Patna High Court
Sweta Sinha vs The District And Sessions Judge, … on 17 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1879 of 2017
======================================================
Sweta Sinha Daughter of Bhupendra Narain Sinha, Resident of Mohalla-
Nakki Nagar, Kayath Tola, P.O. and P.S.- Jamalpur, District- Munger.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The District and Sessions Judge, Madhubani
2. The Judge Incharge Administration, Civil Court, Madhubani.
3. Sri Sachin Kumar Chouhdary Bearing Roll No. 2375, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani
4. Sri Rishi Kumar Jha bearing Roll No. 1978, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
5. Sri Binay Tiwary bearing Roll No. 1601767, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani,
6. Miss/Mrs. Nisha Verma bearing Roll No. 1200330, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
7. Sri Shailesh Kumar Singh bearing Roll No. 1601486, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
8. Md. Miraj Khan bearing Roll No. 3679, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
9. Sri Pankaj Kumar Srivastava bearing Roll No. 1050, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
10. Sri Manoranjan Kumar bearing Roll No. 1200483, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
11. Sri Mirtunjay Kumar bearing Roll No. 2100870, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
12. Sri Deepak Kumar Jha bearing Roll No. 2301548, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
13. Sri Raushan Kumar Singh bearing Roll No. 1200059, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
14. Sri Rahul Kumar Mishra bearing Roll No. 1012, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
15. Sri Saurav Kumar Jha bearing Roll No. 4560, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
16. Sri Vishwendra Pratap Singh bearing Roll No. 1201731, Presently Working
as Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
17. Sri Anand Bihari bearing Roll No.- 89, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
18. Sri Jitendra Kumar Jha bearing Roll No. 1502269, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
19. Sri Amit Narayan Jha bearing Roll No. 4595, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
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20. Sri Partik Kumar Upadhyay bearing Roll No. 1301739, Presently Working
as Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
21. Sri Mohit Kumar Pathak bearing Roll No. 6747, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
22. Sri Azaz Ahmed bearing Roll No. 1203270, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
23. Miss/Mrs. Pallavi Kumari bearing Roll No.- 2201400, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
24. Sri Ajay Kumar Jha bearing Roll No.- 2920, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
25. Sri Rajni Kant Jha bearing Roll No. 2302, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
26. Sri Harsh Kumar bearing Roll No. 1300102, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
27. Sri Krishnakant Sahai bearing Roll No. 1301559, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
28. Sri Vijay Kumar bearing Roll No. 949, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
29. Sri Anil Kumar Mishra bearing Roll No. 1300163, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
30. Sri Samir Ranjan bearing Roll No. 1203457, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
31. Sri Satendra Kumar Mishra bearing Roll No. 654, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
32. Sri Kundan Kumar Mishra bearing Roll No. 1401048, Presently Working as
Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
33. Sri Ajit Kumar bearing Roll No. 1202312, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
34. Sri Prabhat Kumar Jha bearing Roll No. 4082, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
35. Sri Sandeep Kumar bearing Roll No. 1200673, Presently Working as Peon,
Civil Court, Madhubani.
36. Sri Atma Nand Kumar Singh bearing Roll No. 1201680, Presently Working
as Peon, Civil Court, Madhubani.
37. Sri Fulkan Ahmed bearing Roll No. 7668, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
38. Sri Indrajit Jha bearing Roll No. 3194, Presently Working as Peon, Civil
Court, Madhubani.
39. Sri Shivendra Kumar Singh Roll No. 1901696 Presently Working as Peon
Civil Court, Madhubani.
40. The Registrar General, Patna High Court, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Dinu Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Ritika Rani, Advocate
Mr. Vardaan Mangalam, Advocate
Mr. Prashant Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Piyush Lall, Advocate
For the Private Respondents: Mr. Birendra Kant Choudhary, Advocate
Mr. Baidya Nath Thakur, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI
CAV JUDGMENT
Date: 17-03-2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the
petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the legality and
validity of the selection process undertaken for appointment to
the posts of Class-IV employees (Peon) in the Judgeship at
Madhubani pursuant to Employment Notice No. 01/2016.
