Himachal Pradesh High Court
Bhag Singh vs State Of H.P on 10 March, 2026
( 2026:HHC:6364 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No. 418 of 2015.
Reserved on: 24.02.2026.
Decided on: 10 March, 2026.
.
Bhag Singh .... Petitioner.
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent.
of
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
rt
For the Petitioner: Dr Lalit K. Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
The present revision petition is directed against the
judgment dated 12.10.2015 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned
Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal No. 33/10 of 2015 vide
which the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence
dated 18.05.2015 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class,
Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial
Court) in Criminal Case No. 3/2 of 2014/12 were upheld. (Parties
1
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision petition are that the police presented a challan before
the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission
of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian
of
Penal Code (for short “IPC“). It was asserted that the
informant Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) was riding a
rt
motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 on
09.08.2012. Pyare Lal (PW-2) was sitting as a pillion rider.
They reached Awari at about 8.45 A.M., when a private bus
bearing registration No. HP-69-2252 attempted to overtake
the motorcycle at a high speed. However, a vehicle came from
the opposite side, and the bus driver turned the bus to avoid the
accident and hit the motorcycle. The motorcyclists fell and
sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the high speed
and negligence of the bus driver. The injured were taken to the
hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry
(Ex.PW11/A) was recorded in the police station, and H.C. Bodh
Raj (PW-13) was sent to the hospital for verification. He filed
an application (Ex.PW10/A) for medical examination of the
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injured. Dr Deepak (PW-10) examined Pyare Lal and found
that he had sustained simple injuries. He issued MLC
(Ex.PW10/B). He also examined Subhash Chander and found
.
that he had sustained multiple injuries. He issued MLC
(Ex.PW10/E). These injuries could have been caused in a motor
vehicle accident. H.C. Bodh Raj recorded the statement
of
(Ex.PW1/A) of Subhash Chander and sent it to the police
station, where FIR (Ex.PW12/A) was registered. H.C. Bodh Raj
rt
investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared a site
plan (Ex.PW13/A). He took the photographs (Ex. 13/B-1 to
Ex.PW13/B-6) with the help of the official camera. He seized
the bus and motorcycle along with documents vide memos
(Ex.PW4/A and Ex.PW1/B). The owner of the bus, Mahender
Singh (PW-7), issued a certificate (Ex.PW7/A) stating that the
accused was driving the bus at the time of the accident.
Sukhdev (PW-5) examined the bus and found that there was no
mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He
issued the report (Ex.PW5/A). Dev Raj (PW-9) examined the
motorcycle and found that there was no mechanical defect in it
that could have led to the accident. However, damage to head
light cover, mud guard and rear-view mirror was caused in the
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accident. He issued the report (Ex.PW9/A). The statements of
witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the
completion of the investigation challan was prepared and
.
presented before the learned trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
of
accusation was put to him for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he
rt
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its
case. Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal (PW-2)
had sustained injuries in the accident. Manmohan (PW-3),
Constable Pankaj Kumar (PW-6) and Bhag Singh (PW-8)
witnessed the recoveries. Abhishek Chandel (PW-4) is an
eyewitness. Sukh Dev (PW-5) examined the bus. Mahender
Singh (PW-7) is the owner of the bus. Dev Raj (PW-9)
examined the motorcycle. Dr Deepak (PW-10) examined the
injured. Constable Rajneesh Kumar (PW-11) proved the entry
in the daily diary. Inspector Sohan Lal (PW-12) signed the FIR
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and prepared the challan. H.C. Bodh Raj (PW-13) investigated
the matter.
5. Accused in his statement recorded under Section
.
313 of Cr.P.C. admitted that he was driving the bus bearing
registration No. HP-69-2252 on 09.08.2012 at about 8.45 A.M.
A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 was going
of
ahead of the bus towards Bilaspur, and Subhash and Pyare Lal
had fallen from the motorcycle, however, he denied that the
rt
bus had hit the motorcycle. He admitted that the police had
visited the spot, prepared the site plan, seized the bus and took
the photographs. He also admitted that the bus was
mechanically examined and that the owner had issued a
certificate showing that he (accused) was driving the bus at the
time of the accident. He stated that a false FIR was registered
against him, and he had not caused any accident. He did not
produce any evidence in defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not
disputed that he was driving the bus at the time of the accident.
