Chattisgarh High Court
Suman Yadav vs Horilal Yadav on 18 February, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:8623-DB
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20.01.2026 18.02.2026 -- 18.02.2026
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on: 20.01.2026
Judgment delivered on: 18.02.2026
CRA No. 178 of 2015
1 - Horilal Yadav S/o Malikram Yadav Aged About 30 Years R/o CIMS
Colony D-01, Type - 03, Guru Ghashidas Vishaw Vidhalay, Bilaspur,
P.S. Koni, District Bilaspur C.G.
--- Appellant
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through - P.S. Koni, District Bilaspur C.G.
--- Respondent(s)
with
ACQA No. 618 of 2019
1 - Suman Yadav W/o Ram Narayan Yadav Aged About 43 Years
Occupation- Aganbadi Worker, R/o Kushalpur, Tulsinagar, P.S. - Purani
Basti, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh.
---Appellant
Versus
2
1 - Horilal Yadav S/o Malikram Yadav Aged About 31 Years R/o CIMS
Colony D-01, Type - 03, Guru Ghasidas Vaishnav, Bilaspur, P.S.- Koni,
District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Bilaspur, District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellants : Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, Advocate in CRA No.
178/2015
Mr. Kishan Kumar Yadav on behalf of Mr.
Awadh Tripathi, Advocate in CRA No.
618/2019
For Objector : Ms. Pooja Lonia on behalf of Mr. Ajay
Chandra, Advocate in CRA No. 618/2019
For State : Mr. Krishna Gopal Yadaw, Dy. G.A.
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
C A V Judgment
Per Rajani Dubey, J.
1. Since the aforesaid criminal appeal and acquittal appeal arise out
of the same judgment, they are being heard together and decided
by this common judgment.
2. The aforesaid Criminal Appeal No. 178/2015 and Acquittal Appeal
No. 618/2019 are directed against the judgment dated
27.01.2015 passed by VI Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur
(C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 185/2013 whereby the appellant in
CRA No. 178/2015 has been convicted under Section 306 of IPC
3
and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years with fine of Rs. 200/-,
with default stipulation, and respondent No.1 in ACQA No.
618/2019 has been acquitted of the charges under Section 302,
201 of IPC.
3. It is admitted that the deceased, Asha Yadav, was the daughter of
Smt. Suman Yadav (PW-4) and Ramnarayan Yadav (PW-7). She
was married to the accused on 16.05.2013 and they lived in
Government Residential House No. D-1, Type-3, Guru Ghasidas
University Campus. On information furnished by the accused, a
merg intimation was registered at Police Station Koni (Ex.P/4).
On 26.07.2013, the deceased had come alone to her parental
home at Raipur. Her mobile phone was seized from the house of
the accused Horilal Yadav vide Ex.P/7 and an application for
post-mortem was submitted vide Ex.P/8. The accused was
subsequently arrested under arrest panchnama Ex.P/15.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 29.07.2013 at about
00:15 hours, the accused informed the police that his wife had
allegedly committed suicide by hanging from the ceiling fan in the
room. Acting on the said information, Head Constable Chhotelal
Jaltare registered merg/inquest proceedings at Police Station
Koni vide Ex.P/4. Sub-Inspector Durga Kiran Patel issued notice
to the witnesses to attend the inquest proceedings (Ex.P/9) and
prepared the spot map (Ex.P/13). Tehsildar Narendra Kumar
Banjara conducted the inquest over the dead body in the
presence of witnesses and prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/10).
4
The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination and Dr.
Anshul Lal submitted the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8). Thereafter,
the dead body of the deceased Asha Yadav was handed over to
the accused vide Ex.P/16, and duty certificate (Ex.P/14) was
issued to Constable Santosh Tirki.
During investigation, the Investigating Officer seized from
the place of occurrence a scarf hanging from the ceiling fan, a
knife, a dongle, a Nokia mobile phone, spectacles, a railway ticket
and the ceiling fan vide seizure memos Ex.P/5 and Ex.P/6. The
Crime Mobile Unit, Bilaspur, inspected the spot and submitted its
inspection report (Ex.P/11). On the basis of the statements of the
family members of the deceased and the post-mortem report, the
investigating agency concluded that the deceased had been
strangulated. Accordingly, FIR No.131/2013 was registered
against the accused (Ex.P/12) and intimation was sent to the
concerned Judicial Magistrate. The accused was arrested vide
arrest panchnama (Ex.P/15), statements of witnesses were
recorded and a Nokia mobile phone was also seized from the
accused at Police Station Koni (Ex.P/7). Patwari Rupesh
Gurudiwan prepared the site map (Ex.P/2) and panchnama
(Ex.P/3) in presence of witnesses. After completion of
investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, where proceedings
commenced on 07.11.2013. Thereafter, learned trial Court framed
5
charge under Section 302/201 of IPC, to which accused abjured
his guilt and claimed to be tried.
5. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
examined as many as 14 witnesses. The statement of the
accused was also recorded under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, wherein he denied all the incriminating
circumstances appearing against him and pleaded innocence
alleging false implication in the case. The accused did not lead
any evidence in defence.
6. Upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence
available on record and after hearing learned counsel for the
respective parties, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused
for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal
Code, instead of Sections 302 and 201 IPC, and sentenced him
as mentioned in para 2 of this judgment.
7. Acquittal Appeal No. 618/2019 has been filed by complainant
(mother of the deceased) against acquittal of accused Horilal
Yadav of the offence under Section 302 ,201 of IPC.
8. In CRA No. 178/2015- Learned counsel for the appellant submits
that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is illegal,
improper and contrary to law and facts on record. The learned
Trial Court gravely erred in holding the appellant guilty for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. Firstly, the appellant
has been convicted under Section 306 IPC without any charge
6
having been framed for the said offence. In fact, prior to final
arguments the prosecution itself moved an application seeking
framing of charges under Sections 302, 304-B and 306 IPC,
which was rejected by the Trial Court on 19.08.2014. Therefore,
the subsequent conviction under Section 306 IPC is
unsustainable in law. Secondly, the essential ingredients of
abetment as defined under Section 107 IPC were neither alleged
nor proved and the presumption under Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act was not attracted. There is no evidence of cruelty,
harassment or any unlawful demand against the appellant. The
evidence of prosecution witnesses, namely the parents and
relatives of the deceased Smt. Suman Yadav (PW-4),
Ramnarayan Yadav (PW-7), Ku. Nilima Yadav (PW-8), Narendra
Yadav (PW-13) and Mahesh Yadav (PW-14) does not disclose
any specific act of instigation or cruelty. On the contrary,
independent witnesses Akhilesh Tiwari (PW-1) and Deepak
Rathore (PW-2) have stated that the relationship between the
appellant and the deceased was cordial and they shared love and
affection having married of their own choice. The prosecution
witnesses have made omnibus and contradictory allegations and
admitted material omissions in cross-examination, creating
serious doubt about the prosecution case. The appellant is also a
physically handicapped person suffering from polio, which further
renders the prosecution story improbable. In absence of reliable
and cogent evidence proving abetment of suicide beyond
7
reasonable doubt, the conviction of the appellant under Section
306 IPC cannot be sustained. Hence, the impugned judgment
and order of conviction and sentence deserve to be set aside and
the appellant is entitled to acquittal.
Reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bimla Devi & Anr. v. State of Jammu and
Kashmir, AIR 2009 SC 2387 as well as the judgment of this
Hon’ble Court dated 10.12.2025 passed in CRA No. 82 of 2013
and the connected appeal in Hari Singh v. State of
Chhattisgarh.
9. In Acquittal Appeal No. 618/2019- Learned counsel for the
appellant submits that that the impugned judgment is illegal,
perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. The learned
Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the oral and medical
evidence of the parents, sister and other relatives of the
deceased, which, read along with the testimony of the doctors
and the Investigating Officer, clearly establishes the commission
of the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC. The
medical evidence indicates injuries on the person of the
deceased and opines that the cause of death was
cardiorespiratory failure due to asphyxia resulting from throttling,
thereby ruling out a natural or suicidal death. In absence of any
expert opinion supporting suicide, the learned Trial Court erred in
granting acquittal from the charges under Sections 302 and 201
IPC. The death occurred inside the matrimonial home while the
8
respondent No.1 was present, and he failed to furnish any
plausible explanation regarding the circumstances of death,
attracting adverse inference. The learned Trial Court ignored
material evidence and the conduct of the accused and recorded
findings contrary to the evidence available on record.
Accordingly, the acquittal of accused Horilal Yadav under
Sections 302 and 201 IPC is unsustainable in law and deserves
to be set aside and he is liable to be convicted and punished in
accordance with law.
10. In ACQA No. 618 of 2019, learned counsel for the respondent
No.1/accused submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is
legal, well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of the
evidence on record. The prosecution has failed to prove the
charge beyond reasonable doubt and the evidence of interested
witnesses is inconsistent and unreliable. There is no direct
evidence connecting the respondent with the alleged offence and
the medical evidence does not conclusively establish homicidal
death. Therefore, no interference is warranted in an appeal
against acquittal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the State, supporting the
impugned judgment, submits that the learned Trial Court has
meticulously appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on
record and has rightly convicted the accused Horilal Yadav for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. It is, therefore,
9
contended that the impugned judgment is well-reasoned and
does not warrant any interference by this Court.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
13. It is evident from the record of the learned Trial Court that
charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC were framed against
the accused, Horilal Yadav. However, upon appreciation of the
oral and documentary evidence, the learned Trial Court acquitted
him of the offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and instead
convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC.