2. The petitioner seeks quashing of the select list
dated 29.11.2016 published by the authorities of the
Madhubani Judgeship on the ground that the said selection
was conducted in violation of the reservation policy of the
State Government providing horizontal reservation for women
candidates.
3. The petitioner further seeks a direction upon the
respondent authorities to prepare a fresh select list by applying
the reservation policy notified by the Government of Bihar
through Resolution No. 963, dated 20.01.2016 and to consider
the petitioner for appointment against the post in question.
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4. The material facts giving rise to the present writ
petition, as stated in the pleadings of the parties, are
summarized hereunder.
5. In March 2016 the District and Sessions Judge,
Madhubani issued Employment Notice No. 01/2016 inviting
applications for appointment to 73 posts of Class IV
employees (Peon) in the civil courts under the Madhubani
Judgeship.
6. Prior to issuance of the said employment notice
the Government of Bihar had issued Resolution No. 963 dated
20.01.2016
providing for 35 percent horizontal reservation for
women candidates in all categories of direct recruitment in
State services.
7. The petitioner claims to belong to the unreserved
category and submitted her application for the said post
pursuant to the aforesaid employment notice. Along with the
application the petitioner also submitted experience
certificates in support of her candidature.
8. Upon scrutiny of the applications the petitioner
was issued Roll No. 1100543 and was called to appear in the
interview held on 31.07.2016 for the purpose of selection.
9. The petitioner asserts that during the course of the
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interview she submitted a representation claiming the benefit
of reservation available to dependents of freedom fighters on
the ground that she is the granddaughter of Late Sukhdeo Lal,
a recognized freedom fighter.
10. After completion of the selection process the
respondent authorities published the list of selected candidates
on 29.11.2016.
11. The grievance of the petitioner arises from the
fact that while publishing the said select list the respondent
authorities allegedly failed to implement the policy of 35
percent horizontal reservation for women candidates as
introduced by the Government of Bihar through the
Resolution dated 20.01.2016.
12. According to the petitioner, as many as 49
candidates were selected in the general category but no
reservation for women candidates in the unreserved category
was provided.
13. The petitioner contends that such failure to
implement the reservation policy deprived her of a fair
opportunity of selection.
14. Being aggrieved by the publication of the select
list dated 29.11.2016 the petitioner approached this Court by
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filing the present writ petition on 04.02.2017 seeking
appropriate relief.
15. During the pendency of the writ proceedings the
Court passed an interim order directing that the recruitment
process pursuant to the impugned select list shall remain
stayed.
16. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of
respondent nos. 1 and 2 wherein the claim of the petitioner
has been opposed.
17. The Learned Counsel for the respondents
contend that the recruitment process in question was
conducted strictly in accordance with the Bihar Civil Court
Staff (Class III and Class IV) Rules, 2009 which governed the
field at the relevant point of time.
18. It has been stated that the Bihar Civil Court
Staff Rules, 2017 came into force only on 23.05.2017 and
therefore had no application to the recruitment process
initiated under Employment Notice No. 01/2016.
19. The Learned Counsel for the respondents further
assert that the Standing Committee of the High Court had
resolved on 15.12.2015 that until the new rules were approved
appointments to Class IV posts in the civil courts would
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continue to be made following the existing procedure under
the 2009 Rules.
20. According to the respondents, the employment
notice itself clearly indicated the categories of reservation
applicable to the recruitment, namely Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, Extremely Backward
Classes and Physically Handicapped candidates.
21. The Learned Counsel for the respondents submit
that the policy of reservation for women candidates
introduced by the State Government through the Resolution
dated 20.01.2016 was not made applicable to the recruitment
of staff in the subordinate judiciary governed by the 2009
Rules.
