Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Jagan @ Satish Pizyani on 13 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2026:CGHC:12084-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1037 of 2022
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Jamul, District : Durg,
Chhattisgarh
... Applicant(s)
versus
Jagan @ Satish Pizyani S/o Nihal Chandra Aged About 22 Years R/o
Qutr. No. C 78 Block, Near Chhota Nalanda School, Housing Board,
Police Station Jamul, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For State/Applicant : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate for the
applicant/State.
2. The State has sought leave to appeal against the impugned
judgment of acquittal dated 01.12.2021 passed in Special Sessions
Digitally
signed by
Case (POCSO Act) No. 238 of 2019 by the learned Additional Sessions
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
MORLE Date:
2026.03.13
18:59:43
+0530
2Judge, Third Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act) Durg, District Durg
(C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the “learned trial Court”), whereby the
learned trial Court acquitted the respondent trial Court acquitted the
respondents of the offences punishable under Section 509, 354 (?k) of
the IPC & under Section 12 of the Prevention of Childresh from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘POCSO Act‘) and under Section 354 of
the IPC & U/s 8 of POCSO Act and under Section 376 (2)(>) of the IPC
& under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, holding that the prosecution failed
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that:
(i) On 17.03.2016, the complainant / mother (PW-4) of the
victim lodged a complaint in the Police Station Jamul, Distt.
Durg alleging that she lives at Ghasidasnagar, Qutr. No. 32.
She alleged that on 17.03.2016 her daughter informed her that
the accused/respondent, with ill intention, always touched her
breast, chick and body and saying her I love you, caught her
anywhere. The victim (PW-3) also informed that on 01 st
February the accused/respondent, in the newly constructed
house, was doing obscene acts with her. When the
complainant told that why she has not informed earlier, the
victim said that the accused/respondent has said to not inform
the incident anyone. The Police registered the case and took
the matter under investigation. The Police recorded the
statement of the witnesses and seized the caste certificate of
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the victim. The victim was sent for medical examination, after
getting consent.
(ii) After due and necessary investigation, the charge-sheet
was filed against the respondent/accused and the
respondent/accused was put to face charge before the learned
trial Court. The respondent/accused abjured the guilt. In order
to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 05
witnesses in its favour.
(iii) After appreciating the evidences on record, the learned trial
Court did not believe the evidence proving guilt of the
respondent/accused, and therefore, acquitted the
respondent/accused from the offence charged vide impugned
judgment and order dated 01.12.2021, hence, the present
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed seeking leave to
appeal.
4. Learned State counsel submits that the learned trial Court
committed a grave error in acquitting the respondent/accused by
unjustifiably discarding the evidence of the complainant without
assigning any cogent, convincing, or substantial reasons. It is
contended that the learned trial Court failed to consider that, for proving
the age of the victim, the admission register (Ex.P/3), wherein the date
of birth of the victim is recorded as 25.03.2004, has not been rebutted
by the defence. He further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to
properly appreciate the statement of the victim (PW-3), wherein she
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stated that on the date of the incident one Kasturi called her to her
house for playing Carrom. When she reached the house, Kasturi called
the accused/respondent by mobile phone. In the room, Kasturi opened
her clothes, thereafter the accused/respondent caught hold of the victim
and, after opening his clothes, established physical relations with her.
The victim (PW-3) was crying due to pain; thereafter Kasturi covered
her mouth and held her hands. After some time, the
accused/respondent left the victim. Despite the prosecution having led
consistent, reliable, and corroborative evidence through its witnesses,
the learned trial Court failed to properly evaluate and appreciate their
testimonies in their correct legal perspective and erroneously acquitted
the accused. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are
therefore perverse, contrary to the evidence available on record, and
unsustainable in law. Accordingly, it is most respectfully prayed that
leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal be granted.
5. We have heard learned State counsel and perused the record of
the case including the impugned judgment of acquittal.
6. Learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondent has
observed in paragraphs 39 to 48 as follows:
“39. According to the prosecution story, since
February 2016 the accused had been touching the
victim’s body, breasts and cheeks with bad intention,
saying “I love you,” and catching hold of her anywhere
and committing obscene acts with her. About one and
a half months later, when the victim informed her
mother (PW-4) about the incident, her mother
5submitted a written complaint against the accused at
Police Station Jamul, District Durg, on the basis of
which the First Information Report was registered.
However, during the trial the victim (PW-3), while
improving her earlier statements, described the
incident in an entirely different manner and alleged
that the accused had committed rape upon her.
40. The victim’s mother (PW-4), without giving any
detailed account of the alleged incident of molestation,
merely stated that the accused had teased/molested
the victim. Her testimony is silent regarding any
allegation that the accused had committed rape upon
the victim. Thus, the statements of the victim (PW-3)
are not supported by the testimony of her mother
(PW-4); rather, the statements of the victim (PW-3)
and her mother (PW-4) are contradictory to each
other, thereby creating doubt regarding their
testimonies.