14. Before the learned Trial Court, it was not in dispute that the
deceased, Asha Yadav, was the legally wedded wife of the
accused Horilal Yadav. Their marriage was solemnized on
16.05.2013 and Asha Yadav died on 28.07.2013.
15. Dr. Anshul Lal (P.W.-10) who conducted the post mortem of the
deceased, opined that the cause of death of the deceased was
asphyxia leading to cardiac arrest, caused by pressure over the
neck. He further opined that the time since death was
approximately 15 to 18 hours prior to the post-mortem
examination and that the death was unnatural in nature. He also
deposed that only a specialist could give a definite opinion as to
whether the death was suicidal or homicidal. He gave
postmortem report vide Ex.P/8.
10
16. Dr. S.N. Vishwas (PW-11), a forensic expert, inspected the place
of occurrence and prepared the spot inspection report, which has
been exhibited as Ex.P-11.
17. Akhilesh Tiwari (PW-1) and Deepak Rathore (PW-2), neighbours
of the deceased and the appellant, deposed that at about 10:30
p.m. the accused knocked at their door and informed them that
his wife had committed suicide.
18. Smt. Suman Yadav (PW-4), the mother of the deceased,
deposed that Asha Yadav was her elder daughter and her
marriage was solemnized with the accused Horilal on 16.05.2013.
She further stated that after the marriage, the accused began
subjecting the deceased to harassment and ill-treatment. The
witness stated that on 26.07.2013 Asha came to Raipur alone
and informed her that she was under mental distress and wished
to stay for a few days. On the morning of 28.07.2013, the
accused Horilal came to their house and insisted on taking Asha
back, but she refused, which led to a quarrel between them. The
accused left between 11:00-11:30 a.m., and thereafter they again
had a heated telephonic conversation, after which Asha was
crying.
She further stated that later Asha expressed her intention to
return to Bilaspur as she feared her husband would be upset and
she accordingly left for the railway station with her father and
travelled alone by train. During the journey, the witness spoke to
11
her two-three times, and upon reaching Bilaspur Asha said she
would call after reaching home, but thereafter her phone
remained unanswered and was later switched off. Despite
repeated attempts by the family to contact her, they were unable
to reach either Asha or the accused. Subsequently, upon
contacting the accused through Neelima, the accused informed
them that Asha had committed suicide. She further stated that on
seeing the dead body of the deceased, they suspected that she
had been murdered by the accused.
In her cross-examination, the witness denied the suggestion
that prior to her marriage with the accused Horilal in Arya Samaj,
Asha had threatened to commit suicide if she was not married to
him and admitted that the deceased had two pre-existing cut
marks on her hand. She admitted that, prior to narrating the
alleged incident, her daughter had once cut her wrist in
connection with her intention to solemnize marriage in Arya
Samaj. She further deposed that her daughter was pursuing an
MBA course and had secured admission in Chouksey
Engineering College with a fee of Rs. 30,000/-, which had been
arranged by her husband.
She stated that upon reaching Koni after receiving the
information regarding her daughter’s death, they did not
immediately approach the police station to lodge any report. She
admitted that her daughter used to talk to her friends on her
mobile phone and that the deceased Asha used to converse with
12
Subham and Ravi. She further admitted the defence suggestion
that due to his disability, Horilal used to face difficulty in
performing his daily chores.
19. Ramnarayan Yadav (P.W.-7), father of the deceased, stated that
on 26.07.2013 Asha had come to Raipur to obtain a migration
certificate. He deposed that the accused, his son-in-law Horilal
Yadav, arrived on 28.07.2013 at about 11:00 a.m., whereafter a
dispute took place between him and Horilal, due to which Horilal
returned to Bilaspur while the girl remained at Raipur.
He further stated that on the evening of 28.07.2013, while
he was sleeping, Asha received a call from Horilal at about 5:00
p.m. and she was crying. Upon being asked, Asha told him that
Horilal had called and asked him to drop her at Bilaspur.
Thereafter he left her at the railway station at about 5:15 p.m. He
deposed that he tried to contact Asha from about 8:00 p.m.
onwards to confirm her arrival at Bilaspur, but her phone was
switched off. He then called his daughter Neelima and asked her
to inquire from Horilal regarding Asha’s whereabouts. At about
10:00 p.m., Neelima informed him that Asha had committed
suicide, which information she had received from Horilal.
Thereafter he reached Bilaspur with his family at about 2:00 a.m.
He expressed the opinion that Asha had not committed suicide
and that she had been murdered by the accused Horilal. He
further stated that there were no visible injury marks on the body
of his daughter. He admitted that in his examination-in-chief he
13
had stated that his daughter’s marriage took place on 16.05.2013
and that, prior thereto, she had married the accused in an Arya
Samaj temple. He also stated that his daughter and the accused
were living happily.