22. The respondents therefore contend that the
selection process cannot be held to be illegal merely because
the said policy was not implemented.
23. It has also been asserted that the petitioner
voluntarily participated in the recruitment process and
appeared in the interview without raising any objection
regarding the applicability of the reservation policy.
24. According to the respondents, having
participated in the selection process and having failed to
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secure selection, the petitioner is now precluded from
challenging the selection process.
25. The Learned Counsel for the respondents further
deny the allegation that the petitioner’s experience certificates
were not considered during the selection process and assert
that the qualifications and experience of all candidates were
duly examined during the interview.
26. Respondent No. 4 has also filed a separate
counter affidavit. In the said affidavit it has been stated that
respondent no. 4 is presently serving as an Orderly to the
learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Madhubani.
27. The Learned Counsel for the private respondent
has asserted that the appointment to the post in question was
made strictly in accordance with the applicable rules and
procedure and there was no illegality in the selection process.
28. The private respondent has further adopted the
defence taken by respondent nos. 1 and 2 and has prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.
29. Upon consideration of the pleadings of the
parties and the submissions advanced on their behalf, the
following issues arise for determination in the present writ
petition:
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(i) Whether the Government
Resolution No. 963 dated 20.01.2016
providing 35 percent horizontal
reservation for women candidates
automatically applies to recruitment of
staff in the subordinate judiciary.
(ii) Whether the recruitment
process undertaken by the Judgeship at
Madhubani pursuant to Employment
Notice No. 01/2016 strictly in accordance
with the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III
and Class IV) Rules, 2009 can be said to
be illegal merely on the ground that the
aforesaid government resolution was not
implemented.
(iii) Whether the selection
process conducted solely on the basis of
interview under the 2009 Rules satisfies
the constitutional requirements of fairness
and transparency under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India.
(iv) Whether the petitioner,
having participated in the selection
process without protest and having
appeared in the interview, is precluded
from challenging the selection process
after having failed to secure selection.
(v) Whether the petitioner’s
claim for reservation under the category
of dependent of a freedom fighter can be
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considered when such claim was neither
reflected in the employment notice nor
raised in the original application form.
30. This Court has heard the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and has carefully examined the
materials brought on record.
31. The principal contention advanced on behalf of
the petitioner is that the selection process conducted by the
Judgeship at Madhubani suffers from illegality inasmuch as
the respondent authorities failed to apply the policy of
horizontal reservation for women candidates introduced by the
Government of Bihar through Resolution No. 963 dated
20.01.2016.
32. The respondents, on the other hand, have
asserted that recruitment to the posts in question was governed
by the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV) Rules,
2009 and that the said government resolution was not
automatically applicable to recruitment of staff in the
subordinate judiciary.
33. At the outset it is necessary to notice that
recruitment of staff in the civil courts is governed by rules
framed under the administrative control of the High Court.
Under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
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exercises control over the subordinate judiciary including
matters relating to appointment and service conditions of staff
attached to the courts.
34. The materials on record indicate that the
Standing Committee of the High Court had resolved on
15.12.2015 that appointments to Class IV posts in the civil
courts should continue to be made following the procedure
prescribed under the Bihar Civil Court Staff Rules, 2009 until
new rules were finalized.
35. The employment notice issued by the District
and Sessions Judge, Madhubani in March 2016 was therefore
issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
2009 Rules.
36. The advertisement itself indicated the categories
of reservation applicable to the recruitment and did not
provide for the horizontal reservation for women candidates
as introduced by the State Government resolution dated
20.01.2016.
37. In such circumstances, the question that arises
for consideration is whether the said government resolution
automatically became applicable to recruitment in the civil
courts without any express adoption by the High Court.
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38. The law relating to applicability of executive
instructions and statutory provisions has been explained by
the Supreme Court in Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area
Development Authority, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 125 as well
as in State of Uttarakhand v. Mohan Singh, reported in
(2012) 13 SCC 281.
