Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Mohammad Yaqoob Beigh vs Union Territory Through Police Station on 12 March, 2026
Serial No. 105
Suppl. Cause List
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Bail App No. 13/2026 c/w
CRM(M) 640/2025
Date of Pronouncement: 12.03.2026
Uploaded on: 12.03.2026
Mohammad Yaqoob Beigh, Aged 58 years
S/o Mohamamd Abdullah Beigh through his ...Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
son Nazar ul Islam Residents of John
Mohalla Shopian
Through: Mr. Hakim Suhail Ishtiyaq, Advocate
Mr. Syed Haroon Rashid, Advocate.
Vs.
Union Territory Through Police Station
Kulgam ...Respondent(s).
Through: Mr. Zahid Noor, GA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
CRM(M) 640/2025
1.The investigation in case FIR No. 119/2022 under Sections 8/15 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs & Ps574ychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(hereinafter referred to as the „NDPS Act‟ for short) and Section 207
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, of Police Station, Kulgam
culminated into a final report/charge-sheet against three accused
persons, including the present petitioner namely Mohammad Yaqoob
Beigh S/o Mohammad Abdullah Beigh R/o Jan Mohalla, Shopian,
under the aforesaid sections of law.
2.The accused, except the petitioner, came to be arrested during
investigation and, as such, they have been facing the trial right from
the beginning. That the present petitioner, as an accused in the case,
could not be arrested by the Police Station concerned during the
investigation of the case on account of the alleged fact of his going
1 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
missing without his whereabouts being immediately known. The
Police Station concerned, accordingly, made a prayer in the final
report/challan that proceedings in terms of the provisions of Section
299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (erstwhile Central Code,
now repealed but applicable in the case and hereinafter referred to as
the „Code‟ for short), corresponding to the provisions of Section 325
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Surkasha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred
to as the „BNSS‟ for short) may be initiated as against the petitioner-
accused. At the presentation of the charge sheet, the statement of the
IO of the case came to be recorded and the ld. Trial Court proceeded
at the trial of the case.
3.The ld. Trial Court, vide order dated 08.09.2023, proceeded to frame
formal charges against the accused for the alleged commission of
offences punishable under Sections 8/15 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 207
of the MV Act after hearing both the prosecution and the defense on
the issue. The ld. Trial Court directed the prosecution to produce the
evidence in the case upon pleading not guilty by the co-accused after
the contents of the charge memos came to be individually read over
and explained to them. The ld. Trial Court simultaneously issued a
non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner and also initiated
the proceedings in terms of the provisions of Sections 82 and 83 of the
Code against him.
4.Subsequently, the petitioner-accused surrendered before the ld. Trial
Court on 04.03.2025 and the ld. Trial Court had already, vide its order
dated 21.12.2024, observed that there is no need to proceed in terms
of the provisions of Sections 82 and 83 of the Code against the
2 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
petitioner, as the ld. District Magistrate, Shopian, had reportedly
proceeded against him for attachment of his property under the
provisions of the NDPS Act. The present petitioner came to be
formally charged in the case on 04.04.2024, who also pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, the petitioner-accused submitted an application
before the ld. Trial Court stating therein that he admits the entire
evidence of the prosecution witnesses who came to be examined at the
trial in his absence during the subsistence of the proceedings under
Section 299 of the Code against him. It was further pleaded by the
petitioner in the said application that he even does not want the
recalling of the examined prosecution witnesses for cross-examination
thereof as the said witnesses have already been properly cross-
examined by the learned counsel for the co-accused 1 and 2 namely
Suhail Ahmad Bhat @ Sayar S/O. Mohd Maqbool Bhat and Showkat
Ahmad Naik S/O. Nazir Ahmad Naik R’s/O. Okey Kulgam.
An application also came to be filed by the prosecution before
the ld. Trial Court with the prayer for recalling of the prosecution
witnesses 1 to 10, who had been already examined in the absence of
the petitioner, for their cross-examination to the extent of the
petitioner-accused.
