Karnataka High Court
G Rangarao S/O Achhanna vs The Deputy Commissioner on 25 February, 2026
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 110072 OF 2025 (SCST)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO. 110075 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 110080 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 110081 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 110083 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 110085 OF 2025
WRIT PETITION NO. 110086 OF 2025
IN WP No. 110072/2025:
BETWEEN:
G.RANGARAO S/O. ACHHANNA
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI, GANGAVATHI,
KOPPAL. DISTRICT-583 201.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
VISHAL 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
NINGAPPA KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583 201.
PATTIHAL
Digitally signed by VISHAL 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
NINGAPPA PATTIHAL
Location: HIGH COURT OF KOPPAL-583 201.
KARNATAKA DHARWAD
BENCH
Date: 2026.03.03 10:29:51
+0530 3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK KOPPAL DISTRICT.
4. THE TAHSILDAR
AND EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK KOPPAL DISTRICT.
5. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP,
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
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SIDDAPUR TALUK, KARAGAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583 201.
6. GOPAL S/O. PEERANAIK
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARAGATI,
DISTRICT KOPPAL-583 201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 04.12.2025
PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT
ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY
THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT
ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110075/2025:
BETWEEN:
G.RANGARAO S/O. ACHHANNA
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI,
GANGAVATHI, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583 201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL-583 201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK, KOPPAL DISTRICT.
4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP,
SIDDAPUR TALUK, KARAGAGI,
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583 201.
5. LAKSHMANA S/O. DEVALU @ DEVAJI
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110080/2025:
BETWEEN:
G. RANGARAO S/O. ACHHANNA
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI, GANGAVATHI,
KOPPAL DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL-583201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK,
KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
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HC-KAR
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP, SIDDAPUR,
TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
5. GEMU S/O. KRISHNA
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110081/2025:
BETWEEN:
G.RANGARAO S/O. ACHHANNA
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI, GANGAVATHI,
KOPPALL DISTRICT-583201.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL-583201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK,
KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP, SIDDAPUR,
TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
5. KASHAPPA S/O. DEVUJU
SIDDAPUR TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110083/2025:
BETWEEN:
Y SRINIVAS RAO S/O. PALAKALA RAO
AGE. 53 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI, GANGAVATHI,
KOPPAL DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL-583201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK, KOPPAL DISTRICT.
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
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4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP,
SIDDAPUR, TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
5. SHEETARAM S/O. BHOJANAIK
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
6. CHIKKARAJU
SIDDAPUR TALUK, KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5 & R6;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110085/2025:
BETWEEN:
G.RANGARAO S/O. ACHHANNA
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI,
GANGAVATHI, KOPPAL DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
KOPPAL-583201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK,
KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP,
SIDDAPUR, TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
5. SHIVAPPA S/O. SOMU NAIK
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583 201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
IN WP NO. 110086/2025:
BETWEEN:
Y. SRINIVAS RAO S/O. PALAKALA RAO
AGE. 53 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURIST,
R/O. JANGAMARAKALGUDI, GANGAVATHI,
KOPPAL DISTRICT-583101.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. M.B.HIREMATH, ADVOCATE)
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL, KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL-583201.
3. THE TAHSILDAR AND
EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE,
KARATAGI TALUK,
KOPPAL DISTRICT-583201.
4. SURESH S/O. SAVAREPPA
AGE. MAJOR, OCC. NIL,
R/O. GONDAVALA CAMP,
SIDDAPUR, TALUK. KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
5. SOMU S/O. DEVALYA NAIK
SIDDAPUR TALUK KARATAGI,
DISTRICT. KOPPAL-583201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ASHOK T.KATTIMANI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. B.C.JNANAYYASWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
NOTICE TO R4 IS SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI, QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
04.12.2025 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT IN
NO.REV/PTCL/70/2025 AT ANNEXURE-G AND IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 19.08.2025 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IN
NO.PTCL/3/2025/E-300907.3419 AT ANNEXURE-E; AND ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR ORDER THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
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WP No. 110072 of 2025
AND CONNECTED MATTERS
HC-KAR
ORAL ORDER
All these writ petition are directed against the
common order dated 19.08.2025 passed by the Assistant
Commissioner, Koppal in PTCL/3/2025 and the Revisional
Order dated 04.12.2025 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner in revision REV/PTCL/70/2025, whereby,
the lands in question under the provisions of the
Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (‘PTCL
Act‘ for short) are directed to be resumed and restored.