39. In the aforesaid decisions the Hon’ble Supreme
Court explained the distinction between legislation by
incorporation and legislation by reference and held that unless
the adopting statute expressly incorporates subsequent
amendments, executive instructions issued later may not
automatically become applicable.
40. In Western Coalfields Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in paragraph 31 observed as follows:
“31. The decision of a
Constitution Bench of this Court
in Ishwari Khetan Sugar
Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(1980) 4
SCC 136 : (1980) 3 SCR 331] , is even
more to the point. In that case, 12 sugar
undertakings stood transferred to and
were vested in a Government undertaking
under the U.P. Sugar Undertakings
(Acquisition) Ordinance, 1971, which
later became an Act. It was contended on
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since sugar is a declared industry under
the Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1951, Parliament alone
was competent to pass a law on the
subject and the State legislature had no
competence to pass the impugned Act by
reason of Entry 52 List I read with Entry
24 List II. The majority, speaking through
one of us, Desai, J., held that the
legislative power of the State under Entry
24 List II was eroded only to the extent to
which control was assumed by the Union
Government pursuant to the declaration
made by the Parliament in respect of a
declared industry and that the field
occupied by such enactment was the
measure of the erosion of the legislative
competence of the State legislature. Since
the Central Act was primarily concerned
with the development and regulation of
declared industries and not with the
ownership of industrial undertakings, it
was held that the State legislature had the
competence to enact the impugned law.
Justice Pathak and Justice Koshal, who
gave a separate judgment concurring with
the conclusion of the majority, preferred
to rest their decision on the circumstance
that the impugned legislation fell within
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requisition of property” — and was
therefore within the competence of the
State legislature.”
41. Similarly, In State of Uttarakhand v. Mohan
Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 25
and 26 observed as follows:
“25. In Mahindra and
Mahindra Ltd. [(1979) 2 SCC 529] after
referring to the above-mentioned
judgment, this Court held as follows:
(SCC pp. 550-51, para 9)
“9. We have no doubt that
Section 55 is an instance of legislation by
incorporation and not legislation by
reference. Section 55 provides for an
appeal to this Court on ‘one or more of
the grounds specified in Section 100’. It is
obvious that the legislature did not want
to confer an unlimited right of appeal, but
wanted to restrict it and turning to
Section 100, it found that the grounds
there set out were appropriate for
restricting the right of appeal and hence
it incorporated them in Section 55. The
right of appeal was clearly intended to be
limited to the grounds set out in the then
existing Section 100. Those were the
grounds which were before the legislature
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applied its mind and it is reasonable to
assume that it was with reference to those
specific and known grounds that the
legislature intended to restrict the right of
appeal. The legislature could never have
intended to limit the right of appeal to
any ground or grounds which might from
time to time find place in Section 100
without knowing what those grounds
were. The grounds specified in Section
100 might be changed from time to time
having regard to the legislative policy
relating to second appeals and it is
difficult to see any valid reason why the
legislature should have thought it
necessary that these changes should also
be reflected in Section 55 which deals
with the right of appeal in a totally
different context. We fail to appreciate
what relevance the legislative policy in
regard to second appeals has to the right
of appeal under Section 55 so that
Section 55 should be inseparably linked
or yoked to Section 100 and whatever
changes take place in Section 100 must
be automatically read into Section 55. It
must be remembered that the Act is a self-
contained code dealing with monopolies
and restrictive trade practices and it is
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not possible to believe that the legislature
could have made the right of appeal
under such a code dependent on the
vicissitudes through which a section in
another statute might pass from time to
time. The scope and ambit of the appeal
could not have been intended to fluctuate
or vary with every change in the grounds
set out in Section 100. Apart from the
absence of any rational justification for
doing so, such an indissoluble linking of
Section 55 with Section 100 could
conceivably lead to a rather absurd and
startling result. Take for example a
situation where Section 100 might be
repealed altogether by the legislature–a
situation which cannot be regarded as
wholly unthinkable. If the construction
contended for on behalf of the
respondents were accepted, Section 55
would in such a case be reduced to futility
and the right of appeal would be wholly
gone, because then there would be no
grounds on which an appeal could lie.
