Karnataka High Court
Sri Gopal Joshi vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 03.03.2026
Pronounced on : 13.03.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.28739 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI GOPAL JOSHI
S/O LATE VENKATESH,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS.
2. VIJAYA LAKSHMI JOSHI S.G.,
W/O SHIVARUDRAMURTHY
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
NO.47, PRAKRUTHI, 8TH MAIN
1ST CROSS, SHARAD COLONY
BASVESHWARANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 079.
3. AJAY JOSHI
S/O GOPAL JOSHI
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
PETITIIONERS NO.1 AND 3 ARE
RESIDING AT: NO.19, INDIRA COLONY,
NAGASHETTIKOPPA, NEAR SBI COLONY,
KESHWAPURA, HUBLI,
DHARWAD - 580 023
2
[PRESENTLY ALL PETITIONERS IN DURESS /POLICE
CUSTODY IN 1ST RESPONDENT STATION]
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI MAYUR D.BHANU, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY BASAVESHWARA NAGAR POLICE STATION
BASAVESHWARA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 079.
REPRESENTED BY ITS HCGP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. SMT.SUNITHA CHAUVAN
W/O DEVANAND
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
RESIDING AT: PLOT NO.302
BRIGADE GATEWAY
YESHWANTHAPURA
BENGALURU - 560 022
PERMANANT R/O: NO.M-I-J-141
DEVATHA NIVAS, KHB COLONY
SOLAPUR ROAD
VIJAYAPURA - 586 103.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI M.T.NANAIAH, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI GAUTHAM NETTAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF BNSS,
2023 PRAYING TO QUASH FIR IN CRIME NO.409/2024, DATED
17.10.2024 AT ANNEXURE-B, IN ITS ENTIRETY FOR THE ALLEGED
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OFFENCES SECTIONS 126(2), (WRONGFUL RESTRAINT) 115(2)
AND 118(1) (VOLUNTARILY CAUSING HURT OR GRIEVOUS HURT
BY DANGEROUS WEAPONS OR MEANS) 118(1), 316(2), (CRIMINAL
BREACH OF TRUST) 318(4), (CHEATING) 61, (CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY) 3(5) (COMMON INTENTION) OF THE BHARATIYA
NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 AND SECTIONS 3(1)(r), (s) (INSULT AND
ABUSES PUBLIC VIEW) AND 3(2)(v-a)(SPECIFIED OFFENCES IN
THE SCHEDULE) OF THE SCHEDULE CASTE AND SCHEDULE TRIBE
(PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989 PENDING ON FILE OF
THE HON'LE LXX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE
AND SPECIAL JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH-71) CR.NO 409/2024.
AS PER ANNEXURE-C.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 03.03.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners/accused 1 to 3 are at the doors of this Court
calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.409 of 2024
registered for offences punishable under Sections 3(5), 61, 115(2),
118(1), 126(2), 316(2) and 318(4) of the BNS and Sections
3(1)(r)(s) and 3(2) (v-a) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ('the Act' for short).
4
2. Heard Sri D.R.Ravishankar, learned senior counsel
appearing for one of the petitioners, Sri Mayur D. Bhanu, learned
counsel appearing for the other petitioners, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha,
learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent
No.1 and Sri M.T. Nanaiah, learned senior counsel appearing for
respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The husband of the 2nd respondent/complainant was
elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly from a constituency in
Vijapura in 2018 elections. He desired of becoming a Member of
Parliament. It is alleged that in the month of March 2024, the 2nd
respondent meets the 1st petitioner who promises to secure a ticket
for the husband of the complainant to contest parliament elections.
It is alleged that for getting the ticket a demand of ₹5/- crores was
made. The 2nd respondent initially paid ₹25/- lakhs as advance and
thereafter, ₹1.75 Crores in a staggered way, to make it ₹2/- crores.
The complainant's husband did not get the ticket. Therefore, the
complainant demanded the money back. The petitioners are said to
5
have dodged return of money. Therefore, the 2nd respondent
registers a complaint on 17-10-2024 projecting the aforesaid
offences including the one punishable under the Act. The
registration of crime is called in question in the case at hand, on the
score that it was filed for recovery of money.