2. Since, the common questions of law and fact
are involved in all the writ petitions, are taken up together
and disposed of by this common order.
Brief facts:
3. The petitioners are purchasers of agricultural
land situated at Kotnekal Village, Karatagi Taluk, Koppal
District, bearing the following survey numbers:
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AND CONNECTED MATTERSHC-KAR
SL Writ petition No. Survey numbers Extent
No.1 110072/2025 38/8 2 acres
2 110075/2025 40/3 2 acres
3 110080/2025 38/9 2 acres
4 110081/2025 38/5 2 acre
5 110083/2025 38/6/4 4 acres
6 110085/2025 40/5 2 acres
7 110086/2025 40/2+4 4 acres
4. The lands were originally granted in the year
1978. Subsequent alienation took place between the years
2000 to 2016, and the petitioners purchased the land
through registered sale deeds and their names were
mutated in the revenue records and they are in
possession. In the year 2025, respondent No.4 filed an
application seeking resumption under Sections 4 and 5 of
the PTCL Act. The Assistant Commissioner allowed the
application and the Deputy Commissioner confirmed the
same in revision. The grant is in the year 1978, PTCL
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AND CONNECTED MATTERS
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proceedings are initiated in 2025. The delay according to
the petitioners is therefore nearly 47 years.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
the application for resumption was not filed by the original
grantee but by respondent No.4, who has no locus standi.
The grantee has not independently sought resumption.
The first alienation was long back and subsequent
purchaser has perfected title. The proceedings initiated
after 47 years are barred by unreasonable delay and does
not come to the rescue of those who have slept over their
rights. It is submitted that the authorities failed to call for
the original grant records as required under law and the
Revisional Authority mechanically confirmed the order. The
nature of grant (free grant or upset price), are not
examined and the PTCL act cannot be invoked after
unreasonable delay.
6. Reliance is placed on the following decision:
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AND CONNECTED MATTERSHC-KAR
i. Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of
Karnataka1 (Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi).
ii. Chhedi Lal Yadav and Others Vs. Hari
Kishore Yadav (dead) Through Legal
Representatives and Others2 (Chhedi
Lal).
iii. Gouramma @ Gangamma Vs. Deputy
Commissioner, Haveri and Others3
(Gouramma).
iv. Smt. M. Manjula and Others Vs. The
Deputy Commissioner and Others4 (M.
Manjula).
v. Muniraju and Others Vs. State of
Karnataka and Others5 (Muniraju).
vi. Erappa Vs Assistant Commissioner
and Others6 (Erappa).
1
(2020) 14 SCC 232
2
(2018) 12 SCC 527
3
W.A.No.100101/2024 D.D 29.07.2024
4
W.A.No.210/2023 D.D 25.11.2023
5
W.P.No.3840/2022 10.01.2025
6
W.A.No.100265/2023 D.D 23.06.2023
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7. Respondent No.4-applicant, who has sought for
resumption has chosen to remain absent in the present
proceedings.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the grantee
contends that the land is a granted land. The PTCL Act is a
beneficial legislation and no limitation is prescribed and
the alienation was in violation of Section 4(2) of the PTCL
Act.
9. This Court has carefully considered the rival
submissions and perused the material on record. The point
that arises for consideration is:
“Whether the proceedings initiated after 47 years are
sustainable in law and whether the impugned order suffers
from non-application of mind.”
10. In Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, the Apex Court
has held at paragraph No. 8 has under:
“8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
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AND CONNECTED MATTERSHC-KAR
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as void
under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not
prescribe any period within which such an
application can be made. Neither does it prescribe
the period within which suo motu action may be
taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari
Kishore Yadav and also in Ningappa v. Commr.
reiterated a settled position in law that whether
statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions
of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable
time. It is held that action whether on an application
of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a
reasonable time. That action arose under the
provisions of a similar Act which provided for
restoration of certain lands to farmers which were
sold for arrears of rent or from which they were
ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to 31-12-
1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to
flood in Kosi River which make agricultural
operations impossible. An application for restoration
was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in
that background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for
restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa
was made after an unreasonably long period and
was liable to be dismissed on that ground.