Could such a consequence ever have been
contemplated by the legislature? The
legislature clearly intended that there
should be a right of appeal, though on
limited grounds, and it would be absurd
to place on the language of Section 55 an
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interpretation which might, in a given
situation, result in denial of the right of
appeal altogether and thus defeat the
plain object and purpose of the section.
We must, therefore, hold that on a proper
interpretation the grounds specified in the
then existing Section 100 were
incorporated in Section 55 and the
substitution of the new Section 100 did
not affect or restrict the grounds as
incorporated and since the present appeal
admittedly raises questions of law, it is
clearly maintainable under Section 55.
We may point out that even if the right of
appeal under Section 55 were restricted
to the ground specified in the new Section
100, the present appeal would still be
maintainable, since it involves a
substantial question of law relating to the
interpretation of Section 13(2).”
26. We are of the view that the
principle laid down in Mahindra and
Mahindra Ltd. [(1979) 2 SCC 529] and
the judgments referred to earlier clearly
apply when we interpret sub-section (4)
of Section 331 of the U.P. Act. Sub-
section (4), as we have already indicated,
has used the expression “on any of the
grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC.
Consequently, the then existing Section
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100 (i.e. Section 100, as it existed in 1908
unamended) was incorporated in sub-
section (4) of Section 331 and substitution
of the new Section 100 does not affect or
restrict the grounds as incorporated. The
right of appeal to the Board of Revenue
under sub-section (4) of Section 331
clearly intended to be limited to the
grounds set out in the then existing
Section 100, since those were the grounds
which were before the legislature and to
which the legislature could have applied
its mind and it is reasonable to assume
that it was with reference to those specific
and known grounds that the legislature
intended to limit the right of appeal.”
42. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of
the present case, it is evident that the recruitment process in
question was conducted under the framework of the Bihar
Civil Court Staff Rules, 2009 pursuant to the administrative
control of the High Court. The said Rules constitute the
governing framework for appointment of staff in the civil
courts and the selection process having been initiated under
the said Rules, the applicable provisions are those which
existed at the time when the recruitment process was
undertaken. The subsequent Government Resolution dated
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20.01.2016 issued by the State Government with regard to
reservation in State services cannot automatically be imported
into the recruitment governed by the Bihar Civil Court Staff
Rules, 2009, particularly when the said Rules do not expressly
incorporate subsequent executive instructions. Consequently,
the earlier framework governing the recruitment would
continue to apply and the later executive notification relating
to reservation cannot operate so as to alter the conditions of
recruitment which had already been governed by the Rules in
force at the relevant time.
43. In the absence of any material indicating that the
said resolution was adopted by the High Court for recruitment
of staff in the civil courts, it cannot be held that the respondent
authorities were bound to apply the said reservation policy
while conducting the selection process.
44. The next question which requires consideration
relates to the validity of the selection process conducted solely
on the basis of interview.
45. In Renu & Ors. v. District & Sessions Judge,
Tis Hazari, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 50 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court emphasized that recruitment to public posts
must satisfy the constitutional requirement of fairness and
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transparency and that the process adopted must be consistent
with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the
said judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.
16 and 22, observed as hereunder:
“16. Another important
requirement of public appointment is that
of transparency. Therefore, the
advertisement must specify the number of
posts available for selection and
recruitment. The qualifications and other
eligibility criteria for such posts should
be explicitly provided and the schedule of
recruitment process should be published
with certainty and clarity. The
advertisement should also specify the
rules under which the selection is to be
made and in absence of the rules, the
procedure under which the selection is
likely to be undertaken. This is necessary
to prevent arbitrariness and to avoid
change of criteria of selection after the
selection process is commenced, thereby
unjustly benefiting someone at the cost of
others.
