Himachal Pradesh High Court
Govind Ram vs Of on 13 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2975 of 2025.
.
Reserved on: 05.03.2026.
Date of Decision: 13.03.2026.
Govind Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr Rajiv Rai, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 37 of 2023, dated 16.02.2023,
registered at Police Station Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS
Act‘).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested
by the police on 16.02.2023. The petitioner has been behind bars
.
for the last more than two years and 10 months. The
prosecution was unable to complete the trial, and the
prosecution has examined 12 witnesses. The conclusion of the
trial would take considerable time, and the petitioner’s right to a
of
speedy trial is being violated. The prosecution’s version is highly
improbable, and there is no chance of the petitioner’s
rt
conviction. The petitioner has deep roots in society, and there is
no chance of his absconding. He would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 16.02.2023.
They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-34C-
4247. The driver identified himself as Govind Ram (petitioner).
The police searched the car and recovered 1.916 kilograms of
charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner.
The charas was sent to SFSL, Unga and as per the result, it was
confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas.
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FIR No.29 of 2016 dated 30.01.2016 under Section 20 of the NDPS
Act was registered against the petitioner, in which he was
.
acquitted. Chargesheet was filed before the learned Trial Court
on 20.04.2023. The prosecution has cited 18 witnesses, out of
whom 14 witnesses have been examined, and the matter is now
listed for recording the statements of remaining witnesses on
of
16.04.2026. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the
rt
petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the respondent/State.
5. Mr Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution was unable to complete the
evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.
The petitioner has roots in society, and there is no likelihood of
his absconding. He would abide by all the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had prayed
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for adjournments, which led to the delay in the completion of the
prosecution’s evidence. The petitioner cannot take advantage of
.
his own wrong to claim a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
The petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity
of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to
the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the twin
of
conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Therefore,
he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
rt
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
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8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
.
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
of
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
rt
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the
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bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable
grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which
means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only
satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case
.
against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.”
(emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
of
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously.
In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter
of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed
as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
rt
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
.
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court’s decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
of
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
rt
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC.
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and
casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu
of
Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p.
511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
rt
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate
material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a
prima facie conclusion. While considering an application
for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be
supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having
regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-Ã -vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
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2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences.
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
of
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
rt
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. The status report specifically mentions that the
petitioner was driving a car from which the police recovered
1.916 kilograms of charas. The Central Government has notified
one kilogram as the commercial quantity of charas; hence, the
petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of
charas, and the rigours of Section 37 apply to the present case.
12. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence
and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
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(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
.
cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless-
of
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
rt application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
13. This Section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that
the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to
commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special
provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:39:25 :::CIS
11certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They
are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
.
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
of
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court
rt
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
14. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act.
In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429,
it has been elaborated as under: –
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits the murder of
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:39:25 :::CIS
12causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly
impact on the society; they are a hazard to the.
society; even if they are released temporarily, in all
probability, they would continue their nefarious
activities of trafficking and/or dealing inintoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the
large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court,
dealing with the contention with regard toof
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly
observed about the adverse effect of such activities
in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy. Union Territory of Goa,
(1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
rt 24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld andthe clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction amonga sizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious andalarming proportions in the recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control anderadicate this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleteriouseffects and a deadly impact on society as a
whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made
effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of
1985 specifying mandatory minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided that
the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:39:25 :::CIS
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(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
.
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not
abiding by the aforesaid mandate while
ordering the release of the respondent
accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take
a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
of
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should implement
the law in the spirit with which Parliament,
rt after due deliberation, has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at
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hand, the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in
addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or
any other law for the time being in force, regulating the
.
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail
under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
15. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
of
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24
rt
or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of
this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv
Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505],
held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this
reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of
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satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
.
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
of
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
rt
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504,
para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, which depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
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and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
.
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused has not committed an offence and
whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.
of
Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the
NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the
grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
16.
rt
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without
complying with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It
was observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 ofthe NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid downtherein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any such
offence while on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow:–
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.-
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(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
.
be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19 or section 24 or
section 27A, and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless-
of
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
rt application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released
on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of
such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
17. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:39:25 :::CIS
18ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)
(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:–
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
.
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
of
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus: —
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
rt
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs andpsychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on NarcoticDrugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with
regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore,
it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
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19
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail it was held therein that they are
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
.