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High
Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Commr.,
Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka and G.
Maregouda v. Commr. holding that there is no
limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any time,
are overruled. Order accordingly.”
11. The Apex Court held that even though Section 5
of the PTCL Act does not prescribe limitation, the
provisions of the statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time. The Apex Court was of the view that the
authorities have to give due regard to the period of time
within which an action has to be taken by the interested
person. The Apex Court of the view that an inordinate
delay in initiating an action by an interested person under
Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act no annulment of transfer
could be allowed. In the present case, the person who has
filed application seeking resumption of land is not even an
interested person.
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12. In Chhedi Lal, the Apex Court has held that
paragraph No.13 as under:
“13. In our view, where no period of
limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken,
whether suo motu or on the application of the
parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly,
what is reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the purpose of the
statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the
action is grossly delayed and taken beyond
reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that
the land was transferred several times during this
period, obviously, in the faith that it is not
encumbered by any rights.”
13. The Apex Court observed that the action taken
after gross delay beyond reasonable time would be
unsustainable and what constitute reasonable time
depends on facts of each case. Here the delay is of 47
years from the date of grant and 25 years from the date of
alienation, which is far beyond the reasonable period. The
Division Bench of this Court in Gouramma’s case at
paragraph No.3 has reiterated as under:
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3 “Having heard the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and the learned
Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the
matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the definition
of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the
1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch
as the grant was not on account of social
status of the grantee. The said grant was
originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The
sale of this land happened vide registered Sale
Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn,
sold a part of the land to one
Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed
dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption
application filed earlier was rejected vide order
dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same
also came to be turned down vide order
27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were
resumption orders that were set aside by a
learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000
vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the
matter back for fresh consideration. That is
how the subsequent application came to be
moved; that was rejected vide order dated
30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate
vide order 23.12.2003.
(b) When above was the state of things as per
record, it is ununderstandable as to how
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persons claiming under the original
grantee could move another application
afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant
Commissioner could not have allowed the
said application vide order dated 22.11.2004.
It sounds strange that even the Deputy
Commissioner dismissed the appeal against
the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The
records reveal that the first alienation took
place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and
the subject application for resumption was
filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the
Re-grant of the land was obtained since it
was a “hereditary land” falling within the
precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices
Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a
time gap of about thirty- two years spanning
between alienation and the filing of
resumption application. There is absolutely
no explanation whatsoever for the laches
that militate on record and against justice.
Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex
Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi
vs State Of Karnataka1, that tardy and
belated claims should not be favoured. This
reasoning has animated the impugned
judgment, rightly and therefore, the same
cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel
for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has
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amended the provisions of Section 5 of the
1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-
section (1) of the said Section and therefore,
the concept of “limitation and delay” has to
remain miles away. These new clauses read
as under:
“(c) notwithstanding anything
conained in any law, there shall be no
limitation of time to invoke the provisions
of this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall
apply to all cases pending before all the
competent authorities and all Courts of
Law adjudicating the cases under this
section.”
It hardly needs to be stated that at no
point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed
any period of limitation for moving
application for the resumption of granted
land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable
with retrospective effect is only a duplication
of the existing legal position. Such
duplication happened even in English
legislative history, hardly needs to be
mentioned. The question of delay is a matter
of limitation which this statute is silent about.
Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to
Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any
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change in the statutory scheme. At the most,
they are declaratory of what the statute
has been all through, so far as the limitation
period is concerned. Nobody disputes that
there was no limitation period earlier and
there is no limitation period now too.
Laches, which would involve a host of
factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of
“limitation period” at all. What it discusses is,
the long lapse of time between alienation of
granted land and the filing of claim for
its resumption. Observations occurring in
para 8 of the decision lend support to this
view:
“8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as
void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section
does not prescribe any period within which
such an application can be made. Neither
does it prescribe the period within which suo
motu action may be taken. This Court in the
case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari
Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6)
SCALE 459 and also in the case of
Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
(C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on
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14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law
that whether Statute provided for a period of
limitation, provisions of the Statute must be
invoked within a reasonable time. It is held
that action whether on an application of the
parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a
reasonable time. This relief was granted to
the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River
which make agricultural operations impossible.
An application for restoration was made after
24 years and was allowed. It is in that
background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation
in upholding that the present application for
restoration of land made by respondent-
Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long
period and was liable to be dismissed on that
ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the
Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs.
Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law
Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of
Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal,
303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy
Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B
holding that there is no limitation provided by
Section
5 of the Act and, therefore, an application
can be made at any time, are overruled. …..”
(Emphasis is ours)
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Apparently, the law declared by the Apex
Court in the above case has not been altered
by the subject amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates
might have taken place about the
observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti
and other such cases while passing the
Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend
credence to the contention that the said
amendment intends to invalidate the law
declared by the highest court of the country
which it did after considering all aspects of
the matter including the sense of equity &
justice. If the Legislature intended to
silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would
have employed a different terminology. We
repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by
computing the period of limitation prescribed
by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping
in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in
Law Reports relating to delay and laches in
writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227
of the Constitution of India. This is only to
illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay
& laches’ that operate in equity and
‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The
following observations of the Apex Court in
Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan2 make
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out this point:
“Delay, laches and acquiescence
The principles governing delay, laches, and
acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus
to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
species by name acquiescence. However, there
may be a case where acquiescence is involved,
but not laches. These principles are common law
principles, and perhaps one could identify
that these principles find place in various
statutes which restrict the period of limitation
and create nonconsideration of condonation in
certain circumstances…. The underlying principle
governing these concepts would be one of
estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an
important issue to be taken note of by the
court.
Laches.
20. The word “laches” is derived from the
French language meaning “remissness and
slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay
or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the
other party. It is neglect on the part of a party
to do an act which law requires while asserting a
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right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the
party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the
length of the delay and the nature of acts done
during the interval. As stated, it would also
involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in
position in the interregnum. Therefore, it
would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to
confer a remedy on a party who knocks its
doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of
such a right. By his conduct, he has put the
other party in a particular position, and
therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate
a challenge before the court. Thus, a man
responsible for his conduct on equity is not
expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”
(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject
Amendment has been put in challenge in
W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is
pending consideration. We make it clear
that construction of a statute is one thing
and its validity is another. We do not want to
say even a word about the validity, that is
being examined by the learned Single Judge
before whom the matter is pending. We
have only placed our interpretation on the
amended provisions of the Act and nothing
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beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are
constrained to observe that, legislative
process is not simple and easy. It has to be
undertaken with a lot of care, caution &
expertise. Law speaks through language. If
language is not properly employed what is
said is not what is meant; if what is said is
not what is meant, what needs to be done
remains undone or misdone. A linguistic
defect thus may defeat the intent of
legislation. More is not necessary to specify.”
14. The Division Bench marked difference between
“delay and Laches”, held that tardy and belated claims
should not be favoured and considering the submission of
the learned counsel that the Act 30 of 2023 was amended,
the provisions of Section 5 of the PTCL Act by adding
clauses (c) and (d) to sub Section (1) of the said Section
and thereby held that the concept of “limitation and
delay”, has to remain miles away. Regard to amendment,
it was stated that at no point of time that the Act itself did
not prescribe any period of limitation for moving an
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application for resumption of land after it was alienated,
the amendment which has been made with retrospective
effect is only duplication of the existing legal position as
most common they are declaratory of what the statute has
been all through so far as the limitation period is
concerned.
15. This Court in Mr. T.S Manjappa Vs Deputy
Commissioner Davangere and Others7 (Mr. T.S
Manjappa) has held at paragraph No.10 as under:
“10. It is not in dispute that there is no
limitation prescribed in the enactment and neither
the amendment which has been sought to be
stated by the respondent as per the Karnataka Act
30 of 2023 prescribe no limitation of time to invoke
the provisions of the Act. What is there is the
latches which involves a ground factor and pertains
to the domain of equity; neither in Nekkanti
Ramalakshmi speak about the limitation period.
7
W.P.No.2113 of 24 D.D 17.02.2025
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What is spoken or discussed is rather the long
lapse of time between the alienation of the granted
land and filing of a claim for its resumption. The
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti
Ramalakshmi’s case still stands the field and the
amendment so sought also prescribed that no
limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the
Act. The recent decision of division bench of this
Court headed by our Chief Justice in the case of
Vijayendra took a similar view and held at para
No.4 to 4.8 as under:
“4. The legal provisions and development of
law in the subject deserve to be noticed. While
‘granted land’ is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act,
Section 4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of
transfer of granted lands, to provide that
notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement,
contract or instrument, any transfer of granted
land made either before or commencement of the
Act, in terms of the contravention of the grant or
in contravention of the law in that regard or in
breach of sub-Section (2) of Section 4, such
transfer shall be treated as null and void, not to
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give any right, title or interest in favour of the
person to whom the land is transferred.
4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall
after commencement of this Act, transfer or
acquire by transfer any granted land without the
previous permission of the Government. Under
sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1)
and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land
in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the
Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the
resumption and restitution of granted lands.
4.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as
under,“5. Resumption and restitution of
granted lands-
(1) Where, on application by any
interested person or on information given
in writing by any person or suo-motu, and
after such enquiry as he deems
necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is
satisfied that the transfer of any granted
land is null and void under Sub-section
(1) of Section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of
such land after evicting all persons in
possession thereof in such manner as
may be prescribed:
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Provided that no such order shall be
made except after giving the person
affected a reasonable opportunity of
being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original
grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not
reasonably practicable to restore the land
to such grantee or legal heir; such land
shall be deemed to have vested in the
Government free form all encumbrances.
The Government may grant such land to
a person belonging to any of the
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in
accordance with the rules relating to
grant of land.
(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in
Sub-section (1) the Assistant
Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that
transfer of any granted land is not null
and void pass an order accordingly.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 5-А, any
order passed under sub-sections (1) and
(1-A) shall be final and shall not be
questioned in any court of law and no
injunction shall be granted by any court in
respect of any proceeding taken or about
to be taken by the Assistant
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Commissioner in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this Section,
where any granted land is in the
possession of a person, other then the
original grantee or his legal heir, it shall
be presumed, until the contrary is proved,
that such person has acquired the land by
a transfer which is null and void under the
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section
4.”
4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid
provision that there is no prescription of time limit
for resumption or restitution of the land which is
null and void under Section 4(1) of the Act.
However, various judicial decisions, prominent
amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), which
was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the
Act. It was held therein that the application made
for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years,
was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was
after unreasonable delay. It was held that there
was no annulment of transfer could be allowed.
4.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti
Rama Lakshmi (supra),
“However, the question that arises is
with regard to terms of Section 5 of the
Act which enables any interested person
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to make an application for having the
transfer annulled as void under Section 4
of the Act. This section does not prescribe
any period within which such an
application can be made. Neither does it
prescribe the period within which suo
motu action may be taken. This Court in
Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore
Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and
also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy
Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of
2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated
a settled position in law that whether
statute provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the statute must be invoked
within a reasonable time. It is held that
action whether on an application of the
parties, or suo motu, must be taken
within a reasonable time.”
(para 8)
4.3.2 It was further stated,
“An application for restoration was
made after 24 years and was allowed. It
is in that background that this Court
upheld that it was unreasonable to do so.
We have no hesitation in upholding that
the present application for restoration of
land made by respondent Rajappa was
made after an unreasonably long period
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and was liable to be dismissed on that
ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the
Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000
(1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G.
Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner,
Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors,
2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that
there is no limitation provided by Section
5 of the Act and, therefore, an application
can be made at any time, are overruled.
……”
4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of
setting aside of transfer could not be granted after
unreasonably long period and the applications
made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption
of the land by a person could not be acted upon in
favour of such person on the ground of delay, the
legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section
5 by virtue of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the
Gazette Notification dated 27.07.2023. Thereby
sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely,
“(c) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law, there shall be no
limitation of time to invoke the provisions
of this Act.
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(d) The provisions of clause (c)
shall apply to all cases pending before all
the competent authorities and all Courts
of Law adjudicating the cases under this
section.”
4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity
of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ
Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before
the learned Single Judge of this Court. This
judgment does not touch anything on merits of the
said validity proceedings and it is clarified that the
said proceedings before learned Single Judge shall
be decided on their own merits.
4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in
light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in
Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be
dealt with by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at
Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs.
Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ
Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29.07.2024.
4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section
5, the Division Bench observed thus, in para 3(d),
“The Amendment Act that is made
applicable with retrospective effect is only
a duplication of the existing legal position.
Such duplication happened even in
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English legislative history, hardly needs to
be mentioned. The question of delay is a
matter of limitation which this statute is
silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now
introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do
not bring any change in the statutory
scheme. At the most, they are
declaratory of what the statute has been
all through, so far as the limitation period
is concerned. Nobody disputes that there
was no limitation period earlier and there
is no limitation period now too. Laches,
which would involve a host of factors,
pertains to the Domain of Equity.”
4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation
period, but focused on the long lapse of time in
making the application for restitution of the land,
by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said
decision, the Division Bench then held as per para
3(f),
“It may be true, that the legislative
debates might have taken place about the
observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while
passing the Amendment Bill. That per se
does not lend credence to the contention
that the said amendment intends to
invalidate the law declared by the highest
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court of the country which it did after
considering all aspects of the matter
including the sense of equity & justice. If
the Legislature intended to silence the
voice of Nekkanti, it would have
employed a different terminology. We
repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided
by computing the period of limitation
prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is
decided keeping in view a host of factors.
Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating
to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction
under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India. This is only to
illustrate.”
4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in
Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC
25], the Division Bench highlighted the nice
distinction between ‘delay and laches’, as against
‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is
a prescription of time for taking an action as
contemplated by the legislature, whereas the
concept of ‘delay and laches’ has a different
connotation to operate.
4.8 The Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above
reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined
without touching the aspects of validity of
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amendment which is pending adjudication. It was
held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the
ground of laches, the court would be justified in
denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and
restoring the land to the applicant when he has
approached the court after unreasonable delay and
his approaching the court is marred by laches.”
16. The Division Bench in Gouramma’s case as
held that doctrine of reasonable time continues to apply
even after amendment to the Act. Thus the proceedings
are vitiated on the ground of inordinate delay and
unexplained delay. At the outset, it should also be stated
that the resumption application was not even filed by the
original grantee. When a person who has no demonstrable
right seeks resumption after decades, the authority must
examine his locus standi. No finding is recorded as to what
right respondent No.4 claims, whether he is a legal heir or
whether he is an authorized by grantee. This aspect goes
to the root of jurisdiction.
17. Before parting with the matter, this Court
deems it appropriate to lay down the manner in which the
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proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act are
required to be dealt with by the Assistant Commissioner
and the Deputy Commissioner. The PTCL Act is
undoubtedly a beneficial legislation. However, being a
statute which nullifies registered conveyances and
unsettled long standing property rights, the authority
exercising jurisdiction thereunder are required to act with
circumspection, strict adherence to law and in conformity
with the binding judicial precedents.
18. Whenever an application for resumption is filed,
the Assistant Commissioner also must determine as to:
i. Who has filed the application.
ii. Whether such person is an original grantee.
iii. Is he a legal heir.
iv. Whether heirship is established or
v. Whether the applicant has a locus standi.
19. Jurisdiction under Section 5 cannot be exercised
at the instant of a person having no demonstrable right.
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Failure to determine locus standi renders the proceedings
vulnerable.
20. The law declared by the Apex Court in
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi and Chhedi Lal clearly
mandates that even in the absence of statutory limitation,
the power must be exercised within the reasonable time.
The silence on delay amounts to failure to exercise
jurisdiction in accordance with law. The Deputy
Commissioner while exercising the revisional jurisdiction
must also independently examine the entire records. The
revisional power is not empty formality, it is a power that
requires independent application of mind. It is to be
clarified that the proceedings under the PTCL Act, the
Assistant Commissioner must verify the original grant
records, locus standi of the applicant, issue of delay shall
be specifically considered and reasoned, and the Deputy
Commissioner while exercising the revisional jurisdiction
shall independently examine the entire material on record
and render a speaking order.
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21. For the foregoing reasons, the orders cannot be
sustained on the ground of the settled proposition of law
that the gross delay vitiates the proceedings and in this
case, there is a delay of not few years but a delay of 47
years from the date of grant and 25 years from the date of
first sale. Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
ORDER
i. The writ petitions are allowed.
ii. The order dated 19.08.2025, passed by the
Assistant Commissioner and the order dated
04.12.2025 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner have been quashed.
iii. Proceedings initiated under the PTCL Act in
respect of the land mentioned above are hereby
dismissed.
iv. The revenue entries shall continue in the name
of the petitioners.
Sd/-
JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
AT
CT:VH/ List No.: 1 Sl No.: 47