The ld. Trial Court, vide a common order dated 17.09.2025
impugned in the instant petition, rejected/dismissed the application of
the petitioner-accused while allowing the application of the
prosecution for recalling of the already examined PW‟s 1 to 10. It is
the said order dated 17.09.2025 of the ld. Trial Court which is
impugned in the instant petition before this Court.
3 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
5. I have heard the learned counsels for both the parties and considered
their rival submissions.
6. Perused the instant petition and the copies of documents enclosed
with the same, especially the order impugned dated 17.09.2025 of
the ld. Trial Court. It is revealed from the perusal of the Trial Court
record that Police Station concerned through the final report/charge-
sheet bearing No. 4/2023 dated 15.02.2023 made a request in the
operative part of the same regarding the initiation of proceedings in
terms of Section 299 of the Code against the present petitioner who,
according to them, could not be traced out despite extensive efforts.
7. The perusal of the first order dated 16.02.2023 passed on the final
report by the ld. Trial Court while entertaining the same reveals that
the Police Station concerned has made a prayer for initiation of
proceedings under Section 299 of the Code as against the petitioner
Mohammad Yaqoob Beigh. The ld. Trial Court also recorded the
statement of the Investigating Officer in attestation of his prayer for
initiation of the said proceedings as against the petitioner, however,
the issuance of warrant of arrest was ordered as against the
petitioner. The co-accused came to be formally charged by the ld.
Trial Court vide its order dated 08.09.2023.
8. The ld. Trial Court through the same order dated 08.09.2023 directed
the prosecution to produce the PW 1 for his examination on the next
date of hearing as the co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The present petitioner upon his surrender before the Trial Court
came to be formally charged for the commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 8/15 and 29 of the NDPS Act and 207 of
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the MV Act vide order dated 04.04.2025 of the ld. Trial Court. He
also pleaded not guilty to the charge. It is very needful to mention
that the said order of the ld. Trial Court revealed that the final
report/challan was filed by the Police Station concerned in the
absence of the petitioner against whom proceedings in terms of
Section 299 of the Code came to be initiated.
9. Upon framing of the charge against the petitioner, to which he
pleaded not guilty, he filed an application before the ld. Trial Court
stating therein that he admits the evidence of all the prosecution
witnesses examined at the trial in his absence and he does not want
to recall them for their cross-examination, who have already been
cross-examined by the learned counsel for the co-accused in a proper
manner in accordance with the law.
10.The prosecution, on the other hand, also filed an application before
the ld. Trial Court seeking recalling of the already examined
witnesses for their re-examination to the extent of the present
petitioner. The prosecution took the stand in their application that no
proceedings in terms of Section 299 of the Code came to be initiated
in the case as regards the present petitioner.
11.In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is quite clear that
proceedings in terms of section 299 of the Code came to be initiated
in the case as regards the present petitioner. It is sufficient to say to
the prosecution that the trial in the case could not have been initiated
even against the co-accused without initiating the proceedings in
terms of Section 299 of the Code against the present petitioner, who
5 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
was reported to be absconding with no prospect of his immediate
arrest at the time of filing of the final report/challan.
The object of the provisions of section 299 of the Code is to
preserve evidence as against an accused who has absconded and in
respect of whom there is no immediate prospect of his arrest, so that
the same is not allowed to get lost by the reason of death, disability,
unknown whereabouts, or by any subsequent inability to procure his
presence without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience
which under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable. It
is profitable to reproduce the provision of section 299 of the Code
for the sake of convenience:
“Section 299-Record of evidence in absence of accused-
(1) If it is proved that an accused person has absconded, and
that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him, the
Court competent to try or commit for trial such person for the
offence complained of, may, in his absence, examine the
witnesses (if any) produced on behalf of the prosecution, and
record their depositions and any such deposition may, on the
arrest of such person, be given in evidence against him on the
inquiry into or trial for, the offence with which he is charged,
if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or
cannot be found or his presence cannot be procured without
an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under
the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable.
