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Home11.03.2026 vs Keshav Ram on 11 March, 2026

11.03.2026 vs Keshav Ram on 11 March, 2026

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Himachal Pradesh High Court

Decided On: 11.03.2026 vs Keshav Ram on 11 March, 2026

    2026:HHC:7497

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                     RSA No. 150/2021

                                     Decided on:           11.03.2026




                                                                                 .
    Rasu & ors.                                                             .....Appellants





                                        Versus

    Keshav Ram                                                            .....Respondent





    Coram




                                                     of
    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
    Whether approved for reporting ?1 Yes


    For the appellants:
                          rt            Mr. Aryan Manta, Advocate, vice
                                        Mr. Rakesh Manta, Advocate.

    For the respondent:                  Mr. V S. Chauhan, Sr. Advocate with
                                         Mr. Vikas Shyam, Advocate.


    Romesh Verma, Judge

The present appeal arises out of the judgment and

decree, dated 08.07.2021 as passed by the learned District

SPONSORED

Judge (Forests), Shimla, H.P. in C. A. No. 08/2019, whereby

the appeal preferred by the present appellants/defendants

has been ordered to be dismissed and the judgment and

decree dated 19.09.2016, as passed by the learned Civil

Judge (Jr. Div.), Court No.2, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P.

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ?Yes

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2
have been affirmed whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/

respondent for possession of the suit land was decreed.

2 Brief facts of the case are that the

.

plaintiff/respondent filed a suit in the Court of learned Civil

Judge (Junior Division), Court No.2, Rohru, on 18.11.2011

for possession of the suit land. It was averred in the plaint

that late Jamku, son of Late Jamalu, was the recorded

of
owner in possession of the land bearing Khasra No. 1042,

area measuring 2-06 along with other pieces of land as the

same was purchased by the deceased from one late Liaqui
rt
Ram, resident of Village Kindari. After the death of late Sh.

Jamku, necessary mutation of inheritance was attested in

favour of the plaintiff along with other co-sharers and the

same is reflected in the jamabandi for the year 2004-05.

3 It has been averred in the plaint that after

purchase of the suit land, the predecessor-in-interest of the

plaintiff became exclusive owner in possession of the suit

property. Earlier, suit land was shown as Khasra No. 1042,

during settlement operation, Khasra Nos. 1463, 1464 and

1465 have also been shown to be part of the original Khasra

number 1042. It has been further averred that till his death,

i.e. during the month of April, 2010, Jamku remained owner

in possession of the suit land and the revenue entries shown

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3
by the settlement staff is wrong and contrary to the spot.

After the death of Jamku, the defendants at the back of the

plaintiff forcibly and un-authorizedly took possession of the

.

suit land on the basis of the wrong revenue entries. When

wrong entries were detected, the predecessor-in-interest of

the defendants, Balku, was requested to hand over the

possession, he refused to do so. Therefore, under such

of
circumstances, suit for possession was filed by the plaintiff

seeking decree for vacant possession of the land bearing

Khasra Nos. 1463, 1464 and 1465 measuring 00-07-27
rt
hectares comprised in Khata Khatoni No. 192/452, situated

in Chak Jharkot, Tehsil Chirgaon, Distt. Shimla, H.P. with

further prayer that defendants be directed to demolish

temporary structure as raised over the suit land.

4 The suit was contested by the

defendants/appellants by raising preliminary objections qua

maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, locus standi, etc.

On merits, it was averred that the suit land never remained

in possession of Liaqui Ram. In the year 1954, defendants’

grandfather, namely, Sh. Nesru had taken Rs.40/- from

Liaqui Ram for marriage of Jamku. Thereafter, in the year

1958, the amount was refunded to Liaqui Ram from joint

fund of the family as the original defendant and father of the

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plaintiff were real brothers and family was joint. The

defendants specifically refuted claim of the plaintiff that

Jamku became exclusive owner in possession of the suit

.

property and on the contrary it was stated that Jamku never

remained in possession of the suit land. Plea was taken by

the defendants that the suit land is in continuous possession

of the defendants till date and the possession of the

of
defendants is open, long, continuous and without

interruption to the knowledge of the plaintiff, hence they have

acquired title with efflux of time and defendants have
rt
become owner by way of adverse possession.