The statements of the injured proved that the bus had
attempted to overtake the motorcycle, the driver steered the
bus towards the motorcycle when a truck came from the
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opposite side, and the bus hit the motorcycle, causing injuries
to the motorcycle rider and pillion rider. The statement made
by the mechanic in his cross-examination that the motorcycle
.
would have fallen towards the left side was not probable. The
defence taken by the accused that the motorcycle had fallen due
to the difference in height of the metalled and unmetalled
of
portions of the road was also not believable. The accused
should not have attempted to overtake the motorcycle when
rt
the truck was coming from the opposite side. His negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident, causing injuries to the
motorcyclists. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the
accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337
of the IPC and sentenced him as under: –
Sr. No. Offence under Sentence imposed
which convicted
1. Sec. 279 IPC Simple imprisonment for six
months.
2. Sec. 337 IPC Simple imprisonment for six
months and fine to the tune of ₹
500/-. In default of payment of
fine to further undergo simple
imprisonment for 15 days.
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Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered
to run concurrently.
.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused
filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate
of
Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court that the accused was negligent in attempting to overtake
rt
the motorcycle on a curve when a truck was coming from the
opposite side. He steered the bus, hitting the motorcycle and
causing injuries to the motorcyclists. Plea taken by the
accused that the motorcycle had lost balance was not probable.
The admission made by the mechanic that the motorcycle
should have fallen towards the left side was not believable.
Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the
accused. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the appeal was
dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
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petition asserting that the learned Courts below have erred in
appreciating the material on record. It was brought on record
that the place of occurrence was a busy place on the National
.
Highway, but no independent witness was joined by the police.
The truck was going downhill, whereas the bus and the
motorcycle were moving uphill. The difference in height of the
of
metalled and unmetalled portions of the road was 2 ½ inch
which made it highly probable that the motorcycle had skidded
rt
on its own. The prosecution had failed to prove the exact
rashness and negligence of the accused. The admission in the
cross-examination of the mechanic that the motorcycle would
have fallen on the left side of the road was wrongly ignored by
the learned Courts below. Therefore, it is prayed that the
present petition be allowed.
9. I have heard Dr Lalit K. Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
10. Dr Lalit K. Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below
have erred in appreciating the material on record. There is no
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evidence of rashness and negligence on the part of the accused.
Learned Courts below wrongly ignored the admission made by
the mechanic that the motorcycle would have fallen towards
.
the left side of the road after it was hit by the bus. Injuries
were noticed by the medical officer on the right side of the body
of the injured, which made it probable that the motorcycle had
of
skidded on its own. Learned Courts below erred in not
extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the
rt
accused. He prayed that the present revision be allowed,
judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set
aside, or in the alternative, the benefits of the Probation of
Offenders Act be granted to the accused. Hence, he relied upon
Manoj Chauhan vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. R. No. 326 of
2014, decided on 23.09.2025; State of H.P. vs. Ram Pal, Cr. Appeal
No. 332 of 2012 decided on 11.09.2025, Lekh Raj @ Raju vs. State of
H.P., Cr. R. No. 4166 of 2013 decided on 27.08.2025, Pawan Kumar
vs. State of H. P., Cr. R. No. 227 of 2015 decided on 08.01.2026 and
Chellammal & Anr. vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police,
Criminal Appeal No. 2065 of 2025, decided on 22.04.2025 in
support of his submissions.
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11. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent-State, submitted that both the learned
Courts below have rightly held that the accused was negligent
.
in attempting to overtake the motorcycle on a curve when the
truck was coming from the opposite side. The mechanic is not
shown to be an expert in physics, and his statement was rightly
of
rejected by the learned Courts below. The motorcycle was
moving uphill, and the motorcyclists would have attempted to
rt
save the motorcycle after it was hit by the bus; therefore, the
possibility of falling towards the right side could not be ruled
out. This Court should not disturb the concurrent findings of
fact recorded by the learned Courts below while exercising the
revisional jurisdiction; hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional
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11 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page
207: –
.