3.2. This Court, while granting an interim order of stay, at the
outset, has passed the following order on 28-10-2024:
"ORAL ORDER
Heard the learned Senior counsel Sri.D.R.Ravishankar,
appearing for the petitioners.
The petitioners are accused Nos.1 to 3. They are said to
have assured the complainant – respondent No.2 that they
would secure a ticket in the then ensuing Parlimentary election
and are said to have taken Rs.25/- lakhs. The alleged
transaction ostensibly has happened prior to the elections or
even announcement of candidates. If the candidature was not
announced then, the compliant should have been registered
then and there. A complaint is registered on 17.10.2024. Six
months after the incident.
The learned Senior counsel submits that the money
that has allegedly been taken by these petitioners they
would undertake to refund the entire amount to the
complainant and that has been the stand of the
petitioners that they would in its entirety refund the
amount to the complainant.
Therefore, it is a pure money claim between the
petitioner and the respondent – complainant. This is now
6
rendered with the colour of crime by registering several
offences.
The complaint itself narrates that the hurling of
abuses happens in the house of the petitioners, which
admittedly is in the four walls of the house. It is neither
in a public place nor a place of public view for it to
become an offence under Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The issue qua the Atrocities Act stands covered by
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hitesh
Verma vs State Of Uttarakhand reported in 2020 10 SCC
710.
Since the issue is purely a money claim between the
two, permitting further proceedings / investigation would
result in the issue running foul of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P.
– 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171.
Therefore, there shall be an interim order of stay of
further investigation in Crime No.409/2024 and all
consequential action taken pursuant to the registration of the
crime, qua the petitioners, till the next date of hearing.
The petitioners are said to be in police custody and the
custody of which is till tomorrow, they shall in the light of the
aforesaid order be released forthwith, in the manner known to
law.
Registry is directed to forthwith communicate the same to
the respondents.
Hand delivery of the order is permitted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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A submission was made before this Court while granting an interim
order that it is purely a money claim between the petitioners and
the 2nd respondent. However, the petitioners have offered to return
the amount back. In that light, the interim order was granted. It is
also submitted that an amount to the tune of ₹75/- lakhs is also
returned to the complainant. The matter is heard at that stage.
4. The learned senior counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar appearing
for one of the petitioner and Sri Mayur D. Bhanu appearing for the
other petitioners, would in unison contend that it is purely a money
claim between the petitioners and the 2nd respondent. The criminal
law is set into motion for the purpose of recovery of money, only
because the 2nd respondent will have to shell out Court fee and will
have to wait for a decision in the civil proceedings. To fast track
recovery of money, the present crime is registered.
5. The learned senior counsel Sri M.T. Nanaiah appearing for
the 2nd respondent would submit that the petitioners have
undertaken that they would pay back the money before this Court.
The undertaking cannot now be obviated by making legal
8
submissions. Therefore, he would submit that a clear case of
cheating is made out against these petitioners, as they have lured
the husband of the complainant to part with certain money on a
desire to contest the elections. The amount was admittedly paid in
cash after taking hand loans from several others.
6. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners would join
issue in contending that merely because the petitioners have
undertaken or have paid certain amount, it would not mean that for
the remainder of the amount, the complainant should be permitted
to pursue the criminal remedy. It is always open to her and her
husband to file a civil suit for the remaining amount that is to be
paid to the complainant. Insofar as the offence under the Act is
concerned, the learned counsel Sri Mayur D. Bhanu submits that
the alleged hurling of abuses has taken place within the four
corners of a house and as such it cannot become ingredients of the
Act. The learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on
several judgments, all of which would bear consideration qua their
relevance in the course of the order.