5 Further, it has been averred in the written

statement that in order to avoid any conflict between the

family members, the plaintiff’s father and the original

defendant entered into family settlement on 25.12.1958 and

in the family settlement, suit land fell to the share of the

defendants and the separate possession of the suit land was

handed over to the defendants on the spot in pursuance to

such family arrangement. Entries showing the plaintiff and

other co-sharers to be owners of the suit land are wrong,

illegal, baseless and contrary to the spot . Therefore,

denying the title of the plaintiff, the defendants set up the

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5
plea of adverse possession and prayed for dismissal of the

suit filed by the plaintiff.

6 The plaintiff filed replication to the written

.

statement filed by the defendants and all the averments as

made in the plaint were reiterated.

7 The learned trial court on 16.05.2012 framed the

following issues:-

of

1. Whether a decree for vacant possession of the land
comprised in Khasra No. 1463, 1464 and 1465 Kita
3 measuring 00-07-27 hectares comprised in K.K.
rt
No.192/452 situated in Chak Jharkot be passed in

favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants
as the same will be for the benefit of all the co-

owners, as prayed for? OPP.

2. Whether the defendant be directed to demolish the
temporary structure so raised over the land in suit
at his costs and in case he fails to do so the cost of

the same to be incurred in the said process may

also be recovered from the defendant, as prayed
for? OPP.

3. Whether the suit is not maintainable, as alleged?

OPD.

4. Whether no cause of action has accrued in favour of
plaintiff, as alleged? OPD.

5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own acts,
conduct, deeds and acquiescence to file the present
suit, as alleged? OPD.

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6. Whether plaintiff has no locus standi
to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD.

7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary
parties, as alleged? OPP.

.

8. Whether the defendants had become owner of the

suit land by way of adverse possession, as
alleged? OPD.

9. Relief.

8 The learned trial court directed the parties to

of
adduce evidence in support of their contentions to

corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the learned
rt
trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 19.09.2016

decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent for possession

and it was held that the plaintiff is having valid, legal title to

the suit land and hence he is entitled to the possession of the

same. Further, the appellants/defendants were directed to

remove the temporary structure created on the suit land at

their own cost and in case they failed to do so, the cost of the

same was ordered to be recovered from them.

9 The defendants, feeling dissatisfied by the judgment

and decree, dated 19.09.2016, as passed by the learned trial

court, preferred an appeal before the learned first Appellate

Court on 13.06.2019, which came to be dismissed vide

judgment and decree dated 08.07.2021.

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10 Now, aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and

decrees, the appellants/defendants have preferred the

present regular second appeal, in which notices were issued

.

to the respondent/plaintiff on 04.09.2021 and pursuant to

that learned counsel for the respondent put in appearance

and thereafter the case was listed for admission hearing.

11 It is contended by Mr. Aryan Manta, Advocate,

of
vice Mr. Rakesh Manta, appearing for the defendants/

appellants that the judgments and decrees as passed by the

learned courts below are perverse and without any evidence.

    He    submits
                  rt that   the   learned     courts     below      have      not

appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on

record and has erred in decreeing the suit filed by the

plaintiff/respondent for possession. He further submits that

the learned courts below have misconstrued and

misinterpreted documentary evidence placed on record,

whereby the defendants/appellants were able to establish

plea of adverse possession over the suit land.