41. The Investigating Officer, Inspector Navi Monika
Pandey (PW-5), deposed that she visited the place of
occurrence and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/10) as
pointed out by the complainant/victim’s mother (PW-
4), which bears her signature at portions ‘A to A’ and
‘B to B’. Revenue Inspector G.S.N. Kaushik (PW-1)
also stated that he prepared the site map (Ex.P/01) of
the place of occurrence as pointed out by the
complainant/victim’s mother (PW-4), which bears his
signatures at portion ‘A to A’. This fact is corroborated
by the testimony of the victim’s mother (PW-4), who
stated that the police prepared the spot map (Ex.P/10)
and that the Patwari prepared the site map (Ex.P/01)
on the basis of her indication. No material
contradiction to this evidence has been brought on
6record by the defence.
42. According to the site map (Ex.P/01) and the spot
map (Ex.P/10), the place of occurrence is an under-
construction house situated at a distance of about 150
feet from the residence of the complainant/victim’s
mother (PW-4). However, the victim (PW-3), in her
testimony, made a contradictory statement by stating
that the place of occurrence was Kasturi’s house, and
in cross-examination she clarified that Kasturi’s house
and her own house are situated one above the other.
Thus, from the statements of the victim herself, the
place of occurrence in the present case becomes
doubtful.
43. It is noteworthy that the victim (PW-3) herself
could not remain consistent during her cross-
examination and admitted that the accused had not
committed any wrongful act, molestation or rape with
her. She further stated that the accused never came to
her house, never met her on the way, never went to
her school, and that she had never informed her
mother or any other person about such an incident.
44. Even the victim’s mother (PW-4), during her cross-
examination, denied the written complaint (Ex.P/8)
and the First Information Report (Ex.P/9) registered on
the basis of that complaint. As a result, the very first
information regarding the incident comes under doubt,
thereby rendering the entire investigation based on it
doubtful.
45. From the above analysis of evidence, this Court
reaches the conclusion that the testimony of the victim
is not consistent with the prosecution story. She could
not remain firm during cross-examination and
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admitted that the accused had not committed any
wrongful act, molestation or rape with her and that she
had never informed anyone about such an incident
prior to the date of her evidence. Moreover, the
statements of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-
4) are mutually contradictory, and the victim’s mother
(PW-4) has even denied the written complaint on the
basis of which the FIR was registered. Therefore, the
testimony of the victim suffers from inherent
weaknesses and raises doubts about its credibility,
and thus fails to inspire confidence. The investigation
has also not been corroborated by reliable evidence.
Consequently, the prosecution case appears doubtful.
46. In this regard, the Bombay High Court in Navin
Dhanicam Baraiye (In Jail) vs State of Maharashtra
(decided on 25 June 2018) has held that the
presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is
not absolute and operates only after the prosecution
first establishes foundational facts against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held
that if such foundational facts are not proved, the
presumption does not arise, and even if it does, the
accused may rebut the same through cross-
examination or by leading defence evidence on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability.
47. As the prosecution has failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption provided
under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 does not apply in the
present case. The Court therefore concludes that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges against
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
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48. Consequently, giving the benefit of doubt to the
accused, he is acquitted of the charges under Section
509 and Section 354-D of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012; under Section 354 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 8 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; and under
Section 376(2)(a) of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012.”
7. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned State
counsel and upon perusal of the entire record, including the impugned
judgment and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, this Court
finds that the trial Court has minutely examined and appreciated the
evidence available on record. The trial Court has taken into
consideration the testimony of the victim and her mother, the evidence
of the Investigating Officer, the documentary evidence such as the site
map and spot map, as well as the contradictions emerging from the
statements of the prosecution witnesses. The trial Court has particularly
noted that the victim was not consistent in her testimony and, during
cross-examination, admitted that the accused had not committed any
wrongful act with her. The Court has also observed that the statements
of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-4) are mutually contradictory,
and even the written complaint and the FIR were denied by the victim’s
mother during her cross-examination. The trial Court further found that
the place of occurrence itself became doubtful due to contradictory
statements of the victim in relation to the site plan. On the basis of the
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aforesaid discrepancies and lack of reliable corroboration, the trial Court
reached the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the charges
beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, extended the benefit of doubt
to the accused.
8. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the scope of
interference by the appellate Court is very limited. Unless the findings
recorded by the trial Court are shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal,
or wholly unsustainable on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the
scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal in State of
Rajasthan vs. Kistoora Ram, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984,
has held as follows:
“8. The scope of interference in an appeal against
acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view
taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not
permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal.
Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible
to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the
Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more
probable. The interference would be warranted only if
the view taken is not possible at all.”
9. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned trial
Court are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence available on
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record and cannot be said to be perverse or wholly unsustainable in
law. Even otherwise, the view taken by the learned trial Court is a
possible and plausible view on the basis of the material placed before it.
Therefore, this Court does not find any sufficient ground to grant leave
to appeal against the judgment of acquittal.
10. Consequently, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition seeking grant of
leave to appeal is dismissed in limine. In view of the dismissal of the
petition, the accompanying acquittal appeal also stands dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan