Unknown vs Madan Lal on 12 March, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Unknown vs Madan Lal on 12 March, 2026

    2026:HHC:7389


    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                     CMP (M) No. 1898/2025
                                     in RSA No. 57/2026

                                     Decided on:           12.03.2026




                                                                                 .

    The Principal Secretary Revenue to the
    Government of H.P. & ors.                                               .....Appellants





                                        Versus

    Madan Lal                                                             .....Respondent




                                                     of
    Coram

    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
                          rt
    Whether approved for reporting ?1

    For the appellants:                 Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Addl. A.G.

    For the respondent : Mr. Malay Kaushal, Advocate.



    Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral)

CMP (M) No. 1898/2025

For the reasons stated in the application, which is

duly supported by an affidavit, and considering the

submissions made by learned counsel for both the sides,

delay of 233 days in filing the regular second appeal is

condoned. Application is allowed and stands disposed of.

Appeal be registered.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ?Yes

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RSA No.57/2026

The present appeal arises out of the judgment and

.

decree, dated 15.01.2025 as passed by the learned District

Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in C. A. No. 28/13 of 2013, whereby

the appeal preferred by the present appellants/defendants

has been ordered to be dismissed and the judgment and

of
decree dated 31.03.2023, as passed by the learned Senior

Civil Judge, Bilaspur, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 73-1 of 2015,
rt
titled as Madan Lal vs. Principal Secretary, Revenue, have

been affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the

plaintiff/respondent for declaration and mandatory

injunction was decreed.

2 Brief facts of the case are that the

plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for declaration and

mandatory injunction in the Court of learned Senior Civil

Judge, Bilaspur, on 27.05.2015 on the ground that the land

comprised in Khata/Khatoni No. 8/8 min., Khasra No. 69,

measuring 2-18 bighas, situated at Village Tramari, Pargna

Rattanpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. is owned and

possessed by the plaintiff. In the year 1980, the defendants

had constructed Deoth-Lag Ghat Jamli link road and for that

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purpose, the land owned and possessed by the plaintiff was

utilized. The officials of the defendants assured the plaintiff

to compensate him for utilization of his land, however no

.

steps were taken by them. Further, it has been averred in

the plaint that the lands of Surjan Ram and Chet Ram were

also acquired and utilized by the defendants for construction

of the road in question in the year 1987 vide Award No. 1/87.

of
When the plaintiff approached the defendants for the grant

of compensation, no steps were taken by them for the
rt
reasons best known to them. Though assurance was given to

the plaintiff to compensate him, but till date, no

compensation amount has been paid, therefore, the plaintiff

was constrained to file a suit for declaration to the effect that

he is owner in possession of the suit land and for mandatory

injunction that since the defendants have utilized the suit

land, therefore, the plaintiff sought vacant possession of the

suit land.

3 The suit was contested by the defendants/State

by raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus

stand, estoppel etc. On merits, it was averred that the

defendants/appellants had constructed the road in question

with the consent of the plaintiff in the year 1980 and the

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defendants had not given any assurance to the plaintiff to

pay the compensation for the suit land. Lands of Surjan Ram

and Chet Ram were acquired during the construction of the

.

road in question and other portion of the road was

constructed with the consent of the plaintiff. At the time of

construction of the road, the plaintiff never raised any

objection and now he cannot be permitted to raise objection

of
that too after elapse of more than 35 years of the

construction of road and consequently, the defendants
rt
sought dismissal of the suit.

4 The plaintiff filed replication to the written

statement filed by the defendants and all the averments as

made in the plaint were reiterated.

5 On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial

court framed the following issues:-

1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of

declaration to the effect that plaintiff is recorded
owner in possession qua the suit land, as prayed?

OPP

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of
mandatory injunction, as prayed? OPP

3. Whether the suit is not maintainable, as
alleged?OPD

4. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the Court
with clean hands, as alleged? OPD

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5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation, as
alleged? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the
present suit by his own act and conducts, as

.

alleged? OPD

7. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the
present suit, as alleged? OPD

8. Relief.

6 The learned trial court directed the parties to

of
adduce evidence in support of their contentions to

corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the learned
rt
trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 31.03.2023

decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent and it was held

that the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land

comprised in Khata/Khatoni No. 8/8 min, Khasra No.69,

measuring 2-18 bighas, situated at Village Tramari, Pargna

Rattanpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. and is

entitled for compensation from the defendants for the suit

land utilized by the defendants/State for the construction of

the road in question in the same manner as the lands of

Surjan and Chet Ram were acquired for the same road and

ultimately, the defendants were ordered to acquire the suit

land and compensate the plaintiff.