He admitted that after the post-mortem they returned to
their house at Raipur and did not lodge any report against the
accused there.
20. Ku. Neelima Yadav (P.W.-8) stated that Asha had told her that
the behaviour of Horilal had changed after the marriage. She
deposed that on 26.07.2013 her sister Asha came to their house
at Raipur for obtaining a migration certificate and stayed there for
about two days. She further stated that on 28.07.2013 at about
11:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon, Horilal came and asked Asha to go to
Bilaspur, but Asha refused, stating that she would stay in Raipur
for two to three more days. A quarrel took place between them on
this issue, after which Horilal returned. Thereafter Asha went to
Bilaspur and subsequently they received information regarding
her death from Horilal. She expressed her belief that her brother-
in-law, i.e., the accused Horilal, had killed her sister.
In her cross-examination, she admitted that there used to
be disputes between her sister (the deceased) and the accused
over trivial matters. She further admitted that when she called her
brother-in-law on the night of the incident, he told her that he had
been cooking at home and was unaware as to when her sister
14
had arrived at Bilaspur and questioned why she had not informed
him about her arrival.
21. It is evident from the testimony of all prosecution witnesses read
in conjunction with the medical evidence on record that the
prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients
constituting the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code. The learned Trial Court has rightly held that
the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC were not proved
against the appellant Horilal Yadav beyond reasonable doubt.
However, despite recording such a finding, the learned Trial Court
proceeded to convict the appellant for the offence punishable
under Section 306 IPC on the premise that the death of the
deceased was homicidal and that she committed suicide on
account of alleged torture by the accused.
22. It is further significant that the charges framed against the
appellant were only under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. No charge
under Sections 304B or 306 IPC was framed at any stage of the
trial. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306
IPC, in absence of a specific charge and without affording an
opportunity of defence in respect thereof, is legally unsustainable
and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
23. In Bimla Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
paras 4, 5 and 6 as under:-
15
4. The respondent-State on the other hand supported the
judgment. So far as the ingredients are concerned, in
Sangaraboina Sreenu v. State of A.P (1997 (5) SCC 348) it
was noted as follows:
“2. This appeal must succeed for the simple reason that
having acquitted the appellant of the charge under
Section 302 IPC– which was the only charge framed
against him the High Court could not have convicted him
of the offence under Section 306 IPC. It is true that
Section 222 CrPC entitles a court to convict a person of
an offence which is minor in comparison to the one for
which he is tried but Section 306 IPC cannot be said to
be a minor offence in relation to an offence under
Section 302 IPC within the meaning of Section 222 CrPC
for the two offences are of distinct and different
categories. While the basic constituent of an offence
under Section 302 IPC is homicidal death, those of
Section 306 IPC are suicidal death and abetment
thereof.”
5. Similarly, in Lokendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1999 SCC
(Criminal) 371) it was observed as follows:
“3. Law is well settled that in respect of a charge once
framed, there can only be an order of conviction or
acquittal. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the trial
16court did not record a formal finding in respect of the
charge under Section 306 IPC, the appellant stood
acquitted thereof. This apart, the trial court having
convicted the appellant of the charge under Section 302
IPC could not have convicted him of the alternative
charge (under Section 306 IPC). Such acquittal could be
converted into conviction by the High Court only in an
appeal preferred by the State. Admittedly, no such
appeal was filed. Of course, by exercising its suo motu
revisional power under Section 401 CrPC, the High
Court could also have set aside the acquittal under
Section 306 IPC but this question is now purely
academic for the High Court did not exercise such power
and, even if it had, it could not have converted the finding
of acquittal recorded in favour of the appellant to one of
conviction in view of the express bar of sub-section (3) of
Section 401 CrPC. We reach the same conclusion
through a different route.
6. In Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka (2001 (2)
SCC 577) in paras 16 to 19 it was noted as follows:
“16. What is meant by “a minor offence” for the purpose
of Section 222 of the Code? Although the said
expression is not defined in the Code it can be discerned
from the context that the test of minor offence is not
merely that the prescribed punishment is less than the
17major offence. The two illustrations provided in the
section would bring the above point home well. Only if
the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main
ingredients are common, the one punishable among
them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as minor
offence vis–vis the other offence.
17. The composition of the offence under Section 304-B
IPC is vastly different from the formation of the offence of
murder under Section 302 IPC and hence the former
cannot be regarded as minor offence vis–vis the latter.
However, the position would be different when the
charge also contains the offence under Section 498-A
IPC (husband or relative of husband of a women
subjecting her to cruelty). As the word “cruelty” is
explained as including, inter alia, “harassment of the
woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.”