22. As a safeguard, the
Constitution has also recognised that in
the internal administration of the High
Court, no other power, except the Chief
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enable a judicial intervention, it would
require only a very strong and convincing
argument to show that this power has
been abused. If an authority has exercised
his discretion in good faith and not in
violation of any law, such exercise of
discretion should not be interfered with
by the courts merely on the ground that it
could have been exercised differently or
even that the courts would have exercised
it differently had the matter been brought
before it in the first instance or in that
perspective.”
46. Similarly, the Patna High Court in Bihar Yuva
Adhiwakta Kalyan Samittee vs Patna High Court & Ors.,
reported in AIR ONLINE 2018 PAT 916, examined the
legality of selections to Class IV posts in the civil courts
conducted solely on the basis of interview under the 2009
Rules.
47. In the said decision the Court observed that
selection based entirely on interview for posts of such nature
may lead to arbitrariness and directed that future recruitments
should be conducted in accordance with the Bihar Civil Court
Staff Rules, 2017 which introduced a written examination as
part of the selection process.
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48. However, it is also necessary to notice that the
recruitment process in the present case was initiated and
completed prior to the coming into force of the 2017 Rules.
49. Therefore, the legality of the selection process
must be examined with reference to the rules which were in
force at the relevant time.
50. The 2009 Rules specifically provided that
selection to Class IV posts may be conducted through
interview.
51. In the absence of any material indicating that the
selection committee acted in a mala fide or arbitrary manner
while conducting the interviews, the selection process cannot
be invalidated merely because it was based on interview.
52. The contention of the petitioner regarding non-
consideration of her experience certificates has also been
denied by the respondents.
53. The respondents have stated in their counter
affidavit that the qualifications and experience of all
candidates were duly considered by the selection committee
during the course of interview.
54. No material has been brought on record by the
petitioner to establish that the selection committee ignored the
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relevant qualifications of the candidates or that the evaluation
process was arbitrary.
55. Another aspect which requires consideration is
the conduct of the petitioner in participating in the selection
process without raising any objection regarding the terms of
the advertisement.
56. The advertisement issued in March 2016 clearly
indicated the categories of reservation applicable to the
recruitment and did not provide for horizontal reservation for
women candidates.
57. Despite being aware of the conditions of the
advertisement the petitioner participated in the selection
process and appeared in the interview.
58. It is a settled principle of law that a candidate
who participates in a selection process without protest cannot
subsequently challenge the procedure after having failed to
secure selection.
59. Reference in this regard may be made to the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar
Yadav vs State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1987 SC 454
wherein the Court observed that a candidate who takes a
chance in the selection process cannot later turn around and
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challenge the procedure adopted therein. In paragraph nos. 9
and 10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
“9. Thirdly, it is difficult to see
how the Division Bench of the High Court
could possibly undertake an inquiry into
the question whether the Chairman and
members of the Haryana Public Service
Commission were men of integrity,
calibre and qualification or not. It was a
totally irrelevant inquiry, because even if
they were men lacking in integrity, calibre
and qualification, it would not make their
appointments invalid, so long as the
constitutional and legal requirements in
regard to appointment were fulfilled.