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7 Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree,

dated 31.03.2023, the defendants/State preferred an appeal

before the learned first Appellate Court on 11.05.2023, which

.

came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated

15.01.2025.

8 Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments

and decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present

of
regular second appeal.

    9            It is contended by Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, learned

    Additional
                   rt
                   Advocate     General    appearing           for       the

appellants/State that the learned courts below have not

appreciated the real controversy inter se the parties and the

impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned

courts below are perverse and thus, liable to be quashed and

set aside. He has further contended that the learned Courts

below have not appreciated oral as well as documentary

evidence, therefore, on that count, the instant appeal

deserves to be allowed.

10 On the other hand, Mr. Malay Kaushal, learned

counsel for the respondent has defended the judgments and

decrees as passed by the learned courts below and has

submitted that since the land of the respondent was utilized

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for the construction of the road in question, therefore, in view

of the mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

whereby it has been repeatedly held that no person can be

.

deprived of his property without following the due process of

law, therefore, the impugned judgments and decrees deserve

to be upheld.

11 I have heard the learned counsel for the parties

of
and have also gone through the material available on the

case file.

12

rt
With the consent of the parties, the case is finally

heard at admission stage.

13 It is admitted fact that the land of the

plaintiff/respondent has been utilized by the

defendants/State for the construction of road i.e. Deoth-Lag

Ghat-Jamli link road.

14 The Court of the first instance as also the First

Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the

plaintiff/respondent was utilized for construction of Deoth-

Lag Ghat-Jamli link road without payment of compensation

to him. No dispute has been raised as to such

findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the

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defendants/State that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs

after almost 35 years and the same was time barred. In

alternative, it was contended that since the

.

plaintiff/respondent remained silent for such a long period,

he was estopped from raising the stale claim. Principle of

acquiescence has also been sought to be applied against the

plaintiff/respondent on the premise that the

of
plaintiff/respondent was aware about the construction of

road and the road was constructed with his implied consent
rt
and now he cannot, turn around to raise objections against

the construction of road.

15 The defendants/appellants are constituents of a

welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot

claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit

on the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which

right could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by

way of adverse possession by the other.

16 Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff is the title

holder of the suit property. Being owner of the suit property,

he may file a suit at any stage until and unless the said right

is defeated by the present appellants/defendants by

perfection of title by way of adverse possession.

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17 Being the owner of the suit land, the

plaintiff/respondent was well within his right to file a suit

for injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land

.

was utilized by the State for construction of the road in

question without adopting due process of law including the

payment of amount of compensation.

18 Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in

of
possession of any document to show that the plaintiff had

consented for construction of road through the suit land.

19

rt
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State

of Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has

held that no person can be forcibly dispossess of his

property without any legal sanction and without following

the due process of law and depriving her payment of just

and fair compensation. The State being a welfare State

governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status

beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The Court has

held as follows:

“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record.

12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property
in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution.
Vidaya Devi vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh on 8

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January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the right to private
property 1, which could not be deprived without due process
of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right

.

by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,

however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare
State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be

deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State
cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in
accordance with the procedure established by law. The

of
obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article The
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors.
rt
AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v.
M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.

12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property,
without following due process of law, would be violative of a
human right, as also the constitutional right under Article
300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment

in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:

” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained

in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in
exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may

interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a
public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)

12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5,
this Court held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away
except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the
Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the
Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the
provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India,

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must be strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4
(2005) 7 SCC 627.

12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic

.

human right in the following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount of property
right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny

and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson
was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without
the support of property.

“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was

of
the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property
itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other
constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus
rt
among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)

12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this
Court held as follows :

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers

of the State that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. There has to be no
deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by

any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there

is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,
the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of
her property without any legal sanction, and without

following due process of law, there is no deprivation.”

12.6 In In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC

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596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her

.

predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is

completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property

of
without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the
judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v.
M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State must
comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or
rt
any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a
welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate

to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human

right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to

shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights
have gained a multi− faceted dimension.