24. In the matter of Hari Singh (supra), this Court held in paras 32
and 33 as under:-
32. Hon’ble Apex Court in the Patel (supra), held in para
18 to 25 and 40 to 45 as under :-
18
“18. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh 1, this
Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge,
provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’ To satisfy
the requirement of ‘instigation’, it is not necessary that
actual words must be used to that effect or that the
words or act should necessarily and specifically be
suggestive of the consequence. Where the accused by
his act or omission or by his continued course of
conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left
with no other option except to commit suicide, then
‘instigation’ may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of
anger or emotion without intending the consequences
to actually follow cannot be said to be ‘instigation’.
19. Elaborating further, this Court in Chitresh Kumar
Chopra versus Stale (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2 observed
that to constitute ‘instigation’, a person who instigates
another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the
doing of an act by the other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging
forward’. This Court summed up the constituents of
‘abetment’ as under:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the
deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or
conduct which may even be a wilful silence until
the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the
deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or
19conduct to make the deceased move forward more
quickly in a forward direction, and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke,
urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide
while acting in the manner noted above.
Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary
concomitant of instigation.
20. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West
Bengal3 is a case where this Court held that in a case of
alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of
direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission
of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment
without there being any positive action proximate to the
time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led
or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction
in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable.
Similar view has been expressed by this Court in case of
Ude Singh versus State of Haryana4.
21. After considering the provisions of Sections 306 and
107 of IPC, this Court in Rajesh versus State of Haryana
56
held that conviction under Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable on the allegation of harassment without
there being any positive action proximate to the time of
20
occurrence on the part of the accused which led or
compelled the person to commit suicide.
22. Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental
process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a
person in the doing of a thing. Without a positive
proximate act on the part of the accused to instigate or
aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be
sustained. Besides, in order to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to
commit the offence.
23. This Court in Amudha versus States6 held that there
has to be an act of incitement on the part of the accused
proximate to the date on which the deceased committed
suicide. The act attributed should not only be proximate
to the time of suicide but should also be of such a nature
that the deceased was left with no alternative but to take
the drastic step of committing suicide.
24. Again, in the case of Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi
versus State of Karnataka7, this Court observed that
discord and differences in domestic life are quite
common in society. Commission of suicide largely
depends upon the mental state of the victim. Until and
unless some guilty intention on the part of the accused
21
is established, it is ordinarily not possible to convict the
accused for an offence under Section 306 IPC.
25. Prakash versus State of Maharashtra 8 is a case
where this Court after analysing various decisions on the
point summed up the legal position in the following
manner:
14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has
been interpreted, time and again, and its principles
are well established. To attract the offence of
abetment to suicide, it is important to establish proof
of direct or indirect acts of instigation or incitement
of suicide by the accused, which must be in close
proximity to the commission of suicide by the
deceased. Such instigation or incitement should
reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission of
suicide and should put the victim in such a position
that he/she would have no other option but to
commit suicide.
25.1 In the aforesaid judgment, this Court referred
to its earlier decision in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh
Sengar versus State of M.P and held that in a given
case, even a time gap of 48 hours between using of
abusive language by the accused and the
22commission of suicide would not amount to a
proximate act.
26. XXXX
27. XXX
40. This takes us to the suicide note (Ex. 33). We have
already noted the delayed and controversial
circumstances under which the suicide note surfaced
which makes it highly suspect. Nonetheless, since it was
exhibited, let us deal with the same. Sum and substance
of the suicide note allegedly written by Dashrathbhai
Karsanbhai Parmar (the deceased) with the date given
as 24.04.2009 is that appellant No. 3 had joined his
office following the illness of the existing cleaner She
used to come to the office daily for cleaning purposes.
Slowly they developed intimacy. It is alleged that
appellant No. 3 had performed ‘black art’ on the
deceased so much so that, he fell in love with her Taking
advantage of the situation, she took photographs and
video of them in compromising position. All the accused
persons were shameless persons. As they started
blackmailing him, he initially paid Rs. 80,000.00 to them
and thereafter started giving them ornaments. He also
gave them his passbook and cheque books after signing
on the cheques. Because of such blackmailing, he had
23
to misappropriate money from his office for which he
was suspended. It is stated that he was totally ruined
and, therefore, he had committed suicide as he had no
other alternative.
41. The suicide note was sent to the Forensic Science
Laboratory (FSL) for examination. The Deputy Chief
Handwriting Expert of FSL, Gandhinagar opined that the
handwriting was of the deceased. However, the
prosecution did not examine the Deputy Chief
Handwriting Expert as an expert witness. The records
also do not indicate that the accused had admitted
genuineness of the report of the handwriting expert.
42. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar
Banerjee (since deceased)11, this Court observed that
expert’s evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence.
