Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ashok Kumar@ Ram vs State Of Punjab on 11 March, 2026
137
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-10763-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 11.03.2026
Date of uploading: 11.03.2026
Ashok Kumar @ Ram
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab
....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:- Mr. Arun Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Hemant Aggarwal, DAG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
1. Present petition has been filed under Section 483 of BNSS for grant
of regular bail to the petitioner in FIR No.74 dated 25.06.2024 registered for the
offences punishable under Section 22-C & 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act‘), at Police Station
Sirhind, District Fatehgarh Sahib.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving 1400
injections of Leegesic Buprenorphine, which was allegedly recovered from the
petitioner and he was nominated in the disclosure statement of the co-accused
namely Manpreet Singh @ Mani and Jaswant Singh @ Dogar.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner is
in custody since 28.06.2024. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
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submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and the
liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has
further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 1 year
and 8 months. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing
that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus,
he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel has
further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned State
counsel seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 10.03.2026 in Court,
which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the
available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 28.06.2024 whereinafter
investigation was carried out and challan was presented on 17.12.2024. Total 37
prosecution witnesses have been cited and out of which only 3 have been
examined till date. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable
issues that shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does
not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage,
lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to
indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or
interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 10.03.2026 filed by
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the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a
period of 1 year, 8 months and 2 days, & is shown to be involved in other
FIRs/cases. In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State
of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings3 of 6
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CRM-M-10763-2026 (O&M)consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend himself.
It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention are
grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to
psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous
conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be
meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s fundamental
right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty cannot be
rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge
in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature
in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye to
the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does not
become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment, an
outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life4 of 6
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CRM-M-10763-2026 (O&M)and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
6.3. Further as per the custody certificate filed today by the learned
State counsel, the petitioner is shown to be involved in three other FIRs/cases.
However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline the
concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when a case
is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by ratiocinating
upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this regard can be
placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Mohd.
Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586; a
Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of
Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court
in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana,
decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR
(Criminal) 191.
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is
not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds to the
satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in
addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty
Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
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(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the
trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and
shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the
effect that he has not been involved in commission of any
offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is
found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged
on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or
otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for
cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be
ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which
may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant
shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
11.03.2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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