Unknown vs Manjeet Singh And Another on 13 March, 2026

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    Himachal Pradesh High Court

    Unknown vs Manjeet Singh And Another on 13 March, 2026

                                                                                       2026:HHC:7139
    
    
    
    
         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
    
                                                  Cr. MP (M) Nos. 1551 & 1552 of 2025
    
    
    
    
                                                                                       .
                                                  Reserved on: 03.03.2026
    
    
    
    
    
                                                  Date of Decision: 13.3.2026.
    
    
    
    
    
        1. Cr.MP(M) No. 1551 of 2025
    
    
    
    
                                                         of
        Chanchal Singh                                                               ... Petitioner
                                              Versus
        Manjeet Singh and another                                                ...Respondents
                               rt
        _____________________________________
        2. Cr.MP(M) No. 1552 of 2025
    
        Chanchal Singh                                                                ...Petitioner
    
    
    
                                         Versus
        Raj Kumari and another                                                   ...Respondents
    
    
    
    
        Coram
    
    
    
    
    
        Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
        Whether approved for reporting?1 No
    
    
    
    
    
        For the Petitioner(s)                       :      Mr Ajay Sharma, Senior
                                                           Advocate, with Mr Tarun
                                                           Brakta, Advocate, in both the
                                                           petitions.
        For Respondent No.1/State                   :      Mr    Animesh       Pathak,
                                                           Advocate, in both the petitions
        For Respondent No.2                         :      Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
                                                           Advocate General, in both the
                                                           petitions.
    
    1
        Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
    
    
    
    
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                                                                  2026:HHC:7139
    
    
    
    
        Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
    

    The petitioner(s) has filed the present petitions for

    .

    SPONSORED

    cancellation of bail granted to the respondents/accused in FIR

    No. 38 of 2025, dated 07.05.2025, registered at Police Station

    Mehatpur, District Una, for the commission of offences

    of
    punishable under Section 108 read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya

    Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

    2.
    rt
    It has been asserted that the petitioner/informant

    made a complaint to the police that the marriage of his

    daughter, Ms Pooja, was solemnised in the year 2016 with the

    accused Manjeet Singh. A daughter was born to her. Manjeet

    Singh started harassing Pooja soon after the marriage. She made

    complaints to the informant. Raj Kumari, mother-in-law of

    Pooja, also used to harass her. Pooja called the informant over

    Mobile Phone on 05.06.2025 and told him not to visit her

    matrimonial home because his life was in danger. She promised

    to mention the details in the morning. The informant received a

    call from Manjeet Singh on 06.05.2025 at 12:00-12:30 pm that

    Pooja had consumed poison. The informant went to the regional

    hospital, Una, where Pooja was lying conscious. Manjeet Singh

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    was also present in the Hospital but he was intoxicated. Pooja

    was referred to PGI. She was taken to Gurdev Hospital, Nurpur

    .

    Bedi, District Ropar (Punjab), where she died. Postmortem of the

    dead body was conducted, and the cause of death was found to

    be the consumption of the insecticides. The police arrested the

    respondents. They filed bail petitions, which were allowed by the

    of
    learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una (learned

    Trial Court). The police recovered a suicide note in which Pooja
    rt
    had attributed the cause of her death to her harassment. The

    offence is grave, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II,

    Una, erred in releasing the respondents on bail. The respondents

    threatened the informant after getting bail from the Court.

    Hence, it was prayed that the present petitions be allowed and

    the bail of the respondents be cancelled.

    3. The State has filed a status report asserting that the

    police received information on 07.05.2025 from Gurdev

    Hospital, Nurpur Bedi, District Ropar (Punjab) that Pooja Devi

    had died. The police went to the hospital and obtained the

    treatment summary. The informant made a complaint to the

    police that Pooja was married to Manjeet Singh in the year 2016,

    as per Hindu rites and customs. A daughter was born to her.