It can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive
evidence. Before acting on such opinion evidence, it is
necessary to see if it is corroborated either by clear
direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
43. In the case of Murari Lal versus State of M.P. 12, this
Court opined that having due regard to the imperfect
nature of the science of identification of hand-writing, the
approach of the court should be one of caution.
Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and
24
examined. In an appropriate case, corroboration may be
sought. Where the reasons for the opinion are
convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a
doubt, uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert
may be accepted.
44. This Court dealt with the effect of placing reliance on
the opinion of handwriting expert without examining him
in court in Keshav Dutt versus State of Haryana 13. One
of the questions which fell for consideration in that case
was whether the opinion of a handwriting expert can be
admitted in evidence without examination of the
handwriting expert. In this connection, this Court took
the view that when the trial court chose to rely on the
report of the handwriting expert, it ought to have
examined the handwriting expert in order to give an
opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the said
expert. In that case, it was found that there was nothing
on record to show that the accused persons had
admitted to the report of the handwriting expert.
45. Finally, even if we take the suicide note as correct
and genuine, we do not find any act of incitement on the
part of the appellants proximate to the date on which the
deceased committed suicide. No act is attributed to the
appellants proximate to the time of suicide which was of
such a nature that the deceased was left with no
25
alternative but to commit suicide. In such circumstances,
it cannot be said that any offence of abetment to commit
suicide is made out against the appellants.”
33. Further, in Abhinav (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court
held in para 13 to 25 and 40 as under :-
“13. It is very pertinent that a reading of the above
decisions would only indicate that always a proximate
incident or act prior to the suicide was held to be a very
relevant aspect in finding the death to be a direct
causation of the acts of the person accused of abetting
the suicide. We think it apt to look at the decisions
discussed in Ude Singh7. Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh9 which was a case in which the husband
pursuant to a quarrel asked the wife to go wherever she
pleased, after which she set herself ablaze. This Court
opined that the wife, on the husband freeing her,
impulsively felt that she could do nothing but kill herself.
It was held so in paragraph 20:
“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke,
incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the
requirement of instigation though it is not necessary
that actual words must be used to that effect or what
constitutes instigation must necessarily and
specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a
26reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must
be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not
a case where the accused had by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of conduct created
such circumstances that the deceased was left with
no other option except to commit suicide in which
case an instigation may have been inferred. A word
uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending
the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to
be instigation.”
(underlining in all the extracts, by us, for emphasis)
14. This Court also relied on State of West Bengal v.
Orilal Jaiswal10, wherein it was held so:
“If it transpires to the court that a victim committing
suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which the victim belonged
and such petulance, discord and differences were
not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to commit suicide, the
conscience of the court should not be satisfied for
basing a finding that the accused charged of
abetting the offence of suicide should be found
guilty.”
27
15. Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Prades 11 was a
case of elopement which resulted in a criminal
prosecution against the boy, later acquitted on the girl’s
testimony in his favour. The boy continued to harass the
girl, holding her responsible for the criminal proceeding
initiated and even threatened to kidnap her, which
proximate threat led to the girl setting herself ablaze. A
dying declaration in the form of a letter, pinned the
responsibility of her death on the accused. While
upholding the conviction entered into by the High Court
reversing the acquittal by the Trial Court, this Court held
so on the scope of the words ‘abetment’ and ‘instigate’:
“43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we
are required to address whether there has been
abetment in committing suicide. Be it clearly stated
that mere allegation of harassment without any
positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence
on the part of the accused that led a person to
commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306
IPC is not sustainable, A casual remark that is likely
to cause harassment in ordinary course of things will
not come within the purview instigation. A mere
reprimand or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the
status of abetment. There has to be positive action
28that creates a situation for the victim to put an end to
life.
44. In the instant case, the accused had by his acts
and by his continuous course of conduct created
such a situation as a consequence of which the
deceased was left with no other option except to
commit suicide. The active acts of the accused have
led the deceased to put an end to her life. That
apart, we do not find any material on record which
compels the Court to conclude that the victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary
petulance, discord and difference in domestic life
quite common to the society to which the victim
belonged. On the other hand, the accused has
played active role in tarnishing the selfesteem and
self-respect of the victim which drove the victim girl
to commit suicide. The cruelty meted out to her has,
in fact induced her to extinguish her life spark.”
Here again the live link, to the just prior threat was
emphasised while also noticing the fact that a young
girl living in a village setting, also belonging to the
poor strata of society, was threatened and teased
constantly, resulting in her resort to the extreme
step. The accused would have known that his acts
would lead to the drastic consequence.
29
16. Amalendu Pal vs. State of West Bengal11 also held:
“Merely on the allegation of harassment without
there being any positive action proximate to the
time of occurrence on the part of the accused which
led or compelled the person to commit suicide,
conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable.”
17. S.S.Cheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan13
emphasised the requirement of a positive act on the part
of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide.
Looking at Section 306, it was held so:
“… in order to convict a person under Section 306
IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the
offence. It also requires an active act or direct act or
direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide
seeing no option and that act must have been
intended to push the deceased into such a position
that he committed suicide.”
18. Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi) spoke on the
suicidal ideation and behaviour in human beings which were
complex and multifaceted (sic) It was held that:
“Different individuals in the same situation react and
behave differently because of the personal meaning
they add to each event, thus accounting for
30individual vulnerability to suicide. Each individual’s
suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective
experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-
respect. Each of these factors are crucial and
exacerbating contributor to an individual’s
vulnerability to end his own life, which may either be
an attempt for self protection or an escapism from
intolerable self.”
19. Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat 15 was a case in
which the accused was alleged to have continuously harassed
and insulted the deceased and spoken as to how he was still
alive despite the insults levelled. There was also a suicide note in
which the deceased, a driver, accused his employer of having
driven him to suicide. Despite such an allegation in the suicide
note, this Court found that there was absolutely nothing in the
suicide note or the F.I.R. which could even distantly be viewed as
an offence, much less under Section 306 of the I.PC.
20. Again, the ingredients under Sections 107 and 306 of the
I.PC. was interpreted by one of us in Prakash and Ors. v. State
of Maharashtra and Anr.16 (B.R. Gavai J., as he then was) in the
following manner:
“14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has been
interpreted, time and again, and its principles are well-
established. To attract the offence of abetment to suicide,
31it is important to establish proof of direct or indirect acts
of instigation or incitement of suicide by the accused
which must be in close proximity to the commission of
suicide by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement
should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the commission
of suicide and should put the victim in such a position
that he/she would have no other option but to commit
suicide.
15. The law on abetment has been crystallised by a
plethora of decisions of this Court. Abetment involves a
mental process of instigating or intentionally adding
another person to do a particular thing. To bring a charge
under Section 306 of the IPC, the act of abetment would
require the positive act of instigating or intentionally
aiding another person to commit suicide. Without such
mens rea on the part of the accused person being
apparent from the face of the record, a charge under the
aforesaid Section cannot be sustained. Abetment also
requires an active act, direct or indirect, on the part of the
accused person which left the deceased with no other
option but to commit suicide.”
21. It was held that abetment involves the mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a
thing and without a positive act on the part of the accused, in
32
aiding or instigating or abetting the deceased to commit suicide, a
conviction cannot be sustained.
22. What comes out essentially from the various decisions herein
before cited is that, even if there is allegation of constant
harassment, continued over a long period; to bring in the
ingredients of Section 306 read with Section 107, still there has to
be a proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide was the
direct consequence of such continuous harassment, the last
proximate incident having finally driven the subject to the extreme
act of taking one’s life. Figuratively, the straw that broke the
camel’s back’; that final event, in a series, that occasioned a
larger, sudden impact resulting in the unpredictable act of suicide.
What drove the victim to that extreme act, often depends on
individual predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively and
demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is the test to find
mens rea. Merely because the victim was continuously harassed
and at one point, he or she succumbed to the extreme act of
taking his life cannot by itself result in finding a positive instigation
constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot be gleaned merely by
what goes on in the mind of the victim.
23. The victim may have felt that there was no alternative or
option, but to take his life, because of what another person did or
said; which cannot lead to a finding of mens rea and resultant
abetment on that other person. What constitutes mens rea is the
intention and purpose of the alleged perpetrator as discernible
33
from the conscious acts or words and the attendant
circumstances, which in all probability could lead to such an end.
The real intention of the accused and whether he intended by his
action to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide, is the sure
test. Did the thought of goading the victim to suicide occur in the
mind of the accused or whether it can be inferred from the facts
and circumstances arising in the case, as the true test of mens
rea would depend on the facts of each case. The social status,
the community setting, the relationship between the parties and
other myriad factors would distinguish one case from another.
However harsh or severe the harassment, unless there is a
conscious deliberate intention, mens rea, to drive another person
to suicidal death, there cannot be a finding of abetment under
Section 306.
24. We have already seen that even a rebuke to “go, kill yourself”,
often a rustic expression against distasteful conduct, cannot by
itself be found to have the ingredients to charge an offence of
abetment to suicide. There is no uniformity in how different
individuals respond and react under pressure. Many stand up,
some fight back, a few runaway and certain people crumble and
at times take the extreme step of suicide. To put the blame on the
pressure imposed and the person responsible for it, at all times,
without something more to clearly discern an intention, would not
be the proper application of the penal provisions under Section
306.
34
25. In this context, useful reference can be made to Sections
113A & 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 providing statutory
presumptions in aid of Sections 498A & 304B respectively, of the
IPC. When a woman dies by suicide within seven years of her
marriage, if it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty by her
husband or his relative there arises a presumption that the
husband or such relative abetted the suicide, in which event the
penalty under Section 306 is attracted. The presumption under
Section 1134 was statutorily employed by the Parliament,
realizing the menace and in an attempt to prevent domestic
violence unleashed on women in the patriarchal society, by
deterrence. This exercise would not have been necessary if
Section 107 did provide for finding abetment without conscious
instigation constituting mens rea. This Court held in Mangat Ram
v. State of Haryana 17 that the provision only enabled the court to
presume on the abetment, having due regard to all other
circumstances of the case and drawing such presumption is
purely within the discretion of the Court.
26. XXXX
27. XXXX
40. True, a person unable to bear the pressure or withstand a
humiliation or unable to oppose, may succumb to the extreme act
of ending his own life, in desperation; but that would not
necessarily mean that the alleged perpetrator had an intention to
35
lead the victim to eventual death by his own or her own hands.
We find no such instigation on the part of the accused in this
case, or a definitive abetment to suicide, as alleged in the FIR.
There arises a cloud on the suicide note, when looking at the
admitted statements recorded in the proceedings of the
Committee of Privileges and also the manner in which the note
was introduced in the case. Before the Committee of Privileges,
no reference was made to the various allegations in the suicide
note, against the named officers. We have found the suicide note
to be suspect and we are not convinced that there is any
modicum of material in the case to find abetment of suicide. The
High Court was not in error, when it quashed the FIR, when no
case is made out from the FIR.”
25. In light of the foregoing, the evidence available on record clearly
demonstrates that the neighbours of the deceased have admitted
that the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was
cordial. The parents and other relatives of the deceased have
also deposed that the marital relationship between the husband
and wife was normal and harmonious. They further admitted that
the appellant had borne the expenses of the deceased for her
higher education. Although certain relatives expressed a mere
suspicion that the appellant might have caused the death of the
deceased, there is not even a whisper in their testimony
regarding any act of instigation, intentional aid or active
participation attributable to the appellant so as to constitute
36
“abetment” within the meaning of Section 107 IPC, which is a sine
qua non for bringing home a charge under Section 306 IPC.
26. In absence of any cogent evidence establishing the essential
ingredients of abetment to suicide, the conviction of the appellant
Horilal Yadav recorded by the learned Trial Court in CRA No.
178/2015 is legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
27. So far as the acquittal of the accused/respondent in Acquittal
Appeal No. 618/2019 is concerned, it is apparent from the
material available on record that the learned Trial Court has
rightly held that the prosecution failed to prove the charges under
Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its latest judgment dated 12.02.2024
(Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and
Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:-
“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on
the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as
guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of
criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of
justice. The principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized
as:-
“(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
37comprehensive–inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a
ground of challenge;
(iii If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds
that two views are possible, the one in favour of the
accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not
justify the reversal of acquittal;(v) If the appellate
Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on
a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for
acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction,
the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality,
perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the
Trial Court.”
29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 12.02.2024
passed in Mallappa (supra) has reiterated the settled principles
governing appeals against acquittal and has held that if two views
are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted
and that a legally plausible view taken by the Trial Court cannot
be interfered with unless the findings suffer from perversity,
illegality, or manifest error of law or fact.
38
30. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to Acquittal Appeal No.
618/2019, and upon a careful scrutiny of the statements of the
witnesses as well as the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the acquittal of
the respondent/accused of the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code is based upon
proper and reasonable appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record. It is further a well-settled position of law that
the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal against
acquittal is limited, and unless the findings of the Trial Court are
perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly unsustainable, the appellate
court ought not to disturb the order of acquittal.
31. In Criminal Appeal No. 178/2015 preferred by the appellant Horilal
Yadav, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court failed to
correctly appreciate and apply the provisions of Sections 107 and
306 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly with regard to the
essential requirement of proof of abetment to suicide.
32. Consequently, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
acquitting the respondent/accused in Acquittal Appeal No.
618/2019 are affirmed and the said acquittal appeal preferred by
the complainant/appellant stands dismissed.
33. Criminal Appeal No. 178/2015 filed by the appellant Horilal Yadav
is allowed. The impugned judgment, in so far as it relates to the
conviction of the appellant Horilal Yadav, is set aside, and he is
39
acquitted of the charge under Section 306 of the Indian Penal
Code.
34. The appellant Horilal Yadav is reported to be on bail. Keeping in
view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the
B.N.S.S.), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal
bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a
period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or
for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice
thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
35. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal)
JUDGE JUDGE
Ruchi
Digitally signed by
RUCHI YADAV RUCHI YADAV