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrentfindings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revisionof
against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vests
rt
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The
object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-
founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
individual cases. It is also well settled that while
considering the same, the Revisional Court does not
dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to
reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the
power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made
in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a::: Downloaded on – 10/03/2026 20:34:03 :::CIS
12 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the
perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
.
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section
397 has been considered and succinctly explained as
under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
of
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself
as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings
or order made in a case. The object of this provision
rtis to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded
error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it,
bear a token of careful consideration and appear to
be in accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where
the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but
are merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing
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with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law
in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in
the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the
case substantially falls within the categories
.
aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
much-advanced stage in the proceedings under
CrPC.”
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
of
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
rt
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope
of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercisingthe revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri,
(1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while consideringthe scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp.
454-55, para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with
the power of an appellate court, nor can it be
treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence
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and come to its conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice
of the High Court which would otherwise
.
tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High
Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no
hesitation in concluding that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the
of
oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to
and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this
rt
Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19].
This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order
of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely
on the ground that another view is possible. The
following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading
of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another
view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant
to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power
in the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The
revisional power of the court under Sections 397
to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an
appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose
decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be
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perverse or untenable in law or is grossly
erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the
decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
.
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the
decision in exercise of their revisional
jurisdiction.”
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)
of
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page
205: rt
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence
of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not
for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret
the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008)
14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that
the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong
order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the
absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first
question is, therefore, in the negative.”
17. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
18. The accused did not dispute in his statement
recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was driving the
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bus on 09.08.2012 at 8.45 A.M. He has also admitted that the
motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-0279 was moving
ahead of the bus. He also did not dispute that Subhash Chander
.
and Pyare Lal had fallen. The only dispute is whether the bus
had hit the motorcycle or the motorcycle had skidded on its
own.
of
19. Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) stated that when
the motorcycle reached near Awari, a bus bearing registration
rt
No. HP-69-2252 attempted to overtake it on a curve. A truck
came from the opposite side, and the driver steered the bus
towards the motorcycle and hit it. The motorcycle lost its
balance and fell on the spot. The accused was driving the bus
at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination
that there was a school towards the left side and shops towards
the right side. He could not say the time from which the bus
was following the motorcycle or the number of times the horn
was sounded by the driver of the bus. There was a curve 40
meters behind the place of the accident, and the bus had to be
slowed to negotiate the curve. He volunteered to say that the
bus could be moved in third gear at the curve. He admitted that
the road goes uphill for about 16 meters, and 25-30 passengers
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were sitting in the bus. The bus driver had attempted to
overtake the motorcycle wrongly. The truck was coming down
hill. The mirror of the motorcycle was broken because of the
.
accident. He denied that he was driving the motorcycle on the
edge and fell off.
20. Payare Lal (PW-2) stated that when the motorcycle
of
had reached near Awari, a bus bearing registration No. HP-69-
2252 attempted to overtake it at a high speed.
rt A truck came
from the opposite side, and the bus driver steered it towards
the motorcycle. The motorcycle fell on the unmetalled portion
of the road. He stated in his cross-examination that the
motorcycle was being driven at a speed of 20-25 kilometres per
hour. The place of the accident was located at a distance of 40-
50 meters from the bridge. There was a curve near the bridge,
and the vehicle had to be slowed down to negotiate the curve.
The road goes uphill after the curve. The truck was being
driven at a slow speed, and the truck driver had attempted to
apply the brakes. The motorcycle was being driven at a
distance of 5-6 inches from the edge of the road. The bus
driver had not sounded the horn before overtaking the
motorcycle. The bus was being driven on the right side of the
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motorcycle. The mirror was damaged by the accident. He
admitted that a small vehicle would fall towards the opposite
side in case it is hit by a larger vehicle, and the occupants would
.
sustain injuries on the left side.