12 On the other hand, Mr. Virender Singh Chauhan,

learned Senior Advocate, duly assisted by Mr. Ajay Singh

Kashyap, Advocate, appearing for the plaintiff/respondent,

has defended the judgments and decrees passed by the

learned courts below. He submits that the case as set up by

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the plaintiff is supported by cogent and authentic

evidence placed on record, therefore, findings as returned by

the courts below are legal, valid and sustainable and do not

.

call for any interference. He further submits that the

findings as returned by the learned courts below are finding

of fact, therefore, no question of law much less substantial

question of law arises in the instant appeal and the same

of
deserves to be dismissed.

13 I have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and have also gone through the material available on record.

14

rt
With the consent of the parties, the case is heard

finally at the admission stage.

15 It is the case of the plaintiff/respondent that his

predecessor-in-interest, Jamku, was the owner of the suit

property and for that purpose, he has placed on record a

copy of jamabandi for the year 2004-05, which shows Jamku

to be owner of the suit property comprised in Khasra

Nos.1463, 1464 and 1465. Further, copy of the mutation,

has also been exhibited as Ext.PW1/C, whereby Jamku has

been shown to be owner of the suit land. Ext. PW1/D is copy

of the jabamandi for the year 1980-81, which also reflects

Jamku to be owner in possession of the suit property.

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16 The controversy between the parties arose

when in the column of the possession, the defendants were

entered as per jamabandi for the year 2004-05, wherein

.

original defendant, namely, Balku, son of Jamlu, was shown

to be in possession of the suit land.

17 The plaintiff has primarily based his case on the

basis of the title and it is the case of the plaintiff that in the

of
the month of April 2010 when his predecessor-in-interest

expired, the defendants illegally tresspassed over the suit

land and took its forcible possession.

18 As
rt regards the defendants/appellants, their

defence in the instant case is primarily based on the adverse

possession. In the written statement, plea of adverse

possession has been set up by the defendants and apart from

that, plea has also been taken that the suit land was given to

the defendants in the family partition, which took place

between the family members of the parties on 25.12.1958,

thereafter they are in possession of the suit land.

19 It has been alleged by the defendants/appellants

that the suit land never remained in possession of Liaqui

Ram. In the year 1954, Nesru, grandfather of the original

defendant, had taken Rs.40/- from Liaqui Ram as money was

required for the marriage of Jamku and due to such reason

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10
in the revenue record name of Liaqui Ram exists.

Thereafter, in the year 1958, the amount was refunded to

Liaqui Ram from joint family funds.

.

20 In common parlance, once the

defendants/appellants have set up plea of adverse

possession, it is presumed that the defendants have

accepted title of the plaintiff/respondent. However, the

of
defendants/respondents have set up their title on the basis

of the family partition alleged to have taken place between the

family members on 25.12.1958.

21

rt
As noticed above, the defendants/respondents

have tried to project their case on the basis of the ownership

by alleging that in the family partition, the suit land was

given to them in the year 1958 and the defendants were put

in possession in the said year itself, however, from the

perusal of the revenue record, said story as projected in the

written statement is falsified since the defendants have relied

primarily on the copy of missal haquiat bandobast jadid,

which is based upon the record prepared during the

settlement operation. On the one hand, plea has been set up

that they are in possession of the suit land since 1958 and

on the other hand, they are relying upon the record prepared

during the recent settlement.

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22 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its catena of

decisions has categorically held that the plea of title and

adverse possession is mutually destructive and inconsistent

.

and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is

renounced.

23 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narasamma and

others vs. A. Krishnappa (dead) through Legal

of
Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 218, has held as under:-

“33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf case case, it has
been clearly set out that a plaintiff filing a title over
rt
the property must specifically plead it. When such a
plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent

in the nature of it that someone else is the owner of
the property. In that context, it was observed in para
12 that “….the pleas on title and adverse possession

are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not
begin to operate until the former is renounced.”