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under
of
the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that
the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal
that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not
only subject to the limitations contained under Section
rt
439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to
the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act.
Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring
the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for
granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be
avoided while passing orders on such applications.”
18. In the present case, the prosecution has collected
sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioner with the
commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to show
that the petitioner would not indulge in the commission of an
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20
offence if released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the twin
conditions laid down in Section 37 of the ND&PS Act.
.
19. It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner, as he
is prima facie involved in the commission of an offence
of
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
rt
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act
involving the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the
rule and its grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view
of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the
offence is punishable with a minimum sentence often years, the accused shall generally not be released
on bail. Negation of bail is the rule, and its grant is an
exception. While considering the application for bail,
the court has to bear in mind the provisions of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in
nature. The recording of findings as mandated in
Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the
accused involved in the offences under the said Act.”
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21
20. It was submitted that the witnesses examined by the
prosecution have not supported the prosecution’s case, and there
.
are various discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. The
copies of the statements were produced on record. This
submission will not help the petitioner. Eyewitnesses Constable
Chaman Lal (PW-1) and Constable Amit Kumar (PW-4) have
of
supported the prosecution’s version. Remaining witnesses have
also supported the link evidence. It is impermissible for the bail
rt
Court to look into the discrepancies in the statements while
considering the bail application. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024
that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court
should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the
commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some
discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: –
“14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder,
dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the
prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be
it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath in
entertaining the bail application of the Accused.
15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e.,
(i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just
before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution
before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the
recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by::: Downloaded on – 13/03/2026 20:39:25 :::CIS
22looking into some discrepancies here or there in the
deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the
victim.
.
16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct
practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial
commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion,
which may either result in the conviction of the Accused
or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High
Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and
orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into
of
the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on
the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral
evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly
delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the
rt
Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release
on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have
a speedy trial has been infringed.”
21. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v.
State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising
bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the
evidence. It was observed:
10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of
witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge,in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal
of these statements, reasonable grounds can be
entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the
petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the
petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this
Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not
appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial.
Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire
list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been
examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to
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23
form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner on the basis of such partial evidence.
22. Therefore, the submission that there are
.
inconsistencies in the FIR, examination-in-chief and cross-
examination, which would entitle the petitioner to bail, cannot
be accepted at this stage.
of
23. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because his right
rt
to a speedy trial is being violated. This submission cannot be
accepted. The copies of the order sheets show that the learned
counsel for the petitioner sought an adjournment on 19.06.2023
for the consideration of the charge. An adjournment was sought
for the cross-examination of HHC Kewal Krishan, PW-12, on
29.11.2024. Witness Babu Ram was present on 28.10.2025 when
the learned defence counsel submitted that he was not ready
with the brief and was not ready to cross-examine him.
Therefore, it is apparent that the petitioner has contributed to
the delay. Further, the prosecution has examined 14 witnesses
out of 18 witnesses cited by it, and the matter is listed for
recording the statements of remaining witnesses on 16.04.2026.
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24
Thus, the majority of the witnesses have been examined, and
only a small number of witnesses are to be examined.
.
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot
be granted on the prolonged incarceration without satisfying the
twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It
of
was observed: –
rt
“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those
premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonablegrounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the
alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and
likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is
not a casual observation. It is the statutory thresholdunder Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the
discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest
on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusionof this nature, if returned without addressing the
prosecution’s assertions of operative control andantecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the
appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of
the trial court at first instance.
18. This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion
exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of
bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity
of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing.
Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail
and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin
requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary
tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
19. In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken
the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to
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25
the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated
22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation
regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days
.
prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the
present complaint, nor do they engage with the
prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in
arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the
consignments. The omission to consider these factors
bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by
of
Section 37(1)(b).”
25. A similar view was taken in Union of India v
NamdeoAshruba Nakade
rt SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on
07.11.2025, wherein it was observed:
“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the
Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four
months, and charges have not been framed, yet theallegations are serious since not only is the recovery much
in excess of the commercial quantity, but the
Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavitiesingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the
contraband.
12. Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the
Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in anorganised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing
with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”
26. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim to bail because
of the violation of his right to a speedy trial.
27. No other point was urged.
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26
28. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
.
29. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
13 March, 2026. rt
(jai)
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