Article 316 of the Constitution makes
provision for appointment and term of
office of members of a State Public
Service Commission. Clause (1) of this
article provides that the Chairman and
members of a State Public Service
Commission shall be appointed by the
Governor of the State and the proviso to
that clause enacts that “as nearly as may
be one half of the members of every
Public Service Commission shall be
persons who at the dates of their
respective appointments have held office
for at least ten years” under the
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25/34Government of a State. Clause (2) of
Article 316 declares that a member of a
State Public Service Commission shall
hold office for a term of six years from the
date on which he enters upon his office or
until he attains the age of sixty-two years,
whichever is earlier. Article 319 lays
down inter alia that on ceasing to hold
office, the Chairman of a State Public
Service Commission shall not be eligible
for any employment under the
Government of India or the Government
of a State, save and except that of
Chairman or any other member of the
Union Public Service Commission and
similarly, a member of a State Public
Service Commission. These are the only
provisions in the Constitution bearing on
the appointment of Chairman and
members of a State Public Service
Commission. Now concededly, none of
these constitutional provisions was
violated in making appointments of the
Chairman and members of the Haryana
Public Service Commission nor was any
legal provision breached and the
appointments of the Chairman and
members of the Haryana Public Service
Commission were made in conformity
with the constitutional and legal
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
26/34requirements. If that be so, it passes our
comprehension as to how the
appointments of the Chairman and
members of the Haryana Public Service
Commission could be regarded as
suffering from any infirmity or any
selections made by them could be said to
be vitiated, merely on the ground that
they were not, in the opinion of the
Division Bench of the High Court,
possessed of integrity, calibre or
qualification. We may take an analogy to
illustrate the point we are making.
Suppose a District Judge is appointed by
the Governor of the State in consultation
with the High Court in accordance with
the requirements of Article 233 and the
appropriate rules made in that behalf.
Can a judgment delivered by him be
assailed as invalid on the ground that he
has not the requisite integrity, calibre or
qualification? The judgment may be set
aside if it is wrong but not because it is
given by a Judge who is lacking in
integrity, calibre or qualification.
Similarly, selections made by the
Chairman and members of the Haryana
Public Service Commission may be
quashed if they are found to be vitiated by
the influence of extraneous
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
27/34considerations or are made in breach of
the rules, but they cannot be invalidated
merely by showing in a general sort of
way that they were not men possessed of
high integrity, calibre or qualification.
10. Lastly, we do not think that
the Division Bench of the High Court was
justified in going into the question
whether the Chairman and members of
the Haryana Public Service Commission
were appointed on account of caste
considerations and political patronage or
were lacking in integrity, calibre or
qualification, when the validity of their
appointments was not challenged in the
writ petitions nor was any relief claimed
for setting aside their appointments. The
validity of their appointments could not
be questioned collaterally while
considering the challenge to the
selections made by them. This view
receives support from the observations of
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking on behalf
of the Court in G. Rangaraju v. State of
A.P. [(1981) 3 SCC 132 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
652 : AIR 1981 SC 1473 : (1981) 3 SCR
474] There, the learned Judge pointed out
: (SCC pp. 140-41, para 17)
“The defective appointment of
a de facto Judge may be questioned
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
28/34directly in a proceeding to which he be a
party but it cannot be permitted to be
questioned in a litigation between two
private litigants, a litigation which is of
no concern or consequence to the Judge
except as a Judge. Two litigants litigating
their private titles cannot be permitted to
bring in issue and litigate upon the title of
a Judge to his office. Otherwise as soon
as a Judge pronounces a judgment a
litigation may be commenced for a
declaration that the judgment is void
because the Judge is no Judge. A Judge’s
title to his office cannot be brought into
jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule
against collateral attack on validity of
judicial appointments.”
We wholly endorse these
observations and conclude that the
principle underlying these observations
must be held to be equally applicable in
the present case and the title of the
Chairman and members of the Haryana
Public Service Commission cannot be
allowed to be placed in jeopardy in a
proceeding for challenging the selections
made by them. This ground of attack
against the validity of the selections must
therefore be rejected.”
60. In so far as the claim of the petitioner regarding
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
29/34
reservation for dependents of freedom fighters is concerned, it
appears from the materials on record that the employment
notice did not provide for such reservation and the petitioner
had not claimed such benefit in the original application form.
61. In the absence of any provision in the
advertisement providing for such reservation the said claim
cannot be entertained at a later stage.
62. Having considered the pleadings of the parties,
the materials on record and the submissions advanced by
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties,
this Court now proceeds to determine the issues framed in the
preceding part of this judgment.