24 This Court also in case titled as Surinder Prasad

and another vs. Madhur Green and another, 2019(1) Civil

Court Case, 182 has held as under:

“9. At the outset, it may be observed that the
defendants had even raised the plea of adverse
possession and obviously they acknowledged and
attorned to the title of the plaintiff. It is more than
settled that whenever the plea of adverse possession
is projected, inherent in the plea is that someone else
was the owner of the property. The pleas on title and

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12
adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and
the latter does not begin to operate until the former is
renounced.”

.

25 In order to establish adverse possession, the

defendants/appellants have examined Roshan Lal as DW1,

who, in his examination-in-chief tendered an affidavit

Ext.DW1/A, wherein in para 3 thereof he has stated that on

of
25.12.1958 in a family partition the suit land was given to his

father and thereafter he along with other defendants is in
rt
peaceful possession of the suit property. However, in para 4

thereof, he has taken contrary stand, whereby he has stated

that the defendants are residing over the suit land for the

last 30 years. Neither the ingredients of the adverse

possession have been spelt out nor the same have been tried

to be proved. In his cross-examination, there is an

admission on the part of DW1 that Jamku is owner in

possession of the suit land.

26 DW2, Negi Ram, has also tendered his affidavit,

Ext. DW2/A in his examination-in-chief. In para 2 of his

affidavit, he has submitted that the defendants are owners in

possession of the suit property for the last more than 30

years in a peaceful manner. Except this, there is no

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13
averment qua plea of adverse possession as raised by

the defendants.

27 Nagru Ram appeared in the witness box as DW3,

.

who has also tendered in evidence his affidavit, Ext. DW3/A,

wherein he has deposed on the same and similar lines as

having been deposed by DW2 Negi Ram.

28 DW4 Lakhi Raj while tendering his affidavit, Ext.

of
DW4/A in his examination-in-chief has also stated on the

same lines as has been stated by DW2 and DW3.

29 None of the defendants’ witnesses has stated that
rt
on which date, the defendants/appellants came in possession

of the suit land and whether their alleged hostile possession

was in the knowledge of the true owner and whether the

said possession was uninterrupted, hostile and what is

continuity of the said possession. Said ingredients as

required to acquire ownership have neither been pleaded

nor proved by the defendants/appellants.

30 Moreover, in order to prove ingredients of adverse

possession, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in

order to prove ownership on the basis of the adverse

possession, said plea has to be specifically pleaded and

proved.

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31 It has to be established by the party,

who claims title on the basis of the adverse possession that

on what date the party came into possession of the suit

.

property. It has to be established by the defendants what

was the nature of their possession over the suit land and

whether said factum of possession was well within the

knowledge of the true owner i.e. plaintiff/respondent. The

of
defendants/appellants were required to prove how long is

their possession on the suit land; whether the same is

continuous or not; and whether the possession on the suit
rt
land was open, hostile and undisturbed.

32 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the

exposition of law qua adverse possession in the following

manner:

(i) In T. Anjanappa and others vs.

Somalingappa and another, (2006) 7 SCC 570,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

“12. The concept of adverse possession
contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a
possession which is expressly or impliedly in
denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to
be adverse must be possession by a person who
does not acknowledge the other’s rights but
denies them. The principle of law is firmly

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15
established that a person who bases his title
on adverse possession must show by clear and
unequivocal evidence that his possession was
hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial

.

of his title to the property claimed. For deciding

whether the alleged acts of a person constituted
adverse possession, the animus of the person
doing those acts is the most crucial factor.

Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and
is aimed against right. A person is said to hold

of
the property adversely to the real owner when
that person in denial of the owner’s right
excluded him from the enjoyment of his property.

13.

          rt   Possession     to    be     adverse    must      be
        possession   by   a       person     who     does      not

acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them.

“24. It is a matter of fundamental
principle of law that where possession can
be referred to a lawful title, it will not be
considered to be adverse. It is on the basis

of this principle that it has been laid down
that since the possession of one co- owner
can be referred to his status as co-owner, it
cannot be considered adverse to other co-

owner.