21. Abhishek Chandel (PW-4) stated that he was
travelling in the bus on 09.08.2012, when the bus reached near
of
Awari school, a motorcycle fell. He got off the bus. The people
were saying that the motorcyclists had fallen. He could not say
rt
whose negligence led to the accident. He was permitted to be
cross-examined. He stated in his cross-examination that there
was a slight curve at the site of the accident. He did not
remember that the driver was overtaking the motorcycle when
a vehicle came from the opposite side, and the bus driver
steered it towards the left side of the road. He denied his
previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in his
cross-examination that no passengers had disclosed that the
bus had hit the motorcycle. There was a difference in the
height of the metalled and unmetalled portions of the road.
22. This witness was permitted to be cross-examined
and confronted with his previous statement. He denied his
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previous statement recorded by the police. H.C. Bodh Raj (PW-
13) specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of
Abhishek Chandel as per his version. This statement was not
.
challenged in his cross-examination, and a general suggestion
was put to him that he had not recorded the statements of the
witnesses as per their version, which was denied by the
of
Investigating Officer. A denied suggestion does not amount to
any proof and cannot be used for discarding the statement of
rt
the witnesses. Therefore, witness Abhishek Chandel is shown
to have made two inconsistent statements — one before the
police that the accident had occurred due to the overtaking of
the motorcycle by the bus and another before the Court that the
accused was not overtaking the motorcycle. Both these
statements cannot stand together, and his credit has been
impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi
Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been
thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous
statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However,
when he is confronted with some portions of the previous
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statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest
of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:
.
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that
even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-
examined and contradicted with the leave of the court
by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as amatter of law, be treated as washed off the record
altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each
case whether, as a result of such cross-examination andof
contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly
discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of
his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the
credit of the witness has not been completely shaken,
rt
he may, after reading and considering the evidence of
the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care,accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record,
that part of his testimony which he finds to be
creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the
whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, andin the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence,
discard his evidence in toto.”
23. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman
versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:
“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has
been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-
examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness
loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the
defence. We find support for the view we have taken
from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir
Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme
Court 1400, the Apex Court observed:
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“It is now well settled that when a witness, who
has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to
be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution,
the result of that course being adopted is to
discredit this witness altogether and not merely to.
get rid of a part of his testimony. ”
24. Therefore, his testimony cannot be used to discard
the prosecution’s case.
of
25. Statements of motorcyclists are corroborated by the
report of mechanical examination (Ex.PW9/A) in which it was
rt
specifically mentioned that head light cover was scratched on
the right side, the mud guard had a dent on the right side, and
the rear-view mirror had broken. Dev Raj (PW-9) conducted
the mechanical examination of the motorcycle. He stated in his
examination-in-chief that the damage was caused to head
light, mud guard and rear-view mirror in the accident.
Photographs (Ex.PW13/B-1 to Ex.PW13/B-4) also show damage
to the rear side of the motorcycle, proving that the motorcycle
was hit by something. Therefore, the statements of Subhash
Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Payare Lal (PW-2) are duly
corroborated by the mechanical report and the photographs,
and these were rightly accepted by the learned Courts below.
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22 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
26. Sukh Dev (PW-5) conducted the mechanical
examination of the bus and found no defect in it that could have
led to the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that if a
.
large vehicle hits a small vehicle, the small vehicle would fall
towards the left side. It was submitted that the statement of
this witness in cross-examination makes the prosecution’s
of
case highly doubtful because the injuries were noticed on the
right side of the body of the motorcyclists and not on the left
rt
side. This submission cannot be accepted. Sukh Dev (PW-5)
mentioned his qualification as Matriculate and ITI, in the
report (Ex.PW5/A). It was rightly submitted on behalf of the
State that he is not an expert in physics but only a mechanic,
and his testimony regarding the direction of fall could not be
accepted. The motorcycle was moving, and the motorcyclists
would have attempted to save themselves from falling;
therefore, the possibility of their falling towards the right side
cannot be ruled out.
27. It is also submitted that the place of the accident
was highly populated and the school and shops were located on
the spot, but no independent witness was examined by the
prosecution. This submission will not help the petitioner.
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23 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
There is no evidence that any independent person was present
on the spot who had witnessed the occurrence. Therefore, the
prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because of the non-
.
examination of any independent witness.