(2)…………”
12.As per the provisions of Section 299 of the Code, in case any of the
examined prosecution witnesses in the instant case would have died
or been rendered disabled or incapable of giving evidence without an
amount of delay, expense or inconvenience or incapable of being
traced then his deposition was capable of being read in evidence
against the present petitioner upon his facing trial. As a necessary
6 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
corollary, such an accused in respect of whom the proceedings under
Section 299 of the Code have been initiated, has the discretion to
admit the deposition of any of the prosecution witnesses recorded at
the trial prior to his appearance at the trial.
13.Allowing the prosecution to recall the already examined witnesses
despite the admission of their depositions will tantamount to granting
undue concession to the prosecution for making an attempt to
improve its case, besides being against the logic and object of the
provisions of Section 299 of the Code. The prosecution witnesses 1
to 10 are reported to have been already examined and their
examinations in chief in case of their death or disability or
incapability of attending the court were to be read against the present
petitioner/accused after his appearance at the trial. The
petitioner/accused has admitted the evidence of all the recorded
prosecution witnesses and, as such, the said witnesses cannot be
recalled at the discretion of the prosecution. The provisions of
Section 299 of the Code are in the form of an exception to the
general rule that evidence needs to be recorded in the presence of the
accused or his legal representative.
14.This Court in its opinion is forfeited with the law laid down by this
Court in “Sonaullah Naik Vs. State” decided on 10.12.2012 (2013)2
JKJ 403, in which under similar circumstances this Court has held
that when an absconding accused subsequently surrenders and
waives his right to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were
recorded under Section 512 Cr.P.C, those statements are admissible
7 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
and complete for trial purposes, eliminating the need for fresh
examination of witnesses.
15.The contention of the prosecution that a separate trial needs to be
conducted against the petitioner/accused is unwarranted. The
prosecution in the trial case is not justified to recall already examined
witnesses whose testimonies already recorded in the absence of the
petitioner have been admitted by the latter.
16.For the forgoing discussion, the impugned order dated 17.09.2025
passed by the learned Trial Court is set aside. The learned Trial
Court is directed to proceed further on the trial of the case in an
expeditious manner.
17.The interim order dated 15.10.2025 passed on this petition is
vacated.
18.Disposed of.
Bail App No. 13/2026
1. Through the medium of the instant application filed in terms of
provisions of Section 483 of the BNSS, bail on behalf of the
petitioner/Accused in case FIR No. 119/2022 under Sections 8/15, 29
of NDPS Act of Police Station, Kulgam has been sought on the
merits of the case as well as on humanitarian grounds. It has been
inter-alia pleaded in the application that he has been facing detention
in the case FIR as an under trial since 04.03.2025. That the final
report/chargesheet in the case FIR came to be filed against him in his
absence, with the initiation of proceedings in terms of provisions of
Section 299 of the Code against him. That subsequently, upon his
surrender at the trial of the case, he admitted the evidence of
8 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
prosecution witnesses 1 to 10 who had already been examined in the
case by the prosecution, as he felt no necessity for cross-examining
the said already examined witnesses who had already been
appropriately cross-examined by the learned counsel for the co-
accused. That he filed a formal application in that behalf. That
simultaneously, the prosecution also filed an application before the
trial court seeking recalling of the already examined witnesses to his
extent. That both the applications filed by him as well as the
prosecution were resisted by each other, and the learned trial court
disposed of both the applications through a common order dated
17.09.2025, while rejecting his application and allowing the
application of the prosecution.
That aggrieved by the said order dated 17.09.2025 of the learned
trial court, he assailed the said order through a petition bearing No.
