Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Purna Chandra Raul & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 5 March, 2026
2026:CHC-AS:362
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas
C.R.A. 114 of 1990
Purna Chandra Raul & Anr.
-Versus-
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellants : Mr. Angshuman Chakraborty
Chakraborty,
Mr. Niladri Saha,
Mr. Subhojit Seth
For the State : Mr. Avishek Sinha,
Mr. Tirupati Mukherjee.
Hearing concluded on : 20.02.2026
Judgment On : 05.03.2026
Prasenjit Biswas, J:-
1.
This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment
and order dated 08.03.1990 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Midnapore in connection with
Sessions Trial No. XXII of September, 1998, arising out of
G.R. Case No. 1166/1987.
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2. By passing the impugned judgment, this appellant was
found guilty for commission of offence punishable under
Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code and was
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years
and to pay fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of
fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two
years.
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said
impugned judgment and order of conviction the present
appeal has been filed at the instance of the appellant.
4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, can be delineated as
follows:
“The instant proceedings originated from
a written complaint lodged by the de-facto
complainant, who is the brother of the
deceased victim. In his complaint, the de-facto
complainant stated that his sister was married
to appellant no.1, Purna Chandra Raul, on 5th
Jaistha, 1393 (B.S.). Following the marriage,
the victim commenced her conjugal life in the
house of the appellants. At the time of
marriage, it is alleged that a sum of Rs.
3,000/-, along with ornaments and other
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articles, was provided to the appellants as
dowry. According to the complaint, after a
short period of married life, the appellants
began to exert pressure on the victim to
procure additional money from her parental
home. The victim, allegedly unable to meet
their demands, purportedly became the
subject of systematic ill-treatment and
physical torture. It is stated that the victim
repeatedly disclosed these incidents to the de
facto complainant, her parents (PW2 and
PW3), and the wife of the de-facto
complainant (PW4) whenever she visited her
parental home. She reportedly conveyed that,
unless the demands of the appellants were
satisfied, she would continue to face physical
and mental harassment and, ultimately, would
be left with no alternative but to take her own
life. Tragically, it is alleged that the victim
committed suicide on 31.07.1987, being
unable to endure the persistent torture
inflicted by the appellants. Upon hearing that
his sister had been admitted to the hospital,
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the de-facto complainant proceeded to the
Hospital, only to find that the victim had
expired. Following this, he reported the matter
to the local police station; however, no
immediate action was taken by the police.
Faced with inaction, the de-facto complainant
filed a written complaint before the learned
Judicial Magistrate, Midnapore. The learned
Magistrate, upon receipt of the petition,
forwarded it to the Officer-in-Charge of
Sabang Police Station, treating the complaint
as an FIR and directing the initiation of a
formal investigation. Pursuant to this direction,
Sabang Police Station registered the matter as
Case No. 3 dated 17.08.1987 against the
appellants and other accused persons.
Following the investigation, the prosecuting
agency submitted the charge-sheet against the
appellants on 28.05.1988, thereby formally
initiating proceedings against them under the
relevant provisions of law. This summary
outlines the prosecution’s narrative, which
forms the foundation of the charges of cruelty,
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dowry harassment, and abetment of suicide
leveled against the appellants in the present
case.”
5. The charge was framed by the Trial Court against the
appellants under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian
Penal Code and the same was read over and explained to
them in which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried.
6. During this appeal the appellant no.2 Smt. Sarala Rani
Raul died and the present appeal stood abated against her.
7. In this case, the prosecution has examined eight(8)
witnesses and documents were marked as exhibits on its
behalf, while the defence has examined none.
8. Mr. Angshuman Chakraborty, learned Advocate appearing
for the appellants, submitted that the impugned judgment
and order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court is
not sustainable for multiple reasons, primarily arising from
omissions, contradictions, and deficiencies in the
prosecution evidence.
9. The learned Advocate contended that the depositions of
PW1 (the brother of the deceased), PW2 (mother), PW3
(father), and PW4 (wife of PW1) could not be relied upon
as they are all close relations of the deceased, and
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therefore their evidence is inherently susceptible to bias.
He submitted that there is no direct evidence on record to
establish that the deceased was subjected to cruelty,
systematic ill-treatment, or physical torture by the
appellants. Despite this, the learned Trial Court
erroneously concluded that the appellants treated the
victim with cruelty and rendered her life miserable on
account of non-payment of sufficient dowry.
10. Mr. Chakraborty further argued that there could have been
mental derangement on the part of the victim, particularly
in view of her pregnancy, which might have led her to take
the extreme step of suicide. The learned Trial Court,
according to the Advocate, failed to appreciate this
significant aspect of the case, thereby arriving at a flawed
conclusion regarding the cause of death.