28. It was submitted that the prosecution has not
established the negligence of the accused, and the mere high
of
speed of the bus is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the
accused. This submission will not help the accused.
rt The
statements of Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal
(PW-2) show that the bus driver had attempted to overtake the
motorcycle on a curve when a truck was coming from the
opposite side of the road. Rule 6 of the Rules of the Road
Regulations, 1989 provides that the driver of a motor vehicle
shall not pass a vehicle travelling in the same direction as
himself on a curve if his passing is likely to cause
inconvenience or danger to other traffic proceeding in any
direction and without getting signal from the driver ahead of
him. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in
Shammi Malik v. Amrik Singh, 1997 SCC OnLine P&H 1266: (1998)
2 RCR (Civil) 14 (2) that the driver of the vehicle cannot overtake
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24 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
when another vehicle is coming from the opposite side. It was
observed at page 15:
.
“5. …Regulation 6 of the Rules of the Road Regulations,
1989, provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall
not pass a vehicle travelling in the same direction if the
driver ahead of him has not signalled that he may beover-taken and if his passing is likely to cause
inconvenience or danger to other traffic proceeding in
any direction. In this case, it is not the case of the truckof
driver was the driver of the car who had given him a
signal that he may be overtaken. In fact, the truck driver
should not have overtaken the car when he had noticed a
truck coming from the opposite direction. It is also not
rt
the case of the truck driver that the truck driver did not
apply the brakes or did not slow the vehicle. Rather, it isthe case of the truck driver that the speed of the car was
slow. A Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in K.N.
Nithyananda v. Mysore State Agro Industries Corporation,
by its Managing Director Bangalore and another, AIR 1973Mysore 314, in context with Regulation 4 (now
Regulation 6), has held that the drivers of automatically
propelled vehicles, when attempting to overtakevehicles going ahead of them should wait for the proper
opportunity viz., slackness in traffic on the same roadbefore doing so. They are duty-bound to exercise
sufficient care and caution by looking ahead and behindto ascertain that it would be safe for them to overtake
such a vehicle. A further duty is cast on them to give a
proper signal to the driver of the vehicle ahead to
indicate that they would be overtaking the vehicle and
wait for a reply signal from the driver permitting them
to overtake and thereby indicating that the road is clear
and there would be no danger in overtaking. The
evidence of RW-1, Amrik Singh, a truck driver, makes it
abundantly clear that he did not at all exercise any
caution while overtaking the Maruti car or while
stopping his vehicle all of a sudden. In these::: Downloaded on – 10/03/2026 20:34:04 :::CIS
25 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that
Amrik Singh, a truck driver, was not only rash in the
manner of driving the truck while overtaking the Maruti
car but was also negligent in stopping his vehicle all of a
sudden, thereby causing the accident.”
.
29. A similar view was taken by this Court in State of
H.P. vs Piar Chand 2003 (2) Shim. LC 341, wherein it was
observed:
of
“19. In Raj Kumar v. State of H.P. 1997 (2) Sim. L.C. 161,
learned single Judge of this Court, while dealing with a
similar situation, has held as under: –
rt”13. It goes without saying that the drivers of
automatically propelled vehicles, when attemptingto overtake vehicles going ahead of them, ought to
wait for the proper opportunity. A duty is cast on
them to exercise sufficient care and caution bylooking ahead and behind to ascertain that it would
be safe for them to overtake the vehicle moving
ahead of them. A further duty is cast on them togive a proper signal to the driver of the vehicle
ahead to indicate that they would be overtaking thevehicles and wait for a reply signal from that driver
permitting them to overtake and thereby
indicating that the road ahead is clear and therewould be no danger in overtaking. If these
minimum precautions are not observed by drivers
of automatically propelled vehicles, while
overtaking the vehicles going ahead of them, it will
have to be considered that such driving is rash and
negligent.”
20. In the case in hand, the accused, while overtaking
the truck, was required to take the minimum precaution
to have awaited for proper opportunity to overtake the
truck and taking necessary caution to see whether any::: Downloaded on – 10/03/2026 20:34:04 :::CIS
26 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )vehicle was not coming from the opposite side and to
give a proper signal to the driver of the truck and wait
for a reply signal from the driver of the truck. This has
not been done by the accused and, therefore, he was
negligent in driving the Jeep.”