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7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of reasons
for the transaction between the parties is a matter of record. What
remains to be considered is, whether further investigation should be
permitted in the case at hand or not? Since the entire issue has
triggered from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the
complaint. It reads as follows:
"ರವ ೆ, ಾಂಕ:17-10-2024
ೕ ಇ ೆಕ
ಬಸ ೇಶ ರನಗರ ೕ ಾ ೆ
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F ೈ3 ನಂಬ : 9449816769 / 9448136769
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12
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ೆ
(Emphasis added)
The allegation is that the petitioners have received the amount on
the assurance that they would get the complainant’s husband a
ticket to contest in the parliament elections. The desire tumbled
and crime emerged. The amount involved in the transaction was
₹2/- crores. Certain amount is repaid before filing of the present
petition or during subsistence of the present petition. The issue now
would be, in such cases whether criminal law which is set into
14motion for the purpose of recovery of money, should be permitted
to be investigated into and permitted to continue.
9. Jurisprudence is replete with the judgments of the Apex
Court that criminal justice system should not be used for the
purpose of recovery of money.
9.1. The Apex Court in LALIT CHATURVEDI v. STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH1, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
6. In Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [Mohd.
Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 929] , this Court had referred to Section 420IPC, to
observe that in order to constitute an offence under the said
section, the following ingredients are to be satisfied: (SCC pp.
757-58, paras 18-19)
“18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients
of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential
ingredients of the offence of “cheating” are as
follows:
(i) deception of a person either by making a
false or misleading representation or by
dishonest concealment or by any other act
or omission;
(ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that
person to either deliver any property or to
consent to the retention thereof by any
person or to intentionally induce that person
so deceived to do or omit to do anything1
(2024) 12 SCC 483
15which he would not do or omit if he were
not so deceived; and
(iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to
cause damage or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or property.
19. To constitute an offence under Section
420, there should not only be cheating, but as a
consequence of such cheating, the accused should
have dishonestly induced the person deceived:
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a
valuable security (or anything signed or
sealed and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security).”
7. Similar elucidation by this Court in V.Y.
Jose v. State of Gujarat [V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat,
(2009) 3 SCC 78: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 996], explicitly
states that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per
se should not lead to initiation of a criminal proceeding.
The ingredient of “cheating”, as defined under Section
415IPC, is existence of a fraudulent or dishonest
intention of making initial promise or representation
thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of
contract. Further, in the absence of the averments made
in the complaint petition wherefrom the ingredients of
the offence can be found out, the High Court should not
hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC. Section 482CrPC saves the inherent power of
the High Court, as it serves a salutary purpose viz. a
person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a
number of years, when no criminal offence is made out. It
is one thing to say that a case has been made out for trial and
criminal proceedings should not be quashed, but another thing
to say that a person must undergo a criminal trial despite the
fact that no offence has been made out in the complaint. This
Court in V.Y. Jose [V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC
78: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 996] placed reliance on several earlier
decisions in Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI [Hira Lal Hari Lal
Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1121:
16
(2003) 262 ITR 466], Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736:
(2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188], Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar
Agarwal [Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal, (2007) 7
SCC 373: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 370] and All Cargo Movers (India)
(P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain [All Cargo Movers (India) (P)
Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain, (2007) 14 SCC 776: (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 947].
8. Having gone through the complaint, which was
registered as an FIR and the assertions made therein, it is quite
clear that Respondent 2 complainant Sanjay Garg’s grievance is
regarding failure of the appellants to pay the outstanding
amount, in spite of Respondent 2 complainant Sanjay Garg’s
repeated demands. Respondent 2 complainant Sanjay Garg
states that the supplies were made between the period 1-12-
2015 and 6-8-2017. The appellants had made the payments
from time to time of Rs 3,76,40,553 leaving a balance of Rs
1,92,91,358.
9. We will assume that the assertions made in the
complaint are correct, but even then, a criminal offence
under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC is not
established in the absence of deception by making false
and misleading representation, dishonest concealment or
any other act or omission, or inducement of the
complainant to deliver any property at the time of the
contract(s) being entered. The ingredients to allege the
offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the
averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money
from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations
which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power
and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for
recovery of money.
