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Criteria for Grant of Interim Injunction in Trademark Infringement Cases

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HomePage No.# 1/7 vs The Union Of India on 16 March, 2026

Page No.# 1/7 vs The Union Of India on 16 March, 2026

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Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/7 vs The Union Of India on 16 March, 2026

Author: Parthivjyoti Saikia

Bench: Parthivjyoti Saikia

                                                                              Page No.# 1/7

GAHC010195912025




                                                                     2026:GAU-AS:1770

                            THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
   (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                            Case No. : Bail Appln./2870/2025

            N ARUN SINGH
            SON OF NAOREM JADUMANI SINGH
            R/O TORBUNG
            BANGLA, P.O., P.S. AND DIST. CHURACHANDPUR-795128, MANIPUR.



            VERSUS

            THE UNION OF INDIA
            (DRI) REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM



Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S C BISWAS, MS. S. CHANDA,MS. K L R YANTHAN,MS. R
DEVI,MS. J GHOSH,MR. A DASGUPTA

Advocate for the Respondent : SC, DRI,




                                         :: BEFORE ::
                (HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA)


             Advocate(s) for the Petitioner             :      Mr. S.C. Biswas,
                                                               Advocate.


             Advocate(s) for the Opposite Party       :        Mr. S.C. Keyal,
                                                               S.C., D.R.I.
                                                                            Page No.# 2/7




              Date on which judgment is reserved :           10.02.2026.

              Date of pronouncement of judgment :            16.03.2026.


              Whether the pronouncement is of the
              operative part of the judgment?       :        YES.


              Whether the full judgment has been
              pronounced?                               :    YES.



                                J U D G M E N T (CAV)

Heard Mr. S.C. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also
heard Mr. S.C. Keyal, the learned Standing Counsel, D.R.I.

2. This is an application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, whereby the
petitioner N. Arun Singh who was arrested in connection with D.R.I. Silchar Seizure
Case No.01/CL/NDPS/DRI/SIL/2024-2025 under Sections 21(c)/29 & 43(a) of the
N.D.P.S. Act.

SPONSORED

3. Commercial quantity of Amphetamine/Methamphetamine tablets commonly
known as “Yaba” tablets worth ₹10 crore was recovered from the possession of the
petitioner.

4. Mr. Biswas has submitted that the contraband goods were recovered from the
driver’s cabin of a TATA Truck, not from the possession of the present petitioner,
though he was driving the truck.

5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides.

6. In State of Kerala v. Rajesh, (2020) 12 SCC 122, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
Page No.# 3/7

held as under:

“18. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the
application for bail moved by the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act.
In Union of India v. Ram Samujh [Union of India v. Ram Samujh, (1999) 9 SCC 429 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 1522] , it has been elaborated as under:

“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be
adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the
accused commits murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing
in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects
and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are
released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of
trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of
such activities in Durand Didier v. State (UT of Goa) [Durand Didier v. State (UT of
Goa), (1990) 1 SCC 95 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 65] as under: (SCC p. 104, para 24)
’24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the
underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances
have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the
adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and
alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control
and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its
wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying
mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.’

8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has
provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be
Page No.# 4/7

released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,

(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence; and

(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail

are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the
aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent-accused on bail.
Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which
Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended.”

7. In Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100, the Supreme Court
has held as under:

“19. With regard to the grant of bail for offences under the NDPS Act, in Union of
India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India
v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 :

(2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505] this Court observed that bail may be cancelled if it has been
granted without adhering to the parameters under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

Further, in Union of India v. Prateek Shukla [Union of India v. Prateek Shukla, (2021) 5
SCC 430 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 597] , one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), speaking for a
two-Judge Bench, noted that non-application of mind to the rival submissions and the
seriousness of the allegations involving an offence under the NDPS Act by the High
Court are grounds for cancellation of bail.

This extract is taken from Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 :

(2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 at page 110

20. Section 37 of the NDPS Act regulates the grant of bail in cases involving offences
under the NDPS Act. Section 37 reads as follows:

“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable .–(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974),–

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

Page No.# 5/7

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under Section 19
or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless —

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail .
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause ( b) of sub-section (1) are
in addition to the limitations under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)
or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”
(emphasis supplied)

21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences
punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:

(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail;
and

(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that : ( a) the person is not
guilty of such an offence; and ( b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.

22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that
the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable
grounds to believe”, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of
India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari
, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505] , held that :

(SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The
expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence
of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording
Page No.# 6/7

of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.

8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in
regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably,
knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.

‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be
unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the
times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the
old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.’

[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4
SCC 497] , SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
Board
v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]

***

10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis it is a question of fact, whether a particular act is reasonable or not
depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of
Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai
v. Kamla
Mills Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 315] )

11. The court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37
of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited
purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that
the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such
grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a
judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)”

8. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe”

Page No.# 7/7

that the person is not guilty of the offence. The court while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of
not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing
the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about
the existence of such grounds.

9. In the case in hand, there are elements of a prima facie case against the present
petitioner. Therefore, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is
not guilty. For this reason, the bail application is rejected and disposed of accordingly.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant



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