CRM(M) 640/2025 before this Court so as to prevent procedural
illegality, without any intention to prolong the trial of the case. That
this Court has stayed the further proceedings in the said case. That
his continued detention despite the stay of trial proceedings has
resulted in his punitive detention. That it is well settled that
prolonged incarceration, particularly when the trial itself is stayed
and is not likely to conclude in the near future, is violative of Articles
14 & 21 of the Constitution of India. That he is deeply rooted in the
society having a fixed place of residence, as such, there is no
likelihood of his absconding or tampering with the prosecution
evidence. That this Court, in exercise of its powers under Section
483 of the BNSS read with Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of
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India, is fully empowered to grant bail in order to secure the ends of
justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of law. That he is of
the age of 58 years and is presently lodged in the Central Jail, Kot
Bhalwal, Jammu. That he has been suffering from serious ailments,
including a heart rhythm disorder, and is in a deteriorating medical
condition, which is clear from the copies of medical reports enclosed
with the application as Annexure II. That his earlier medical records
issued by the SKIMS Soura reveal that he is a chronic cardiac patient
with approximately 20% cardiac functioning and has been advised
urgent surgical intervention. That after his removal to Central Jail,
Kot Bhalwal, Jammu, he has not been receiving the required
specialized treatment.
2. The respondent has resisted the instant application through the memo
of objections filed by the learned counsel Mr. Zahid Qais Noor,
learned Government Advocate, on the grounds that the
petitioner/Accused is involved in the offences punishable under
Sections 8/21, 29 of the NDPS Act in relation to a commercial
quantity, as a quantity of 281.5 kilograms of Poppy Straw came to be
seized in the case from his possession and the possession of co-
accused, Suhail Ahmad Bhat and Showkat Ahmad Naik. That the
trial of the case is going on and the petitioner stands formally
charged for the commission of the aforesaid offences. That the
petitioner fled away from the spot of occurrence, whereafter he went
absconding, which led to the filing of the chargesheet in the case in
his absence. That upon his production at the trial, he filed an
application before the learned trial court admitting the statements of
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the already examined prosecution witnesses, which was not allowed
by the learned trial court as the prosecution had also filed an
application before the trial court seeking the recalling of the already
examined witnesses for their fresh examination to the extent of the
petitioner/Accused. That the learned trial court, through order dated
17.09.2025 dismissed the application of the petitioner/Accused while
allowing the application of the prosecution.
That the petitioner assailed the said order of the learned trial
court before this Court and the trial proceedings stand stayed through
an interim order passed on the said petition. That the prosecution/UT
is not responsible for delay in trial which has been occasioned by the
petitioner himself by filing a petition before this Court. That bar in
terms of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is attracted in the case of the
petitioner who cannot claim bail. That otherwise also the petitioner
does not seem to be entitled to bail for the commission of highly
anti-social and non-bailable offences relating to trafficking in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances having lethal effect on
the society, especially the younger generation. That the
petitioner/Accused upon his surrender at the trial of the case was
initially granted short term bail on 28.05.2025 by the learned trial
court.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, who reiterated their
stands taken in the application and the memo of objections,
respectively.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner/Accused is entitled to be admitted to bail in the case both
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on the merits as well as on humanitarian grounds. That none of the
prosecution witnesses already examined and whose evidence has
been admitted by the petitioner, have not incriminated the petitioner,
which is the reason for the prosecution who intends to seek the
recalling of the witnesses to improve their case.
5. He further contended that, without prejudice to his right to get bail
on merits, he is also entitled to be enlarged on bail on exclusive
humanitarian grounds, as he is a documented case of Hypertension
(HTN) and Dilated Cardiomyopathy (DCM) with a history of
syncope. That his current Ejection Fraction (EF) is 20%, indicating
severe cardiac dysfunction. That he has been advised to undergo
implantation of Cardiac Resynchronization Therapy with
Defibrillator (CRT-D).
6. Learned counsel for the respondent/UT, however, controverted the
arguments of the counsel for the petitioner/Accused and submitted
that the health condition of the petitioner is being monitored and
taken care of by the jail authorities. He further submitted that nothing
serious has been reported regarding his health condition.