10. The charge-sheet also refers to Section 406IPC, but
without pointing out how the ingredients of the said section are
satisfied. No details and particulars are mentioned. There are
decisions which hold that the same act or transaction cannot
result in an offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust
simultaneously. [Wolfgang Reim v. State, (2012) 173 Comp Cas
86 : 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3341; Mahindra and Mahindra
Financial Services Ltd. v. Delta Classic (P) Ltd., (2009) 151
17
Comp Cas 661 : 2009 SCC OnLineGau 105 : (2011) 6 Gau LR
604; Mukesh Sharma v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP
426] For the offence of cheating, dishonest intention must
exist at the inception of the transaction, whereas, in case
of criminal breach of trust there must exist a relationship
between the parties whereby one party entrusts another
with the property as per law, albeit dishonest intention
comes later.
11. In this case entrustment is missing, in fact it is not
even alleged. It is a case of sale of goods. The charge-sheet
does refer to Section 506IPC relying upon the averments in the
complaint. However, no details and particulars are given, when
and on which date and place the threats were given. Without
the said details and particulars, it is apparent to us, that these
allegations of threats, etc. have been made only with an intent
to activate police machinery for recovery of money.
12. It is for Respondent 2 complainant Sanjay Garg to file
a civil suit. Initiation of the criminal process for oblique
purposes, is bad in law and amounts to abuse of process of
law.”
The Apex Court clearly holds that if there is intention to cheat from
the inception, then it would become an offence under Section 316
or Section 318 of the BNS. The issue, in the case at hand, is a
transaction which has gone wrong. Money allegedly changed hands.
Therefore, it was purely for the purpose of recovery of money
criminal proceedings are set into motion, which the Apex Court
deprecated in the aforesaid judgment.
18
9.2. The Apex Court in the case of ANUKUL SINGH v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2, has held as follows:
“… … …
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge
are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the
duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of
criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil
nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it.
Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise requiring
adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial.
12. The specific case of the appellant is that his father
purchased land comprised in Khasra Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22
situated at Village Sherpur Mafi, District Moradabad, from one
Akil Hussain. This land was used for the purposes of Qurbani.
According to the appellant, in order to usurp the said property,
the Shaher Imam of Bilari, in collusion with the district
administration and under pressure exerted upon the local police,
ensured that a series of false criminal cases were foisted against
him. As many as eight FIRs were lodged against the
appellant, including the present one, all of which, in
substance, arise out of a civil dispute relating to
ownership and possession of the property. Initiation of
the present criminal proceedings, therefore, amounts to a
clear abuse of the process of law, squarely falling within
the illustrative categories delineated in Bhajan Lal,
particularly where the dispute is manifestly civil in nature
and the prosecution is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive.
13. The record reveals that within a short span, as many
as eight FIRs were registered against the appellant. The
gravamen of the allegations in the present FIR is that
Respondent No. 2/complainant approached the appellant for a
loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-, but was allegedly advanced only Rs.
1,40,000/-. It is further alleged that, in connection with the said
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060
19
transaction, an agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998 was
executed in respect of a plot owned by the complainant, and
that the appellant procured three cheques from Respondent No.
2, which, upon presentation, were dishonoured for insufficiency
of funds. Even if accepted in entirety, these allegations disclose,
at best, a civil dispute and do not prima facie constitute the
essential ingredients of the criminal offences alleged.
14. It is significant to note that prior to registration of the
present FIR, the appellant had already initiated proceedings
against Respondent No. 2, namely a complaint under Section
138 of the N.I. Act (Complaint No. 2402840/2005) before the
N.I. Court, Moradabad, as well as FIR No. 120/2002, in which,
the complainant himself was arrested. The present FIR was
lodged nearly three months after the filing of the Section 138
complaint and seven months after FIR No. 120/2002. The plea
that the FIR is a retaliatory counterblast to the proceedings
legitimately initiated by the appellant, therefore, carries
substantial weight.
15. The mala fide nature of the complaint is further
fortified by the fact that, by judgment dated 15.01.2025, the
trial Court convicted Respondent No. 2 under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act, sentencing him to one month’s imprisonment and
imposing a fine of Rs. 90,000/-. This conviction lends strong
support to the appellant’s case that the initiation of the present
FIR was a retaliatory measure, maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive to neutralise the lawful action taken by him.