11. The learned Advocate also highlighted procedural lapses in
the investigation. He pointed out that the Investigating
Officer (PW8) had clearly stated in his deposition that
PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, and PW5 did not make any
statement before him that the appellants had ever
tortured the victim or pressured her to bring additional
dowry. This omission, according to Mr. Chakraborty,
severely undermines the credibility of the evidence led by
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the prosecution in Court and creates serious doubts
regarding the reliability of the allegations made for the
first time during trial.
12. Another point of contention raised was the delay in lodging
the complaint. The complaint was filed before the learned
Judicial Magistrate, Midnapore, on 05.08.1989, six days
after the alleged incident. The learned Advocate submitted
that the prosecution failed to provide a satisfactory
explanation for this delay, which casts further doubt on the
authenticity and spontaneity of the complaint.
13. In conclusion, Mr. Chakraborty contended that the
evidence brought on record by the prosecution is neither
sufficient nor reliable to sustain a conviction under
Sections 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. He
submitted that, in view of the material omissions,
contradictions, lack of direct evidence of cruelty,
procedural lapses, and the possible alternative explanation
relating to the mental condition of the deceased, the
prosecution has manifestly failed to prove the charges
against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
14. On these grounds, the learned Advocate urged that the
impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the
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learned Trial Court be set aside and the present appeal be
allowed
15. Mr. Avishek Sinha, learned Advocate appearing for the
State, submitted that there is no material on record
warranting interference with the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment and order of
conviction. He contended that, according to the evidence
led by the prosecution, the victim was subjected to
physical and mental cruelty at the hands of the appellants
after her marriage, in connection with the demand for
additional dowry.
16. The learned Advocate drew attention to the consistent
depositions of PW1 (brother of the victim), PW2 (mother of
the victim), PW3 (father of the victim), and PW4 (wife of
PW1), who all stated that the victim had repeatedly
reported to them about the torture inflicted by the
appellants on the pretext of demanding more dowry.
These witnesses, as per the submission of Mr. Sinha,
consistently described the mental and physical suffering
endured by the deceased and conveyed that she had
informed them about the harassment at various points in
time.
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17. Further, reliance was placed on the testimony of PW5, a
neighbor of PW1, who stated that the victim frequently
visited his house and had informed him that her marital
relationship with appellant no.1 was not cordial. According
to PW5, the victim disclosed that she was subjected to
systematic ill-treatment and torture by appellant no.1 and
appellant no.2 (now deceased) because she could not
meet their financial demands.
18. According to Mr. Sinha, when the depositions of PW1,
PW2, PW3, and PW4 are read in conjunction with the
evidence of PW5, a consistent pattern emerges indicating
that the victim was subjected to physical and mental
harassment by the appellants, which, in turn, led to her
committing suicide by hanging.
19. The learned Advocate also emphasized the medical
evidence to support the prosecution’s case. PW6, the
autopsy surgeon, deposed that he observed a ligature
mark approximately three-quarters of an inch broad,
obliquely encircling the neck with a gap on the left side,
along with parchmentation upon dissection. In his opinion,
the cause of death was ante-mortem hanging, which was
likely suicidal. Although the post-mortem report was not
brought on record or marked as an exhibit, Mr. Sinha
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submitted that the oral deposition of PW6 cannot be
discarded merely on that account.
20. Attention was further drawn to PW7, the attending doctor
at Sabang Primary Health Centre, who deposed that on
31.07.1987 the deceased’s body was brought to the
hospital, where he declared her dead. PW7 also expressed
the opinion that the death appeared unnatural and
accordingly referred the matter to the Sabang Police
Station.
21. Mr. Sinha submitted that the prosecution, through the
cumulative evidence of PW1 to PW5 and the medical
witnesses PW6 and PW7 had successfully proved the
charges framed against the appellants. He contended that
although these witnesses were subjected to cross-
examination, their veracity was not materially shaken, and
their evidence remained consistent and credible.
22. On this basis, it was submitted that there was no illegality
or material irregularity in the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment and order of
conviction. Consequently, Mr. Sinha urged that the
judgment of conviction be upheld and the present appeal
challenging the same be dismissed.
11
C.R.A. 114 of 1990 2026:CHC-AS:362 23. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions
advanced by both the parties and have gone through all
the materials on record.