63. The principal grievance of the petitioner relates
to non-implementation of the policy of horizontal reservation
for women candidates introduced by the Government of Bihar
through Resolution No. 963 dated 20.01.2016.
64. However, as noticed earlier, recruitment to the
posts in the civil courts is governed by rules framed under the
administrative control of the High Court in exercise of powers
under Article 235 of the Constitution of India.
65. The materials brought on record indicate that the
Standing Committee of the High Court had resolved on
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
30/34
15.12.2015 that appointments to Class IV posts in the civil
courts were to be made following the procedure prescribed
under the Bihar Civil Court Staff (Class III and Class IV)
Rules, 2009 until new rules were finalized.
66. The recruitment process in question was
initiated pursuant to Employment Notice No. 01/2016 issued
in March 2016 and therefore the said recruitment was
governed by the 2009 Rules.
67. The advertisement issued by the District and
Sessions Judge, Madhubani specifically mentioned the
categories of reservation applicable to the recruitment and did
not provide for horizontal reservation for women candidates
as introduced by the Government Resolution dated
20.01.2016.
68. In absence of any material indicating that the
said government resolution was adopted by the High Court for
recruitment of staff in the civil courts, it cannot be held that
the respondent authorities were bound to implement the said
reservation policy while conducting the recruitment process.
69. The next contention of the petitioner relates to
the validity of the selection process conducted solely on the
basis of interview.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
31/34
70. It is true that the Supreme Court in Renu vs
District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, (supra) emphasized
the requirement of transparency and fairness in recruitment to
public posts.
71. It is also true that in Bihar Yuva Adhiwakta
Kalyan Samittee vs Patna High Court, (supra) this Court
expressed concern regarding selections to Class IV posts
conducted exclusively through interview and observed that
such method of selection may lead to arbitrariness.
72. However, it must also be borne in mind that the
recruitment process in the present case was initiated and
completed under the framework of the 2009 Rules which
specifically provided that selection to Class IV posts may be
conducted through interview.
73. The legality of the recruitment process must
therefore be examined with reference to the rules which were
in force at the relevant time.
74. No material has been placed before this Court to
demonstrate that the selection committee acted in a mala fide
or arbitrary manner while conducting the interviews.
75. In absence of any such material the selection
process cannot be invalidated merely on the ground that it was
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
32/34
conducted on the basis of interview as prescribed under the
applicable rules.
76. Another significant aspect which cannot be
overlooked is the conduct of the petitioner in participating in
the selection process without raising any objection regarding
the terms of the advertisement.
77. The advertisement clearly indicated the
conditions governing the recruitment and the categories of
reservation applicable to the posts in question.
78. The petitioner, despite being aware of the said
conditions, participated in the recruitment process and
appeared in the interview.
79. It is well settled that a candidate who
participates in a selection process without protest cannot
subsequently challenge the same after having failed to secure
selection.
80. In this regard reference may be made to the
principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar
Yadav vs State of Haryana (supra) as well as several
subsequent decisions wherein it has been held that a candidate
who takes a chance in a selection process cannot turn around
and challenge the procedure after being unsuccessful.
Patna High Court CWJC No.1879 of 2017 dt.17-03-2026
33/34
81. In so far as the petitioner’s claim regarding
reservation under the category of dependent of a freedom
fighter is concerned, it appears that such reservation was
neither provided for in the employment notice nor claimed by
the petitioner in her original application.
82. In absence of any provision in the advertisement
providing for such reservation the said claim cannot be
entertained at a subsequent stage.
83. Having regard to the discussion made
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the
petitioner has failed to make out a case warranting
interference with the recruitment process undertaken pursuant
to Employment Notice No. 01/2016.
84. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court
does not find any merit in the present writ petition.
85. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.
86. The interim order passed earlier in the case
stands vacated.
87. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J)
skm/-
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AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE 26.02.2026
Uploading Date 17.03.2026
Transmission Date 17.03.2026