.
30. In the present case, the accused overtook the
motorcycle on a curve when another vehicle was coming from
the opposite side, contrary to the Rules of the Road
of
Regulations. There is no evidence that the motorcyclist had
signalled the petitioner to overtake him. Therefore, the
rt
petitioner was in breach of the statutory regulations, which led
to the accident. Therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the
IPC.
31. It is undisputed that motorcyclists Subash Chander
Chandel and Pyare Lal had sustained injuries in the accident.
The accused admitted this fact in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Dr Deepak (PW-10) also proved that
Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and Pyare Lal (PW-2) had
sustained injuries which could have been caused by an accident.
This was not suggested to be incorrect. Therefore, it was duly
proved on record that Subhash Chander Chandel (PW-1) and
Pyare Lal (PW-2) had sustained injuries in the accident caused
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27 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
by the negligence of the accused, and he was rightly convicted
of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337
of the IPC.
.
32. In Manoj Chauhan (supra), the identity of the driver
was not proved. However. In the present case, the accused had
not disputed his identity. Therefore, the judgment of Manoj
of
Chauhan (supra) does not apply to the present case.
33. In Ram Pal (supra), the prosecution had asserted
rt
that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the bus,
which was not held to be sufficient. In the present case, the
accident occurred because of a violation of Rule 6 of the Rules
of the Road Regulations. Therefore, the cited judgment does
not apply to the present case.
34. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the
IPC, and for six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹
500/-, and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 15
days for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 337 of the IPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
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28 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82
that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted
of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:
.
“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is
made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to aconvicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents
have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is
galloping up day by day in India and that no solution isof
in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them
down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that
“more people die of road accidents than by most dis-
eases, so much so the Indian highways are among the
rt
top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents
was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. KrishnaIyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :
“Rashness and negligence are relative concepts,
not absolute abstractions. In our current condi-
tions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the
rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the
fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty ve-
hicles and speeding menaces.”
12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC
538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed
on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to
remain in force although the High Court too had con-
firmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted
of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the
death of a human being. In that case, this Court en-
hanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six
months besides imposing a fine.
13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents
in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the
victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat
the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as at-
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29 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
tracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act.
While considering the quantum of sentence to be im-
posed for the offence of causing death by rash or negli-
gent driving of automobiles, one of the prime consider-
ations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals
.
the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his
working hours. He must constantly inform himself that
he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or
inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle
in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance
thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an
of
accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not nec-
essarily result in the death of any human being, or even
if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the
offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would
rt
be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always
keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the
offence of causing the death of a human being due to his
callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail
sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, par-
ticularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the
high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of
automobiles.”
35. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.
Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: –
“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy
of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver,
they must have better training in traffic laws and moral
responsibility, with special reference to the potential
injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased
number of road accidents, this Court, on several
occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing
with the offences relating to motor accidents that they
cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section
304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We::: Downloaded on – 10/03/2026 20:34:04 :::CIS
30 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir
Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208].
36. Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh
.
Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine
SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196:
“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to
observe that India has a disreputable record of road
accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among theof
drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all
they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless
driving, where other people become their prey. The
poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians
rt
think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in
constant fear, but are still apprehensive about theobnoxious attitude of the people who project
themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances,
we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should
scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in
Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”
37. Therefore, the sentence imposed by the learned
Courts below cannot be said to be excessive.
38. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of
Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused.
However, it is not permissible because of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalbir (supra). This Court is bound
by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and is unable to
follow the judgments of this Court in Lekh Raj (supra) and in
Pawan Kumar (supra). The Judgment of the Supreme Court in
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31 ( 2026:HHC:6364 )
Chellammal (supra) dealt with the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 304-B and 498A of the IPC and not
with the commission of offences punishable under Sections
.
279 and 337 of the IPC. Hence, the cited judgment does not
apply to the present case.
39. No other point was urged.
of
40. In view of above, the present revision petition fails,
and it is dismissed and so are the pending applications, if any.
rt
41. Records be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
10 March, 2026.
(jai)
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