14. Adverse possession is that form of

possession or occupancy of land which is
inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner

and tends to extinguish that person’s title.
Possession is not held to he adverse if it can be
referred to a lawful title. The person setting up
adverse possession may have been holding
under the rightful Owner’s title e.g. trustees,
guardians, bailiffs or agents. Such persons
cannot set up adverse possession.

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16

              "Adverse         possession"          means        a
         hostile possession which           is expressly or

impliedly in denial of title of the true owner.
Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, burden

.

is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A

person who bases his title on adverse
possession must show by clear and
unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was

hostile to the real owner and amounted to a
denial of his title to the property claimed. In

of
deciding whether the acts, alleged by a
person, constitute adverse possession, regard
must be had to the animus of the person doing
those acts which must be ascertained from the
rt
facts and circumstances of each case. The
person who bases his title on adverse

possession, therefore, must show by clear and
unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was
hostile to the real owner and amounted to a

denial of his title to the property claimed.

Where possession could be referred to a

lawful title, it will not be considered to be
adverse. The reason being that a person

whose possession can be referred to a lawful
title will not be permitted to show that his

possession was hostile to another’s title. One
who holds possession on behalf of another
does not by mere denial of that other’s title
make his possession adverse so as to give
himself the benefit of the statute of limitation.
Therefore, a person who enters into
possession having a lawful title, cannot divest

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17
another of that title by pretending that he
had no title at all.

15. An occupation of reality is inconsistent
with the right of the true owner. Where a person

.

possesses property in a manner in which he is not

entitled to possess it, and without anything to
show that he possesses it otherwise than an
owner (that is, with the intention of excluding all

persons from it, including the rightful owner), he is
in adverse possession of it. Thus, if A is in

of
possession of a field of B’s, he is in adverse
possession of it unless there is something to show
that his possession is consistent with a
recognition of B’s title. (See Ward v. Carttar (1866)
rt
LR 1 Eq.29). Adverse possession is of two kinds,
according as it was adverse from the beginning,

or has become so subsequently. Thus, if a mere
trespasser takes possession of A’s property, and
retains it against him, his possession is adverse

ab initio. But if A grants a lease of land to B, or B
obtains possession of the land as A’s bailiff, or

guardian, or trustee, his possession can only
become adverse by some change in his position.

Adverse possession not only entitled the adverse
possessor, like every other possessor, to be

protected in his possession against all who cannot
show a better title, but also, if the adverse
possessor remains in possession for a certain
period of time produces the effect either of barring
the right of the true owner, and thus converting
the possessor into the owner, or of depriving the
true owner of his right of action to recover his
property and this although the true owner is

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18
ignorant of the adverse possessor being in
occupation.

16. xxx xxx xxx

17. According to Pollock, “In common speech a

.

man is said to be in possession of anything of

which he has the apparent control or from the use
of which he has the apparent powers of excluding
others”.

18 & 19 xxx xxx xxx

20. It is well recognized proposition in law

of
that mere possession however long does not
necessarily means that it is adverse to the true
owner. Adverse possession really means the
rt hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly
in denial of title of the true owner and in order to
constitute adverse possession the possession

proved must be adequate in continuity, in
publicity and in extent so as to show that it is
adverse to the true owner. The classical

requirements of acquisition of title by adverse
possession are that such possession in denial of

the true owner’s title must be peaceful, open and
continuous. The possession must be open and

hostile enough to be capable of being known by
the parties interested in the property, though it is

not necessary that there should be evidence of the
adverse possessor actually informing the real
owner of the former’s hostile action.”

(ii) In Chatti Konatri Rao and others vs.

Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316,

the Hon’ble Apex Court further held as under:

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19

“13. What facts are required to prove adverse
possession have succinctly been enunciated by
this Court in the case of Karnataka Board of

.