7. I have perused the instant bail application, the memo of objections,
and the copies of the documents enclosed with the both. I have
accorded my thoughtful consideration to the rival arguments
advanced on both the sides.
8. Keeping in view the aforementioned perusal and consideration, this
Court is of the opinion that, it may meet the ends of justice, in case
the petitioner/Accused is temporarily admitted to a short term bail on
exclusive humanitarian grounds so as to enable him to get himself
12 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
treated for his underlying heart ailment. He is reported to be a
documented case of Hypertension (HTN) and Dilated
Cardiomyopathy (DCM) with a history of syncope. That his current
Ejection Fraction (EF) is 20%, indicating severe cardiac dysfunction.
That he has been advised to undergo implantation of Cardiac
Resynchronization Therapy with Defibrillator (CRT-D).
9. This Court cannot consider the bail of the petitioner/Accused on the
merits of the case, as he is reported to be involved in offences under
NDPS already charged against him relating to commercial quantity.
He has to approach the trial court in the first instance seeking bail on
merits of the case.
10.This Court can derive its authority from the provisions of the Section
483 of the BNSS read with the provisions of Article 21 of the
Constitution, to address an eventuality, like the present one and pass
the appropriate orders regarding temporary bail subject to some
stringent conditions, under exceptional and compelling
circumstances. After all, a health issue even of a detenue is of
paramount consideration. All under trial and convicts have their
fundamental right to claim proper medical care and treatment.
However, the conditions viz. gravity of the offences charged against
an accused, likelihood of his absconding at the trial and influencing
the prosecution witnesses, impact of the crime charged against the
accused on the society and State shall weigh the consideration of a
court while overlooking the statutory bars. When bail is to be
considered on humanitarian grounds, the merits of the case do not
apply. The basic power to grant bail is derived from the procedural
13 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
law i.e. BNSS/ CrPC and the limitations on the power of a court
imposed either by the procedural law or any other special statue, can
under some compelling circumstances be read with the relevant
provisions of the Constitution and some extra-ordinary provisions
itself contained in the procedural law.
Otherwise while considering a bail under Section 483 BNSS in a
routine manner, the statutory restrictions/limitations as laid down
under Section 437 of the Code (corresponding to Section 480 BNSS)
have also to be considered.
11.In its opinion this court is fortified with an authoritative judgment of
the Hon‟ble Karnatka High Court cited as “Syed Abdul Ala vs Narcotic
Control Bureau”, South,2003 Cri.L.J 999 (Kar) decided on 17
December, 2002 wherein it has been authoritatively laid down that
High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
1973(corresponding to Section 483 of BNSS) is not powerless to
consider bail on humanitarian grounds not-with-standing the
restrictions imposed by section 37 of the NDPS Act. It has been held in
the case concerned that provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
apply where bail is to be considered on merits. It has been agitated
before the Hon‟ble Court in the case that power to grant bail is
basically derived from Code of Criminal Procedure and not from the
NDPS Act and the later only qualifies the power of the court vested
under the code. It was held that provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act
do not clamp or cap powers of the High Court to grant bail under
section 439 of the Code in its entirety. It is profitable to reproduce
paras 9 and 10 of the judgment as under:-
14 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
“9. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act make a
drastic departure from the conventional cannons of burden
of proof of prima facie case against the accused on the
prosecution even at the stage of bail. In respect of the
offences under the NDPS Act, the onus is on the accused to
prove the innocence/non-complicity in order to secure bail.
The restrictions in Section 37 relates to prima-facie material
regarding the guilt of the accused. The powers of High
Court to grant bail under Section 439 are quite wide and
discretionary. Notwithstanding a prima facie case of guilt,
under exceptional circumstances, the High Court in its
discretion can grant bail. The embargo placed under Section
37 of the NDPS Act operates only when the Court is
considering the bail application on merits. Thus, the
provisions of Section 37 do not clamp or cap the powers of
High Court to grant bail under Section 439 in its entirety. In
other words Section 37 operates only as partial eclipse on
the powers of the High Court. While deciding the
application on merits with reference to prima facie material
of guilt then only the provisions of Section 37 operate and
they have to be read with the provisions of Section 439 of
the Cr. P.C. When the bail is to be granted on other
extenuating circumstances or humanitarian ground like the
medical ground, the powers of the High Court under
Section 439 are not curtailed. The provisions of Section 37
do not operate as a blanket ban on the powers of the High
Court under Section 439 of the Cr. P.C.