16. Despite this background, the police proceeded to file
a charge sheet dated 16.04.2003 against the appellant for
offences under sections 420, 467, and 468 IPC. Even if the
allegations are assumed to be true, they unmistakably arise out
of a commercial/contractual transaction relating to loan and
repayment, which has been given a criminal colour. The case
thus falls squarely within categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal,
namely, where the allegations do not disclose the commission of
an offence, and where the proceedings are maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive. Continuation of such prosecution would
amount to an abuse of process of law and consequently,
warrant quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
20
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as
a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of
process. The following paragraphs from the decision are
apposite:
“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out the case
alleged against the accused. For this purpose,
the complaint has to be examined as a whole,
but without examining the merits of the
allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an
assessment of the reliability or genuineness
of the allegations in the complaint, is
warranted while examining prayer for
quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as
when the criminal proceeding is found to have
been initiated with malafides/malice for
wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or
where the allegations are absurd and
inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant
caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid
in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the
21complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts
which are absolutely necessary for making
out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a
civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c)
a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A
commercial transaction or a contractual
dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of
action for seeking remedy in civil law, may
also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceedings are different
from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that
the complaint relates to a commercial
transaction or breach of contract, for which a
civil remedy is available or has been availed,
is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a
criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This
is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes
also, leading to irretrievable break down of
marriages/families. There is also an impression that
if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure though criminal prosecution should
be deprecated and discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution
must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or
private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam,
this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to
harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.
22
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as
a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery cannot be enforced through criminal
prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The
Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such
matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The
following paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is that there
is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent
No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance
with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant –
herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the
Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether prima
facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been
committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be
reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,
there has to be something more than prima facie on
record to indicate that the intention of the accused
was to cheat the complainant right from the
inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not disclose
any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh“, (2024) 10 SCC
690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what
constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust
respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears
that this very decision was relied upon by the learned
counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court.
However, instead of looking into the matter on its own
merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to
go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs.
25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent.
We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake
such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition
saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition
saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should
the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to
recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is
for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be
23
to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money
or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act,
1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that
the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing
for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any
civil suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery
of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for
recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be
recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the
parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the
help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of
law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to
recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek
any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He
cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the
High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court
first directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the
Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear
before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose
of settlement. That’s not what is expected of a High Court
to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for
quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is
expected of the High Court is to look into the averments
and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other
material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have
forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the
decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal“, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335”
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the
present case, it is manifest that the dispute – concerning
repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in
execution of documents – is purely civil in character. The
essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima
24facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick
succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated
lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides.
21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the
proceedings, misdirected itself in law by failing to apply
the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent
authorities referred to above, which uniformly hold that
the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be
misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance.
22. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated
22.10.2019 of the High Court is set aside. FIR No. 47 of 2003
dated 05.02.2003 and the consequential charge sheet dated
16.04.2003, pending before the trial Court, are hereby quashed.
This judgment, however, shall notpreclude the parties from
pursuing civil remedies as may be available to them in
accordance with law.”
9.3. Later, the Apex Court, in the case of INDER CHAND
BAGRI v. JAGADISH PRASAD BAGRI3, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
24. The complainant/respondent No. 1 has an
alternative remedy of filing a civil suit to set aside the
sale deed dated 20.06.2011 and claim damages for the
alleged violation of his contractual rights which he is
already pursuing vide Title Suit No. 160 of 2012 against
the appellant-accused which is currently pending
adjudication and hence the route through criminal
proceedings, when no ingredient of offence is made out,
cannot be permitted. Criminal law ought not to become a
platform for initiation of vindictive proceedings to settle
personal scores and vendettas. The appellant-accused
therefore, in our view, could not be attributed any mens
rea and therefore, the allegations levelled by the
3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2529
25
prosecution against the appellant-accused are
unsustainable.
25. Furthermore, in Inder Mohan Goswami, it was
held by this Court that the Court must ensure that
criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of
harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an
ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. It was further
held by this Court that it is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above and
for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion
that to continue the criminal proceedings against the
appellant-accused herein would cause undue harassment
to him because as observed hereinabove, no prima
facie case for the offence under Sections 406 or 420 of
the IPC is made out.