24. PW1, Milon Kumar Giri, who is the brother of the deceased
and the de-facto complainant in the present case, deposed
that his sister was married to appellant no.1 and that, at
the time of marriage, cash money, ornaments and other
articles were given as dowry in accordance with the
demand allegedly made by appellant no.1 and his mother
(appellant no.2). He further stated that, subsequent to the
marriage, appellant no.1 along with appellant no.2 began
to ill-treat his sister. According to this witness, the
deceased had disclosed to him that appellant no.1 used to
demand further sums of money from her for the purpose
of starting a business, and that such demand was also
conveyed to PW2 and PW3, the parents of the deceased. It
was his version that due to financial constraints, they were
unable to satisfy the said demand.
25. However, when the evidence of PW1 is carefully
scrutinized, certain aspects emerge which cast serious
doubt on its reliability. Although PW1 claimed that his
sister had informed him about the alleged torture and
continued demands for dowry, it is indeed surprising that
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he did not take any immediate or effective steps to
address the alleged cruelty. No complaint was lodged
before the local police station, nor was any approach made
to any village authority or other competent forum prior to
the unfortunate death of the victim. Such inaction on the
part of a brother, who claims to have been aware of
persistent torture and unlawful demands, appears
unnatural and inconsistent with normal human conduct.
26. PW1 further deposed that he came to know about the
incident from one Gostha Raul, who informed him that his
sister had been admitted to Sabang Hospital. Upon
receiving this information, PW1 went to the hospital at
night and learned that his sister had already expired and
that the police had taken the body for post-mortem
examination. Even at this crucial juncture after personally
witnessing the death of his sister under allegedly
suspicious circumstances PW1 did not immediately lodge
any complaint. Instead, he admitted in his evidence that
he did not return home that night but stayed in a shop,
and although he visited the police station the following
morning, he did not submit any written complaint.
27. This conduct is wholly inconsistent with the expected
reaction of a brother who genuinely believed that his sister
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had been subjected to cruelty and dowry-related
harassment leading to her death. A natural and
spontaneous reaction would have been to immediately
approach the police authorities with a written complaint
detailing the alleged acts of torture and dowry demand.
The absence of such prompt action raises a serious doubt
regarding the veracity of his version.
28. Significantly, the formal complaint was ultimately lodged
not before the police but before the Court of the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Midnapore, on 05.08.1987, whereas
the incident had occurred on 31.07.1987. Thus, there is an
apparent delay of five days in setting the criminal law in
motion. Though PW1 attempted to explain that he had
visited the concerned police station on two consecutive
days after the incident and that no action was taken by the
police, compelling him to file a complaint before the
learned Court, his evidence does not satisfactorily clarify
why he waited until 05.08.1987 to do so. If indeed the
police failed to act immediately upon his approach, nothing
prevented him from promptly seeking judicial intervention
without undue delay.
29. The explanation offered is vague and lacks specific details
as to the dates, the officers approached, or the exact
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nature of the alleged inaction by the police. In the absence
of any cogent or convincing explanation for the delay, such
procrastination assumes significance, particularly in a case
involving serious allegations of dowry-related cruelty and
death.
30. Therefore, considering the unexplained delay in lodging
the complaint, the unnatural conduct of PW1 in not taking
timely steps either prior to or immediately after the death
of the victim, and the lack of clarity in his explanation
regarding police inaction, the testimony of PW1 becomes
doubtful and does not inspire confidence. His evidence,
when assessed in its entirety, appears to suffer from
material infirmities which substantially affect its credibility.
31. PW1 stated in his examination-in-chief that the victim had,
on 2-3 occasions, informed him about the alleged ill-
treatment, assault, torture and demand for additional
money by appellant no.1. He further deposed that the last
such complaint was made approximately five to six months
prior to her death. Thus, by his own showing, the alleged
acts of cruelty were neither sudden nor isolated, but were
recurring in nature and known to him well in advance of
the unfortunate incident. However, what is striking is the
complete inaction on his part despite such knowledge. If
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indeed the deceased had repeatedly complained of assault
and unlawful demands for money, and if those demands
had created such distress that she allegedly expressed an
apprehension of committing suicide in case the money was
not paid, it would be reasonable to expect that her brother
would take immediate and effective steps to protect her.
Yet, PW1 admittedly did not lodge any complaint before
the local police station or any other appropriate authority
at any point of time prior to her death.
32. In cross-examination, PW1 candidly admitted that neither
he nor his family members informed the police station
about the alleged torture or the demand for additional
money by appellant no.1. He further admitted that they
did not inform the police that the victim had expressed a
threat of committing suicide if the demanded money was
not paid. These admissions are significant. An allegation
that a married woman had conveyed her intention to
commit suicide due to dowry-related harassment is an
extremely serious matter. The natural and expected
conduct of a responsible family member would have been
to immediately approach the authorities or at least
attempt some form of intervention. The absence of any
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such action casts a serious doubt on whether such
statements were in fact ever made by the deceased.
33. PW1 also stated that he had informed one Niranjan Raul,
who had allegedly arranged the marriage between the
victim and appellant no.1, about the torture inflicted upon
his sister. However, this Niranjan Raul was not cited or
examined as a prosecution witness. In the absence of such
independent corroboration, the version of PW1 remains
unsubstantiated. When a material witness, who could have
thrown light on the veracity of the allegations, is withheld
without explanation, an adverse inference may reasonably
arise against the prosecution case. Furthermore, PW1
admitted in cross-examination that even after coming to
know about the death of his sister, he did not inform the
police or the hospital authorities in writing regarding the
alleged torture or dowry demands. This conduct, viewed in
the totality of circumstances, appears inconsistent with the
conduct of a person who genuinely believed that his sister
had been driven to death by persistent cruelty and
unlawful demands.
34. The cumulative effect of these omissions and admissions is
that the testimony of PW1 does not inspire confidence. His
failure to take any contemporaneous action despite alleged
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repeated disclosures by the victim, the absence of
corroboration from an independent witness like Niranjan
Raul, and his admitted silence before the authorities even
after the death of the victim, creates a substantial dent in
the prosecution case.
35. PW2, Parul Bala Giri, the mother of the deceased, deposed
that after her daughter’s marriage, the victim visited her
parental home and narrated the incidents of torture
allegedly inflicted upon her by appellant no.1 and his
mother (appellant no.2). According to PW2, she came to
learn from her daughter about the ill-treatment,
harassment and demand for additional money. She further
stated in her evidence that she had reported the entire
episode to the police as narrated to her by the victim.
However, when her testimony is examined in light of the
evidence of PW8, the Investigating Officer, material
contradictions surface which significantly impair the
credibility of her version. PW8 categorically stated in his
deposition that PW2 did not tell him during investigation
that appellant no.1 and appellant no.2 used to torture her
daughter. He further stated that PW2 did not disclose
before him that she had heard from her daughter about
such torture or harassment. Additionally, PW8 deposed
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that PW2 did not state before him that after marriage
appellant no.1 had lost his job and, due to financial
distress, used to exert pressure upon the victim to bring
more money from her parental home.
36. These omissions are not minor discrepancies but go to the
root of the prosecution case. Allegations of torture and
dowry demand form the very foundation of the charge. If
PW2 had truly informed the Investigating Officer about
these serious allegations during the course of
investigation, it is reasonable to expect that the same
would have been reflected in her statement recorded
under law. The failure of PW2 to state these vital facts
before the Investigating Officer renders her testimony
before the Court an apparent improvement and
embellishment, thereby affecting its reliability.
37. PW2 further stated that PW3, the father of the victim, used
to visit the matrimonial home of the deceased. However,
she could not say whether PW3 informed the police about
the alleged torture inflicted upon their daughter. This
uncertainty further weakens the prosecution case, as it
suggests that no concrete or consistent steps were taken
by the family members despite their alleged knowledge of
continuous harassment.
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38. It is also significant that, by her own admission, PW2 did
not take any immediate or effective step after being
informed by her daughter about the alleged torture and
demand for money. Being the mother of a married
daughter, it would be natural and expected for her to react
with concern and urgency upon learning that her daughter
was being subjected to cruelty and unlawful demands.
Ordinarily, such information would prompt a mother to
intervene personally, convene a meeting between the
families, or approach the police or other appropriate
authorities. In the present case, however, no such step
was taken. No complaint was lodged, nor was the matter
formally brought to the notice of any authority prior to the
unfortunate death of the victim.
39. The silence and inaction on the part of PW2, despite
allegedly having knowledge of persistent torture, appear
inconsistent with normal human conduct. When this aspect
is considered alongside the material omissions in her
earlier statement as pointed out by PW8, her testimony
becomes doubtful.
40. In view of these contradictions, improvements, and
unexplained inaction, the evidence of PW2 does not inspire
confidence. Her deposition, lacking corroboration and
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suffering from material infirmities, cannot be safely relied
upon to substantiate the charge framed against the
appellants.
41. PW3, Gayaram Giri, the father of the victim, deposed
substantially on the same lines as PW2. He stated that his
daughter had informed him about the alleged assault and
torture inflicted upon her by appellant no.1 and his mother
(appellant no.2). According to him, the deceased
complained that appellant no.1 frequently pressurized her
to bring money from her parental home due to financial
hardship in the matrimonial family. He further stated that,
responding to such demand, he paid a sum of Rs. 600/- to
appellant no.1 for purchasing a bicycle so that he could
start some business.
42. While these assertions appear to support the prosecution
case on the surface, a deeper scrutiny of his evidence
reveals serious infirmities that cast doubt upon its
reliability. Firstly, although PW3 alleged persistent physical
torture and repeated monetary demands, no
contemporaneous complaint was lodged by him before any
police station or other competent authority during the
lifetime of his daughter. Such silence is significant. If a
father genuinely believed that his daughter was being
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subjected to sustain physical cruelty and unlawful
demands for money, it would be natural for him to take
prompt steps, either by reporting the matter to the police,
approaching local elders, or initiating some form of
intervention. However, no such action was taken. In cross-
examination, PW3 admitted that he did not remember
whether he had reported the incidents narrated by his
daughter to the police. He further stated that he had not
reported to anybody about the alleged torture and ill-
treatment inflicted upon his daughter prior to her death.
These admissions are material. They demonstrate not only
a lack of contemporaneous action but also uncertainty as
to whether any grievance was ever formally raised at all.
43. The inaction of PW3, coupled with the similar inaction of
his wife (PW2), during the lifetime of the victim,
substantially weakens the prosecution’s version. The
conduct attributed to them is inconsistent with that of
concerned parents who were allegedly aware of sustained
physical and mental cruelty inflicted upon their daughter
for dowry.
44. Moreover, the testimony of PW3 suffers from further
contradictions when viewed in light of the evidence of
PW8, the Investigating Officer. PW8 categorically deposed
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that PW3 did not state before him that he had heard from
the victim about any assault or torture by the appellants.
He also did not state before PW8 that appellant no.1 used
to pressurize his daughter to bring money from him in
order to start a business. Furthermore, PW3 did not inform
the Investigating Officer that the relationship between his
daughter and appellant no.1 was not cordial.
45. These omissions are of a serious nature. The allegations of
pressure to bring money, strained marital relations, and
repeated torture form the core of the prosecution case. If
such facts were truly known to PW3 and were
communicated to him by the victim, it is expected that he
would have disclosed the same during investigation. The
failure to do so indicates that these statements were
introduced for the first time during his deposition before
the Trial Court. Such material improvements and
embellishments at the stage of trial seriously affect the
credibility of a witness. When crucial facts are absent in
the statement made during investigation but are later
introduced in Court, they assume the character of
afterthoughts and cannot be accepted without caution.
46. PW4, Swarnalata Giri, the wife of PW1, deposed largely
along the same lines as PW1, PW2, and PW3. She stated
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that the deceased had been subjected to alleged torture at
the hands of appellant no.1 and his mother (appellant
no.2). According to her, when she asked the victim, the
deceased disclosed that the appellants were exerting
pressure on her to provide more dowries, and that very
often she refused to return to her matrimonial home
because of the ill-treatment. PW4 further asserted that the
victim had endured persistent harassment and torture in
connection with the demand for additional dowry.
47. However, as with the other family members, a critical
aspect of her testimony undermines its reliability. PW4 did
not lodge any complaint with the police or bring the
alleged cruelty to the attention of any appropriate
authority during the lifetime of the victim. Despite being
aware of the purported torture and the serious nature of
the dowry demands, she failed to take any immediate
steps to intervene or protect the victim. Such inaction is
inconsistent with ordinary human conduct and raises
serious questions regarding the veracity of her claims.
Further scrutiny of her testimony in the context of the
evidence of PW8, the Investigating Officer, reveals
material contradictions. PW8 deposed that PW4 did not
state before him that appellant no.1 or his mother had
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tortured the victim to demand additional dowry. She also
did not inform PW8 that the appellants had physically
assaulted the victim, nor did she claim that, despite
payment of Rs. 600/- by PW3 to appellant no.1, the
alleged torture had continued unabated.
48. This discrepancy is significant. The omissions indicate that
the allegations regarding torture on account of dowry
demands were not part of the contemporaneous statement
made to the police during investigation. The version of
PW4 presented in Court thus represents an embellishment
or improvement introduced for the first time at trial. Such
material alterations reduce the credibility of the witness,
as they are inconsistent with the statements recorded
during the investigation. Taken together with the fact that
PW4, like PW1, PW2, and PW3, did not take any
contemporaneous action during the lifetime of the
deceased, her testimony cannot be viewed as spontaneous
or reliable. The failure to report the alleged harassment,
coupled with the first-time disclosure of critical details
regarding torture and dowry pressure in Court, casts
serious doubt on the authenticity of her evidence.
49. In conclusion, while PW4 claims to have knowledge of the
alleged torture upon the victim, the material omissions in
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her earlier statement and the lack of any
contemporaneous action render her testimony inherently
doubtful. Her deposition, therefore, cannot be safely relied
upon to substantiate the charge of cruelty and dowry
harassment against the appellants.
50. PW5, Prafulla Maity, cited as a neighbor of PW1, deposed
in the present case that he came to know from the victim
that her marital relationship with appellant no.1 was not
cordial. According to his testimony, the victim disclosed to
him that she was subjected to systematic ill-treatment and
torture at the hands of appellant no.1 and his mother
(appellant no.2, now deceased) because she was unable to
meet their demands for money or dowry. PW5’s evidence,
at first glance, appears to corroborate the claims made by
PW1, PW2, PW3, and PW4 regarding harassment and
cruelty inflicted upon the deceased.
51. However, on a closer examination, several serious
deficiencies emerge in the testimony of PW5 that
undermine its reliability. Despite allegedly being informed
directly by the victim about the torture and harassment,
PW5, like the other witnesses who were close relations of
the deceased, did not take any contemporaneous action.
He did not lodge any complaint with the police, nor did he
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bring the matter to the attention of any appropriate
authority at the time the alleged incidents occurred. Such
inaction, given the seriousness of the allegations, is
inconsistent with the conduct expected of a person who
claims to have been aware of persistent cruelty and
harassment.
52. Further, during cross-examination and in the course of
investigation, material contradictions in PW5’s evidence
were revealed. It was admitted by him that he had not
stated before the Investigating Officer (PW8) that there
existed a strained relationship between the victim and
appellant no.1. PW8 corroborated that PW5 did not state
before him that the victim had informed him about
systematic ill-treatment, torture, or harassment by the
appellants for non-payment of dowry.
53. These omissions are crucial. They indicate that the
material allegations concerning ill-treatment, torture, and
dowry demand were introduced for the first time during his
deposition in the Trial Court. In other words, these claims
were not part of his statement made during investigation,
which substantially diminishes their credibility. In criminal
proceedings, especially in cases of serious charges like
cruelty and dowry harassment, such improvements or
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embellishments at the stage of trial are significant
indicators that the testimony may not reflect true and
contemporaneous knowledge.
54. In conclusion, while PW5 claims to have received
information from the victim about alleged torture and
dowry-related harassment, the failure to take any
contemporaneous steps, coupled with the absence of these
crucial facts in his prior statement to the Investigating
Officer, renders his evidence inherently doubtful. His
deposition cannot be relied upon as independent
corroboration of the prosecution’s case, and it does little to
strengthen the charges leveled against the appellants.
55. PW6, Dr. Kingshuk Basu, the Autopsy Surgeon who
conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead
body of the victim, deposed that he found a ligature mark
placed obliquely around the neck with a gap on the left
side. He further stated that the uterus contained a foetus
of approximately 24 weeks’ gestational age. According to
his opinion, the cause of death was ante-mortem hanging,
likely suicidal in nature. While this medical evidence
appears significant, a crucial procedural lapse undermines
its evidentiary value. It is indeed surprising that the post-
mortem report itself was neither brought on record nor
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exhibited during trial. No explanation has been offered by
the prosecution for its failure to formally prove and mark
the post-mortem report as an exhibit.
56. The post-mortem report constitutes a primary
documentary piece of evidence reflecting the detailed
findings of the autopsy, including the nature, position,
measurement and characteristics of injuries, internal
examination, and the final medical opinion as to the cause
of death. In the absence of such a document being
exhibited, the Court is deprived of the opportunity to
scrutinize the complete medical findings in their entirety.
Oral testimony of the doctor, though relevant, is ordinarily
corroborative of the written report prepared
contemporaneously at the time of examination. When a
document forms the foundation of an expert’s opinion, it
must be duly proved and exhibited in accordance with law.
Without the formal exhibition of the post-mortem report,
the Court cannot rely solely upon oral assertions made in
examination-in-chief, particularly in a case involving
serious criminal charges. The non-production of such a
vital document creates a gap in the chain of evidence and
raises doubt regarding the completeness and transparency
of the prosecution’s case.
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57. Furthermore, the opinion expressed by PW6 that the death
was due to ante-mortem hanging and was likely suicidal
assumes great significance in the context of the charges.
However, in the absence of the exhibited report, the
defence is prejudiced in effectively testing the basis of
such opinion, including whether the ligature mark and
other findings conclusively ruled out alternative
possibilities. The Court, too, is constrained from
independently assessing whether the medical findings are
consistent with the prosecution narrative.
58. In criminal jurisprudence, particularly where the cause of
death is central to the determination of guilt, strict
adherence to rules of proof is essential. The failure to
exhibit the post-mortem report, without any justification,
amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the prosecution.
Such omission cannot be treated as a mere technical
defect; rather, it goes to the root of the matter.
59. Therefore, in the absence of the post-mortem report being
duly proved and exhibited, the oral testimony of PW6
regarding the cause of death cannot, by itself, be safely
and conclusively relied upon. This deficiency creates a
significant lacuna in the prosecution case and renders the
medical evidence insufficient to independently establish
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the cause and nature of the victim’s death beyond
reasonable doubt.
60. PW7, Dr. Krishna Das, the attending doctor at Sabang
Primary Health Centre, deposed that on 31.07.1987, the
dead body of the victim was brought to the hospital where
he was posted, and upon examination, he declared the
victim to be dead. He further stated that, in his opinion,
the death appeared to be unnatural, and accordingly, he
referred the matter to the Sabang Police Station. At first
glance, this testimony appears to corroborate the fact that
the death was brought to official notice; however, a
detailed examination of PW7’s evidence exposes significant
gaps and deficiencies that diminish its evidentiary value.
61. Firstly, PW7 does not specify who brought the deceased to
the hospital. There is no indication whether it was a family
member, a neighbor, or any other person. The absence of
such information raises questions about the chain of
custody of the deceased prior to arrival at the hospital,
and whether any relevant events or circumstances prior to
hospitalization could have been properly recorded. In
cases involving alleged unnatural death, identification of
the person bringing the body is critical to establish the
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initial facts and to ensure that the authorities were
immediately notified.
62. Secondly, there is no documentary evidence presented to
show the admission of the deceased at Sabang Primary
Health Centre. Hospital records, registration entries, or
any contemporaneous notes regarding the admission or
examination of the deceased are conspicuously absent. In
the absence of such documentation, the oral evidence of
the attending doctor stands uncorroborated, which
weakens the probative value of the testimony of the
witness.
63. Thirdly, while PW7 stated that the death appeared
unnatural, he has not explained the basis for such opinion.
There is no description in his evidence of any examination
findings, observations, or medical indicators that led him
to conclude that the death was not natural. In forensic and
medico-legal practice, an opinion regarding the unnatural
nature of death must ordinarily be supported by visible
injuries, external signs, or circumstances observed upon
examination. Without any elaboration, the assertion of
“unnatural death” remains conclusory and
unsubstantiated.
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64. Given these gaps, absence of information on who brought
the body, non-production of hospital records, and lack of
explanation regarding the basis of the opinion, the
testimony of PW7 cannot be considered sufficient to
establish either the circumstances surrounding the death
or the nature of the death itself. His evidence, in isolation,
is inadequate to corroborate the prosecution’s narrative
about the alleged role of the appellants in causing the
death.
65. The allegations levelled by the prosecution, particularly
through PW1 (the de-facto complainant), the parents of
the victim, namely PW2 and PW3, as well as PW4 (wife of
PW1), regarding the demand for additional dowry and the
purported cruelty inflicted upon the victim, are wholly
bald, vague, and unsubstantiated. On careful scrutiny of
the written complaint as well as the evidence on record, it
becomes apparent that the allegations are conspicuously
devoid of material particulars. The complaint itself fails to
disclose crucial details such as the specific dates, times,
locations, or the precise manner in which the alleged
demands for dowry were made. Similarly, the complaint
does not clearly describe the nature, extent, or form of the
alleged physical and mental cruelty. Such omissions strike
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at the very foundation of the prosecution’s case. To
establish an offence under Section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code, it is imperative that there is cogent,
consistent, and reliable evidence showing that the conduct
of the accused amounted to harassment or cruelty of a
grave nature.
66. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to provide
any specific instances of cruelty in the evidence brought on
record. There is no elaboration regarding the precise acts
of torture, the frequency with which such acts occurred, or
the manner in which the alleged conduct affected the
physical or mental well-being of the victim. The evidence,
whether oral or documentary, remains general, omnibus,
and entirely lacking in particulars. It is essentially a
collection of broad and cryptic allegations without
corroboration or detail.
67. Bald and vague allegations of this nature cannot, and
should not, form the basis for a finding of guilt. Courts are
required to scrutinize such claims with utmost caution,
particularly when the accusations are general in nature
and implicate multiple members of a family without
delineating their individual roles and responsibilities. In
criminal law, the standard of proof is beyond reasonable
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doubt, and general or un-particularized statements cannot
meet that standard.
68. Moreover, in the present case, there is absolutely no
evidence on record to demonstrate that the conduct of the
appellants, if at all such acts occurred, was of a sufficiently
grave or willful nature as to drive the victim to commit
suicide. The prosecution has not adduced any evidence
establishing a direct causal link between the alleged
harassment and the unfortunate death of the victim.
69. In conclusion, the allegations made by the prosecution
witnesses being vague, general, and devoid of particulars
do not inspire confidence. The absence of specific details,
corroborative evidence, or contemporaneous
documentation renders the entire prosecution case
regarding dowry demand and cruelty inherently weak and
unreliable. Such evidence, without clear particulars and
substantiation, cannot serve as a basis for convicting the
appellants under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
70. To sustain a conviction for the offence of abetment of
suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, the
prosecution is required to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the essential ingredients contemplated under
Section 107 of the Code. Legally, abetment necessarily
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involves one of three forms: instigation, conspiracy, or
intentional aid rendered to the commission of the act. It is
settled law that not every act of discord, harassment, or
difference of opinion in a domestic or matrimonial context
would attract the rigours of Section 306 IPC.
71. Abetment of suicide is intrinsically linked to the mental
process of instigating, encouraging, or intentionally aiding
a person to commit self-destruction. Mere allegations of
harassment, strained relations, or ordinary domestic
discord do not by themselves constitute abetment unless
such conduct is of such severity and intensity that it leaves
the victim with no reasonable alternative but to commit
suicide. In other words, a proximate and direct causal
connection between the acts of the accused and the
suicide is indispensable. Remote, indirect, or generalized
conduct, unaccompanied by a clear causal link, falls short
of the statutory threshold.
72. A critical requirement under Section 306 IPC is the
existence of mens rea. The prosecution must demonstrate
that the accused possessed a guilty mind with the
intention to provoke, incite, or encourage the victim to
commit suicide. The mental element cannot be presumed
merely because a suicide occurred in the backdrop of
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alleged harassment or domestic disputes. Rather, the
evidence must clearly show that the accused acted with
conscious design or deliberate intention to bring about the
act of self-destruction. The requisite mens rea must be
apparent, conspicuous, and supported by credible
evidence; it cannot be inferred solely from strained
relations or general allegations of cruelty.
73. In the present case, a careful review of the record reveals
that there is no evidence of any positive, proximate, or
direct act on the part of the appellants that can reasonably
be said to have compelled or driven the deceased to
commit suicide. There is nothing on record to indicate that
the appellants consciously or deliberately intended to
instigate or facilitate the act of suicide. The conduct
alleged, even if accepted at its highest, amounts to
general discord and alleged harassment, which, in the
absence of specific and demonstrable instigation, is
insufficient to attract liability under Section 306 IPC.
74. As previously noted under Section 107 IPC, the state of
mind of the accused to facilitate or instigate the
commission of a particular crime must be visible and
demonstrable. There must be cogent and credible material
indicating that the accused acted with a conscious and
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deliberate design to bring about the suicide. In the present
case, such evidence is entirely absent. The prosecution has
failed to establish the mental element required for
abetment, and the alleged acts are too remote, vague, and
generalized to form the basis of a finding of guilt.
75. Further, to invoke liability under Section 306 of I.P.C., the
prosecution must first prove the factum of suicide beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, the post-mortem report of
the victim was not brought on record. Even if the oral
testimony of PW6, the autopsy surgeon, is taken into
consideration, it only suggests that the death was “likely
suicidal,” which is by no means sufficiently determinative
to establish the occurrence of suicide beyond reasonable
doubt. Without unequivocal proof of suicide, any claim of
abetment necessarily fails.
76. For the foregoing reasons, the charges framed against the
appellants under Sections 498A and 306 of the Indian
Penal Code cannot be sustained. The prosecution has
failed to establish the existence of cruelty or dowry-related
harassment under Section 498A, or the proximate,
intentional, and mens rea laden acts required for abetment
of suicide under Section 306. In the absence of credible,
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specific, and corroborated evidence, the charges cannot be
brought home.
77. In view of the above facts and circumstances and
discussions made above the conviction under Section 306
and 498A of the Indian Penal Code is not tenable in the
eye of law and as such, the impugned judgment and order
of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court is liable to
be set aside.
78. Accordingly, the instant appeal be and same is hereby
allowed.
79. The impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by
the learned Trial Court dated 8.03.1990 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Midnapore in
connection with Sessions Trial Case No. XXII of
September, 1988 arising out of G.R. Case No. 1166/87 is
hereby set aside.
80. The appellant no.1 is on bail. He is to be discharged from
his respective bail bond and be set at liberty if he is not
wanted in connection with other case.
81. In accordance with the mandate of Section 437A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 483 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), it is incumbent upon the
appellant to furnish bail bonds, accompanied by suitable
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sureties. Such bonds, once executed, shall remain in full
force and effect for a period of six months, ensuring the
presence of the appellant as required by law and securing
the due administration of justice.
82. Let a copy of this judgment along with the Trial Court
record be sent down to the Trial Court immediately.
83. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for,
be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees.
(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)