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    2026:HHC:7139

    Manjeet Singh and Raj Kumari used to harass Pooja. Pooja called

    the informant on 05.06.2025 and advised him not to visit her

    .

    matrimonial home, as his life was in danger. She asked the

    informant to visit in the morning with some people, as she was

    being harassed. Manjeet Singh called the informant at about

    12:30 pm and told him that Pooja had consumed insecticide. The

    of
    informant went to the hospital and found that Pooja was under

    treatment. Manjeet Singh was also present in the hospital, but
    rt
    he was intoxicated. Pooja was referred to a higher institution,

    and she was taken to Gurdev Hospital, Nurpur Bedi, District

    Ropar (Punjab). Pooja died during the treatment. The police

    registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police

    recovered the bottle of insecticide from Pooja’s house. The

    police arrested the respondents. One suicide note was found to

    have been written by Pooja, stating that Manjeet Singh used to

    remain intoxicated. He used to abuse Pooja. Her mother-in-law

    also used to taunt and blame her for every wrong. The police

    seized the suicide note. The respondents filed bail applications,

    which were allowed by the learned Trial judge. The admitted

    signatures of the deceased were taken and sent to RFSL;

    however, the handwriting expert demanded more admitted

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    signatures. The informant made a statement that he did not

    have any documents written by Pooja with him. Hence, the

    .

    status report.

    4. I have heard Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior

    Advocate, assisted by Mr Tarun Brakta, learned counsel for the

    of
    petitioner, Mr Animesh Pathak, learned counsel for respondent

    No.1 in both the petitions, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy
    rt
    Advocate General for respondent No.2/State.

    5. Mr Ajay Shrama, learned Senior Counsel for the

    petitioner/informant, submitted that the learned Trial Court

    erred in granting bail to the respondents. The deceased had

    complained about her repeated harassment; therefore, a

    presumption would arise that she had committed suicide

    because of her harassment. The allegation against the

    respondents are serious, and the learned Trial Court erred in

    releasing the respondents on bail by writing a cryptic order;

    therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and

    the bail granted by the learned Trial Court be cancelled.

    6. Mr Animesh Pathak, learned counsel for the

    accused/respondent No.1, in both the petitions submitted that

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    the learned Trial Court had exercised the discretion in favour of

    the respondents based on the relevant consideration. This Court

    .

    should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned

    Trial Court unless it is shown to be perverse or arbitrary. The

    informant had not made any complaint to any person. The

    suicide note is not connected to Pooja. No complaint of any

    of
    threat was made to any person. Therefore, he prayed that the

    present petitions be dismissed.

    rt

    7. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General

    for the respondent No.2/State has nothing to state in this matter

    and prayed that an appropriate order may be passed.

    8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

    made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

    9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 188 that an order

    granting bail is liable to be interfered with when it is shown to be

    arbitrary, perverse or passed in disregard of the material

    consideration. It was observed:

    “13. It is trite that while personal liberty occupies a
    position of high constitutional value, an order granting
    bail does not enjoy immunity from appellate scrutiny

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    where it is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or passed in
    disregard of material considerations. The discretion to
    grant bail, though wide, is structured by well-settled

    .

    legal principles and is neither uncanalised nor unfettered.

    14. In State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan 2025 SCC OnLine SC
    1702, and Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince
    2025 SCC OnLine SC 2580, this Court authoritatively

    clarified that cancellation of bail on account of post-bail
    misconduct stands on a fundamentally different footing
    from annulment of a bail order which is itself unjustified

    of
    or legally unsustainable at its inception. An order
    granting bail is liable to be interfered with where it
    reveals reliance on irrelevant considerations, ignores
    relevant material, or suffers from perversity without the
    rt
    necessity of waiting for supervening circumstances.

    15. In Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher

    (2024) 10 SCC 753, in which one of us (Ahsanuddin
    Amanullah, J.) was a member of the Bench, this Court set
    aside the grant of bail in appeal, holding that the

    discretion exercised by the High Court was vitiated. The
    Court comprehensively restated the parameters
    governing the exercise of jurisdiction to grant bail,

    including the nature and gravity of the accusation, the
    role attributed to the accused, criminal antecedents, the

    likelihood of tampering with evidence or witnesses, the
    risk of abscondence, and the overall impact on society.

    The following paragraphs are pertinent:

    “18. Courts, while granting bail, are required to
    consider relevant factors such as the nature of the
    accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned,
    possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence
    and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al.
    Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in
    Ajwar v. Waseem [(2024) 10 SCC 768], apropos relevant
    parameters for granting bail, observed: (SCC paras 26-

    27)

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    “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to
    be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal
    offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like

    .

    the nature of the accusations made against the

    accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to
    have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the
    role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents

    of the accused, the probability of tampering of the
    witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
    released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being

    of
    unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility
    of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts
    of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the
    accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.
    rt
    [(2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan
    Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
    [(2004) 7 SCC 528:

    2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [(2009)
    14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
    Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee
    [(2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011)
    3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014)

    16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar
    Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi
    ) [(2018) 12 SCC 129 :

    (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar

    [(2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558].]

    27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted

    ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner.

    However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is

    always open to interference by the superior court. If
    there are serious allegations against the accused,
    even if he has not misused the bail granted to him,
    such an order can be cancelled by the same Court
    that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by
    a superior court if it transpires that the courts below
    have ignored the relevant material available on record,
    or not looked into the gravity of the offence, or the
    impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v.
    State of M.P.
    [(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-
    Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us

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    (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations
    that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an
    order granting bail to an accused under Section

    .

    439(1) CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224,

    para 24)
    ’24. As can be discerned from the above
    decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the

    court must consider whether any supervening
    circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the
    accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is

    of
    no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him
    to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession
    of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana,
    (1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it
    rt differently, in ordinary circumstances, this
    Court would be loath to interfere with an order

    passed by the court below granting bail, but if
    such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or
    premised on material that is irrelevant, then
    such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and

    interference by the appellate court.’ (emphasis
    supplied)

    19. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj [(2023) 17 SCC 510],
    speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah,

    J.), the Court, while setting aside an order [Dharamraj
    v. State of Haryana
    , 2021 SCC OnLine P&H 4632] of the
    Punjab and Haryana High Court granting

    (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: (SCC paras
    6-11)
    “6. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is
    warranted. This Court considered the factors to
    guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
    Sudarshan Singh
    [(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri)
    688] and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan

    [(2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977].
    In Prasanta
    Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee
    [(2010) 14 SCC 496 :

    (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765], the relevant principles were
    restated thus: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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    ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not,
    normally, interfere with an order passed by the
    High Court granting or rejecting bail to the

    .

    accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon

    the High Court to exercise its discretion
    judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance
    with the basic principles laid down in a plethora

    of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
    settled that, among other circumstances, the
    factors to be borne in mind while considering an

    of
    application for bail are:

    (i) whether there is any prima facie or
    reasonable ground to believe that the accused
    had committed the offence;

    rt (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

    (iii) severity of the punishment in the event
    of conviction;

    (iv) danger of the accused absconding or
    fleeing, if released on bail;

    (v) character, behaviour, means, position and
    standing of the accused;

    (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

    (vii) reasonable apprehension of the
    witnesses being influenced; and

    (viii) danger, of course, of justice being

    thwarted by the grant of bail.’

    7. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118 :

    (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558], this Court opined as under:

    (SCC p. 125, para 16)
    ’16. The considerations that guide the power of an
    appellate court in assessing the correctness of an
    order granting bail stand on a different footing
    from an assessment of an application for the
    cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order
    granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there

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    was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the
    discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether
    the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or

    .

    unjustified. On the other hand, an application for

    cancellation of bail is generally examined on the
    anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances
    or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to

    whom bail has been granted.’

    8. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar [(2023) 13 SCC
    549: 2023 INSC 761], this Court, in view of Dolat Ram

    of
    v. State of Haryana
    [(1995) 1 SCC 349: 1995 SCC (Cri)
    237]; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh [(1996) 4 SCC
    693: 1996 SCC (Cri) 844] and X v. State of Telangana
    [(2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902], held as
    rt
    follows: (Bhagwan Singh case, SCC p. 557, para 13)
    ’13. It is also required to be borne in mind that

    when a prayer is made for the cancellation of a
    grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming
    circumstances must be present, and bail once

    granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical
    manner without considering whether any
    supervening circumstances have rendered it

    inadvisable to allow a fair trial. This proposition
    draws support from the judgment of this Court

    in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [(1995) 1 SCC
    349: 1995 SCC (Cri) 237], Kashmira Singh v.
    Duman Singh
    [(1996) 4 SCC 693: 1996 SCC (Cri)

    844] and X v. State of Telangana [(2018) 16 SCC
    511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902].’

    9. In X3 v. State (UT of Andaman) [(2023) 14 SCC 280:

    2023 INSC 767], this Court noted that the principles
    in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, [(2010)
    14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] stood reiterated
    in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra [(2022) 9 SCC 321 :

    (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560].

    10. The contours of anticipatory bail have been
    elaborately dealt with by five-Judge Benches in

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    Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2
    SCC 565: 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] and Sushila Aggarwal v.
    State (NCT of Delhi
    ) [(2020) 5 SCC 1 : (2020) 2 SCC

    .

    (Cri) 721]. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of

    Maharashtra [(2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri)
    514] is worthy of mention in this context, despite its
    partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal. We are

    cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with
    easily. More so, when an order of pre-arrest bail
    already stands granted by the High Court.

    of

    11. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail
    is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The
    factors illustrated by this Court through its
    pronouncements are illustrative and not
    rt
    exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns
    on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied)

    20. In Ajwar v. Waseem, [(2024) 10 SCC 768], this Court
    also examined the considerations for setting aside bail
    orders in terms below: (SCC paras 28-29)

    “28. The considerations that weigh with the
    appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an
    application being moved by the aggrieved party

    include any supervening circumstances that may
    have occurred after granting relief to the accused,

    the conduct of the accused while on bail, any
    attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate,
    resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of

    threats being extended to the witnesses while on
    bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to
    tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may
    add that this list is only illustrative and not
    exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that
    at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case
    needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to
    the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the
    accused ought to be avoided. It is sufficient to state
    that the bail order should reveal the factors that

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    have been considered by the Court for granting
    relief to the accused.

    29. In Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, [(2022) 9 SCC

    .

    321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560], a three-Judge Bench of

    this Court, has observed that the power to grant bail
    under Section 439 CrPC is of wide amplitude and
    the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may

    be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while
    deciding an application for bail. But this discretion
    is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the

    of
    due application of the judicial mind following well-
    established principles of law. In the ordinary
    course, courts would be slow to interfere with the
    order where bail has been granted by the courts
    rt
    below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal
    or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant

    material, the appellate court would be well within
    its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also
    refer: Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338: 2001 SCC
    (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat

    [(2008) 13 SCC 584 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813])”

    (Emphasis Supplied)

    16. Recently, in Salil Mahajan v. Avinash Kumar 2025 SCC
    OnLine SC 2732, this Court once again crystallised the

    distinction between an appeal against the grant of bail
    and an application seeking cancellation of bail. It was
    reiterated that in an appeal against the grant of bail, the

    superior court is concerned with examining the legality,
    propriety, and correctness of the bail order itself, and not
    the subsequent conduct of the accused. Where the bail
    order suffers from perversity, illegality, or non-
    consideration of relevant factors such as the gravity of
    the offence, impact on society, or criminal antecedents,
    interference is fully justified. The following observations
    are pertinent:

    “7. At the outset, it is well settled by this Court that an
    appeal against the grant of bail and an application
    seeking cancellation of bail are on a different footing. The

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    grounds for testing the legality of an order granting bail
    are well settled. Recently, in Ashok Dhankad v. State
    (NCT of Delhi
    ) [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690], this Court

    .

    had summarised the position of law as follows:

    “19. The principles that emerge as a result of the
    above discussion are as follows:

    (i) An appeal against the grant of bail cannot be

    considered to be on the same footing as an
    application for cancellation of bail;

    of

    (ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a
    threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by
    the prosecution. The merits of such evidence
    rtmust not be adjudicated at the stage of bail.”

    10. A similar view was taken in Shobha Namdev Sonavane

    v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 291, wherein it

    was observed:

    “20. We make it clear that there is a clear distinction
    between cancellation of bail on the considerations
    provided under Section 439(2) CrPC (corresponding

    Section 483(3) BNSS) and reversal of an order of bail by

    the superior Court. While cancellation should only be
    resorted to in cases where the accused misuses the liberty
    of bail granted to him or tamper with the evidence. On the

    other hand, the order granting bail can be interfered with
    by the superior Court considering the nature and gravity
    of the offences; if the order granting bail ignores the
    relevant material available on record or if the same is
    based on extraneous considerations. The present is a case
    in the second category.”

    11. This position was reiterated in Sarju Prasad v. State of

    U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 334, wherein it was held:

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    “14. Thus, the Appellate Court or the Higher forum that
    examines whether the order granting bail suffers from
    non-application of mind or is not borne out of a prima

    .

    facie view on evidence on record, would be an essential

    feature. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess
    whether, on the basis of the evidence on record, there
    exists a prima facie case or reasonable ground that the

    accused has committed the crime, also taking into
    account the seriousness of the crime and the severity of
    the punishment. It is worth noting that in the instant

    of
    case, what is being considered relates to whether the High
    Court had exercised the discretionary power under
    Section 439 in granting bail appropriately or not. Such an
    assessment is different from deciding whether
    rt
    circumstances after the grant of bail have made it
    necessary to cancel the same. If the twin factors are

    conspicuously present, then in such an event, this Court
    would be required to examine both the factors. The first
    situation requires analysing whether the granting of bail
    is illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On the other

    hand, an application for cancellation of bail looks at
    whether supervening circumstances have occurred,
    warranting cancellation.”

    12. The learned Trial Court held that the custody of the

    respondents was not required for any purpose whatsoever, and

    no fruitful purpose would be served by their detention. There

    was no apprehension that respondents would influence any

    witnesses, and there was no reason to deny bail. Bail is the rule

    and jail is the exception, and a person cannot be kept behind

    bars indefinitely.

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    13. These are relevant considerations, and it cannot be

    said that the learned Trial Court had not considered the relevant

    .

    material while granting the bail. Learned Trial Court had rightly

    held that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and no case was

    made out for invoking the exception. This was not a perverse

    order, and it is not possible to interfere with it.

    of

    14. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had not
    rt
    discussed the gravity of the offence. This submission cannot be

    accepted. Learned Trial Court noticed in para 10 that the

    allegations levelled against respondents were heinous and

    grievous in nature, but it was not a decisive factor to deny bail.

    The learned Trial Court was well advised not to appreciate the

    evidence collected by the prosecution to avoid any prejudice to

    either of the parties. Thus, the bail cannot be cancelled on the

    ground that the learned Trial Court had not considered the

    gravity of the offence.

    15. Even otherwise, the suicide note stated to have been

    recovered has not been connected to the deceased. It was sent to

    RFSL, but the handwriting expert could not give any definite

    opinion about its authorship and demanded the documents

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    2026:HHC:7139

    written in Hindi. The petitioner himself stated before the police

    that he had no document written by Pooja Devi in Hindi.

    .

    16. The status report also mentions that no complaint

    was made by the petitioner or Pooja Devi during her lifetime

    regarding the harassment. The informant claimed that he had

    of
    received a telephonic call about the harassment and threats, and

    he was advised to visit the home of Pooja with some persons.

    rt
    There is nothing on record that the informant had visited the

    matrimonial home of Pooja immediately after receiving the

    message or in the morning. He received a call at 12-12:30 from

    Manjeet Singh informing him about the consumption of

    insecticide by Pooja.

    17. Any father receiving the distress call of his daughter

    about the harassment would have taken steps to visit the spot or

    to ensure the safety of his daughter. The fact that nothing was

    done till 12:30 pm makes it difficult to rely upon the informant’s

    version that the respondents were harassing Pooja.

    18. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Trial

    Court granting bail to the respondents cannot be faulted, and it

    is not possible to interfere with the order.

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    18

    2026:HHC:7139

    19. No other point was urged.

    20. In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and

    .

    are dismissed.

    21. The observation made herein before shall remain

    confined to the disposal of the instant petitions and will have no

    of
    bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

                           rt                      (Rakesh Kainthla)
                                                          Judge
    
              13th March, 2026
                  (Nikita)
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
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