12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title

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over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12.

.

The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches

of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be
rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a
continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock

the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay
is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances

of
of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental
rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the
delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
rt
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do
substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for

justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would
exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and
not defeat it.

12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which

state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth
a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service

jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for

educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,
etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that
lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of
the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over

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possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without
any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly
for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must
either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition,

.

or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate

person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been
deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The

of
Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
rt
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction

or following due process of law. The present case is one
where the demand for justice is so compelling since the
State has admitted that the land was taken over without
initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known

to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under
Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the
State to pay compensation to the appellant.

20 To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in

(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another

vs. State of H.P. and others has held as under:

14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without
due process, or authorization of law. The recognition of
this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the
King’s Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this
court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal

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Pradesh18. Further, in several judgments, this court
has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider
bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher
responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within
the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the

.

basic principle of the rule of law.

15. When it comes to the subject of private property,
this court has upheld the high threshold of legality that

must be met, to dispossess an individual of their
property, and even more so when done by the State. In
Bishandas v. State of Punjab19 this court rejected the
contention that the petitioners in the case were

of
trespassers and could be removed by an executive
order, and instead concluded that the executive action
taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of
the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in
rt
another case – State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v.
Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20 , held: “A

lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a
lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the
lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the
expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not

authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession.
Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the
expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession

and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee
cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of

law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the
State does not place it in any higher or better position.
On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition

stemming from the requirement that all actions of
Government and Governmental authorities should have
a ‘legal pedigree'”.

16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must
meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can

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the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches,
evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom
private property has been expropriated? In these facts
and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be
unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the

.

grounds of equity and fairness.

17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the
State’s actions, or lack thereof, have in fact

compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants
and compelled them to approach this court, albeit
belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings
initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the

of
High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the
State continued to only extend the benefit of the court’s
directions to those who specifically approached the
courts. The State’s lackadaisical conduct is discernible
rt
from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings
selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ

petitioners who had approached the court in earlier
proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to
the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004)
and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively.
In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk

its responsibility of acquiring land required for public
use in the manner prescribed by law.

18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both

sides in the present dispute – however, the specific
factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of
the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield

itself behind the ground of delay and laches in such a
situation; there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice.
This court in a much earlier case – Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, held:

’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would
be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because

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the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable

.

to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be

asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.

But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by
any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence

of
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party
rt
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State
has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively
tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by
law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded

by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled.
This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the
appellants’ prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of

cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration,
and intervention by the High Court, under its Article

226 jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) – a
similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been
deleted from revenue records leading to his

dispossession from the land without payment of
compensation – held: 6″Having heard the
learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that
the case projected before the court by the appellants is
utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from
any State which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned
counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be
gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay

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the compensation to the respondent, the State has
taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing
what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the
respondent.

.

7 Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights

available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by
the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article

300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads
as follows:

“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property

of
save by authority of law.–No person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.”

8.This is a case where we find utter lack of legal
rt
authority for deprivation of the respondent’s property
by the appellants who are State authorities. In our

view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution…

20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while

dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held as
follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)

11″There are authorities which state that delay and
laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of

these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant
of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago,
recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational
facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc.

Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that
lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the
case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether.
The functionaries of the State took over possession of
the land belonging to the appellants without any
sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly

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for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must
either comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.”

.

21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court

finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not
inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State
has merely averred to the appellants’ alleged verbal

consent or the lack of objection, but has not placed any
material on record to substantiate this plea. Further,
the State was unable to produce any evidence
indicating that the land of the appellants had been

of
taken over or acquired in the manner known to law, or
that they had ever paid any compensation. It is
pertinent to note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well,
rt
in the other writ proceedings.”

21 The similar position has been reiterated and

relied upon in the judgment of the Apex Court by the Hon’ble

Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022,

titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After

relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi

& SukhDutt Ratra‘s case, the Court held as follows:

7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that contention advanced by the State of
delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is
liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute that
petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with the
fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to
initiate acquisition proceedings.

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8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it
clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of
their land, without following due process of law. If it is so,
ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have
made their land available with consent, is of no

.

consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the

fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the
construction of road in question, is compelled to agree with
the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that

her clients are entitled for compensation qua the land
utilized by respondents for construction of road in question.

