant
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commits any offence under this section shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than one year which
may extend to the punishment provided for
that offence."
In the present case, it has been duly proved that the
accused had entered into the house of an Adibasi
lady. The act of the accused has also caused
dishonour the Adibasi lady. Besides, it has been
proved that the modesty of p.w.1 and 2 has been
out-raged. Thus, the accused is liable u/s.3(1)(xii) of
S.C./S.T. Prevention of Atrocities Act.
13. In view of my above discussion, I hold the
accused guilty u/s.451/354/325 (instead of section
307 I.P.C.)/27 Indian Arms Act and 3(i)(xi) of S.C.
& S.T. Prevention of Atrocities Act and convict him
thereunder and he is acquitted for the offence
u/s.376 I.P.C."
11. Ms. Mishra, the learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant
contended the impugned judgment on the ground of serious evidentiary
infirmities. She submitted that P.W.1, the injured and the most material
witness, failed to identify the appellant in Court. In criminal
jurisprudence, identification of the assailant by the injured witness
carries paramount evidentiary value. The failure of P.W.1 to identify the
appellant breaks the chain of proof linking the appellant to the alleged
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firing. Conviction based primarily on the testimony of P.W.2, whose
evidence regarding rape having been disbelieved, the conviction is not
safe.
12. Ms. Mishra further argued that once the learned trial Court
rejected the allegation of rape and found P.W.2 unreliable to that extent,
her testimony ought to have been approached with greater caution even
in respect of the lesser charge of outraging modesty. The allegations
were interwoven and stemmed from the same transaction. In the absence
of consistent and reliable identification evidence, conviction under
Section 354 IPC cannot be sustained. Conviction under Section 3(1)(xi)
of the SC/ST (POA) Act is unsustainable as there is no evidence
whatsoever to establish that the alleged act was committed on account of
the victim belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, and mere proof of her caste,
absent specific caste-based intent as held in Masumsha Hasanasha
Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, does not attract the rigors of the
Act. The discharge of the firearm was accidental. The contemporaneous
conduct of immediately reporting misfire to superior officers negates
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mens rea. There is no evidence of intention to cause grievous hurt, a
necessary ingredient under Section 325 IPC. Moreover, essential
ingredients of Section 27 of the Arms Act are not made out, as the
firearm was a service weapon lawfully possessed and there is no
independent proof of "use" in the commission of a criminal act beyond
reasonable doubt.
13. Lastly, she submitted that even assuming that some offence is
made out, the incident is of the year 1992 and more than three decades
have elapsed. The appellant has already undergone about one year and
four months of incarceration and has lost his service. Considering the
long lapse of time, absence of antecedents and mitigating circumstances,
the sentence deserves to be reduced to the period already undergone, or
the appellant may be extended the benefit of probation in the interest of
justice.
14. Mr. Panigrahi, the learned Addl. Standing Counsel submitted that
the judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is well-
reasoned and based on cogent oral, medical and circumstantial evidence.
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It is contended that the gunshot injury on P.W.1 stands conclusively
proved through the reliable testimony of P.W.1 and corroborated by
P.W.2, P.W.4 and other post-occurrence witnesses. The medical
evidence of P.W.17 clearly establishes that the injury was a firearm
injury caused from a close range of about four feet and was grievous in
nature. The defence has not disputed that the appellant's service rifle
discharged one round on the relevant date; rather, the appellant himself
reported "misfiring" upon returning to camp, which forms a strong
incriminating circumstance.
15. He further submitted that the plea of accidental firing is wholly
untenable. P.W.11, the Zamadar, has categorically deposed that when the
rifle is in "charge magazine position," firing is not possible unless the
bolt is consciously operated and the lock opened. The Doctor's opinion
regarding firing range, recovery of pellet pieces from inside the dwelling
house, and shoe marks of a sepoy leading to the village cumulatively
establish voluntary discharge of the firearm. He relied on Gurcharan
Singh & another v. State of Punjab, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC
Page 11 of 22
42, wherein it was held that examination of an expert is not an inflexible
requirement if other reliable evidence establishes the use of the weapon.
16. Mr. Panigrahi contended that though the appellant was acquitted
under Section 376 IPC, the absence of motive does not weaken the
prosecution case when direct ocular testimony and surrounding
circumstances point towards guilt. He placed reliance on Surinder
Singh v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), reported in (2021) 20
SCC 24, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that absence of
motive is not fatal when credible eyewitness account exists. He also
submitted that the entry into the house of tribal women in the absence of
their husbands and use of force clearly attracts Sections 451 and 354 IPC
and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. The conviction under
Section 325 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act is thus legally
sustainable, and the appeal deserves dismissal.
17. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the
learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant and the learned counsel for the
State and have gone through the records of the case, including the
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depositions of the witnesses, the medical evidence and the documents
produced.
18. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and careful scrutiny
of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has
successfully established that P.W.1 sustained a grievous firearm injury
on the date of occurrence. The testimony of P.W.1 regarding the factum
of injury is corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W.17, who opined
that the injury was caused by a firearm discharged from close range and
was grievous in nature. The seizure of pellet fragments from inside the
dwelling house and the surrounding circumstances lend assurance to the
prosecution version that the injury was not self-inflicted nor fabricated. It
is pertinent to note that P.W.2, an eyewitness to the occurrence, has
categorically identified the appellant both in the Test Identification
Parade and before the Court. Extract of P.W.2's testimony is profitable
to be reproduced for true appreciation:
"4. Prior to the occurrence, I had not seen the
accused at all. After occurrence Gram Vikas People
and O.M.P people had brought the accused to our
village and there also I identified the accused.
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Thereafter I also identified the accused in the T.I.
Parade. The T.I. Parade was conducted inside the
jail. The Police people were inside the Jail. But,
Garabanda Police were outside the jail. As Police
people told to identify the accused I identified the
accused inside the jail."
Her testimony substantially corroborates the evidence of
P.W.1 regarding the manner of occurrence and the role of the appellant
in the firing incident. Such consistent ocular evidence, duly supported by
medical testimony, inspires confidence and firmly establishes the
appellant's culpability for causing grievous hurt.
19. However, insofar as the conviction under Section 354 IPC is
concerned, this Court finds that the learned trial Court itself disbelieved
the prosecution case with respect to the allegation of rape and recorded
acquittal under Section 376 IPC. The substratum of the allegation
relating to outraging modesty emanated from the same transaction. The
evidence in that regard is neither consistent nor of unimpeachable
character so as to sustain a conviction independently. In criminal
jurisprudence, where two views are possible, the one favourable to the
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accused must prevail. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 354
IPC is liable to be set aside.
20. With respect to Section 27 of the Arms Act, the conviction cannot
be sustained in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh v.
State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), reported in (2021) 20 SCC 24,
has categorically held that post the 1988 amendment, Section 27 is
strictly confined to contravention of Sections 5 or 7 of the Arms Act.
Mere "illegal use" of a firearm does not ipso facto attract Section 27
unless it is shown that the weapon was used in violation of the licensing
regime contemplated under Sections 5 or 7. It was held thus:-
"29. Adverting to the conviction of the appellant
under Section 27 of the Arms Act, it appears to us
that the trial court has erred in arriving at his
culpability. There is no gainsay that in order to prove
a charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act, the
prosecution must necessarily demonstrate
contravention of either Section 5 or 7 of the Act. In
the instant case, although not explicitly stated, it
appears that the trial court has held it to be a case of
breach of Section 5 of the Arms Act, which stipulates
that no person shall use, possess, manufacture, etc.
any firearms, unless such person holds a licence in
this behalf, and prescribes a minimum punishment of
3 years of imprisonment.
Page 15 of 22
30. The relevant extracts of unamended Sections 5
and 27 of the Arms Act which were in force at the
relevant time, read as follows:
"5. Licence for manufacture, sale, etc., of arms
and ammunition.--(1) No person shall--
(a) use, manufacture, sell, transfer, convert,
repair, test or prove, or
(b) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in
his possession for sale, transfer, conversion,
repair, test or proof,
any firearm or any other arms of such class or
description as may be prescribed or any
ammunition, unless he holds in this behalf a
licence issued in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and the rules made thereunder.
***
27. Punishment for using arms, etc.–(1)
Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in
contravention of Section 5 shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than three years but which may extend to
seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or
prohibited ammunition in contravention of
Section 7 shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for
life and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or
prohibited ammunition or does any act in
contravention of Section 7 and such use or act
results in the death of any other person, shall be
punishable with death.”
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31. True it is that prior to the amendment of Section
27 of the Arms Act, vide Arms (Amendment) Act,
1988, the said provision penalised the use of any
arms and ammunition for any “unlawful purpose”.
However, post its amendment, Section 27 of the Arms
Act is strictly confined to violation of conditions
mentioned either under Section 5 or 7 of the Arms
Act and the “unlawful purpose” of using arms and
ammunition is no longer an inseparable component
of the delinquency.
32. The appellant was admittedly a police official at
the time of the incidence and the arms and
ammunition used for the commission of the offence,
were placed in his possession under the sanction
accorded by the competent authority. The appellant
being in authorised possession of the weapon, cannot
be said to have used an unlicensed weapon, as
prohibited under Section 5 of the Arms Act. It
appears that the trial court was swayed by irrelevant
considerations such as illegal use of the weapon, and
lost track of the objective of the statute, which has
been enacted to provide a licensing/regulatory
regime, to enable law-abiding citizens to carry arms,
and also to prohibit the possession, acquisition,
manufacture, etc. of certain categories of firearms,
unless authorised by the Central Government. In
other words, illegal use of a licensed or sanctioned
weapon per se does not constitute an offence under
Section 27, without proving the misdemeanour under
Section 5 or 7 of the Arms Act. At best, it could be a
“misconduct” under the service rules, the
determination of which was not the subject of the
trial.”
Page 17 of 22
In the present case, the appellant was admittedly a member
of the armed force on duty and the rifle was issued to him under lawful
authority. There is no evidence that he was in unauthorised possession of
the firearm or that he used a prohibited arm in contravention of Section
7. Therefore, in the absence of proof of breach of Section 5 or 7, the
essential statutory ingredients to attract the provision of Section 27 are
not satisfied. The conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act is
accordingly set aside.
21. Nonetheless, the evidence on record clearly establishes that the
firearm discharged from the appellant’s service rifle resulted in grievous
hurt to P.W.1. Even if the plea of accidental discharge is considered, the
manner of handling of a loaded service rifle inside a civilian habitation
reflects culpable rashness and knowledge of likely consequences. The
injury suffered by P.W.1 answers the definition of grievous hurt under
Section 320 IPC. The prosecution has therefore proved the offence under
Section 325 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 18 of 22
22. In so far as the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC & ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, I have no reasons to disagree
with the submission of Ms. Mishra that the appellant had no
acquaintance with the victims, as such the accused was not even aware
of the “caste” of the victim. Therefore, the overt act attributed to the
accused cannot be intended by him to have caused harm, knowing the
victims to be SC or ST. It was determined in the case of Masumsha
Hasanasha Musalman vs State of Maharashtra, reported in 2000 (3)
SCC 557, relevant part of which is extracted herein:-
“Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that whoever,
not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under
the Indian Penal Code punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more
against a person or property on the ground that
such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for
life and with fine. In the present case, there is no
evidence at all to the effect that the appellant
committed the offence alleged against him on the
ground that the deceased is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract
the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine
qua non is that the victim should be a person whoPage 19 of 22
belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe
and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is
committed against him on the basis that such a
person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such
ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the
Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both
the trial court and the High Court missed the
essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the
conviction under the aforesaid provision by the
trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be
set aside.”
23. In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has succeeded
only to the limited extent of proving that the appellant caused grievous
hurt to P.W.1 by discharge of a firearm, thereby attracting Section 325
IPC. However, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential
ingredients of the offences under Section 354 IPC, Section 27 of the
Arms Act, and Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC & ST (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. Consequently, while the conviction under Section 325
IPC is sustained, the remaining convictions cannot be legally maintained
and are accordingly set aside.
24. On the question of sentence, it is not in dispute that the occurrence
relates to the year 1992 and more than three decades have elapsed. The
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appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of
approximately one year and four months during the investigation and
trial. There is no material to show any subsequent criminal antecedent.
25. Considering the long lapse of time, the age of the case, the period
already undergone in custody, and the overall circumstances, this Court
is of the considered view that the ends of justice would be adequately
met by giving him the benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act. This Court directs the appellant to be released under
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of six months on
his executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) with one
surety for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called
upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellant shall keep
peace and good behavior and he shall remain under the supervision of
the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of six
months.
26. With the above modification in the sentence, the Criminal Appeal
stands partly allowed.
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27. This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance
rendered by Ms. Rakhi Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae in this case.
Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/-
(Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of
appreciation.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 17th March, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA
Designation: Secretary
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 18-Mar-2026 18:25:00 Page 22 of 22