10. On careful reading of the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Kishan Lal’s case, I find that there is no ratio laid
down to the effect declaring that Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, operates as a total blanket ban on the powers of High
Court under Section 439 of the Cr. P.C. In the present case,
the accused is seeking bail on medical grounds and the
Court is considering the case of the petitioner dehors, prima
facie material of guilt placed by the prosecution. On
humanitarian considerations, the powers of High Court
under Section 439 of the Cr. P.C., to grant bail is not eroded
or affected by the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act.”
15 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
12.In “Jasvinder Singh Vs State of J&K” B.A No: 156/2019 decided on
12.04.2021 bail on humanitarian grounds (medical grounds) was
granted by this Court to an accused who was suffering from diabetes,
which had substantially affected his eye sight as per the medical
records brought to the notice of the Court. It was authoritatively held in
the case that the Sec 37 of the NDPS Act only prescribes the
limitations on the release of a person on bail. That the powers to grant
bail stand vested with the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. That Section 37 of the NDPS Act, comes into play
only when bail of a person/accused of an offence involving
commercial quantity of a contraband is being considered on merits and
the limitations contained therein would not apply when bail is to be
granted on humanitarian grounds like medical ground. In such cases
the powers of the High Court U/s 439 of the Cr.P.C are not curtailed.
Thus the provisions contained under Section 37 of the NDPS Act do
not act as a blanket ban on the powers of the High Court U/s 439 of the
13.It is a settled legal position that basic human rights cannot be denied to
a person regardless of the allegations of the involvement against him.
Refusing to grant temporary bail on exclusive health grounds may
sometimes endanger his life.
14.For the forgoing discussion, this application is allowed for grant of
temporary bail in favour of the petitioner/Accused on exclusive
humanitarian grounds for a period of 45 days with effect from the date
of his release from the jail so as to enable him to have his medical
treatment and especially to undergo advised Cardiac Surgery at the
16 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
hospital of his own chose. However, this order shall be subject to
following terms and conditions that:
i. The petitioner/accused shall furnish surety and personal bail
bonds to the tune of ₹1.00 lac each respectively to the
satisfaction of learned trial court i.e. Court of Principal Sessions
Judge, Kulgam and the Superintendent of Jail concerned;
ii. the petitioner shall immediately after the release from the jail in
pursuance of this order and without wasting any time ensure his
medical treatment/surgery;
iii. The petitioner shall surrender before learned trial court on 46th
day of his release from the jail and, in case, such date falls a
holiday, on the next working day and;
iv. the petitioner/accused shall not cause any inducement, threat
or undue influence on any of the unexamined prosecution
witnesses so as to dissuade them from giving their statements
before learned trial court;
15.It is needless to mention that learned trial court shall be at liberty to
proceed under the provisions of Sections 491 and 492 of BNSS, in case
of absconding at the trial of the petitioner/accused beyond the bail
period.
16.In case, the requisite surety/bail bonds are furnished to the satisfaction
of learned trial court, a release order shall go from the learned trial
court directing the Superintendent, Central Jail, Kot Bhalwal, Jammu
to release the petitioner/accused from custody after obtaining the
requisite personal bond to the tune of ₹1.00 lac from him.
17 Bail App 13/2026 c/w CRM(M) 640/2025
17.A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the learned trial court for
information and compliance.
18. Disposed of.
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
12.03.2026
ARIF
Whether the order is speaking? Yes
Whether the order is reportable in law journal? Yes
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