10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for

of
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid
any amount, which action of the respondent-State certainly
amounts to forcible dispossession of the petitioners from
their land, which is violative of provision contained under
rt
Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed Ram
Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that
entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and
without workable roads, no communication is possible;
every person is entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of

the Constitution of India; every person has right under
Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to move freely,
throughout the territory of India; for the residents of hilly

areas, access to road is access to life itself. Stand taken by
the respondents that there was a policy for providing roads

on demand of residents as a favour to them on conditions
that they would not claim compensation, cannot be
sustained because such stand is violative of Article 300A of

the Constitution of India

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that though right to property is not a
fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right under
Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a human
right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person can
be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. No

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21

doubt, State possesses the power to take or control the
property of the owner of the land for the benefit of public,
but at the same time, it is obliged to compensate the injury
by making just compensation.”

.

22. The Courts below after appreciating the oral as

well as documentary evidence placed on record and on the

basis of the title decreed the suit as filed by the respondent

and has rightly came to the conclusion that he is entitled

of
for mandatory injunction with the direction to acquire the

portion of the suit land which has been utilized by the
rt
present appellants for the construction of the road.

23 The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that

no person can be deprived of his property without adopting

due process of law, therefore, under such circumstances,

the plea as set up by the appellants-State is not tenable in

the facts and circumstances of the case, once they have

utilized the land of the villagers without adopting due

process of law. Now the plea as raised by the present

appellants is not permissible that too at the stage of Regular

Second Appeal. There are concurrent findings of fact by the

Courts below.

24 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of

judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court

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22

of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the

power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the

findings of fact on limited grounds such as – (a) where the

.

finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in

ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is

based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but

that is not case in hand.

of
25 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with

scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth
rt
(minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as

under:

“18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting
for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the

memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time
of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and
generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the

procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It has
further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are

made to distinguish between a question of law and a
substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under
this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first

appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be
kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor
an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive
statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law
in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the
section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be
maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge

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23

those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on
merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will
not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers
under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has

.

to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This

Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. &
Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : “The proper test
for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is

substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general
public importance or whether it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an

of
open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not
free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.

rt
If the question is settled by the highest court or the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are well

settled and there is a mere question of applying those
principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law.

” 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at,
by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is

true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject

witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility
but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the
trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second

appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given
satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given
set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one
drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by
the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach
is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere
where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower

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24

appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the
mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position
on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or
was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by

.

ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable,
not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision

of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the
parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law
“involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it

of
laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it
must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just
rt
and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised
for the first time before the High Court is not a question

involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It
will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each
case whether a question of law is a substantial one and
involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall

consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance
between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages
and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of

any lis.”

26 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.

Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-

“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be
determined by a court of fact after appreciating the evidence
available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the
final court of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court
exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can interfere with

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25

a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the
finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in
ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is
based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse.

.

But that is not the case here.

17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in paragraph
29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made
on the back of a registered document (Exb. A-1) after

considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and
the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2
were not disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank

of
paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in paragraph
29 of its judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In
fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a
rt
signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is
not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here. While

exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have
interfered with the finding of fact returned by the first
appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first
appellate court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the

evidence available on record as also the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document (Exb.A-

2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing the

finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did not hold

that the finding returned by the first appellate court is based
on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant
evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no occasion for

the High Court, exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to
interfere with the finding of the first appellate court regarding
payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and
above the sale consideration fixed for the transaction.

18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate
court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold that

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the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform
its part under the contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out
of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and,
over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid

.

in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so,

because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness and
willingness to perform its part under the contract is to be
formed on the entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a

case including conduct of the parties. The test is that the
person claiming performance must satisfy conscience of the
court that he has treated the contract subsisting with

of
preparedness to fulfil his obligation and accept performance
when the time for performance arrives.”

27

rt
No other point was raised by the learned counsel

for the parties.

28. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated

the Point in controversy after considering the oral as well as

documentary evidence placed on record. No question of law

much less substantial question of law arises in the present

case.

29 In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of

any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

    12th March, 2026                                     (Romesh Verma)
         (pankaj)                                            Judge




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