By Pawan Kumar
On February 26, 2026, the Supreme Court sharply criticised the functioning of tribunals, describing them as a “liability” and even a “no-man’s land”. The remarks have sparked intense debate within the legal community.
The observations come amid longstanding concerns regarding the functioning, administration, and independence of tribunals. What the 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976 envisioned as a mechanism for speedy and specialised justice has, nearly five decades later, become synonymous with vacancies, administrative bottlenecks, and stagnating proceedings.
The moment calls for a renewed examination of tribunals—how they were designed, how they evolved, and why the system today appears to be faltering.
THE HISTORICAL SETTING
Tribunals were introduced into India’s constitutional framework through the 42nd Amendment, which inserted Articles 323A and 323B. The idea was ambitious: to reform the justice delivery system by reducing the burden on traditional courts while allowing specialised bodies to handle complex technical disputes.
As India’s regulatory state expanded, disputes increasingly involved specialised domains such as environmental science, corporate finance, and administrative governance. Tribunals were meant to address these complexities with expertise and efficiency.
Institutions such as the Central Administrative Tribunal for service disputes, the National Green Tribunal for environmental matters, and the National Company Law Tribunal for corporate and insolvency cases were established to fulfil this vision.
These bodies were expected not only to accelerate adjudication but also to improve the quality of decisions by combining judicial and technical expertise.
THE JUDICIAL CHECK: THE L CHANDRA KUMAR TURNING POINT
A defining moment in the tribunal system came with the landmark judgment in L Chandra Kumar vs Union of India (1997). In this case, the Supreme Court held that tribunals could not replace the constitutional powers of High Courts in matters of judicial review. The Court affirmed that the powers of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 form part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
While this preserved the primacy of constitutional courts, it also reshaped the tribunal system. Rather than replacing High Courts, tribunals became the first step in a longer appellate chain.
Today, many litigants begin their legal journey in tribunals, move to High Courts, and eventually approach the Supreme Court—sometimes lengthening rather than shortening the litigation process.
STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS: VACANCIES AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The Supreme Court’s recent frustration is not merely a criticism of tribunal performance. It reflects deeper structural flaws in their design and administration.
Unlike constitutional courts, most tribunals operate under the administrative control of government ministries. Their funding, infrastructure, and appointments are largely determined by the very executive authorities whose decisions they are often required to adjudicate. This raises a fundamental question: Can true independence exist when the adjudicator depends on the executive it must review?
These concerns have repeatedly reached the Supreme Court through litigation initiated by the Madras Bar Association. In several judgments, the Court emphasised that tribunals must maintain judicial independence and credibility. Yet, legislative responses have often retained significant executive control.
The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 attempted to streamline the system by abolishing some tribunals and consolidating jurisdictions. However, the deeper issues of autonomy and institutional accountability remained unresolved.
THE CRISIS OF VACANCIES
Perhaps the most visible problem today is the persistent shortage of tribunal members. Large vacancies in bodies such as the Central Administrative Tribunal, National Company Law Tribunal and the Armed Forces Tribunal have rendered several benches partially functional—or completely stalled. Delays in appointments, even after recommendations by judicial selection committees, have forced courts to intervene administratively.
In effect, the Supreme Court is increasingly compelled to act not only as a constitutional adjudicator but also as a manager of tribunal appointments—a role that sits uneasily with the principle of separation of powers.
INDEPENDENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CASE FOR A NATIONAL TRIBUNAL COMMISSION
A recurring concern surrounding tribunals is the absence of institutional autonomy from parent ministries. In many cases, the same ministry whose decisions are challenged before a tribunal also controls the tribunal’s budget, infrastructure, and staffing.
To address this conflict, the judiciary has repeatedly advocated the creation of an independent National Tribunal Commission—a body that would oversee appointments, administration, and finances across tribunals. Such a commission could help align tribunals with the institutional integrity enjoyed by High Courts.
The reluctance of the executive to relinquish control has contributed to what the Supreme Court recently described as a “mess.” Instead of reducing the burden on High Courts, underperforming tribunals have often become intermediate stages before inevitable court litigation.
CONTRIBUTIONS THAT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED
Despite the criticism, tribunals have also played an important role in shaping specialised areas of law. The National Green Tribunal has been instrumental in advancing environmental jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving pollution control and protection of the Yamuna River in the Delhi region. Similarly, the National Company Law Tribunal has been central to implementing the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, transforming corporate insolvency resolution in India. These successes demonstrate that the tribunal model itself is not flawed; rather, its administrative architecture requires urgent reform.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional legitimacy of tribunals rests on a clear principle: they are meant to supplement, not replace, the judicial review powers of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227.
Yet, the growing trend of diverting disputes from civil courts to specialised tribunals has created a fragmented legal landscape. When tribunals remain understaffed or dysfunctional, litigants are left in a procedural vacuum.
The Supreme Court’s recent frustration reflects a deeper institutional paradox: the state has created a parallel system of adjudication, but has failed to provide the judges, infrastructure, and independence necessary to sustain it.
Dismissing tribunals entirely would ignore the genuine need for expertise in modern governance. But preserving them without structural reform risks perpetuating inefficiency and constitutional ambiguity.
If tribunals are to fulfil their original promise of specialised and speedy justice, India must urgently move towards institutional reform—particularly through the creation of an independent National Tribunal Commission, time-bound appointments, and administrative autonomy. Only then can tribunals evolve from a perceived liability back into a meaningful pillar of the justice delivery system.
—The writer teaches at Amity Law School, Amity University, Noida