Wakf vs. Government of India and Ors. (2004) 10

SCC 779. It has also been observed that a
person pleading adverse possession has no
equities in his favour and since such a person is

trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is
for him to clearly plead and establish necessary

of
facts to establish his adverse possession.
Paragraph 11 of the judgment which is relevant
for the purpose reads as follows:

“11. In the eye of the law, an owner would
rt
be deemed to be in possession of a
property so long as there is no intrusion.
Non-use of the property by the owner even

for a long time won’t affect his title. But
the position will be altered when another
person takes possession of the property
and asserts a right over it. Adverse

possession is a hostile possession by
clearly asserting hostile title in denial of
the title of the true owner. It is a well-
settled principle that a party claiming

adverse possession must prove that his
possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec
precario”, that is, peaceful, open and

continuous. The possession must be
adequate in continuity, in publicity and in
extent to show that their possession is

adverse to the true owner. It must start
with a wrongful disposition of the rightful
owner and be actual, visible, exclusive,
hostile and continued over the statutory
period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina AIR
1964 SC 1254, Parsinni v. Sukhi
(1993) 4
SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappa v.
State of Karnataka
(1997) 7 SCC 567)
Physical fact of exclusive possession and
the animus possidendi to hold as owner in
exclusion to the actual owner are the most
important factors that are to be accounted

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20
in cases of this nature. Plea of
adverse possession is not a pure question
of law but a blended one of fact and law.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse
possession should show: (a) on what date
he came into possession, (b) what was the

.

nature of his possession, (c) whether the

factum of possession was known to the
other party, (d) how long his possession
has continued, and (e) his possession was
open and undisturbed. A person pleading

adverse possession has no equities in his
favour. Since he is trying to defeat the
rights of the true owner, it is for him to
clearly plead and establish all facts

of
necessary to establish his adverse
possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.)
v. Raj Kumari Sharma

14. In view of the several authorities of this
rt
Court, few whereof have been referred above,
what can safely be said that mere possession

however long does not necessarily mean that it is
adverse to the true owner. It means hostile
possession which is expressly or impliedly in

denial of the title of the true owner and in order
to constitute adverse possession the possession
must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and

in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the

true owner. The possession must be open and
hostile enough so that it is known by the parties
interested in the property. The plaintiff is bound

to prove his title as also possession within 12
years and once the plaintiff proves his title, the
burden shifts on the defendant to establish that
he has perfected his title by adverse possession.
Claim by adverse possession has two basic
elements i.e. the possession of the defendant
should be adverse to the plaintiff and the

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21
defendant must continue to remain in
possession for a period of 12 years thereafter.

15. Animus possidendi as is well known a
requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere

.

possession does not ripen into possessory title
until possessor holds property adverse to the title
of the true owner for the said purpose. The

person who claims adverse possession is
required to establish the date on which he came
in possession, nature of possession, the factum

of
of possession, knowledge to the true owner,
duration of possession and possession was open
rt and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse
possession has no equities in his favour as he is
trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and,

hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish
all facts necessary to establish adverse
possession. The courts always take unkind view

towards statutes of limitation overriding property
rights. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure
question of law but a blended one of fact and

law.”

33 The essential ingredients, which have been laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the present case,

have neither been spelt out nor proved by the

defendants/appellants. The learned courts below have rightly

held that the defendants/appellants though have taken plea

of adverse possession, but the grounds to prove the same

have not been established.

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22

34 The learned courts below have rightly come

to the conclusion that the defendants have failed to

establish their title on the basis of adverse possession,

.

therefore, the findings as returned by the learned courts

below are legal, valid and sustainable and do not call for any

interference.

35 As regards the plea raised by the defendants qua

of
the family partition, except the oral testimony, no evidence

has been placed on record to establish that in the family

partition, the suit land was given to the predecessor in
rt
interest of the defendants. No document has been placed on

record to establish the family partition, therefore, the findings

qua the same as rendered by the learned courts below are

also sustainable and do not call for any interference.

36 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments

has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact.

No doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under

Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on

limited grounds such as – (a) where the finding is based on

inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the

relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on

misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is

not case in hand.

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23

37 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with

scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth

(minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as

.

under:

18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial

question of law in the memorandum of appeal and
formulating the same at the time of admission, the High
Courts have been issuing notices and generally

of
deciding the second appeals without adhering to the
procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It
has further been found in a number of cases that no
rt
efforts are made to distinguish between a question of
law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the

powers under this section in several cases, the findings
of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been
disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of

appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right
attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory
right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in

force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in

the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second
appeal can be maintained and no court has the power
to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal

cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the
High Court in exercise of the powers under this section.

Further, a substantial question of law has to be
distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This
Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century
Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.
(AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that :

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24

“The proper test for determining whether a
question of law raised in the case is substantial would,
in our opinion, be whether it is of general public
importance or whether it directly and substantially

.

affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is

either an open question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the
Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for

discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled
by the highest court or the general principles to be

of
applied in determining the question are well settled and
there is a mere question of applying those principles or
that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question
would not be a substantial question of law.”

rt

19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were

arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court
should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the

trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has
rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the

same is no ground for interference in second appeal
when it is found that the appellate court has given

satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from
a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are

possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will
not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal.
Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The
High Court will, however, interfere where it is found
that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court
were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the
basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or

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25
was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence.

20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be

.

debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a

binding precedent, and must have a material bearing
on the decision of the case, if answered either way,
insofar as the rights of the parties before it are

concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the
case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the

of
pleadings and the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts
and it must be necessary to decide that question of law
for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely
rt
new point raised for the first time before the High Court
is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to

the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the
facts and circumstance of each case whether a question
of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or

not; the paramount overall consideration being the need
for striking a judicious balance between the

indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and
impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of

any lis.”

38 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-

“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the
evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first
appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a
second appellate court exercising power(s)

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26
under Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding
of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the
finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it
is in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c)

.

where it is based on misreading of evidence; and (d)

where it is perverse. But that is not the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the

endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a
registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the

of
oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and the
circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and
D-2 were not disputed, though claimed as one obtained
on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first appellate
rt
court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was not
addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High Court, in

one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a signed blank
paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not
proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here.

While exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it
ought not to have interfered with the finding of fact

returned by the first appellate court on this aspect;
more so, when the first appellate court had drawn its

conclusion after appreciating the evidence available on
record as also the circumstance that

signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
(Exb.A-2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while
disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the
High Court did not hold that the finding returned by the
first appellate court is based on a misreading of
evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is
perverse. Thus, there existed no occasion for the High
Court, exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to

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27
interfere with the finding of the first appellate
court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to
D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale consideration
fixed for the transaction.

.

18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional

sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first
appellate court is sustained, there appears no logical
reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not

ready and willing to perform its part under the contract
particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total

of
consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and,
over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000
was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This
we say so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s
rt
readiness and willingness to perform its part under the
contract is to be formed on the entirety of proven facts

and circumstances of a case including conduct of the
parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that

he has treated the contract subsisting with
preparedness to fulfil his obligation and accept

performance when the time for performance arrives.”

39 As observed above, the Hon’ble Apex Court has

repeatedly held that the scope of interference under Section

100 CPC is limited and the interference will be in those cases

where the judgments are perverse and based on no evidence.

40 On perusal of the impugned judgments and

decrees, this court is of the opinion that the same are valid,

legal and sustainable in the eyes of law and no interference of

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28
any kind is required in the same. No question of law

much less the substantial question of law arises in the

present case.

.

41 No other point raised by the learned counsel for

the appellants.

42 In view of aforesaid discussions and for the

reasons stated hereinabove, there is no merit in this appeal

of
and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to

bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands

disposed of.

                      rt

    11th March, 2026                             (Romesh Verma)
         (pankaj)                                    Judge








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