26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the
judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 (“Bhajan Lal”) with
particular reference to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court
observed:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent
powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
26
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that thereis sufficient ground for
proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.”
27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against
the appellant-accused herein is made out. In fact, we find that
the allegations of criminal intent and other allegations against
the appellant-accused herein have been made with a mala-
fide intent and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case
27
of Bhajan Lal extracted above, squarely applies to the facts of
these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice
to permit the present prosecution to continue.
28. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention
the observations of this Court in Vishal Noble
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 14 SCC
112 wherein it was observed that in recent years the
machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain
persons for their vested interests and for achieving their
oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be
vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of
omission and commission having an adverse impact on
the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. We
say so for the reason that while the
complainant/respondent No. 1 has made grave
allegations against the appellant herein, he has failed to
justify the same before this Court. Such actions would
create significant divisions and distrust among people,
while also placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial
system, particularly criminal courts.”
10. What remains next is the offence under the Act. The
complaint itself indicates that the alleged hurling of abuses has
taken place in the house of the accused No.2. If it is inside the
house within the four corners, it would not become an offence
under the Act is by now too well settled principle.
10.1. The Apex Court in HITESH VERMA v. STATE OF
UTTARAKHAND4, has held as follows:
".... .... .... 4 (2020) 10 SCC 710 28
12. The basic ingredients of the offence under
Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1)
intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe and (2) in any place within public view”.
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act
would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and
intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or
intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the
Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of
victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an
offence under the Act would be made out when a member
of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to
indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of
title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either
the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a
right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if
the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of
the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction
of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in
accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action
is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of
Scheduled Caste.
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be
regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran
Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 :
(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction
between the expression “public place” and “in any place within
public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside
the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be
seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary
wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public
view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building,
29but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives
or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to
what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in
para 15, below:”Also, even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in
the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44,
para 28)“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2
and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near
the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In
our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,
since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a
building, and also was not in the public view. However,
if the offence is committed outside the building
e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be
seen by someone from the road or lane outside the
boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place
within the public view. Also, even if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of the
public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then also it would be an offence since it is in the
public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the
expression “place within public view” with the
expression “public place”. A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view. On the other
hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place
which is owned or leased by the Government or
the municipality (or other local body) or
gaonsabha or an instrumentality of the State, and
not by private persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)
15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building. It is
not the case of the informant that there was any member
of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time
of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic
ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place
30
within public view” is not made out. In the list of
witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain
witnesses are named but it could not be said that those
were the persons present within the four walls of the
building. The offence is alleged to have taken place
within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of
the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran
Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as
none was said to be present within the four walls of the
building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.
16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land
which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties
as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and
others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land
for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession
of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on
account of possession of the said property would not disclose an
offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or
harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
17. In another judgment reported as Khuman
Singh v. State of M.P. [Khuman Singh v. State of M.P.,
(2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104] , this
Court held that in a case for applicability of Section
3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to
Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced
punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to
suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant
only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste.
The Court held as under:
“15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence
must be such so as to attract the offence under Section
3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been
committed against the person on the ground that such
person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased
was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not
disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence
was committed only on the ground that the victim was a
31member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the
conviction of the appellant-accused under Section
3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not
established merely on the fact that the informant is a
member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention
to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.
In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of
the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person
who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be
a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act
is not made out.
19. This Court in a judgment reported as Subhash
Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [Subhash Kashinath
Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 124] issued certain directions in respect of
investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a
review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court
in a judgment reported as Union of India v. State of
Maharashtra [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4
SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] reviewed the directions
issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and
unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under Section 482 of the
Code can be invoked. The Court held as under : (Union of India
case [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761
: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] , SCC p. 797, para 52)
“52. There is no presumption that the members
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may
misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not
resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the
members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it
cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It
is due to the human failing and not due to the caste
factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the
other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster
the courage to lodge even a first information report,
much less, a false one. In case it is found to be
false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty
32
investigation or for other various reasons including
human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be
certain cases which may be false that can be a ground
for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be
changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can
be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC.”
20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the
provisions of the amending Act (Central Act 27 of 2018), this
Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union
of India [Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC
727 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 657] held that proceedings can be
quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under :
(SCC p. 751, para 12)
“12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise
power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to
prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as
already observed while deciding the review petitions.
The legal position is clear, and no argument to the
contrary has been raised.””
10.2. Again, the Apex Court in KARUPPUDAYAR v. STATE5
has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
8. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be
apposite to refer to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and
3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, which read thus:
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.–
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,–
(a) ………………………………………………
(b) ………………………………………………
xxx xxxxxx
5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 215
33
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place
within public view;”
9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act
would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder,
it has to be established that the accused intentionally
insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member
of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence
under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be
necessary that the accused abuses any member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in
any place within public view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially
came up for consideration before this Court in the case
of Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel2. This
Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of
Uttarakhand3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and
reiterated the legal position as under:
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is
insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”.
What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had
come up for consideration before this Court in the
judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran
Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the
expression “public place” and “in any place within public
view”. It was held that if an offence is committed
outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and
the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane
outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly
be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members of
the public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be
contrary to what is stated below in the extract
from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e,
34
and in the application of this principle in para 15,
below:”Also, even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an
offence since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held as
under: (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that
Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
when he stood near the car which was parked at
the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was
certainly a place within public view, since the gate
of a house is certainly a place within public view. It
could have been a different matter had the alleged
offence been committed inside a building, and also
was not in the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the building e.g.
in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can
be seen by someone from the road or lane
outside the boundary wall, the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view.
Also, even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are
there (not merely relatives or friends) then
also it would be an offence since it is in the
public view. We must, therefore, not confuse
the expression “place within public view”
with the expression “public place”. A place
can be a private place but yet within the
public view. On the other hand, a public place
would ordinarily mean a place which is owned
or leased by the Government or the
municipality (or other local body) or
gaonsabha or an instrumentality of the State,
and not by private persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within
public view’, the place should be open where the
members of the public can witness or hear the utterance
made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence
takes place within the four corners of the wall where
members of the public are not present, then it cannot be
said that it has taken place at a place within public view.”
35
10.3. In SOHANVIR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH6 the
Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
10. The expression “any place within public view” has
been interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most
recently in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy4. Relying on Hitesh
Verma v. State of Uttarakhand5, this Court reaffirmed that:
“11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place
‘within public view’, the place should be open
where the members of the public can witness or
hear the utterance made by the accused to the
victim. If the alleged offence takes place within
the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that
it has taken place at a place within public view.”
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the
complainant under Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals
that the alleged casteist abuses were stated to have
been used by the Appellants inside the premises of the
complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does not
satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were
made “in any place within public view,” which is an
essential component of the offence under Section
3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of the complainant
cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2
has not been able to show that the complaint or the statement
recorded under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific
averment that the caste based abuses were hurled at a place
within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in
concluding that the incident occurred in public view. A careful
reading of the complaint makes it evident that the
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2730
36
alleged caste-based abuses were uttered inside the
premises, in the presence of the Appellants and
Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement
of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is
not satisfied.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court clearly holds in the afore-mentioned judgments that
the allegations under the Act cannot spring in air. It is to be made
in public view or in a public place. Neither of which is present in the
case at hand. Therefore, a pure and simple money transaction
between the parties is sought to be rendered with the colour of
crime and criminal law is being set into motion for the recovery of
money. Therefore, the petition deserves to succeed as, if the
investigation is permitted in the case at hand, it would run foul of
the judgments rendered by the Apex Court quoted supra.
11. For the aforesaid reasons the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.409 of 2024 registered before
Basaveshwara Nagar Police Station on 17-10-2024 and
37pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and
Sessions Judge and Special Judge at Bengaluru stands
quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of the petitioners under
Section 528 of the BNSS, and the same would not
influence or bind any proceedings pending or to be filed
between the parties.
Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2025 also
stand disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